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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Aim and Structure of the Study 
This study concerns the human conditions for seeking an understanding of 
the world. The overall thesis is that human self-understanding depends on 
an ability to relate and orient oneself in the world, which is to say that the 
human being conceives itself through the way it inhabits the world. This 
thesis pertains to an understanding of religion as a way of orienting oneself 
in the world. Understood in this way, religion not only reflects the human 
disposition to seek an understanding of the world, but also reflects a way of 
inhabiting the world on human conditions. Thus, religious orientation 
reflects the semantic conditions of human life in the way self-
understanding is mediated by the meaningful structures of the world. 
The thesis emerges within a hermeneutic-existential framework. This 
framework determines the central exposition of the anthropological thought 
of the German philosopher F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) as portrayed in 
his notion of personhood. It is my ambition to show how this notion of 
personhood reflects the embeddedness of human life in the world and to 
make it available for a contemporary philosophical discussion of religion. 
This shall be done by first clarifying, with contemporary thinking, how 
religion can be understood as a concern with the world and how this 
concern binds religion to the question of human selfhood. The 
methodological movement of this study consists in a treatment of Schelling 
in light of the findings of preliminary discussion of contemporary 
standpoints (Nagel, McDowell and Taylor), facilitating a return to a 
discussion of Schelling’s potential for contemporary reflections on religion 
(Dalferth). The guiding question of this study is the question of the world: 
‘what is the world’ in its capacity of being that through which human self-
understanding comes about? The guiding question is therefore an open 
question, one that allows for an assessment of different options for 
understanding the world and the self.  
In Part I, I explore such options, starting with Thomas Nagel’s 
formulation of ‘the cosmic question’ in his discussion of human 
religiosity.1 The discussion of possible answers to the cosmic question and 
its implications for the self-world relation transitions into an assessment 
                                         
1 The cosmic question, which I refer to as ‘the question of the world’, is formulated 
by Nagel as the question concerning a conception of the world and one’s relation to it. 
Thomas Nagel, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament,” in Secular 
Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 5. 
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and discussion of John McDowell’s naturalism of second nature2 and 
Charles Taylor’s notion of background frameworks. 3  I argue that the 
cosmic question cannot be sufficiently answered by ontologies such as 
naturalism because these undermine the status of the cosmic question as an 
existential concern. I argue that naturalism, as well as any other theory of 
the world that is ignorant of the embeddedness of the self that is revealed in 
the cosmic question, falls short of providing a satisfying answer. I call such 
an answer a first-person cosmology. 
Against this backdrop, I initiate, in Part II, a reading of the notion of 
personhood within Schelling’s later thought. My reading of his notion of 
personhood proceeds in three steps. The first step is a historical 
introduction to Schelling’s main ideas as they derive from the tradition of 
post-Kantian idealism (chapter 5). The second step is a systematic 
reconstruction of his later ontology, an ontology of freedom, as it develops 
into a distinction between rational and historical philosophy. Against the 
background of Schelling’s ontology of freedom, the third step develops his 
notion of personhood. This procedure makes evident that Schelling’s way 
of incorporating epistemology into ontology has an anthropological turn 
that reflects a radical notion of human embeddedness in the world. 
Personhood designates the human embeddedness in being as an ontological 
situation that is determining for the formation of the world and its semantic 
conditions.  
The central contribution of this study is the application of Schelling’s 
notion of personhood to the problem characterizing the question of the 
world as it is explored in the contemporary context. This is not a 
comparative inquiry. The discussion of Part I serves to establish 
contemporary markers for the questions at issue in embeddedness. These 
markers are informative of Schelling’s conception of the world as a limit-
concept, which is ultimately indeterminable, in the form of an ultimate 
claim. Schelling portrays embeddedness as a radical condition of 
contingency. From the perspective of personhood, a modern setting can be 
seen that makes clear what it means that no ultimate, objective reference is 
given for an understanding of the world, and that all references lead back to 
their ground in personal being. The human being is a groundless agent who 
sees the world, and its own position in such a world, in a particular way 
that reflects its orientation in the world.  
                                         
2 I discuss McDowell’s naturalism of second nature in the context of his seminal 
work Mind and World. John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
3 Aside from a few concise papers, I refer to the exposition that Taylor gives on 
background and framework (these two words are interchangeable) in the systematic part 
of Sources of the Self. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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Understood in this way, Schelling’s notion of personhood provides a 
basis for understanding the intersection of religion and selfhood in religious 
orientation. In order to explore this, I consult, in Part III, the notion of 
religion provided by the German philosopher of religion Ingolf Dalferth.4 
In religion, orientation is established by interpretations of living in the 
world by means of orders that enable a localization of the human being. 
Against the background of Dalferth’s notion of orientation, the final 
discussion seeks to unfold the potentials of Schelling’s notion of 
personhood in the context of Dalferth’s philosophy of religion. In this 
regard, I seek to demonstrate how religion discloses an understanding of 
what it means to pursue a meaningful life in accordance with the conditions 
of human embeddedness in a contingent world. In particular, I seek to 
demonstrate that this remains the case in Dalferth’s notion of absolute 
orientation.  
The conclusions that follow from this study are structured by four 
interrelated claims: 
1. Religion is concerned with the world from a state of engagement and 
embeddedness of human life in the world.  
2. The embeddedness of human life in the world binds the question of 
the world to an understanding of subjectivity and the self. 
3. Schelling’s notion of personhood provides a theory of the 
embeddedness of human life in the world that reflects the semantic 
conditions of world-orientation. 
4. From the perspective that religion reflects world-inhabitation as a 
matter of world-orientation, Schelling’s notion of personhood can be 
understood as absolute orientation. 
1.2 Religion and Selfhood 
The problem addressed in this study pertains to a question. In its 
preliminary version, this question is the question concerning the world. As 
a question of the world, the question reaches out for an understanding of 
the totality of ‘all there is.’ For example, the question could read ‘What is 
the world?’ or ‘What is the constitution or nature of the world?’ The 
meaning of the term ‘world’ is not univocal. Different strands of thinking 
claim a correct understanding of this term on the grounds of ontological 
theories about the nature of ‘all there is.’ This is no doubt because many 
things hinge on the question of the world, e.g. we could say that the notion 
of the world determines what we understand as real and, as real, as 
something that belongs to the world. Hence, in many respects, the question 
                                         
4 I discuss Dalferth’s notion of religion and absolute orientation in the context of his 
systematic work Wirklichkeit des Möglichen. Ingolf Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des 
Möglichen: hermeneutische Religionsphilosophie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). 
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of the world determines the reality in which we live. The question of the 
world can also be approached on different levels. For example, on one level, 
the world could denote the complete sum of the inventory, entities, and 
phenomena in the world; or it could apply to the coherence of all existing 
things (relations included); or the concept could be understood as the 
totality of the real and the possible as a horizon of possibility. Furthermore, 
the question of the world, in whatever way it is approached, also 
determines our understanding of ourselves as human beings that are part of 
the world. Hence, the question of the world, for human beings, is a 
question concerning that of which they are a part. The way we determine 
the world determines our understanding of ourselves. 
The question of the world is formulated by Thomas Nagel as a human 
disposition to seek a conception of the world and one’s relation to it.5 This 
is, according to Nagel, an initially religious disposition that characterizes 
human nature. Nagel calls the question the cosmic question. In Nagel’s 
view, religious orientation reflects the human inclination toward the cosmic 
question. But how can religion be understood as a question concerning the 
world? How is religion concerned with the world? If we follow Nagel, it 
seems clear that the relational aspect of the question (‘one’s relation to the 
world’) is determinative of the question, not to mention the world in 
question. The world is determined as something with which the human 
being is (already) standing in a relation. The question of the world as a 
matter of religion therefore marks a relation and the attempt to come to 
terms with this relation. 
The question of the world is a central question to philosophy. Despite the 
long history of humankind, this question, which has occupied thinkers of 
all times, is still pressing. Many answers to the question are reflected in the 
history of philosophy. Furthermore, the way the question of the world has 
been asked marks differences in the history of philosophy. For example, it 
marks a fundamental shift of focus between ancient metaphysics and 
modern philosophy. Ancient metaphysics was concerned with the question 
as a question of being (ontology), while modern philosophy, by and large, 
has been concerned with the question as a question about our access to 
being (epistemology). In this sense, epistemology can be said to have 
replaced ontology as the prima philosophia. As a consequence of this shift, 
the world turns into ‘the external world’ – external to the human mind.6 At 
least since Descartes’ groundbreaking contribution to this shift, philosophy 
has been preoccupied with human consciousness and old questions 
concerning the human self. With regard to the question of the world, the 
                                         
5 Nagel, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament,” 5. 
6  Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 4. 
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self has often been seen as ‘something’ that is conscious of the world and 
therefore both sets itself apart from the world and at the same time relates 
to the world. Therefore, as a philosophical concept, selfhood frames the 
idea of a world-relation. 
Throughout the history of philosophy, and even as early as Plato, the 
question of the world has also been carried out as a matter of human 
religiosity and a deeply felt yearning for reconciliation with the universe. 
Nagel calls this yearning the religious temper of the human being, which 
primarily reflects a desire for a proper world-relation. This further reflects 
a notion of religion as a concern with the problem of relating to the world. 
This provides a possible explanation for why religions tend to conflict with 
other ways of posing or responding to the question of the world, for 
example ways that deny or seek to eliminate its character as a problem.7  
Another widespread way of thinking about the world in our time is to 
think the world without a world-relation; that is, to think the world as an 
enclosed entity, grounding the reality of ‘all there is.’ As Stanley Cavell 
puts it: “looking at the world as if it was another object.”8 This is an 
attempt to think the world as world tout court. As a sort of immanentist 
thinking, this approach is characterized by reductions of fundamental 
convictions such as those underlying the notion of selfhood or religious 
convictions. By its own standards, the question of the world becomes easier 
to answer and the answer becomes more accurate.  
However, one of the problems with dismissing the idea that the world is 
part of a world-relation is how one is to go about explaining the question 
that one claims to answer; furthermore, it becomes difficult to understand 
why the question of the world is asked. This problem reflects a 
fundamental tie between the question of the world and the world-relation of 
the self from which it could be said to derive. Hence, by not including the 
world-relation in the conception of the world (thinking the world from 
                                         
7 Nagel’s characterization of religion as a matter of relating to the world, derived 
primarily from Plato, gives expression to one of the etymological meanings of the word 
‘religio’, from re-ligare (ligare), which means ‘to bind,’ or ‘to re-attach’ something that 
has been separated or detached. See Carl H. Ratschow, “Religion II. Antike Und Alte 
Kirche,” ed. Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel, Historisches 
Wörterbuch Der Philosophie (Basel: Schwabe, 2007 1976). In this study, religion is 
treated with regard to the philosophical aspects and problems related to religion as a 
way of living one’s life, as opposed to a theological or apologetic approach. As explored 
in discussion with Dalferth (Part III), religion is understood as a life-orientation that 
reflects how the question of the world is a question of religion. This approach places 
religion (any form of religion) on par with non- or anti-religious possibilities of 
orientation, essentially as a concern of human selfhood.  
8 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and 
Tragedy (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1979), 236. 
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within a world-relation), any answer to the question of the world becomes 
insufficient, incomplete, and ultimately fails to cover ‘all there is.’ 
What I call immanentist thinking can be characterized as a reductive or 
restrictive rationality. For example, the widespread conviction that reality 
squares with naturalistic explanations. Naturalistic thinking, in its different 
varieties, refers to reality or the world as an (theoretically) intelligible 
totality, which is often simply called nature.9 Naturalistic thinking, in this 
broad sense, defends an understanding of the world that allegedly is fully 
describable by the natural laws etc. as described by the natural sciences.  
Naturalisms tend to be closed off to concepts such as the ‘self.’10 The 
naturalistic ways of determining the world tend to eliminate contrasting 
features such as those underlying the notion of the self (mind-body) or 
those expressed in religious forms of orientation (body-soul). In particular, 
one could argue that the means of precise explanation seeks to narrow the 
distinctions and categories of reality in order to enable clear and precise 
explanations. In a great deal of naturalistic thinking, the world, as ‘nature’, 
marks a claim that there is only one ontological realm; that all contrasts are 
contrasts within nature, and not borderlines of it.11 In other words, nothing 
is so extraordinary or so artificial that it cannot be explained by the laws of 
nature. 
This is a view of the world as the world is understood to be in itself. 
When the scientific image of the world is said to be influential, this is 
because naturalistic thinking has made its way into common understanding 
to such a degree that we often develop and employ understandings that 
exclude any individual or subjective perspectives of the world. Nagel has 
once called this the centerless view of the world, and contends that this 
view leaves no room for the viewer: 
The conception of the world that seems to leave no room for me is a familiar one that 
people carry around with them most of the time. It is a conception of the world as 
simply existing, seen from no particular perspective, no privileged point of view – as 
simply there, and hence apprehensible from various points of view.12 
                                         
9 See Hans Fink, “Three Sorts of Naturalism,” European Journal of Philosophy 14, 
no. 2 (August 1, 2006): 202-221. 
10 See Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2008). 
11 Naturalism, as a theory of nature, is only one type of emphasis among different 
varieties of naturalism. It can be called ontological naturalism and should be 
distinguished from e.g. a methodological naturalism. See Owen Flanagan, “Varieties of 
Naturalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and 
Zachary Simpson (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 430-452. 
12 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 56. 
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A world like this leaves the human being ‘nowhere.’ We must ask whether 
we can ultimately do without the contrasting features that underly the 
impressions we make of ourselves. Is there no basis for taking a stance 
against the downgrading of a reality that reflects one’s individual 
impressions and self-conception and does not reduce “the manifest image 
of man-in-the-world” to “the scientific image of man,” to borrow the words 
of Wilfred Sellars?13 Is the world of science at all a human world, a world 
for humans to live and orientate themselves in? Many modern thinkers 
have raised these questions. For example, the German philosopher 
Wolfgang Janke claims that the essential problem lies in the ambition of 
precision. Janke calls this view of the world praecisio mundi. 
In Critique of the World that has been made Precise (1999), Janke 
proposes a diagnosis of what is commonly called the modern world-
alienation.14 His analysis is concerned with the history of physics and 
metaphysics as a historical process of increasing the precision of the world 
(Weltpräzision). The aim is an understanding of the categorical changes 
that underpin the existential crisis provided by the positivistic cardinal 
thesis: “Everything that can be made precise is real, everything real can be 
made precise.”15  
We live in a world that has been made precise; in this world only what can be 
precisely calculated, presented, measured and made available counts as real. This is 
also the case when it comes to language. The expression “Express yourself precisely!” 
asks for a concise and precise formulation of the vague, inaccurate, indefinite, 
rambling and ambiguous speech. [...] The demand to determine everything there is, 
to contract it concisely to the essential, to formulate it definitively and univocal, 
demands at the same time to put aside everything unessential and to cut off as 
superfluous or even as meaningless that which does not comply with the postulate of 
the precise.16 
                                         
13 Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in In the Space of 
Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 369-408. 
14 Wolfgang Janke, Kritik der präzisierten Welt (Freiburg: Verlag K. Alber, 1999). 
See also “Praecisio Mundi: Über die Abschnitte der mythisch-numinosen Welt im 
Schatten der Götzendämmerung,” in Mythos und Religion: interdisziplinäre Aspekte, ed. 
Oswald Bayer (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1990), 31-57; Wolfgang Janke, Plato: antike 
Theologien des Staunens (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007). 
15 “Eine Kritik der präzisierten Welt geht von der Generalthese des positivistischen 
Zeitalters aus: Alles, was präzisierbar ist, ist wirklich, und alles Wirkliche ist 
präzisierbar.” Janke, Kritik der präzisierten Welt, 263. On translations: If nothing else is 
mentioned, all translations of non-English material are my own. When I find it 
necessary or helpful, I include the original quotations in the footnotes. 
16 “Wir leben in einer präzisierten Welt; in ihr wird nur noch das als wirklich 
gegeben zugelassen, was präzise berechnet, hergestellt, abgemessen, verfugbar gemacht 
werden kann. Das gilt auch fur die Sprache. Die Wendung »Drücke dich präzise aus!« 
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Janke refers to the Latin root of praecisio: prae-cidere, which means ‘to 
cut off at the front’, e.g. a tongue, a hand, a head or the genitals. He then 
traces symptoms of the development of ‘amputations’ of the human world-
relation in the history of physics and metaphysics, right up to our modern 
era. In his opinion, this has led to a crisis where “the precise calculated and 
exposed world is alienated, disenchanted, godless, lifeworld-oblivious, 
abandoned of being, so that the modern human being no longer feels by 
itself and at home in it.”17 The central aim, however, is not to fight world-
precision as such, but to criticise the demand for an exclusive right to truth 
claims about the real. The point is to show how the categorical positing of 
praecisio mundi gets in the way of a natural human attempt to fit into the 
world and find oneself at home in the world. Janke therefore claims a need 
for a world-construal in accordance with human existence, one that can 
restore the separation of ontological and existential categories.  
This critique of precision aims at certain tenets, such as the 
contemporary critique of ‘folk psychology’ proposed by neurophilosopher 
Paul Churchland. Churchland’s basic assumption is that the natural ways 
we think and ‘theorise’ about our human cognitive capacities are mistaken. 
Neuroscience, on the other hand, gets it right (or approximately so). ‘Folk 
psychology’, according to Churchland,  
is a framework of concepts, roughly adequate to the demands of everyday life, with 
which the humble adept comprehends, explains, predicts, and manipulates a certain 
domain of phenomena. It is, in short, a folk theory… Call this the theoretical view of 
our self understanding.18  
In Churchland’s opinion, explanations offered by neuroscience have been 
tested and improved to an extent that confirms their superiority through 
scientific verification.  
                                                                                                                       
fordert dazu auf, eine vage, ungenaue, unbestimmte, weitschweifige, vieldeutige 
Redeweise knapp und genau auf den Punkt zu bringen… Die Forderung, jegliches, was 
ist, exakt festzulegen, bundig auf das Wesentliche zusammenzuziehen, es definitiv und 
eindeutig zur Sprache zu bringen, erfordert zugleich, alles als Unwesentliches beiseite 
zu lassen und als überflüssiges oder gar Sinnloses abzuschneiden, was sich nicht dem 
Postulat des Präzisen fugt.” Ibid., 12. My italics. 
17 “Und gibt es nicht Symptome genug, die anzeigen, in welchem Ausmaße die 
präzise verrechnete und verfügbar gemachte Welt entfremdet, entzaubert, entgöttert, 
lebensweltvergessen und seinsverlassen ist, so daß sich der moderne Mensch in ihr nicht 
mehr bei sich selbst und zu Hause fühlt?” Ibid., 13.  
18 Paul Churchland, “Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 209. Also, “Our self understanding, I continue to 
maintain, is no different in character from our understanding of any other empirical 
domain. It is speculative, systematic, corrigible, and in principle replaceable.” 
Churchland, “Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior,” 210. 
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The problem with Churchland’s critique is whether a natural (pre-
scientific) human self-understanding is adequately characterized as 
theoretical, and whether there is a normative basis for claiming that it is 
better to replace them with the insights of the empirical sciences. This is 
exactly the kind of idea that Janke objects to. First of all, the objection 
concerns the characterization of the initial self-understanding as theoretical 
and as a mistaken or insufficient theory. Secondly, the objection concerns 
the assumption that only one true way of conceiving (and relating to) the 
world is required (the theoretical).  
From these examples (even though they mark two opposing extremes) 
we can suspect that the principles of naturalistic thinking are in dissonance 
with the question of the world as a question. This is a dissonance between 
the way the question of the world is answered by the sum total of scientific 
assumptions and the very reason why the question of the world was asked – 
at all. Despite the fact that the natural sciences have, as an ultimate goal, to 
unearth the nature of ‘all there is,’ it seems that the question of the world 
becomes untenable on a scientific basis. So long as naturalistic thinking 
about the world cannot integrate the human disposition to ask the question 
of the world this conflict will remain. Hence, the question of the world 
requires us to bring these two ends together. 
1.3 The World-inhabitor 
In order to establish an argument that the question of the world is tied to a 
world-relation from which it must be answered, I critically engage this 
situation within an exploration of ‘the cosmic question’ (chapter 2). At first, 
Nagel’s underlying notion of the ‘religious temper’ and its compatibility 
with a naturalistic framework is discussed through a strand of thinking 
characterized as Religious Naturalism (chapter 3.1, 3.2). Given that 
naturalism takes various forms in contemporary thinking, I examine the 
more specific possibility of answering the cosmic question by means of 
McDowell’s so-called Liberal Naturalism (chapter 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6). Both 
of these discussions prove unsatisfactory to the extent that neither provides 
a way of relating to a naturalistic world that complies with the premise of 
the cosmic question. However, through a discussion of these different ways 
of employing a naturalistic framework, the discussion is able to proceed 
with a clearer notion as to why selfhood is essential to the question of the 
world as a matter of understanding the underlying world-relation itself: the 
self is always already engaged with the world, always already placed in the 
world. This factor of embeddedness in the world constitutes an awareness 
of the self as a need for orientation. 
In Nagel’s approach to the cosmic question, the question of the world-
relation is already built into his model (as a notion of human subjectivity 
and world-embeddedness). Nagel’s concern with the question is therefore 
Introduction 10 
limited to the extent that it squares with a specific notion of subjectivity. 
However, Nagel’s model of subjectivity entails an inconsistency between 
the embeddedness that is claimed and the world that Nagel has in mind, an 
‘outer world.’ Hence, the question of the nature of world-embeddedness 
moves to the fore. I deal with this question in a discussion I take up with 
Charles Taylor’s notion of background frameworks (chapter 4). With 
Taylor’s notion of selfhood, the notion of embeddedness reflects back on 
the question of the world as a question. Using Taylor’s model (a model of 
engaged selfhood), the question of the world is transformed from seeking a 
world that lies before us (an outer world) to articulating the background 
against which the world as we understand it or experience it on a 
phenomenological basis makes sense. Thus, from the perspective of the 
underlying status of selfhood, the question of the world becomes 
intertwined with the question of meaning.  
Part I is not simply meant to show that naturalistic thinking is bound to 
principles that cannot provide sufficient conditions for human self-
understanding. It also aims at showing why. The decisive point is how self-
understanding comes about, considering that it is required. The ability to 
think the world as world depends on a fundamentally different setting, one 
that brings the very need for self-understanding into view. This is the 
recognition that there is a setting that underlies the question of the world. 
We could call this setting the setting of world-embeddedness, or, as I 
propose, we could call it the setting of a first-person cosmology. What I 
mean by first-person cosmology is that the self (that is embedded in the 
world) is a human person that inhabits the world on the basis of the fact 
that it is a part of the world.  
This, in turn, reflects the problem as a metaphysical problem. We can 
understand metaphysics as theories of ‘all there is’ that seek to explain how 
everything pertains to an order of totality. Metaphysical thinking has a long 
history of attempting to deploy principles for understanding the world. The 
motivation for metaphysical thinking can therefore be understood as the 
ambition to think the world in the ‘proper’ way, that is, to think the world 
as world. This is one of the central questions that guided the thinking of 
F.W.J. Schelling. Schelling contributes to an understanding of what 
metaphysical thinking is all about even ‘after metaphysics.’ The problems 
raised in this study can therefore be illuminated by Schelling’s fundamental 
reflections on metaphysical thinking.  
If metaphysics can rightfully be understood as an ambition to formulate 
a theory of the world as ‘all there is,’ then the attempt to grasp this totality 
can be understood as an attempt to think the world as world. In so doing, 
that is, in thinking the world at all, we are first referred to the capacities of 
thinking and to a thinking subject. We are referred to someone who 
attempts to get a hold of and relate him- or herself to the world as world. 
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However, there are precautions that need to be taken. If we take the 
question to be a matter of the world, and the world alone, then we might 
get the setting wrong. Decisively, we might miss that there is a setting and 
that there necessarily always will be a setting for any attempt to think the 
world as world. The least we can say is that the setting consists of the 
world as something that is thought. 
First, it could be said that the project of thinking the world as world 
involves the things or the content of the world. We cannot think the world 
without its inventory. On the other hand, there is no possible way of 
proposing a notion of the content of the world without at the same time 
having delineated a notion of the world of which they are a part. A theory 
of the world always outlines the order according to which phenomena are 
placed in the world as a part of that world. A theory of the world always 
determines possible content of that world; it ultimately defines the totality 
of possible phenomena of the world. The order of the world is therefore the 
arrangement of the relations of the possible phenomena of the world.  
However, thinking about the world is an enterprise that is not necessarily 
in view, and the setting is therefore easily left out of consideration. 
Thinking can be blind to its own attempt to think the world. At least that is 
the case if the view of the world itself is not considered. In such cases, 
one’s view of the world is left out of sight, making the attempt to think ‘all 
there is’ incomplete, insofar as such a view of the world loses the viewer, 
loses itself.  
The assumption of the purity and independence of the world is a view of 
the world without a viewer. We are then struck by an inconsistency: any 
such thing as an independent object (however imagined) cannot be 
accessed or ‘brought into view.’ It is neither thinkable nor what is being 
thought in the attempt to think the world as world. The world as a pure, 
untouchable and unthinkable object would not be the world as world, or 
even available to thought. The world is therefore never in view as world, 
but only as determinate things provided by the presupposition of the world. 
The ambition to think the world as world is an attempt to think a world 
through the determinate things that one has in view. We are granted this 
view by a world we can never explicate or determine. As ‘all there is’ that 
world is an ‘unprethinkable’ being (Schelling’s designation) that grants this 
access. It is an origin of everything we have in view that, as origin, can 
never be determined. This remains the case to the extent that it requires 
determination to determine it, and the origin of determinate things is not 
itself determinate. It is indeterminable. This is what it means to approach 
the question of the world from within a world-relation. This position in the 
world, however, is still of fundamental concern. One has the world as one’s 
world. Schelling states very clearly that the world is always already there. 
Our inevitable position in the world is the way we inhabit the world. This 
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is what we seek to come to terms with when we ask for the world and seek 
to locate ourselves in the world. However, our position in the world lays a 
claim on the attempt to think the world as a determinate world. Our 
conditions for thinking of this world as ‘all there is’ are never available to 
us in our embeddedness in the world.  
In his later works, Schelling develops an ontology that reflects this 
problem, and he comes to recognize the radical character of this situation. 
According to this ontological situation, he develops an interesting notion of 
the embedded human being: personhood.19 The person is a finite being. 
Schelling presents, through the determination of the human being as a finite 
being, a way in which to understand human embeddedness in the world. 
The later Schelling’s ontological thinking serves to illuminate these 
conditions. 
In Part II, I turn to the question of how Schelling’s notion of personhood 
characterizes the question of the world, and what human embeddedness 
means according to his philosophy. I do not develop a historical reading of 
Schelling or of his individual works, but an interpretation focused on his 
anthropological thought from the perspective of his notion of personhood.20  
The first step is a historical introduction of the main ideas in Schelling’s 
post-Kantian program (chapter 5). The second step is a reconstruction of 
his later ontology, an ontology of freedom, as it develops into a distinction 
between rational and historical philosophy.21 This reconstruction, which I 
                                         
19 Schelling mostly uses the words ‘Person’ and ‘Persönlichkeit’, and does so 
interchangeably. Even though personality could be a more accurate translation of 
Persönlichkeit, I take personhood to cover all meanings. Today, personality would more 
likely refer to specific characteristics, attitudes or tempers. What Schelling describes 
includes this, but is also far more than that. Personhood is an ontological structure 
developed within Schelling’s middle period and, in this repect, determines the 
ontonomous character of the human being, that is, how the question of being 
determines human existence. 
20 I intentionally leave aside many parts and topics that are normally at issue in many 
interpretations of Schelling, e.g. the question of system, nature, theodicy. More could be 
mentioned. This is not to say that these are not important issues in Schelling’s works. I 
seek to navigate, with sensitivity to the larger topics and concepts, with a rather specific 
aim. This aim is anthropological and it is determined (admittedly) by the ambition to 
make Schelling available for a discussion with contemporary thinking. This is my 
reason for seeking out the topics that I do. 
21 My reading of Schelling’s notion of personhood seeks to understand its central 
formulation in the middle period against the background of the ontological framework 
of his later period. I draw these distinctions from Michael Theunissen’s thesis of three 
distinct approaches in Schelling: an egological approach, which he assigns to 
Schelling’s early thinking; an anthropological approach, which he assigns to his middle 
period (Freiheitsschrift and the fragments of Ages of the World); and finally an onto-
theological approach, which he assigns to Schelling’s later thinking. I thereby tie the 
two later periods closely together and refer to them as the ‘mature’ or simply ‘later’ 
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take to be in line with the seminal reading of Walter Schulz,22 starts from a 
presentation of Schelling’s later development of two concepts of being (one 
logical and one historical) that pertain to his distinction of negative and 
positive philosophy as presented in the introductions to his later works 
Philosophy of Mythology and Philosophy of Revelation (chapter 6). From 
these texts, I approach Schelling’s ontology of predication as delineated by 
Wolfram Hogrebe. 23  This theory of predication is important because 
Schelling, in turning to freedom as “the one and all of philosophy,”24 
becomes able to break out of a logical concept of being as determinacy. 
This change (a shift of primacy from essence to existence) leads to a 
concept of being that is characterized as historical and contingent. I 
approach Schelling’s development of this concept of being in his notion of 
‘unprethinkable being’ and discuss it in line with Markus Gabriel.25  
Against this background of the ontology of freedom, I initiate an 
interpretation of Schelling’s notion of personhood (chapter 7). I engage 
with different textual expressions of personhood, primarily from his middle 
period, represented by his Freiheitsschrift (1809), Stuttgart Private 
Lectures (1810) and the fragments of Ages of the World (1811-).26 In order 
to show Schelling’s reflections on human embeddedness in his notion of 
personhood, I draw a path through several interrelated and intertwined 
characteristics of Schelling’s anthropological thinking that show how 
personhood embodies the conditions of human existence in terms of 
                                                                                                                       
thinking. What I refer to as Schelling’s ontology of freedom is supposed to cover this tie. 
In this regard, I follow Markus Gabriel’s recent delineation of Schelling’s late ontology 
of freedom. Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism 
(New York: Continuum, 2011), 60–101. 
22 Walter Schulz, Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie 
Schellings., 2nd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1975). 
23  Wolfram Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis: Metaphysik als 
Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings “Die Weltalter” (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1989), 40–78. 
24  F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human 
Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2006), 22. All translations of untranslated texts of Schelling are from the 
German text of Schelling’s collected works. F.W.J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, ed. 
K.F.A. Schelling, I. Abteilung Vols. 1-10, II. Abteilung Vols. 1-4 (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 
1856). This edition (SW) is quoted throughout with reference to volume (I-XIV) and 
page number. If nothing else is noted translations are my own. 
25  Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology; Markus Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos: 
Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie und Selbstbewusstseinsgeschichte 
in Schellings “Philosophie der Mythologie” (De Gruyter, 2006). 
26 My interpretation of Schelling’s notion of personhood primarily draws on recent 
scholarship on various facets of personhood in Schelling’s thought. I should mention 
Dieter Sturma, Thomas Buchheim, Oliver Florig, Temilo Zantwijk. My interpretation is 
guided by my discussion with these interpretors. 
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finitude, fallibility, heteronomy, self-formation and what I call world-
inhabitation. In these different aspects Schelling depicts how the human 
being, as a finite and heteronomous being, becomes the living and 
formative conditions of the world that it inhabits. Through these aspects, 
personhood is understood as the groundless ground of human world-
inhabitation. 
It is a central ambition of this study to illuminate how religion can be 
understood to engage with the question of the world. I claim that 
Schelling’s notion of personhood provides a basis for exploring religious 
self-understanding as interpretations of the human world-embeddedness 
and the attempt to orientate oneself within the world that one inhabits. I do 
this, in part, by presenting a formalization of Schelling’s ontological 
thinking that has been offered by Markus Gabriel in terms of a domain-
ontology.27 I draw on this formalization of Schelling’s thought in my 
attempt to appropriate Schelling’s thinking in the discussion on religion, as 
illuminative of religious orientation. To this end, I consult Ingolf Dalferth’s 
philosophy of religious orientation (chapter 8).  
Dalferth’s approach to religion as orientation takes religion to be a 
matter of life-orientation and, as such, an inherent part of human life in a 
contingent world. Life is life in the world, and life therefore pertains to the 
task of world-orientation. Orientation in life is orientation in the world that 
one inhabits; or, to put it differently, orientation characterizes how one 
inhabits the world. Dalferth’s central point is that religion (as a form of 
life-orientation) provides a way in which to relate to the inconceivable; that 
is, religion conserves the inconceivable without making it conceivable.28 
Religious articulations of these conditions by various systems of symbols 
provide cognitive and emotional structures for living with the 
uncontrollable in the controllable. 
The final discussion (chapter 9) seeks to appropriate Schelling’s notion 
of personhood in relation to Dalfert’s notion of absolute orientation. The 
human being, if we follow Dalferth, finds in religion an absolute aspect of 
heteronomy that positively determines human self-understanding. Absolute 
orientation becomes the comportment of the individual to the absolute 
                                         
27 See Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 119–138. 
28  “Auf verschiedene Weise versuchen Religionen, die Bereiche des 
Unbestimmbaren, Unzugänglichen, Chaotischen, Sinnlosen, Unverfügbaren, 
Unfaßbaren und nicht Kontrolierbaren an die Bereiche vernünftig bestimmter 
Ordnungen und sinnvoll verstehbarer Strukturen zurückzubinden, sie also als das 
Andere und als die für sich und als solche nicht faßbare Rückseite des Sinnvollen, 
Verfügbaren und Kontrollierbaren zu thematisieren.” Ingolf Dalferth, “Leben angesichts 
des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser Lebensorientierung,” in Orientierung: 
philosophische Perspektiven, ed. Werner Stegmaier (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2005), 251. 
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heteronomy of facticity that in turn becomes determining of oneself and 
one’s relation to everyone else. Self-determination is somehow forfeited 
insofar as the self gives itself over to its heteronomous condition by 
interpreting its finitude in the horizon of the unconditioned. 
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 PART I  
 
The World in Question 
2 The Cosmic Question 
2.1 Nagel and the Religious Temper 
In “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temper”, the American 
philosopher Thomas Nagel presents a notion of religiosity characterized as 
a temperament, that is, a religious temper.29 This temper manifests itself in 
a human yearning to reconcile and understand oneself in coherence with 
the universal whole. Nagel calls the religious temper “a disposition to seek 
a view of the world that can play a certain role in the inner life – a role that 
for some people is occupied by religion.”30 In this view, human religiosity 
is a natural attempt to incorporate a conception of the universe into a 
conception of oneself and one’s life. Hence, the ‘religious temper’ is the 
disposition to ask the cosmic question. 
The connection between a conception of the universe and the human 
self-conception that Nagel points to is expressed in the human urge to seek 
orientation and an understanding of oneself in form of a ‘cosmic question’. 
The basic assumption is that one’s self-understanding cannot be achieved 
from one’s own perspective (or within one’s finite perspective) but depends 
on an external point of view. This external point of view is traditionally 
provided by religious answers, e.g. in the form of a transcendent divine 
power. As Nagel argues, such an external view is also required on a secular 
basis.  
In a secular age traditional religious answers have become invalid, so 
Nagel says. However, despite the erosion of traditional answers, the cosmic 
question continues to be asked. Nagel’s secular take consists in 
reinterpreting, and thereby qualifying, human religiosity while 
disqualifying traditional religious answers. Nagel sets out to find such an 
answer, a secular answer, to human religiosity. 
Whatever form this answer might take, it provides a perspective on 
oneself and one’s life, enabling orientation and self-understanding. This 
suggests that the cosmic question, in its deeper sense, is a question about 
oneself. This is how Nagel sees it: there is the point of view that I occupy – 
the internal point of view, and the point of view through which I 
understand myself – the external point of view. Nagel fails to comment 
                                         
29 Nagel, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.” 
30 Ibid., 4. 
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directly on the interrelation of these perspectives in his essay, but it 
becomes clear that self-understanding requires an external point of view. 
To understand oneself requires the distance provided by a so-called 
external perspective. In other words, the cosmic question is a way of 
pursuing a greater perspective in one’s life that provides a proper self-
understanding. The cosmic question is thus a direct matter of seeing oneself 
and one’s life from an external point of view. 
Nagel’s background for distinguishing between an internal and an 
external point of view derives from the conception of an irreducible first-
person perspective. Since his essay What Is It Like To Be A Bat? (1974), 
Nagel has played a central role in the re-examination of the question of the 
subjective character of experience within philosophy of mind. 31  He 
presents a critique of a variety of reductionist takes on consciousness and 
subjectivity in modern analytical thinking. However, in his seminal work, 
The View From Nowhere (1986), Nagel discusses his theory of subjectivity 
more fully.32 He presents his philosophy as a theory of perspectives and as 
an examination of the possibility of relating and unifying different 
perspectives, in particular what he calls a subjective and an objective 
perspective. 
How to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an 
objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included. It is a 
problem that faces every creature with the impulse and the capacity to transcend its 
particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole.33 
As Nagel sees it, the task of bringing different perspectives together is not 
always possible. Where perspectives can be combined, we must endeavor 
to see how this is possible, and where the perspectives cannot be combined, 
the task is to acquire a sense of reality that can deal with the particular 
                                         
31 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 165-180. The famous example of 
Nagel’s argument is a bat’s experiences as something, which provides a bat with a 
unique experience of what it is like to be a bat. Hence, consciousness is equipped with a 
unique and therefore irreducible point of view. “It is impossible to exclude the 
phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one 
excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical 
reduction of it – namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers. 
If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be 
given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that 
such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is 
essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an 
objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.” Nagel, “What Is It Like to 
Be a Bat?,” 167. 
32 Nagel, The View From Nowhere. 
33 Ibid., 3. 
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conflicts without thinking that one of them must be abandoned in favor of 
the other. Nagel stresses that an objective view of the world, from 
‘nowhere in particular’, enables us to form a broader conception of our 
place in the world for the benefit of our possibilities and development. The 
subjective view of the world is the perspective that is from one’s own 
particular point of view34 and enables one to understand certain aspects of 
the world which simply cannot be understood from any other perspective, 
as well as aspects that give value and meaning to one’s particular life.35  
Nagel also characterizes the distinction between the internal and the 
external perspective as polar, which means that the poles are relative to 
each other and therefore a matter of degree.36 In Nagel’s formulation of the 
external perspective, we find the idea of an objectivity that stands opposed 
to the subjective character of the internal, personal perspective (an 
unreachable ideal). Nagel depicts the ideal of objectivity in the following 
way. 
The attempt is made to view the world not from a place within it, or from the vantage 
point of a special type of life and awareness, but from nowhere in particular and no 
                                         
34 “I am Thomas Nagel” is a recurring example. See, for example, the discussion on 
‘the objective self’ Ibid., 54–66. 
35  Dieter Henrich has provided an informative critique of Nagel’s theory of 
subjectivity. Dieter Henrich, “Dimensionen und Defizite einer Theorie der 
Subjectivität”, no. 36, Philosophische Rundschau (1989): 1-24. Among other things, 
Henrich points out an inconsistency in the theory of subjectivity as formulated through 
a grammatical ‘I’ (first-person), an inconsistency between the various topics within 
which Nagel identifies the subjective and the objective aspects. Furthermore, Henrich 
points out that Nagel never sufficiently provides a final consistent ground for the 
question of reality, which makes the theory in itself torn between various philosophical 
topics in which different criteria are worked out, e.g. between the ethical and theorical 
chapters. Henrich is clearly more impressed by the theoretical part than by the 
discussions of practical philosophy. However, Henrich’s appraisal finds too much being 
presupposed and ultimately not integrated into the fundamental consideration of 
subjectivity. As Henrich puts it, “Die Rechtfertigung der subjektiven Dimension im 
Weltverhältnis geschieht so, daß diese Dimension als solche von der Analyse gerade 
nicht erreicht wird.” Henrich, “Dimensionen und Defizite einer Theorie der 
Subjectivität,” 23. 
36 “At one end is the point of view of a particular individual, having a specific 
constitution, situation, and relation to the rest of the world. From here the direction of 
movement toward greater objectivity involves, first, abstraction from the individual’s 
specific spatial, temporal, and personal position in the world, then from the features that 
distinguish him from other humans, then gradually from the forms of perception and 
action characteristic of humans, and away from the narrow range of a human scale in 
space, time, and quantity, toward a conception of the world which as far as possible is 
not the view from anywhere within it. There is probably no end-point to this process, 
but its aim is to regard the world as centerless, with the viewer as just one of its 
contents.” Thomas Nagel, “Subjective and Objective,” in Mortal Questions 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 206. 
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form of life in particular at all. The object is to discount for the features of our pre-
reflective outlook that make things appear to us as they do, and thereby to reach an 
understanding of things as they really are. We flee the subjective under the pressure 
of an assumption that everything must be something not to any point of view, but in 
itself. To grasp this by detaching more and more from our own point of view is the 
unreachable ideal at which the pursuit of objectivity aims.37  
The ideal of objectivity contains the idea that one’s own viewpoint is 
distorted by contingencies such as one’s particular situation and therefore 
needs to be corrected. It is the idea of the world as it really is without an 
observer and the distortions that derive from a point of view. From the 
belief in a fixed reality beyond a particular point of view, it follows that the 
conditions of particularity need to be scrutinized.38 Objectivity can be 
reached through two sorts of abstractions, or, as Nagel calls it, two sorts of 
transcendence: first, a transcendence of particularity, and secondly, a 
transcendence of one’s type. In principle, complete detachment is able to 
give the world as it really is and thereby escape the distortions implied 
when the world is for someone particular. 
Nagel however does not approve of a complete priority of objectivity 
over subjectivity. Insofar as certain subjective facts and values that seem 
indispensable to human living are omitted in the advancement towards 
objectivity, Nagel proposes combining the perspectives.39 This is not a 
claim that objectivity is false, but partial. By omitting phenomena available 
only to a first-person perspective such as the subjective character of 
experiences (what it is like to be me), the world becomes incomplete. Both 
aspects are needed.  
Nagel describes the ideal combination of the two perspectives as a 
unified conception of life and the world, which amounts to a ‘worldview.’40 
Nagel leaves the ambition to provide a complete worldview aside and sets 
out to investigate the complications contained in the task of establishing a 
                                         
37 Ibid., 208. 
38 “If there is a way things really are, which explains their diverse appearances to 
differently constituted and situated observers, then it is most accurately apprehended by 
methods not specific to particular types of observers… Objectivity requires not only a 
departure from one’s individual viewpoint, but also, so far as possible, departure from a 
specifically human or even mammalian viewpoint. The idea is that if one can still 
maintain some view when one relies less and less on what is specific to one’s position 
or form, it will be truer to reality.” Ibid., 209. 
39 These so-called subjective facts primarily regard the subjective character of 
experience, but among other things Nagel also discusses personal identity, free will, 
agent-centered morality and the mind-body distinction. 
40 “If one could say how the internal and external standpoints are related, how each 
of them can be developed and modified in order to take the other into account, and how 
in conjunction they are to govern the thought and action of each person, it would 
amount to a world view.” Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 3. 
The Cosmic Question 21 
worldview. The central aim becomes to find out how an interplay of 
perspectives can work, that is, to recognize when a unification is possible 
and when it is not. Ultimately, objectivity is not a point of view in the same 
way as the subjective internal point of view. Rather, objectivity is a way of 
abstracting and detaching from inevitable subjective points of view: 
Objectivity is a method of understanding. It is beliefs and attitudes that are objective 
in the primary sense. Only derivatively do we call objective the truths that can be 
arrived at in this way. To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of 
life or the world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a new conception 
which has that view and its relation to the world as its object. In other words, we 
place ourselves in the world that is to be understood. The old view then comes to be 
regarded as an appearance, more subjective than the new view, and correctable or 
confirmable by reference to it.41  
Nagel thereby asserts that objectivity should still be sought, but only as far 
as it seems to provide a better understanding of reality. Decisively, not 
everything is better understood the more objectively it is viewed. Nagel 
defends that appearance and perspective are essential parts of reality. 
Hence, detachment is not the only ideal. Even the most hardheaded 
objectivity cannot deny the starting point that it seeks to escape. If the 
whole world is what is in question, then one has to admit, “that we and our 
personal perspectives belong to the world.”42 Ultimately, the ambition to 
get outside of ourselves cannot be completed. Despite Nagel’s strong 
affirmation of noumenal reality, he admits the limits of the possibility of 
accessing it (as the attempt to deny the access itself).43  
Nagel’s central critique, whether it is aimed against tenets of idealism (as 
settling on the subjective side) or scientism (as settling on the objective 
side), concerns the attempt to employ one single strategy for understanding, 
and to comprehend everything by means of one single form of 
understanding. Nagel argues for the use of different perspectives within a 
range between subjectivity and objectivity and the interplay of these 
perspectives. In Nagel’s model’s concern with the question of reality, it is 
his central aim to formulate a legitimate way of including subjective 
phenomena, in their irreducible form, to other ways of speaking of reality. 
Subjective phenomena are fundamentally a part of reality and therefore 
cannot be dismissed. Ultimately, the central question to Nagel’s model of 
perspectives is the question concerning reality, our understanding, and how 
                                         
41 Ibid., 4. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 “Since we are who we are, we can’t get outside of ourselves completely. Whatever 
we do, we remain subparts of the world with limited access to the real nature of the rest 
of it and of ourselves. There is no way of telling how much of reality lies beyond the 
reach of present or future objectivity or any other conceivable form of human 
understanding.” Ibid. 
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reality really is. Nagel’s central claim is that reality is not univocal, but torn 
between subjective and objective perspectives.  
Nevertheless, Nagel’s approach to religion as a religious temper is not 
centered on the question of reality, but on the self and its self-conception 
within and through the question of reality. This is an important difference 
that one needs to keep in mind in the application of the model of 
perspectives to the question of religion. How does that match? 
2.2 First-Person Cosmology? 
In Nagel’s treatment of the religious temper, the model of perspectives is 
applied to the question of religion. The question of a religious temper is a 
natural human disposition and therefore a part of the subjective perspective. 
The human being is understood through an initial religious temper as a 
disposition to ask ‘the cosmic question’ which is a reaching out for an 
external universal perspective. Hence, the religious temper reflects, in its 
concern with the world, an initial concern with oneself, but not by asking 
directly about oneself: The religious temper asks about the world and 
within this question about the world lies the initial concern with oneself. 
Nagel fails to make explicit in what sense a conception of the world 
provides self-conception. However, he does indicate why:  
You must try to bring this conception of the universe and your relation to it into your 
life, as part of the point of view from which it is led. This is part of the answer to the 
question of who you are and what you are doing here.44 
Nagel characterizes the external perspective as ‘a way of seeing’. The other 
perspective is meant to provide us “with a way of seeing the point or sense 
of our lives.”45 We get an idea that in this view, or this ‘way of seeing’, one 
becomes aware of one’s relation to the universe required for providing an 
understanding of oneself. Nagel does not require a conception or simply a 
theory of the world, what is required is a conception of the world including 
one’s relation to it. The world that Nagel speaks about is the world that one 
is (already) in a relation to – it is one’s world. Without this world-relation, 
one’s access to the world, it would not be one’s world, or one would be 
world-less. The relation must be included in one’s conception.  
The subjective or first-person perspective is the condition on which the 
human being seeks to understand itself as well as its best way of living. 
Nagel’s idea of incorporating other perspectives into one’s own asserts the 
uniqueness and irreducibility of the first-person perspective as the basic 
vantage point, which, in reaching out for ‘greater’ perspective, requires 
improvement of sight. This is an existential notion of perspectivity. The 
                                         
44 Nagel, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament,” 5. 
45 Ibid., 12. 
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religious temper, therefore, regards a need that is inherent to this first-
person perspective in its way of being a particular perspective. The cosmic 
question is not primarily about the world: the cosmic question is asked for 
the sake of the self-understanding of oneself, a particular human being.  
Considering what the cosmic question asks for, I would characterize any 
possible answer a first-person cosmology. I say cosmology because Nagel 
speaks of cosmology as the external perspective and as a conception about 
coherence that provides a certain hold, order and orientation as opposed to 
contingent chaos. There is no doubt that the cosmic question is concerned 
with the question about reality and the constitution of the world, but not as 
disinterested, disengaged or anonymous – there is a particular human being 
involved, centrally involved. To Nagel it is clear that the cosmic concern is 
grounded in a particular being, the perspective of this being, and its 
concern with its particularity. It is therefore a first-person cosmology 
because the question is of interest to someone particular and an interest of 
someone particular. Without the religious temper, as a disposition of a 
particular individual, the cosmic question would not matter, it would not 
even be asked.  
Cosmology designates the feature of the order provided in the external 
view. The view of the world is a matter of the order of the world, an order 
which makes one’s relation to the world comprehensible. This is what 
Nagel speaks of as the incorporation and integration of the external 
perspective into one’s particular point of view, a way of locating oneself by 
a certain order. Furthermore, one needs this great cosmological perspective, 
for the benefit of a life that is practical. A central point is that the 
cosmological perspective, through which one lives one’s life (the first-
person cosmology), serves to support and guide one as a morally 
responsible agent in a life that requires reasons and meaning. Self-
understanding, following through on that thought, serves, in part, to support 
the agent in identifying his own acts through their valuations as either 
morally good or bad. This means that the ‘order of the world’ serves to 
provide the human being with reasons beyond itself and coordinates for a 
moral orientation.  
What can we say about all this? The overall ambition of Nagel’s notion 
of the cosmic question is not unproblematic. Among the merits of Nagel’s 
model and his exploration of the relation between religion and selfhood, we 
also encounter some limitations. The idea of ‘a view of the world’ seems in 
many ways to be too simplified when presented as a point of view external 
to someone. Much of the technical rhetoric of the polarity in the basic 
model, despite seeming seductive, lacks the nuances admitted by Nagel. 
However, the fundamental primacy of the subjective view implies that no 
external point of view (view of the world) can be understood, as a view, on 
par with one’s own point of view, the point of view that one is. It seems 
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incomplete to continue opposing two perspectives as if they existed 
independently of each other. More likely, the external point of view is to be 
understood as a point (or points) of orientation for the internal point of 
view. Nagel makes the point that a worldview is a worldview of someone, 
and that it provides interpretational resources through which one seeks to 
understand oneself and one’s experiences. However, as I see it, the polarity 
logic cannot sufficiently account for this. These problems seem important 
to the idea of integration: What does it mean to take up a certain view of 
the world? What is it that is integrated and into what?  
The idea of a replacement of religion seems to suggest that one can do 
without an external point of view, and simply live through a God-shaped 
void until a new perspective is taken up. However, it seems more consistent 
with the model to assume that what can be replaced has been replaced. It 
seems fair to assume that a worldview is only challenged by another 
worldview. These aspects, which Nagel leaves under the broad and fuzzy 
category of secularity, invite a more critical discussion than I have intended 
here. However, in order to appreciate the merits of the notion of the cosmic 
question we do not have to agree with Nagel, neither in his understanding 
of the task of philosophy to replace religion, nor in the idea of the necessity 
of replacing religion, that is, the necessity of filling a void (however the 
void is understood).  
The question concerning a secular basis for the religious temper seems to 
articulate a more common tenet: where can religious orientation place itself 
in the contemporary intellectual landscape? As much as Nagel gives 
meaning to religious orientation in the notion of the religious temper, he 
considers any religious self-understanding to be obsolete, and therefore 
aims directly for secular solutions. As Nagel points out, contemporary 
thinking is secular in the sense that certain answers for understanding 
oneself are dismissed. In his own description, traditional religion offers an 
external point of view through a transcendent divinity, and often in the idea 
of a transcendent realm as well as in transcendent powers. This is an 
absolute transcendence understood as an independent realm. To think on 
secular premises implies that this kind of transcendence is invalid. In 
Nagel’s view secular philosophy is only concerned with the manifest world, 
the immanent world, which excludes any such sort of supernaturalism. 
Secular options for a worldview and a way of relating oneself to the world 
are therefore defined as secular by excluding anything beyond the 
immanent world. The basic criterion of secular thinking is an immanence of 
the world. And it is the possibilities of this criterion of immanence that 
Nagel intends to explore.  
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2.3 Contemporary Options 
Nagel’s discussion of the religious temper and the possibility of answering 
the cosmic question without religion proceeds by means of an assessment 
of different secular ideologies that offer some sort of cosmological outlook. 
By examining the possibilities of different positions, including atheism, 
existentialism, humanism and naturalism, Nagel makes an assessment of 
their compatibility based on this fundamental notion of the religious temper. 
When Nagel considers the potential of a naturalistic worldview as a secular 
basis for a religious orientation (and we shall turn to this example in 
particular) there is already a claim put forth about why the world matters to 
human orientation. This claim is the cosmic question. 
At first Nagel makes the claim that a simple denial of the existence of 
the cosmic question along with existential concerns in general is untenable. 
Nagel takes this attitude as itself a response to the cosmic question. The 
cosmic question, in the desire for a human self-understanding, is there. The 
character of the question takes up too much space on the horizon of human 
life to simply be denied.46 
The second response Nagel characterizes as a response from the inside 
out or from the human point of view. It derives from an attitude “that the 
universe has nothing to offer that we can use, and that we are thrown back 
on our own resources.”47 One example of this response is the existentialist 
way of responding – Nagel refers to Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus – where 
one, in despair, makes  
a virtue of the will to go on in spite of the complete indifference of the cosmos – 
without the kind of sense that religion could give to our lives. In that case, not to be 
defeated by pointlessness is what gives our lives their point.48  
Another example is a form of humanism that draws on our embeddedness 
in something larger, which is “the collective consciousness of humanity 
rather than the cosmos.”49 We are the ones, our community, that give sense 
to the world as a whole (first-person plural). From this perspective the 
greater whole is defined by a larger social identity and the comfort that we, 
despite the lack of meaning, are not alone.  
What this kind of humanism offers is the transcendence of individuality. 
The point of view in this case lies in humanity as such, in the same way as 
it was applied in Kant’s, and later in Rawls’, moral theory. As Nagel 
mentions, this is what Rawls called the view ‘sub specie aeternitatis’. 
However, Nagel assesses that these varieties of humanism never really 
reach a cosmic point of view:  
                                         
46 Ibid., 9. 
47 Ibid., 10. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
The Cosmic Question 26 
They go part of the way toward incorporating a cosmic point of view into the life of 
the individual, and they certainly embed that life in something larger. But they stop 
with the value of human (and other) life itself, which does not receive endorsement 
from some higher value.50 
Nagel’s idea of value is simply assumed within the model. Nevertheless, he 
finds that, in this kind of humanism, the human being is itself the source of 
value, and not something beyond human existence. Nagel thinks of a 
source of value beyond humanity as a higher value. In his understanding 
the human being is, in its religious temper, requesting a supra-human 
standpoint. Critically, we could ask whether Nagel’s basic recognition of 
subjectivity does not inevitably tie him to some sort of humanism. If the 
cosmic question is determined as a human concern then an inside-out 
position seems unavoidable, as one cannot give up the concern itself. 
In Nagel’s view, we still have the option to move “further outside” the 
human perspective to “a larger view of our place in the universe.”51 He 
finally turns to this third way of responding from the outside-in. It is “a 
way of seeing the point or sense of our lives from a perspective larger than 
the human one from which we naturally start.”52 In Nagel’s view, this is the 
perspective of the natural order. In this context, he encounters the question 
of a naturalistic worldview and the question whether naturalism offers a 
sufficient standpoint for human self-understanding. 
When we travel further outside the human perspective than the universal value of 
humanity, or of rational or sentient beings, we come to the natural order. The 
scientific conception of that order is uncompromisingly secular. The question to be 
asked now is whether naturalism provides a view of one’s relation to the universe 
that can be taken on as an essential part of the standpoint from which we lead our 
lives.53  
In his assessment of a naturalistic worldview, Nagel points to evolutionary 
biology as the most likely candidate. A tension emerges though because a 
strictly scientific form of biology does not primarily offer a replacement for 
religion, but instead a rejection. However, a different form of evolutionary 
biology might. Nagel refers to Nietzsche’s interpretation of the genealogy 
of value, which is inspired by evolutionary biology. As Nagel reads 
Nietzsche, Nietzsche “turns a genealogical self-understanding, based on 
both biology and history, into a highly individual project of self-
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51 Ibid., 12. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
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creation.”54 For Nietzsche, free valuations can therefore be made through 
the evolutionary understanding of why one values.55  
But that was Nietzsche. Nagel makes clear that contemporary 
evolutionary biology, as well as the non-biological sciences like physics, 
have become radically anti-teleological when it comes to the history of 
evolution. As Nagel points out, they do not offer any foundation for human 
values at all.  
This implies that it [the evolutionary perspective] is not suited to supply any kind of 
sense to our existence, if it is taken on as the larger perspective from which life is 
lived. Instead, the evolutionary perspective probably makes human life, like all life, 
meaningless, since it makes life a more or less accidental consequence of physics.56  
That conception [the naturalistic conception], far from offering us a sense of who we 
are, dissolves any sense of purpose or true nature that we may have begun with. The 
meaning of organic life vanishes in the meaninglessness of physics, of which it is 
one peculiar consequence.57  
Nagel’s evaluation of scientific naturalism is rather straight forward: “If 
naturalism means that everything reduces to physics, then there is no 
naturalistic answer to the cosmic question.”58 At this point we ought to note 
that this is not the only form of naturalism one could consider. However, 
Nagel does not try to explore any variations of a naturalistic position that 
(hypothetically) could have changed the outcome of this assessment. It is 
the strict and indeed scientific form of naturalism that he has in mind.  
Naturalism fails to provide an answer to the cosmic question. And in 
order to not simply fall back on traditional answers from existentialism and 
humanism, Nagel proposes a new kind of response: maybe naturalism can 
be integrated into an inside-out response. In Nagel’s proposal, this response 
is a Nietzsche-inspired kind of Platonism. In regard to Platonism, Nagel 
seems to have something in mind that most philosophers tend to ignore, 
which is Plato’s religious worldview. Plato’s religiously engaged 
                                         
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 “Once we understand how humans have come to be ‘the sick animal,’ the animal 
in which the products of natural and social selection are in conflict, we can in full 
consciousness recreate ourselves to transcend this conflict… Instead of starting from 
one's existing values, one steps back and tries first to understand them in virtue of one's 
place in a much larger natural and historical order, and then to recast one's life from this 
new, expanded starting point.” Nagel does not discuss Nietzsche’s radical ethical and 
political conclusions further, but he characterizes Nietzsche’s general strategy as one 
“of importing not just historical genealogy but evolutionary biology into the perspective 
from which one lives.” Ibid., 13. 
56 Ibid., 15. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 16. 
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philosophy, Nagel suggests, shows a profound and exemplary sensitivity to 
the cosmic question:  
Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his 
relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to 
produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy 
was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore 
every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and, if possible, 
satisfyingly.59  
In Nagel’s view this form of Platonism seeks to make a non-reductive 
naturalism available to a human perspective. The central idea of this 
standpoint consists of “a nonaccidental fit between us and the world order: 
In other words, the natural order is such that, over time, it generates beings 
that are both part of it and able to understand it.”60 Hence, the Platonic 
attitude has to reconcile with the facts in order to offer some sense that can 
be internalized. Nagel suggests a response to the cosmic question, one that 
implements evolutionary history and the pre-human sources of human 
nature (as the larger perspective) into a human point of view. It corrects “a 
Nietzschean conception of mere humanity as a stage that we may be in a 
position to transcend.”61 Is this humanism? Maybe. One could perhaps call 
it a form of humanism that is enriched or expanded by an evolutionary 
perspective of humanity.  
Nagel settles on an answer that seems to integrate a sort of naturalism, or 
evolutionary orientated thinking - he calls it non-reductive – into an inside-
out directed position. Nagel claims that an evolutionary approach in itself 
can bridge or merge the external with an internal perspective by being a 
natural order that gives rise to subjective perspectives, that is, to nature-
understanding individuals. Nagel sees this as a translation of Plato into a 
contemporary and, roughly sketched, evolutionary oriented thinking.62  
The characterization I have given shows Nagel’s conception of a 
combination of an internal standpoint with an external. In this, religion has 
been assigned a place within the relation of the self with the world as a 
problem in the way the self relates to itself. That being said, we can move 
on with a discussion of these aspects of the question of the world. However, 
                                         
59 Ibid., 4. 
60 Ibid., 17. 
61 “Each of us, on this view, is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually 
waking up. It was originally a biological evolutionary process, and in our species, it has 
become a collective cultural process as well. It will continue, and seen from a larger 
perspective, one's own life is a small piece of this very extended expansion of 
organization and consciousness.” Ibid. 
62 See also Thomas Nagel, “Nietzsche’s Self-creation,” in Secular Philosophy and 
the Religious Temperament  : Essays 2002-2008 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 33-40. 
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with regards to the question of naturalism, two open ends in Nagel’s 
approach stand out. 
First, it might be worth asking whether religion, as characterized through 
the religious temper, necessarily has to be dismissed. It seems possible to 
move on with an understanding of religion that does not take secularity as 
its definitive. The general idea seems, despite Nagel’s admissions, to 
provide a more adequate basis for speaking about religion even on secular 
premises. Put differently, why even demand a contemporary variety of 
religious orientation to be secular? If one looks to another contemporary 
position, Religious Naturalism, one finds a similar secular ambition to that 
of Nagel’s, but carried out as a religious option. If a religious naturalism, 
as a religion with a naturalistic orientation, can offer a way of combining 
the religious temper with naturalism, then maybe the question concerning 
the world can achieve a different outcome than that proposed by Nagel. 
Secondly, it might be worth asking whether a different notion of 
naturalism would change the situation. Nagel does not consider that 
contemporary philosophy provides alternatives to the reductive or scientific 
naturalism he has sketched. In particular, a revised non-reductive 
naturalism is given broad attention in contemporary philosophy. This 
revised naturalism is commonly called liberal naturalism. It therefore 
seems worth considering whether a liberal naturalism, as a non-reductive 
naturalism, can provide better answers to the cosmic question than the 
reductive naturalism presented by Nagel.  
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3 Religion and Second Nature 
3.1 The Possibility of a Religious Naturalism 
Nagel’s approach to religiosity accords in many ways with the central 
ambitions of religious naturalism: to seek a response to the religious 
aspects of human nature on secular premises. Similar convictions are 
glimpsed in the implication that one’s conception of the world is somehow 
involved in the natural aspiration for meaning, values, and self-
understanding. In order to overcome traditional religious mythological 
cosmologies, a naturalistic worldview is considered an obvious alternative 
for framing the question of the world. However, contemporary varieties of 
religious naturalism do not seem to cohere with Nagel on the question as to 
why one should be concerned with naturalism as a matter of religiosity. We 
find that naturalism is represented in different varieties, but it is not clear 
why, or at least, consensus seems lacking.  
In the introductory literature, religious naturalism is explained as a 
position that defends a naturalistic worldview as the basis for religious 
orientation. However, very different notions of naturalism seem to be at 
issue under this common label. This can be seen in how naturalism 
seemingly plays quite different roles in the different notion of religious 
orientation as such.63  
                                         
63 The introductory material that is available is not impressive. The historian Gary 
Dorrien offers a comprehensive exposition of the historical background of religious 
naturalism in the tradition of American liberal theology in The Making of American 
Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, and Postmodernity 1950-2005 (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2006). Jerome Stone, a religious naturalist, has also 
provided a historical ‘group portrait’ of the protagonists, which in his view forms a 
tradition that goes back to thinkers such as George Santayana and Samuel Alexander et 
al., but also carries an older heritage from philosophers such as Spinoza. Aside from 
these, various introductions to the science-religion debate contain shorter expositions, 
e.g. Willem Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates (New 
York: Routledge, 2010); Willem Drees, Religion, Science, and Naturalism (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). However, the literature often fails to 
coincide with regard to locating religious naturalism among other strands of thinking. In 
Ian Barbour’s classic mapping of the science and religion debate, religious naturalism is 
understood as representing a conflicting relation: “These versions of naturalism retain at 
least some concepts from the Western religious heritage but radically reformulate them 
to accommodate contemporary science. Perhaps these authors might wish to be included 
in our fourth category, Integration, because they do integrate science with their 
minimalist understanding of religion. But in my judgment they have rejected so many 
traditional religious beliefs that they should be considered examples of Conflict – 
despite their thoughtful efforts at reinterpretation and their portrayal of some continuity 
as well as more evident discontinuity between their views and classical Christianity.” 
Ian Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2000), 
157.  
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Aside from the differences regarding the naturalistic foundation, the 
terms in use, definitions, individual ambitions, and questions addressed, 
eventually point in quite different directions. The label ‘religious 
naturalism’ does not therefore, in itself, clarify the issues actually 
addressed by self-described religious naturalists. So, we could ask: what 
are the issues to which a religious naturalism primarily contributes? What 
are the kinds of question religious naturalism purports to answer? How do 
these compare with the ‘cosmic question’?  
Before I turn to specific proponents of religious naturalism, it seems fair 
to address the meaning of the concept naturalism. Religious naturalism 
(despite its connotation) is not per se a naturalistic position in a 
philosophical sense, but rather an attitude towards a naturalistic worldview. 
According to the standard picture, there are two classical meanings of 
naturalism that cover the most common uses of the term. In the first sense, 
naturalism is understood as antagonistic, as mere non-supernaturalism, 
which implies the dismissal of any force or entity ontologically beyond the 
natural world holding a causal commerce with this world and its 
constitution.64 In its second sense, naturalism means that the constitution of 
the world squares with the best theories offered by the natural sciences. 
According to this view, naturalism determines what actually counts as 
‘nature’ and the ‘natural’. This is commonly called reductive naturalism, or 
scientific naturalism, because it implies that all conceptions of the world 
from a context other than the natural scientific (theoretical) must be 
reducible to natural scientific assumptions (theories). This reductive form, 
however, affirms its meaning positively, while the first non-supernatural 
meaning states its meaning negatively, by rejecting what is not natural. In 
this regard, it is possible for the first meaning to coincide with the second. 
From these two meanings we see how the designation of religious 
naturalism contains a sort of oxymoron if religion is taken as a conviction 
that there is more than nature, and naturalism is the conviction that nature 
is all there is. If naturalism in its non-supernatural meaning implies an anti-
religious presumption, then what can we expect from someone who 
suggests a religious variety? The least we can say is that the concept of 
                                         
64  Flanagan, “Varieties of Naturalism.” Also Barry Stroud underlines the 
fundamental influence of this tenet: “In the sense in which naturalism is opposed to 
supernaturalism, there has been no recent naturalistic turn in philosophy. Most 
philosophers for at least one hundred years have been naturalists in the 
nonsupernaturalist sense. They have taken it for granted that any satisfactory account of 
how human belief and knowledge in general are possible will involve only processes 
and events of the intelligible natural world, without the intervention or reassurance of 
any supernatural agent. Many people regard that as, on the whole, a good thing. But it is 
nothing new.” Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. 
Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 23. 
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nature and the way it pertains to religion somehow makes the central 
difference. 
The first meaning – non-supernaturalism – is fundamental to the 
protagonists of religious naturalism, and it is key to understanding how 
they understand religion. Preliminarily, we can say that religion is 
understood as something natural that does not compromise the laws of 
nature. Religion is therefore strictly non-ontological, in the sense that 
religion does not interfere with the ontological principles of naturalism. 
However, religion is understood as something natural. It is understood as 
expressed in the epochal 1944 volume Naturalism and the Human Spirit. 
Here John Herman Randall Jr. writes: 
There is no room for any Supernatural in naturalism – no supernatural or 
transcendental God and no personal survival after death. There is room for religion, 
to be sure, since that is an encountered fact of human experience. […] There is room 
for celebration, consecration, and clarification of human goals; there is room […] for 
man’s concern with the eternal and with what Plato calls “the deathless and divine.” 
But for naturalism eternity is no attribute of authentic Being, but a quality of human 
vision; and divinity belongs, not to what is existent, but to what man discerns in 
imagination.65 
Nevertheless, the attempt to avoid supernaturalism – to deny anything 
transcendent to the natural world – depends on a clear determination of the 
world and its constitution. This has led the majority of religious naturalists 
to advocate some variety of naturalism in the second meaning, in which the 
constitution of the world squares with the theories of the natural sciences. 
Religious naturalism, roughly speaking, partakes in scientific and religious 
debates by proposing that traditional religious cosmologies should and can 
be replaced by a scientifically informed worldview, that is, by naturalism in 
the second sense.  
In religious naturalism, naturalism serves as the ontological and 
cosmological framework for disparate notions of religion. However, the 
connection between ‘the religious’ and naturalism is not as clear. On the 
one hand, it seems to be a way of avoiding supernaturalism by giving up 
traditional and mythological cosmologies, which would be an attempt to 
adapt to secular conditions. We could call this an ‘ontological strategy.’ On 
the other hand, it could be a way of suggesting a religious potential in a 
naturalistic worldview, that is, to be religious about the naturalistic 
understanding of the world. We could call this a ‘cosmological strategy.’ 
On the basis of the ontological strategy (naturalism as a matter of ontology) 
any notion of religion must (in theory) be scientifically acceptable. 
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Interestingly, this does not itself connect religion with naturalism. However, 
if it is a cosmological strategy, then religion is connected to naturalism 
(and we can use Nagel’s words here) as the ‘greater perspective’ that 
provides self-understanding and orientation, as the perspective to be 
incorporated into one’s own particular experience of the world. This could 
potentially replace traditional religion, providing religious orientation 
within an immanent reality. However, such a way of combining religion 
and naturalism implies that cosmology is essential to human religiosity (as 
in the case of the cosmic question).  
3.2 Losing the World from View 
The common idea of human religiosity in religious naturalism is that of a 
religious attitude that provides meaningfulness and orientation in both a 
moral and an existential sense. The sharpest differences among the 
adherents can fairly be narrowed down to the question concerning the 
source of religious meaning or orientation. 
As Nagel depicts it, traditional metaphysical and theological cosmology 
is centered on a highest divinity that is the origin or creator of the universe 
and that guaranties the universal order as expressed in the cosmology. In a 
religious practice, such as Christianity, the order assigned to the world 
through the conception of a creator can be said to be a constitutive factor of 
the Christian religious orientation. This central point is altered in religious 
naturalism.  
Revised notions of divinity (God) maintain ‘the divine’ as the source of 
religious orientation. However, in contrast to the classical way of 
grounding cosmology in the concept of the divine, and in a notion of 
creation, most varieties of religious naturalism either give up the concept of 
a divinity completely or propose new non-cosmological and non-
ontological concepts of the divine. Most proponents who maintain a notion 
of God designate God as the source of religious orientation and not as the 
order and origin of the world.66 The decisive consequence of this separation 
of the divine (the source of orientation) and cosmology (the ordered world) 
is in fact the separation of the question of the world and religious 
orientation as such. This means a replacement of religious cosmology is not 
taking place. The religious cosmology is rejected, not replaced. The 
question about the order of the world is dismissed as a matter for religious 
orientation. In this way, the link between cosmology and religious 
orientation is lost. However, this makes the claim of naturalism rather odd. 
A central reason for defending naturalism suddenly becomes irrelevant to 
the question of religiosity. 
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Again, Nagel’s reason for considering a naturalistic stance is the search 
for a worldview through which one can conceive oneself in one’s relation 
to the greater whole. Nagel’s basic idea is that religious orientation is 
achieved through the conception of one’s relation to the world and the 
reality in which one finds oneself. If it turns out that this is not an interest 
in naturalism for religious naturalists, then what notion of religious 
orientation does religious naturalism provide? Should naturalism still 
matter?  
The contemporary protagonist of religious naturalism, Charley Hardwick, 
defends a revised variety of Christian theology. For Hardwick, religious 
naturalism is a non-supernatural Christianity with a strictly existential basis 
for speaking about God. In this sense, religious naturalism does not violate 
the ontological principles of naturalism. Hardwick interprets Christianity as 
completely neutral to the question of the world. The religious is a 
completely existential matter, and only regards the individual’s need for 
meaning and self-understanding. Inspired by the demythologization of 
Rudolf Bultmann, Hardwick’s theology posits a religious naturalism by 
means of two principles: “(a) that the content of the gospel is the offer of a 
new self-understanding (not a set of doctrines or beliefs) and (b) that the 
theological task is to explicate this self-understanding existentially (not to 
offer up doctrines suitable for belief).”67 Hardwick explains it like this: 
If the content of faith is an existential self-understanding we are not constrained at 
the outset by any metaphysical preconditions. Undertaking such an effort from a 
naturalist point of view will not import them […] naturalism will not so much dictate 
what faith must say as constrain what it cannot say. It frames the theological task but 
does not define it in detail. Though theological propositions must be consistent with 
naturalism, naturalism alone will not prescribe their positive content. If, following 
Bultmann, faith requires no anterior “creedal” convictions, if it is not tied to any 
particular world view, and if on entirely independent grounds we are convinced that 
philosophical naturalism gives a true account of the world, then we may ask what the 
Christian confession looks like from this perspective.68 
In this example, we see that Hardwick speaks about naturalism at the same 
time as explaining why a naturalistic worldview (and any other conception 
of the world) is irrelevant to Christian faith. Faith is not tied to any 
metaphysical preconditions or worldviews. Consequently, there is no 
necessary connection between religiosity and the naturalism that Hardwick 
(still) finds necessary to defend. Hardwick’s notion of religion seems to be 
concerned with existential issues in a way that does not involve ontology.  
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Naturalism renders the traditional idea of divine transcendence 
impossible. Nevertheless, alternative notions of transcendence are imported 
into religious naturalism. The conceptions of transcendence found in 
religious naturalism explore transcendence as a non-reductive dimension of 
human experience. However, in the way it is presented, there is no 
compromise of a naturalistic stance implied. 
In an attempt to revise a traditional concept of transcendence, Jerome 
Stone defends an understanding of religiosity as meaningful experiences.69 
While Stone seems to have a similar existential emphasis as Hardwick, he 
rejects the legitimacy of traditional religions such as Christianity. Instead, 
religious orientation is achieved through experiences that provide 
orientation in their way of being meaningful, through experiences of 
transcendence. Stone considers this to be a form of religious orientation. 
He suggests that “occasions within our experience elicit responses that are 
analogous enough to the paradigm cases of religion that they can 
appropriately be called religious.”70 These experiences of overwhelming 
meaning are, in Stone’s view, experiences of transcendence. This is not an 
interference of transcendent powers, an absolute transcendence, but simply 
a surplus of meaning from an experience that seems to carry with it a 
change of perspective and, in that way, is important to one’s self-
understanding and the choice of values and ideals in one’s life.  
Stone occasionally speaks about nature and the world in order to 
underline that his idea of experiences of transcendence does not violate the 
laws of nature. However, he does not address the question of the world in 
regard to religious orientation. Stone defends a form of religiosity that 
consists of a situational orientation in deep-impact human life-experiences. 
It is heavily subjective, even though subjectivity as such is barely 
mentioned aside from the central importance of personal and non-reductive 
experiences. It is not in Stone’s interest to propose a theory of subjectivity. 
He seems to isolate religious orientation within particular subjective 
experiences, and not as a matter of the conditions of subjectivity. Stone’s 
‘philosophy of transcendence’ has little to do with naturalism, maybe even 
too few for his self-acclaimed designation as a ‘Religious Naturalist’ to 
make sense beyond stating a non-supernaturalistic stance. 
Despite the claim of naturalism, the irony of both Hardwick’s and 
Stone’s varieties of religious naturalism is that they indirectly suggest that 
cosmology, naturalistic or not, is irrelevant to the matter of human 
religiosity. There seems to be a lot of rhetoric that implies that naturalism 
plays a role in (positively) defining what is central to the propositions of 
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religious naturalism, but nothing explicit. The question of the world is 
dismissed, along with one’s relation to the universe, the particular to 
totality, the finite to the infinite. While Nagel managed to combine the 
structure of traditional religious orientation with secular options in the 
notion of the religious temper, these religious naturalists seek to reinvent a 
new notion of religion through Christian and non-Christian religiosity 
respectively.  
Stone and Hardwick are central figures in the contemporary religious 
naturalism, but their approach to naturalism and religion is influenced by 
the ambitions of past thinkers, especially Henry Nelson Wieman (1884-
1975). Wieman was a dedicated naturalist and Chicago-theologian. He 
might well be the most important influence for contemporary religious 
naturalism. Wieman possessed a strong appreciation of scientific methods 
and was deeply inspired by James’ and Whitehead’s treatment of religious 
experience. This led him to a rigorously empirical theology, a theology 
concerned with what transforms the human life for the better. As the 
human being cannot transform or improve itself, it transforms through 
creative interchange, Wieman claimed. This creative interchange Wieman 
calls God.71 
Wieman’s notion of religion was that of creative transformation of 
human existence toward the good. In this notion of religion, the creative 
interchanges that enable the human being to escape or avoid evil constitute 
the core of a religious life. A naturalistic conception of the world is not 
directly involved in religious orientation. As a revised sort of theism, 
Wieman called this creative, life-transforming and basically value-focused 
process, God. And yet, still there is no demand for cosmology. Instead, 
there is a focus on human experiences and development.  
In the case of Stone and Hardwick, it is not the worldview itself, but the 
circumstances of human life – on an existential level – that provide 
religious orientation. In other words, they do not answer a cosmological 
question because they do not construe religious orientation as concerned 
with the question of the world. Hardwick seems to answer a question about 
how Christian theology can be rewritten without ontological statements 
that counters scientific theories. Stone seems to answer yet another, 
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somehow non-Christian, question about the potential of meaningful 
experiences. We can understand this as a sort of religious orientation – if 
we take their word for it, but we have to admit that they dismiss the 
question of the world as a matter of human religiosity.  
Religious naturalism has difficulties in following Nagel’s request for a 
first-person cosmology insofar as the general concern with religion regards 
the question about meaning and moral orientation without (necessarily) 
having a real theoretical interest in naturalism. The best description of the 
relation between religious naturalists and naturalism seems to be a sort of 
supporting attitude. Religious naturalism, as a form of religious thinking, 
supports the legitimacy and authority of the natural sciences but, as I have 
argued, this does not necessarily imply the idea of a naturalistic cosmology 
as the background of a religious orientation. 
This problem in religious naturalism seems to cause the loss of the 
connection between the human perspective and its relation to the world. A 
strict naturalism seems to deny an adequate understanding of the human 
world-relation. This is also the central point in Nagel’s attack on 
reductionism. The religious naturalists leave aside the ontological 
implications of the non-reductionism that they claim. Nagel never really 
provides any arguments against religion, but simply assumes that religious 
answers are less available to the contemporary intellectual landscape. 
Secularity is not necessarily a verdict concerning religion, but is more 
likely to be understood as a verdict concerning the role of religion within 
civil society.72 Nagel has no intention of dismissing the practice of a 
religious orientation per se. His agenda is more an attempt to reconcile 
contemporary philosophy with its oldest task of providing the outlook and 
the means for orientation and self-understanding regardless of a particular 
definition of religion. To raise Nagel’s cosmic question as a question for a 
philosophy of religion enables many different answers and opportunities. 
In philosophy, this has been given much attention. That being said, 
religious naturalists seem, regarding the treatment of the concept of 
naturalism, to be more generally oriented towards the natural sciences than 
to the tenets of contemporary philosophy. The non-reductionism that is 
implied in the positions of religious naturalism seems to have been 
explored, nurtured, and contested more directly in philosophical circles. 
The concept of naturalism has, in many ways, been modified, revised, and 
reformulated in order to find room for the human aspect within some 
notion of naturalism. Liberal Naturalism seems, in this regard, to be the 
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most thorough attempt to formulate a non-reductive philosophical 
naturalism.  
3.3 Reductive and Liberal Naturalism 
In the previous section, the primary distinction of naturalistic thinking was 
that between a non-supernatural naturalism and a reductive (scientific) 
naturalism. The question now at issue is whether a revised form of 
naturalism can provide what is required for the question of the world as 
raised in the discussion with Nagel. This revised naturalism is commonly 
called liberal naturalism. The question is as to whether a liberal naturalism, 
as a non-reductive naturalism, can provide a better answer to the cosmic 
question than the reductive naturalism presented by Nagel.  
The polarities of naturalism and supernaturalism presented in the last 
section – a monism of nature and an ontological dualism – have led modern 
philosophy into many quarrels. Roughly sketched, modern thinking has 
attempted, on the one hand, to liberate itself from religious supernaturalism, 
and, on the other hand, to find ways to maintain a proper explanation of the 
undeniable uniqueness of human experience. Liberal naturalism is 
somewhere between monism and dualism, claiming to be able to avoid the 
dilemmas inherent to both poles. It does this by raising epistemological 
questions concerning conditions of human experience and knowledge more 
radically than reductive naturalism. Nonetheless, liberal naturalism still 
predominantly associates more with reductive naturalism than 
supernaturalism by expanding on an unaltered reductive naturalism.73  
Reductive naturalism can be characterized through two distinguishable 
components: an ontological and a methodological. David Papineau calls it 
a discernment between “the contents of reality”, on the one side, and “the 
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ways of investigating reality”, on the other side.74 According to Papineau, 
the basis of causal explanation implied in ‘ontological naturalism’ 
fundamentally binds it to a spatiotemporal determination of reality. In this 
we sense how the term ‘nature’ can be used not only to mark contrasts 
between ontological realms, but also to claim one single ontological realm 
within which all contrasts are contrasts and not borders. This is how 
naturalism can be said to mark a worldview. Reductionism protects this 
monism of explanation insofar as nothing can be said to be so extraordinary 
or artificial that it does not belong to nature as the totality of all there is.  
Consequently, many contemporary thinkers adopt a naturalist view of 
e.g. the mental realm, the biological realm, and the social realm for the sake 
of explanation. Naturally, the fundamental materialistic implications of 
causal explanations reflect the recognition of the most fundamental 
sciences, such as biology, chemistry and most of all physics. In a strict 
physicalistic approach for example, the reduction asserts that basic reality 
follows the laws of physics entirely. However, consensus is lacking 
between many different sciences and philosophical strands, which is why 
there exists other varieties with more moderate doctrines e.g. about the 
nature of causation. One example is ‘token identity’, the view of causes as 
particular events considered independent of any properties they may hold. 
Another example is ‘property dualism’, which is a non-reductive yet 
physicalist view that claims two essentially different properties of nature. 
Regarding mental states, property dualism contains the idea that the 
qualitative nature of consciousness is non-reducible to physics as a 
genuinely emergent phenomenon.75  
The central difference between reductive and liberal naturalism lies in 
the notion of a non-reductive class of ‘entities’ or phenomena with which 
liberal naturalism expands the concept of nature, or the natural, promoted 
by reductive naturalism. In this sense, liberal naturalism could be seen as a 
variety internal to scientific naturalism regarding the inventory of what 
ultimately exists. If we take reductive naturalism to be the position of the 
natural sciences, which implies that everything that exists can be explained 
with the ontological assumptions of the best scientific theories, then liberal 
naturalism introduces a new distinction that makes room for a class of 
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irreducible ‘entities’ or phenomena that are ontologically independent. This 
independency is formulated by an epistemological distinction (for example, 
in the way McDowell asserts that knowledge as a human phenomenon sets 
itself apart from physical reality). Reductive naturalism, according to its 
own logic, cannot exhaustively account for the nature of such entities as 
knowledge. Liberal naturalism, however, provides the basis for still 
considering these entities natural. 
The ambition of the protagonists of liberal naturalism is to propose an 
alternative naturalism that gives priority to epistemic practice: how to 
account for knowledge, thinking, and modal properties (such as normative 
properties) on the basis of a reality (nature) as defined by the natural 
sciences. This is the central question that liberal naturalism sets out to solve. 
It does so by means of a redefinition and widening of the notion of nature 
and of the concept of ‘the natural’. The irreducible entities recognized by 
liberal naturalism have, regarding their ontological status, no causal power, 
and do not “contravene the laws of the world investigated by the 
sciences.”76 Concerning the epistemological status of these entities, no 
“special modes of understanding that would be irreconcilable with rational 
understanding”77 are required. Both characteristics are crucial points that 
show why liberal naturalism is not supernaturalism.  
3.4 McDowell’s Naturalism of Second Nature 
The American philosopher, John McDowell, has played an important role 
in pointing to philosophical problems caused by the influence of modern 
science on contemporary naturalistic thinking. In McDowell’s central work, 
Mind and World, he elaborates a basic concern with the concept of 
knowledge as a matter of representation of a naturalistic world. This 
concern, to put it simply, regards a thread of naturalism to leave the world 
disenchanted and empty of meaning if the notion of meaning cannot itself 
be established properly within that same world.78 This is the problem 
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through which McDowell develops his so-called liberal naturalism. In 
Mind and World, McDowell presents this as a “naturalism that makes room 
for meaning.”79  In broader terms, his is a naturalism that admits an 
additional epistemic feature of cognition within the realm of nature, viz., a 
human or second nature.80  
The central ambition of McDowell’s project is to broaden the parameter 
of reductive naturalism and propose an ‘ontology of meaning’ by means of 
a naturalism that is understood differently. In McDowell’s own words, this 
is a relaxed naturalism or a “naturalized Platonism”81 as opposed to a 
rampant Platonism (some might say an Aristotelianism). McDowell’s 
proposition of a liberal naturalism thus seeks to integrate Aristotle’s notion 
of second nature into a reductive naturalism without violating the latter.82 
The question with which we are addressing McDowell here is whether he, 
while leaving the ontological premises more or less intact, changes the 
prospects for a human self-understanding on the basis of a naturalistic 
outlook. I shall therefore present those central stages of this “naturalism of 
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second nature”83 that make it relevant to our discussion of a first-person 
cosmology.  
McDowell’s criticism of reductive naturalism, in his terms a ‘bald 
naturalism,’ aims at its strict concept of nature. ‘Bald naturalism’ consists 
of a reductive naturalistic account of the world that takes nature to be an 
entirely law-governed realm, exhausting the totality of all there is. If nature 
is understood as the realm of law – following the natural sciences – and 
nature is all there is, it then becomes highly problematic to speak about the 
reality of phenomena like meaning, rationality, morality and human 
freedom. Within such a concept of nature, we can only understand a human 
experience as an event in a causal series without any justificatory role in 
our thinking. How then are we to discern true from false? If we want our 
experience to have a justificatory role in our thinking (McDowell refers to 
this as ‘the tribunal of experience’), we must still concede that it makes no 
direct contact with the way things are in the realm of law. This central 
relation of experience and nature is the center of attention. McDowell’s 
claim is a notion of normative intentionality, which he sees as ‘a minimal 
empiricism’, “the idea that experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating 
the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it must be if we 
are to make sense of it as thinking at all.”84 
McDowell seeks to determine why the possibility of our access to the 
world and its constitution implicates that nature is more than simply law-
governed. This focus of McDowell’s agenda can, in a broader perspective, 
be seen as an expression of the more general priority given to epistemology 
in modern philosophy. The question of reality is conditioned by our access 
to reality. However, McDowell wants more than to state an epistemological 
point. His argumentation sets out from the ontological implications of bald 
naturalism to make room for epistemological categories, which receive 
their initial support from practical philosophy. McDowell’s arguments 
therefore attack the insufficiency of a concept of nature that is neither apt 
nor equipped for the practical aspects of human life. 
The question about a liberal naturalism is the question of whether 
naturalism, in its reductive form, can be improved with the right 
epistemological furnishing. For this purpose, McDowell develops a Kant-
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motivated notion of intentionality, which he deploys in a social, practical, 
and fundamentally normative realm. The normative aspect of intentionality 
is not a random, but an essential feature. Thinking is not a bare receptive 
matter but essentially an activity in judgments and propositions. Thinking 
involves justification in the sense that the thinking subject participates in 
certain norms and standards (games) for giving and asking for reasons. The 
practical and social world of the semantic rules to which our intentionality 
is subordinated is essential for making knowledge possible at all. 
McDowell follows Wilfred Sellars’ critique of the naturalistic fallacy 
(the mistake of understanding all concepts, including knowledge, within a 
logical space of empirical description) and The Myth of the Given.85 This 
implies the need to separate concepts according to two different sorts of 
intelligibility. McDowell’s point is that we ought to discern concepts that 
serve to place things in a logical space that is structured by reasons, from 
concepts that can be employed in empirical description. As stated by 
Sellars, the concept of knowledge belongs to a normative context, which he 
called the logical space of reasons, as opposed to the logical space of 
nature, the realm of laws. Knowledge belongs to a normative space of 
reasons because knowledge can be true or false. Knowledge complies with 
certain truth-conditions, to wit, knowing something means taking 
something to be true. Normativity thereby builds the foundations of the 
space of reasons to the extent that to know something means to take it to be 
true.86 
These two sui generis logical spaces are employed in order to understand 
concepts of different kinds.87  
[T]he logical space of nature is the logical space in which the natural sciences 
function […] to place something in nature on the relevant conception, as contrasted 
with placing it in the logical space of reasons, is to situate it in the realm of law.88  
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88 Ibid., xiv. “The idea of receiving an impression is the idea of a transaction in 
nature. On Sellars’s principles, then, to identify something as an impression is to place 
it in a logical space other than the one in which talk of knowledge—or, to keep the 
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We ought to notice that McDowell’s distinction between a law-governed 
realm and a reason-governed realm is not an ontological distinction 
between mind and world, which would be a misleading assumption 
(however, an assumption easily made considering the title). The issue is not 
the identification of a logical mind over and against something else, e.g. the 
world as a thing in itself. What McDowell proposes is a distinction 
between two logical spaces that represent two sorts of intelligibility. This is, 
in both cases, an explanation of the form that intelligibility takes in each 
space, one by means of laws and one by means of reasons. The gravitation 
towards ontological dualism that could be drawn from the title, Mind and 
World, is simply not what McDowell has in mind. His point is that two 
different forms of comprehension and meaning apply to different concepts. 
This is also the reason why he warns against confusing the scientific 
understanding of nature with nature itself.89 The decisive point to be made 
is that both spaces are logical spaces. The two spaces are meaningful 
according to two different sorts of logic. This suggests that the real issue is 
not the constitution of nature, (McDowell barely makes any remarks 
concerning the world, aside from the world-directedness of intentionality) 
but meaning and the identification of two logical spaces as two separate 
semantic fields.  
McDowell approaches naturalism at the level of intelligibility, as a 
matter of how we make sense of the world and how the world is made 
intelligible. The split represented in McDowell’s naturalism of second 
nature is a split in intelligibility. From this it follows that the claim derived 
from the naturalistic fallacy is not ontological, but the claim that a 
scientific form of explanation is insufficient. According to this claim the 
world is not uniform or univocal, but applies to different logical spaces (at 
least two).  
The far-reaching conditions of the shape of meaning in the space of 
reasons is the motivation for McDowell’s use of Aristotle and Gadamer to 
introduce the concepts of second nature, ‘Bildung’, ‘modes of life’, ‘World’ 
(as opposed to environment) and Gadamer’s notion of ‘tradition’ (see 
especially lecture IV and VI). McDowell’s understanding of logical spaces 
can be understood as a theory of sense-diversity between how we 
understand the world, and how we understand our access to the world.  
Addressing the question of sense-diversity on the terms of naturalistic 
thinking, McDowell reformulates the question of ontology and 
epistemology. Meaning, in the space of reasons, is factual according to a 
rationality that works through practical life, practical reason. McDowell 
                                                                                                                       
general case in view, talk of world-directedness, knowledgeable or not—belongs.” 
McDowell, Mind and World, xv. 
89 “If we identify nature with what natural science aims to make comprehensible, we 
threaten, at least, to empty it of meaning.” McDowell, Mind and World, 70. 
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points to the notion of second nature in Aristotle as a model for 
understanding how the human being, in its natural constitution and as a 
rational animal, holds the capacity to conform and mature – McDowell 
uses the German word Bildung – and to shape our lives according to reason 
on a completely natural basis.90 It is on the basis of this rationality that 
meaning in the space of reasons exists. For Sellars, this is an 
anthropological implication and a consequence of the idea that the logical 
space of reasons cannot be integrated into the logical space of nature, the 
realm of law. Second nature is irreducible. 
The central question (maybe the only question) is meaning and how we 
make sense according to different logics (semantic fields we could say).91 
Despite the labels of first and second nature, the dichotomy is not within 
nature (in the broadest sense of the term). The dichotomy is within our 
epistemic capacities, and it relies on another inevitable distinction, namely, 
the distinction between the world or nature (‘all there is’) and our access to 
it. This is the distinction implied in any empiricism or representationalism. 
McDowell must be understood as stating that whatever is can be 
understood by means of one of two sorts of intelligibility. From the logical 
space of nature concerned with the explanations of a law-governed nature, 
we take a step back, a transcendental step back, to the knowledge about 
nature which has different implications and conditions of intelligibility, to 
the space of reasons. Consequently, it seems necessary to apply 
McDowell’s notion of nature, the all-including frame, to something already 
accessed, something already meaningful and therefore always placed 
within a logical space.  
3.5 The Human Mode of Being 
McDowell’s explanation of the sense-dichotomy of the logical spaces is 
supported by the concept of ‘life’. In his introduction of second nature, 
McDowell moves from a focus on experience to a focus on action. Second 
nature, as the logical space of reasons in which thinking and knowing has 
its place, is not external to first nature in an ontological sense, as 
                                         
90 “Our Bildung actualizes some of the potentialities we are born with; we do not 
have to suppose it introduces a non-animal ingredient into our constitution. And 
although the structure of the space of reasons cannot be reconstructed out of facts about 
our involvement in the realm of law, it can be the framework within which meaning 
comes into view only because our eyes can be opened to it by Bildung, which is an 
element in the normal coming to maturity of the kind of animals we are. Meaning is not 
a mysterious gift from outside nature.” Ibid., 88. 
91 Donald Davidson has criticized McDowell for dismissing the mind-body problem 
by removing the body and the external world from the equation, which to Davidson 
amounts to an updated mentalism. Donald Davidson, “Reply to John McDowell,” in 
The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 
1999), 105-108. 
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supernaturalism; it belongs to something deeply rooted in first nature: 
human lives. McDowell calls it “our mode of living”, which is “our way of 
actualizing ourselves as animals.”92 The parameter of meaning in the space 
of reasons is based in the human life-world, including our social interaction, 
our historical self-understanding (tradition) and affective practices that set 
us apart from animal life-forms.93 
To avoid conceiving thinking and knowing as supernatural, we should stress that 
thinking and knowing are aspects of our lives. The concept of a life is the concept of 
the career of a living thing, and hence obviously the concept of something natural. 
But there are aspects of our lives whose description requires concepts that function in 
the space of reasons. We are rational animals. Our lives are patterned in ways that 
are recognizable only in an inquiry framed within the space of reasons.94 
Second nature is not only a practical rationality in isolation from nature, 
but, essential to human nature, it is the basis of the human world-relation in 
general. McDowell therefore turns to Aristotle’s practical philosophy.95 He 
believes himself to be dissolving the Kantian dualism of reason and nature 
without replacing it – at least not with another dualism of the same kind. 
Reason is human. The human being is a natural being, and normativity is a 
natural component inherent to human nature. This, he says, is no regular 
dualism, but a “deeper dualism”, the dualism from which all other dualisms 
derive: 
Modern philosophy has taken itself to be called on to bridge dualistic gulfs, between 
subject and object, thought and world. This style of approach to meaning sets out to 
bridge a dualism of norm and nature. The claim might be that this is a deeper 
dualism, the source of the familiar dualisms of modern philosophy.96  
With regard to the norm-nature bridge, McDowell understands the 
actualization (‘Bildung’) of the rational animal on the premises of the 
individual.97 Consequently, the space of reasons is itself conditioned by the 
particularity of individuals. The agent is situated in a practical and ethical 
context in which the agent’s reasons have their ground. The model of 
Aristotelian practical wisdom (‘phronesis’) provides a notion of situated 
rationality, which implies “that one can reflect only from the midst of the 
way of thinking one is reflecting about.”98 Second nature is therefore one’s 
                                         
92 McDowell, Mind and World, 78. 
93 Ibid., 108–126. 
94 McDowell, “Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind,” 94f. 
95  McDowell particularly takes up the notion of ‘phronesis’ as presented in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics book VI. 
96 McDowell calls it ‘a new clarity about nature’, McDowell, Mind and World, 93. 
97 Ibid., 78. 
98 Ibid., 81. E.g. “If a person conceives her practical situation in terms provided for 
her by a specific ethical outlook, that will present her with certain apparent reasons for 
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particular character as developed through concrete practical situations. The 
ethical outlook is not provided from outside my sensibility to the practical 
obligations of concrete situations, but nurtured and molded from ‘within’ – 
that is, through my rational responsiveness to concrete situations. This is 
the actualization of second nature by means solely inherent to nature. 
3.6 Assessing the Options 
Many similarities between Nagel’s subjective-objective distinction and 
McDowell’s two logical spaces can be drawn. It is not my aim here to 
make a general assessment of McDowell’s proposition, but to reconsider 
Nagel’s notion of the cosmic question in regard to McDowell’s naturalism 
and general model. The model presents a distinction between what can be 
framed by naturalistic thinking and what cannot. The general idea is that 
both logical spaces concern nature, as presented in McDowell’s inclusive 
and non-restrictive employment of the term. The distinction, however, is a 
distinction of intelligibility.  
If we translate McDowell’s model into a setting compatible with Nagel’s, 
we return to the question of the relation between first and second nature. 
This relation is crucial to the matter of the cosmic question. Is there any 
connection or exchange between first and second nature? Can first nature 
be a cosmological outlook for the rational animal, and thereby provide the 
value-resources for practical interaction within the space of reasons? To wit, 
is the logical space of nature (the realm of law) that which provides a self-
understanding and orientation in the logical space of reasons? Can the law-
governed components of first nature be, or provide, the reasons in second 
nature?  
As already suggested, the world is not the central issue in McDowell’s 
liberal naturalism. From the perspective of a minimal empiricism and the 
idea of normative intentionality, the world (in the sense articulated by 
McDowell only as nature) is the ontological framework for the entire 
epistemic enterprise of logical spaces. McDowell’s concern is therefore the 
conditions of meaning, and not the content of meaning. The separation of 
two logical spaces does not depend on any mutuality. The content of the 
logical space of nature seems to be an isolated matter for natural science 
and not a means to an end or endeavor of second nature. The concept of 
‘life’, career, and the human mode of living do not point us in the direction 
of an integration of first nature knowledge. Furthermore, first nature does 
                                                                                                                       
acting. On a better understanding of Aristotle’s picture, the only standpoint at which she 
can address the question whether those reasons are genuine is one that she occupies 
precisely because she has a specific ethical outlook. That is a standpoint from which 
those seeming requirements are in view as such, not a foundational standpoint at which 
she might try to reconstruct the demandingness of those requirements from scratch, out 
of materials from an independent description of nature” McDowell, Mind and World, 80. 
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not seem to represent a worldview in the sense described by Nagel. In that 
way, second nature seems to work on its own isolated premises. This 
means that the attempt, armed with McDowell’s model, to make a 
naturalistic outlook of the world available to a moral agent, might not be 
possible. 
Robert Pippin has offered an explication of this problem, which he 
believes is often overlooked by protagonists of naturalism. In this 
explication, Pippin seeks to clarify why reductive explanations are useless 
for practical living. His central argument is based on a notion of the self as 
a moral agent. The situational conditions of the space of reasons are 
designated as the “agential” or “first-personal perspective,”99 and this is an 
irreducible perspective.  
Knowing something about the evolutionary benefits of altruistic behavior might give 
us an interesting perspective on some particular altruistic act, but for the agent, first-
personally, the question I must decide is whether I ought to act altruistically and, if 
so, why. I cannot simply stand by, waiting to see what my highly and complexly 
evolved neurobiological system will do. The system doesn’t make the decision, I do 
– and for reasons that I find compelling, or that, at least, outweigh countervailing 
considerations. […] It is in this sense that the first-personal perspective is strictly 
unavoidable: I am not a passenger on a vessel pulled hither and yon by impulses and 
desires; I have to steer.100 
The point is that an agent is required to act and to decide. An agent cannot 
replace that requirement with an evolutionary or naturalistic explanation. 
Just as Nagel asserted that there is no basis for ethical responses in 
evolutionary thinking, a naturalistic framework cannot ‘steer the vessel’. 
Naturalistic facts do not impose any claim or obligation on me. My reason 
and choice of action is my sense of obligation provided by fundamental 
beliefs, beliefs that might be grounded in a worldview, but neither 
naturalism nor ‘the logical space of nature’ can be such a worldview. The 
notion of worldview or cosmology is not detached from the world in which 
I am the responsible agent, but fundamentally implied in it. The split 
asserted by McDowell shows how fundamentally different explanations 
can be. However, it also shows that human life entails components that are 
not just incompatible but inexplicable in the context of a law-governed 
reality. Human freedom and consciousness seem to be such components.101 
                                         
99  Robert Pippin, “Natural and Normative,” Daedalus (January 1, 2009): 38, 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/daed.2009.138.3.35. 
100 Ibid., 39. 
101 David Papineau is one of the peers who criticizes McDowell for leaving the 
question concerning the relation between scientific facts and human values and norms 
inarticulate and blurred. David Papineau, The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on 
Rationality, Evolution, and Probability (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 19–20. Another critique has been raised by Hans Fink who 
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Nagel characterizes subjectivity as something that is capable of 
incorporating another perspective. Besides being a point of view, or a 
perspective, subjectivity consists in the capacity to operate with different 
perspectives. This is the context in which Nagel introduced the question of 
naturalism, and assessed naturalism, not simply as a theory, but as 
something to be incorporated into a lived human life. This is the 
characterization of the question of the world in Nagel’s theory of the 
religious temper. Surely, there is a greater question concerning the ground 
of knowledge, concerning reality wavering, a question central to both 
Nagel’s and McDowell’s thinking, but the reason why reality, the world, is 
such an important question lies in the fundamental disposition to seek an 
understanding of oneself and one’s relation to everything else. 
Nagel’s model shows that naturalism, as a way of conceiving the world 
objectively, is a problem in the sense that the ground of knowledge is 
bound up with subjectivity of a particular perspective. Subjectivity is, in 
many regards, something to overcome and transcend for the sake of 
understanding. However, Nagel shows that even if it was possible to 
overcome the subjective perspective, naturalism is itself insufficient 
because it cannot provide an understanding of the world-relation of the 
individual subject. Hence, naturalism cannot, as an external point of view, 
reflect the human world-relation and embeddedness in the world. 
Naturalism cannot provide the components required for the orientation of a 
lived human life.  
This last point says that naturalism is a world-model that cannot account 
for the world-relation. The question of the world, posed as the cosmic 
question, is posed from within a world that one is a part of and takes part in. 
Detachment compromises this fundamental condition. Nagel’s idea of self-
transcendence therefore needs to come to terms with the self and its 
condition of participation. The world that can answer to the cosmic 
question needs to be sought through this participation, through attachment 
and not detachment, through engagement and not disengagement. The 
cosmic question reflects the condition of embeddedness in the world; any 
answer can only succeed by including the embedment itself.  
From this final exploration of Nagel’s cosmic question and the question 
of embeddedness, it seems obvious that the question of subjectivity needs 
to be taken up again. If the first-person perspective is an expression of the 
subjectivity that ultimately defines the world-relation in question, then a 
notion of the self that pertains to the aspect of world-embedment is needed. 
In what follows, I therefore turn to an exploration of Charles Taylor’s 
                                                                                                                       
argues that McDowell’s naturalism is incoherent at the conceptual or semantic level, 
since it confuses what is included and excluded in the notion of nature. Fink, “Three 
Sorts of Naturalism.” I thank my colleague René Rosfort for fruitful discussions on 
McDowell and his critics. 
Religion and Second Nature 51 
notion of framework as a theory of engaged selfhood. The question at issue 
is the question of embeddedness in the world. 
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4 Frameworks and the Embedded Self 
4.1 Framework 
Charles Taylor defends a strand of contemporary philosophy that is 
concerned with selfhood, which Taylor develops from a notion of 
embeddedness and engaged agency. Within this agenda, Taylor seeks to 
broaden the scope of an all too narrow conception of moral philosophy in 
contemporary thinking. This broadening, in a preliminary sense, consists in 
exploring what Taylor calls moral ontologies, which are “the background 
we assume or draw on in any claim to rightness, part of which we have to 
spell out when we have to defend our responses as the right ones.”102 This 
is his background for approaching the question concerning the human self 
and the reason why Taylor is so difficult to frame as ‘simply’ a moral 
philosopher (the aspects of his thinking being much broader than that).103 
Through Taylor’s notion of the self we come to see the significance that 
selfhood has, not only as a notion of world-directedness, but also as a 
notion of world-engagement. A central feature of this notion is what Taylor 
calls frameworks or backgrounds. It is through these that one expresses and 
reflects on oneself, that one forms one’s personal predicament for engaging 
in a community as a moral agent. This is a multifaceted notion of sense-
shaping as the determining of the human life in the world. “A framework is 
that by virtue of which we make sense of our lives spiritually. Not to have a 
framework is to fall into a life which is spiritually senseless. The quest is 
thus always a quest for sense.”104  
The notion of framework is fundamental for Taylor. However, it can also 
be found throughout a heritage of classical thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. Taylor does not disregard the 
history of this heritage but, in many ways, presents it exemplarily for the 
benefit of the present discussion. I primarily refer to the exposition that 
Taylor gives on this concept in the first part of Sources of the Self (1989). 
Frameworks have to do with meaning in the most fundamental sense. In 
fact, they pertain to the very possibility of sense. In Taylor’s view, the 
human self is a self that operates through meaningful encounters and 
articulations. Whether we address this notion of frameworks from a moral, 
                                         
102 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 9. 
103 Charles Taylor has contributed to the philosophical discussion of selfhood in 
contemporary thinking. Ethics, culture, politics and religion are but some of Taylor’s 
recurring themes, which impregnate and broaden his central concern with human 
selfhood. Among the many aspects of Taylor’s comprehensive work, this discussion 
will focus on Taylor’s notion of frameworks or backgrounds and Taylor’s 
understanding of embeddedness in the notion of embodied agency. 
104 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 18. 
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existential, ontological, or logical perspective, the central question 
concerning the self involves a constitutive relation to its surroundings, 
which is a relation determined and articulated by the predicaments of the 
self as an agent, which Taylor calls a background framework. A framework, 
in Taylor’s view, is inescapable. The human being establishes meaning 
through distinctions of quality, what is worthy of respect and what is 
desirable. While meaning is found on various levels, the notion of 
frameworks provides a conception of the human life as the broader frame 
within which meaning is shaped.  
A framework incorporates a crucial set of qualitative distinctions. To think, feel, 
judge within such a framework is to function with the sense that some action or 
mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparable higher than others which are more 
readily available to us.105  
In this sense, a framework provides tools for the evaluation and the 
articulation of what is preferred or desired over something else. In the 
framework lies the expression of what Taylor has called strong evaluations.  
4.2 Strong Evaluation 
In his notion of strong evaluation, Taylor develops Harry Frankfurt’s 
description of the human being as a species that can evaluate its desires and 
form second-order desires.106 This is a capacity or power of self-evaluation 
that is characteristic for the mode of agency identified as human. Taylor 
then distinguishes two sorts of evaluation of desires: weak and strong 
evaluation.107  
In the matter of a weak evaluation, an agent is merely concerned with the 
outcome of his actions. In the matter of a strong evaluation, an agent is, 
though engaged in reflection at another level, concerned with the 
qualitative worth of her desires.108 An example would be when a young 
healthy person takes a comfortable seat on the bus for the sake of 
convenience. A simple weak evaluation takes place: I desire to sit, here is a 
seat, thus I take a seat. In another case, before occupying the last available 
seat on the bus, I see an elderly fellow passenger who needs a seat. In this 
latter case, I evaluate the immediate desire to take a seat, but I refrain from 
carrying out my desire due to the worth of the desire: I refrain from taking 
the last seat on the bus and potentially causing an elderly passenger great 
annoyance and discomfort. Whereas weak evaluations concern simple and 
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106 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20. 
107 See Charles Taylor, “What Is Human Agency?,” in Human Agency and Language 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15-44. 
108 Ibid., 16. 
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immediate desires (sometimes without further consequences), strong 
evaluations evaluate the value of my desire, which entails a notion of ‘good’ 
or worth at a higher level against which the quality of an action is measured. 
I simply decide not to be a rude or disrespectful person who refuses to 
recognize an elderly person’s greater need for a seat.  
In this last aspect lies the idea that the actions derived from strong 
evaluations concern what kind of person I find myself to be or aspire to be. 
My strong evaluations thereby form a mode of life, as Taylor puts it. 
However, it is by means of a deeper-lying framework that the ‘sense’ of 
qualitative distinctions is present. A framework is not necessarily an 
articulated conscious basis of higher goods or values. “It may be only this; 
or it can be spelled out in a highly explicit way, in a philosophically 
formulated ontology or anthropology.”109 A framework may or may not be 
articulated, but – and this is a decisive point – for a self, for a human agent, 
there is always a framework. 
4.3 Naturalism and the Self 
A fundamental aspect of Taylor’s thinking is a critique of what he calls the 
‘widespread naturalist temper.’ The implications of naturalism result in a 
denial of any such theory of frameworks altogether. Nonetheless, this is but 
one of the characteristics of naturalism that Taylor finds problematic. 
Primarily, naturalism runs into a highly problematic understanding of 
agency, one that can be traced back to the cosmological revolution of the 
17th century. This notion of agency consists in a disengaged (autonomous, 
atomic) notion of consciousness that underlies the primacy of epistemology 
in modern philosophy. This has led to a confused and, in Taylor’s view, 
mistaken understanding of the self as a punctual self that is not engaged 
with, but separated from, the world it perceives and lives in.110 Taylor’s 
critique of naturalistic thinking pertains to the view of the self and of 
human agency espoused by naturalistic thinking. Moreover, this critique 
reflects how central human agency is to Taylor’s understanding of the self: 
the nature of agency defines the self. Naturalism is incapable of 
formulating or understanding the dimensions of the self as reflected in 
human agency within a neutrality-aspiring scientific language. Agency is 
not determined by causal relations, whereas movement is. To act is 
something different, which implies strong qualitative distinctions and 
discriminations. 
To be a full human agent is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of 
worth. But it is also to exist in a space of questions from which we seek 
sufficient answers, answers that we incorporate into our self-understanding. 
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110 See also Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” 7; Taylor, Sources of the Self, 22. 
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A self is a being for whom certain questions of categoric value have arisen, and 
received at least partial answers. Perhaps these have been given authoritatively by 
culture more than they have been elaborated in the deliberation of the person 
concerned, but they are his in the sense that they are incorporated into his self-
understanding, in some degree and fashion.111  
The questions we ask are incorporated into our self-understanding along 
with the qualitative distinctions that we have incorporated into our 
framework. This feature of self-understanding implies that there can be no 
absolute understanding of who we are as persons:  
A being who exists only in self-interpretation cannot be understood absolutely; and 
one who can only be understood against the background of distinctions of worth 
cannot be captured by a scientific language which essentially aspires to neutrality.112 
The background framework provides a language for our self-understanding. 
In the background framework, we carry the horizons available to our 
understanding. As a self (a human agent), we orientate ourselves according 
to coordinates and contrastive articulations of worth and qualitative 
distinctions. The more general point of the notion of framework, however, 
is that it not only provides the means for the choices and the sense we make 
of our moral actions, but for the sense we make of experiences in general. 
Human experiences are formed against the background of a framework. In 
this sense, there are always conditions of orientation involved in any 
experience. This feature of orientation is central to the notion of framework 
and how experiences are shaped to become our experiences. Another way 
to conceive of Taylor’s notion of framework can be found in his 
employment of transcendental arguments. 113  From this side, Taylor’s 
implementation of the notion of frameworks can be illuminated through 
Taylor’s own employment of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘embodiment’ and 
embodied agency as an orientational structure for the way experiences 
make sense.114 
The point of the notion of embodied agency is that the self-
understanding of the perceiver, as an embodied agent, provides the 
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orientational structures through which experience is rendered meaningful. 
This sensitivity to human embodiment, as an example of the fundamental 
embedment in the world, is essential to Taylor’s critique of naturalistic 
thinking. It is a semantic condition that the naturalistic approach has left 
out of sight. McDowell’s attempt to situate the propositional involvement 
of the human being in the world brought him to explicate the human mode 
of living, ‘Bildung’, and tradition. In Taylor, this understanding of 
experience through embodied agency implies that experience is never 
neutral or pure (as with a physical eye over and against a physical object). 
Our preoccupation, embedment, and engagement in the world we 
experience are fundamental. Hence, experience is always meaningful by 
means of inherent orientational structures that enable and guide whatever 
sense an experience makes. A good example is the gravitational condition 
that keeps us bound to the ground. The self-understanding and intimacy 
with oneself as a bodily agent in a gravitational field provides the 
coordinates or directionality according to which experiences are rendered 
meaningful. I comprehend a flying object against the background of my 
awareness of my own gravitational limits. It is in this way that I can relate 
to something as flying.  
Another example is the perception of a chair: the distinct way in which a 
chair makes sense, to and for me, depends on the condition that I am a 
being which uses a chair and am familiar with chairs through a certain 
practice. I might be able to recognize a comfortable chair due to my 
intimate sense of my physical conditions and my experiences around chairs. 
When a perception of a chair makes sense to me, it does so at a 
fundamental level, because I am aware of the properties and proportions of 
chairs as suited for my own physical constitution and my frequent desire to 
rest my legs. In other words, my bodily constitution provides me with a set 
of proportions that gives me a standard with which I meet my surroundings. 
As Taylor puts it, “our perceptual field has the structure it has because it is 
experienced as a field of potential action.”115 Neither dualistic subject-
object settings nor mechanistic models can replace the orientational 
structures formed by the self-understanding of an agent as an embodied 
agent. 
The notion of framework applies to all sense. The decisive point in 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodiment is that in order to be able to make 
sense of an object as an object, one draws on orientational markers 
provided by one’s own constitution as a bodily agent that can move and act 
around objects; an intimacy with the proportions and dimensions of a 
spatio-temporal gravitational space is what enables the recognition of a 
given object as an object. 
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4.4 Identity and Orientation 
Aside from the question concerning the meaning of the inventory of our 
immediate surroundings, a framework or a background picture also plays a 
role in the broader scope of our lives regarding what makes them 
meaningful or fulfilling. In our life among other people we explicate the 
sense of our moral responses through the articulation of our framework 
which serves to explicate the meaning of our actions. In this respect, it 
should be clear that one’s framework in no way sets one apart from the 
broader social engagement. Frameworks are something we share. Our co-
existence succeeds in virtue of the framework we have in common. It does 
not construct an isolated individuality but maintains one’s capacities for 
social interaction. Our background understandings are therefore shared and 
taken over, much like social norms. Societies are, in large part, defined by 
the norms and ideals they share. Likewise, the framework reflects one’s 
social belonging, loyalty, and the fundamental ideas of what is good and 
worth striving for – the complete framework in which life matters and has 
meaning. Consequently, these factors are not separate from one’s 
framework, but descriptive of how one’s framework works. Moreover, the 
background framework is the most fundamental level of understanding that 
one has of oneself. Naturally, the framework, and the meaning articulated 
from it, also works as a means for the development of personal identity. 
This is  
the essential link between identity and a kind of orientation. To know who you are is 
to be orientated in moral space, a space in which questions about what is good or bad, 
what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and 
what is trivial and secondary.116 
Identity is shaped by a plethora of background assumptions that cannot be 
listed as a complete set of properties, but instead take the form of a 
personal identity as a grasping and projection of ‘who I am’. In this way, 
my strong evaluations are inseparable from who I am. My strong 
evaluations cannot simply be left aside as theoretical moral questions, but 
are tied up with the expression and self-identification of me as a personal 
agent. Responsibility, in this sense, can be said to be responsibility to my 
own identity and integrity before anyone else. 117  Taylor says, “our 
existence as persons, and hence our ability to adhere as persons to certain 
evaluations, would be impossible outside the horizon of these essential 
                                         
116 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 28. 
117 “An identity is something that one ought to be true to, can fail to uphold, can 
surrender when one ought to. More fundamentally, we can see that it only plays the role 
of orienting us, of providing the frame within which things have meaning for us, by 
virtue of the qualitative distinctions it incorporates.” Ibid., 30. 
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evaluations, that we would break down as persons, be incapable of being 
persons in the full sense.”118  
To talk about orientation, Taylor says, presupposes that we are engaged 
with our framework such as to find meaning through a proper orientation. 
The ontological implication of this locates the human being in what Taylor 
calls a space of questions,119 in which we move and operate “as we seek 
and find an orientation to the good.”120 These questions are questions 
concerning the good, and it is our framework that enables an articulation of 
our orientation in this space of questions about the good. Our orientation is 
therefore fragile. It consists of “contestable answers to inescapable 
questions.”121 The conditions for our identity do not enable an exhaustive 
static answer to the question of who we are. We are always changing and 
becoming.  
Since we cannot do without an orientation to the good, and since we cannot be 
indifferent to our place relative to this good, and since this place is something that 
must always change and become, the issue of the direction of our lives must arise for 
us.122  
Our sense of orientation towards the good, our self-understanding, is best 
understood as an unfolding story, a narrative. 123  This narrative is 
constitutive of the space of questions, as the answers provided by a 
coherent narrative. This narrative self-relation opens up a historical 
dimension in which identity is understood through a development leading 
up to a now which further projects a possible future.  
The sort of engagement defended by Taylor deploys an argument against 
the idea of detachment and neutrality which shows that a neutral stance 
toward things (what Nagel calls objectivity) is only possible against the 
background of a pre-reflective engagement as a way of modifying our more 
fundamental involvement with things.  
Neutrality conflicts with the fundamental condition of engaged selfhood: 
The self is engaged in whatever is made sense of. Sense is sense to a self. 
As a philosophy of engaged selfhood, Taylor’s notion of frameworks reads 
the question about the world (indeed, any question) as a question to a self 
to whom a sufficient answer makes sense in virtue of a framework. Even 
though subjectivity is an inescapeable condition, the human being is not an 
isolated animal but a social animal in the sense that one’s framework 
                                         
118 Taylor, “What Is Human Agency?,” 34–35. 
119 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 29. 
120 Ibid., 34. 
121 Ibid., 41. 
122 Ibid., 47. 
123 Ibid. Taylor mentions a few of the more broadly known explorations of narrative 
identity provided by thinkers such as Heidegger, Ricoeur, McIntyre and Bruner. 
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reflects one’s social intertwinement. One is involved in social and cultural 
negotiations where many answers are a form of participating in social 
exchanges that influence our meaning-making and reasoning. Naturalistic 
thinking is itself established against a background and implies certain 
framework features. Taylor’s critical claim is that naturalism denies this, or 
makes this denial a fundamental and necessary condition.  
4.5 Initiary Considerations 
The discussion of the cosmic question has brought many interesting aspects 
to the fore and has found a basis for discerning at least two different ways 
of understanding what is asked for in the concern with the world: On the 
one side, we have the world as an object, we could say a world with an 
objective determination and closure; and on the other side, we have the 
world in the form of a meaningful environment of the embedded self. The 
first understanding is characterized by a theoretical view of the world and, 
in Nagel’s view, an external reality: the world as something you determine 
in itself and refer to as an independent object. The second understanding of 
the world is characterized as something you find yourself partaking in, 
living in, and in that sense in-habiting. The world thereby has no object 
character, but becomes the background against which objects are available 
to us, as objects of a world. Taylor’s idea of background frameworks 
provides a notion of the latter. Nagel, McDowell, and Taylor all contribute 
to uncovering the difference between these two understandings of the 
world. However, both Nagel and McDowell take these different 
perspectives to be inherent to our way of experiencing, and are therefore 
required to respond to an external reality.  
The central issue is ‘the question of the world.’ In terms of religious 
orientation, as Nagel’s describes it with the religious temper, the issue is 
that of integrating a “conception of the universe and your relation to it into 
your life.”124 With this, Nagel seeks to find a way of speaking of the world 
that reflects the world-relation that motivates the question. If the cosmic 
question, with which Nagel reflects upon religion, is a concern with one’s 
relation to the world, then the world that one asks for depends on the 
possibility of including that which relates to the world, as well as the 
relation itself. The attempt to translate Nagel’s cosmic question into the 
question of a first-person cosmology was an attempt to describe this aspect 
of the cosmic question.  
For Nagel, the world-relation is our subjectivity, defined as an internal 
perspective that, on the one hand, seeks to respond to an external world, 
and, on the other hand, seeks to come to terms with its own subjective 
condition. For Taylor, however, the understanding of subjectivity is 
                                         
124 Nagel, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament,” 5. 
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different. The world-relation is understood as an engagement through 
which things make sense. The world is not an ‘external world’, but the 
background against which things make sense. Moving from Nagel to 
Taylor, we came to speak of the world in a different way, which is reflected 
in two different models of subjectivity. For Nagel, subjectivity is a 
challenge to the attempt to understand the world as it is in itself. For Taylor, 
however, the world consists in the framework that underlies the sense that 
is present to the subject. The embeddedness asserted by Taylor does not 
repond to an outer reality, but determines the conditions of actual meaning.  
Let us recapitulate. 
We reconsidered Nagel’s idea of naturalism as an option for the cosmic 
question (3.1, 3.2). This was initially a question of religion and how 
religion reflects a concern with the world. In this regard, the position of 
religious naturalism proved insufficient in relating the religious and the real. 
Religious naturalism, in the varieties presented, cannot therefore provide a 
basis for answering the cosmic question.  
We reconsidered the notion of naturalism (3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6) in order 
to find out if the human concern with the world could be incorporated into 
a different naturalism, a revised and liberal naturalism. McDowell proposes 
such a liberal naturalism by means of a broader concept of nature that 
seems to change the context of the problem. The merit of the distinction of 
logical spaces is a re-enchantment of the world due to the primacy of the 
question of meaning. But what world? Not a naturalistic world. There is no 
exchange of meaning between the realm of laws and the space of reasons, 
which makes naturalism irrelevant to a human concern. Nevertheless, we 
achieved a preliminary notion of the possibilities available through an 
improved notion of selfhood and, consequently, a different notion of the 
world. Since Nagel, the question of subjectivity has followed the discussion 
of the cosmic question as a central premise of thinking the world from the 
world-relation in which the question is formulated. McDowell took us part 
of the way, by pointing to ‘the human mode of being’ as an independent 
space of meaning-shaping. This independency, however, made 
McDowell’s claim of a naturalism questionable. He might claim that 
second nature is part of first nature, but he does not show what that means 
in praxis. What is therefore required is a different approach to the question 
of the world. 
We turned to Taylor who presents a notion of engaged selfhood as the 
notion of the human world-relation (chapter 4). He examines this relation 
through the concepts of engaged agency and the notion of background 
framework. This offered an opportunity for reconsidering the question of 
subjectivity with regard to the notion of embeddedness. We are engaged 
with the things we are surrounded by. To Taylor that means that the world 
comes into view by means of a framework of our engagement (e.g. 
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embodiment) that provides the meaningful encounter with our surroundings. 
There are no direct ontological claims presented by Taylor, besides his 
notion of framework. Taylor thereby turns against any claim to respond in 
any particular way to an external, fixed, ‘outer’ world outside of the 
framework-condition. The world we live in takes its form in the relation 
that one always already has in the human way of inhabiting its world. The 
notion of background framework is therefore better suited to recognizing 
the fundamental premise of a world-relation.  
With respect to the question of the world, the discussion of these first 
chapters has reflected that the world is something that always includes us. 
The question of subjectivity as it relates to the initial idea of a religious 
temper has only initially been explored in the feature of orientation. It 
remains to provide a more complete picture of this. 
4.6 Determining and Inhabiting the World 
Before we leave this discussion, I want to point out a few more aspects 
concerning Taylor’s position and potential for reflections on human 
selfhood. Taylor’s thinking is equipped with a Heideggerian heritage, not 
only with regard to the idea of engaged agency, but in the very idea of 
engagement as the fundamental characterization of the human world-
relation. In its broad sense, the notion of engagement establishes the point 
that “the world of the agent is shaped by his or her form of life, or history, 
or bodily existence.”125 I have called this embeddedness. It implies that 
whatever is assumed to be an object of our understanding is something that 
we are always already engaged with. Engagement, for example in the form 
of embodiment, provides a background of understanding as a context of a 
space of intelligibility, within which experiences are intelligible. Taylor 
calls it a “context conferring intelligibility.”126 Not only are we conditioned 
by our embodiment, but also by our language. We have certain pre-
developed resources for articulating an experience through our language; 
this language is itself developed through past experiences. Our experiences 
are shaped intelligibly, and are colored through many different features of 
                                         
125  Charles Taylor, “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge [England]; New 
York USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
126  “Our embodiment makes our experience of space as oriented up-down 
understandable. In this relation the first term, the form of agency (embodiment), stands 
to the second (our experience), as a context conferring intelligibility… The context 
stands as the unexplicited horizon within which – or to vary the image, as the vantage 
point out of which – this experience can be understood.” Charles Taylor, “Lichtung or 
Lebensform: Parallels Between Heidegger and Wittgenstein,” in Philosophical 
Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 68. 
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our human life that all count as conditions for our understanding of new 
experiences. 
Taylor stresses the importance of embeddedness because the dominant 
rationalist view of the self provides us with a model of ourselves as 
disengaged thinkers.127 Taylor refers to Nagel’s notion of objectivity as a 
sort of thinking that seeks to overcome and escape “the distortions and 
parochial perspectives of our kind of subjectivity, and grasps the world as it 
is.”128 In the context of modern rationalism, embodied experience, that is, 
subjective experience, was taken to be potentially misleading. The 
distinction made between primary and secondary properties by the 
seventeenth century thinkers (e.g. Locke) served to determine illusory 
impressions of understanding from correct ones, concerning the question of 
whether it was properties located in the objects or produced in the 
perceiving mind. Consequently, objectivity was reached through an 
overcoming of immediate impressions. The goal of this ‘rationalistic 
detachment’ was to place the perception in an undistorted position where 
things could be conceived as they are in themselves.  
One of Taylor’s central objections lies in this idea of things as 
intelligible in themselves, and that sensational impressions can be 
understood as mere transfers of bits of information: that is, the idea that 
intelligibility is assumed from the start, and it does not need a context to 
provide it. It is understood that the bits of information are taken as such 
from the beginning and that the operations that follow amount to a 
processing of that information.129  
This rationalist model has to a large extent become common sensical, 
often taken for granted, and it is Taylor’s ambition to confront and revoke 
this refusal of the most intimate impressions, and the neglect of the human 
embeddedness in the world we make sense of. In Taylor’s own attempt to 
marshal arguments against the widespread employment of the rationalist 
model, he points to Heidegger and Wittgenstein, both of whom played 
crucial roles in the formulation of such arguments. This was accomplished 
through an exploration of different notions of the conditions of 
intelligibility. 
The notion of embodiment, as introduced with Merleau-Ponty’s notion 
of embodied agency, draws on aspects of Heidegger’s understanding of 
                                         
127 Taylor’s account of modern intellectual history points out a reflexive turn of 
modern rationalism in which the idea that reason is the faculty that connects us to the 
order of the universe as the true ground of reason was given up. “In its theoretical 
employment, reason serves to build a picture of the world. Rationality requires that we 
scrutinize this building closely, and not let our view of things just form itself 
distractedly, or self-indulgently, or following the prejudices of our day.” Ibid., 64. 
128 Ibid., 65. 
129 Taylor, “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,” 214. 
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being-in-the-world. This, as Heidegger presents it in Being and Time 
(1927), designates embeddedness as a way of relating to things in one’s 
surrounding environment. A central Heideggerian conceptual distinction 
that depicts this familiarity is that between ‘present-at-hand’ 
(Vorhandensein) and ‘ready-to-hand’ (Zuhandensein). Heidegger’s 
concepts frame the sort of understanding of things that we have by means 
of our practical familiarity with them. Engagement, understood as a 
present-at-hand, is an intimate understanding of things, in Heidegger’s 
formulation a pre-understanding (Vor-habe). Due to engagement, we are 
never in contact with things on ‘pure’ or blank-sheet conditions, but 
disclose them within a coherent conception of the world. Understanding 
always takes form through connections of impressions, experiences, and 
familiarity that we have – what Heidegger conceived as our getting-around-
in-the-world. Heidegger means that we operate within a familiarity with 
things as we get around with them, e.g. in the way we use them. The basic 
idea is that our experience is shaped by certain conditions, for example our 
bodily predicament.130 
When Heidegger speaks of the world, he deploys a central idea of Kant’s 
transcendental thinking.131 Kant’s investigation of sensual impressions is 
concerned with the special character of impressions that they are about 
something. This, Kant argues, can only be established through a 
                                         
130 Taylor further clarifies the sort of awareness implied in our conditions of 
intelligibility by emphasizing that while we are not thinking about our conditions of 
intelligibility as we make experiences, we could bring them to our attention if we 
wanted – at least in part. Our articulation of our background framework “makes 
intelligible what I am uncontestably aware of; but at the same time I cannot be said to 
be explicitly or focally aware of it, because that status is already occupied by what it is 
making intelligible.” Ibid., 210. The idea of articulating the background is not meant as 
an objective description of the background. The articulation of the background also 
needs the background to succeed, which means there is no point outside the background 
from which to approach the background. 
131  Heidegger’s comprehensive work, and especially his concept of world 
(“Welt”/Welt) as presented in Sein und Zeit (primarily §12-27), reflects many aspects 
that cohere more with the questions of this study than can actually be considered. The 
ability to discuss Heidegger in relation to the positions presented in this chapter outsize 
the scope of this study. I limit myself in this study to minor remarks, but primarily leave 
Heidegger’s own work aside. Besides the question of engagement, the central 
Heideggerian influence on Taylor lies in Taylor’s critique of naturalism and the 
naturalistic conception of the world in modern rationality. Heidegger presents these 
thoughts in various texts, but more thoroughly in his direct discussions on modern 
technology, especially in “Die Frage nach der Technik.” Another illuminating 
expression of Heidegger’s ideas is his Bremen-lectures from 1949 “Die Frage nach dem 
Ding” and “Das Ge-Stell” Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 79: Bremer und 
Freiburger Vorträge, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 2005).  
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fundamental relation of our knowledge to the object of the impression.132 
The ‘aboutness’ of the impression, and its determinate character, depends 
on a context of relations in which the object of impression gains its 
determination, as a position, that it is an impression of a thing in the world. 
The object of impression has to be determined in relations to other things 
from which it can be distinguished. If I cannot determine the object of 
impression through its relations to other things, then it would be completely 
indeterminate for me. The determination of an object of impression through 
its differences from and similarities to other things (a context of 
constitutive relations) is, in Kant’s argument, only possible due to a unity of 
the world that one has to presume in order for anything to present itself as 
something determinate. We could also say that to determine something is to 
place it within a context of relations to other things. Heidegger’s 
application of this Kantian idea leads to the idea that things are disclosed 
both through a world and as part of a world: the world is something 
through which things have their being for us. The world that goes before 
and enables the disclosure of things designates our engagement and 
embeddedness in our environment.  
Taylor’s application of this idea of ‘world’, as the framework that 
provides the context of intelligibility and the sense we make of our 
experiences, emphasizes the plasticity of the world: the world is a 
contestable framework that we shape in negotiations of either social ways 
or ways of responding to big questions. There is never a static or resting 
world that provides us with sense, but a dialectic motion between our self-
awareness and situations we are presented with. Taylor therefore asserts 
that “World shaping is a matter of sense making.”133 The fact that things 
make sense to us is due to our embeddedness, to our being-in-the-world – 
Heidegger calls it the ‘Lichtung’ (clearing). Decisively, it is not a subject-
centered idea of the world, but the idea that we in our world-shaping and 
our articulation of our world respond to something which is not 
ourselves.134 It is not the external world, reality, or anything that can be 
                                         
132 This idea of a necessary relation of knowledge to its objects (Von der Beziehung 
aller Erkenntnis auf ihren Gegenstand, Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998), A104.) is later called ‘intentionality’, and it is also a 
central concern in McDowell’s discussion in Mind and World.  
133  Taylor, “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,” 213. While 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘Lichtung’, in parallel to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘Lebenswelt’, 
has inspired Taylor’s charge against the detachment of the self in widespread modern 
rationality, Heidegger and Taylor can be held apart when it comes to ethics. While 
Heidegger never engaged directly with ethical questions in his approach to ontology (as 
he understood it), Taylor’s conception of ‘moral ontologies’ puts the question of strong 
evaluation and constitutive goods at the centre of his approach to the self.  
134 Taylor, “Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels Between Heidegger and Wittgenstein,” 
77. 
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articulated within our framework, but simply the brute fact that our 
framework is responding to a fundamental facticity. In modern thinking, 
this is the idea that has been framed as ‘the decentered self.’  
As we move on to the next part that is concerned with Schelling’s notion 
of personhood, the questions of this discussion will not be forgotten. 
Through this discussion, we have provided our approach to Schelling with 
markers of contemporary positions that enable us to assess Schelling’s 
notion of the human being as embedded in the world, and furthermore to 
consider Schelling’s potential for a notion of religious orientation – 
something which we will do in Part III, in discussion with Dalferth’s 
philosophy of religion.  
  
 PART II 
 
Schelling’s Notion of Personhood 
5 Schelling and Post-Kantian Idealism 
5.1 Introduction 
The following exploration of F.W.J. Schelling’s thinking aims at an 
interpretation of the notion of personhood found in his later thought.135 
Personhood pertains to an ontological situation in which Schelling exploits 
the philosophical components of his later ontology, which is an ontology of 
freedom. The systematic reconstruction of personhood aims to show the 
composition of human embeddedness in the world insofar as it pertains to 
the questions raised in part one: how does the human being relate to the 
world, and how is that relation formative of the world? 
Schelling is not an unusual historical figure to address. The influence of 
his later thought can be traced through various 19th and 20th-century 
traditions such as phenomenology, existentialism and psycho-analysis. 
Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and many others 
were influenced, inspired, and provoked by the gravity of Schelling’s 
insights concerning the tasks and challenges of modern philosophy. 
Moreover, his more recent reception, especially in the Anglo-American 
world, shows the compatibility of his thinking with debates in 
contemporary philosophy.136  
                                         
135 Schelling’s thinking takes several developmental steps around which there has 
been a lot of dispute. I find it to be an important trait of Schelling that he never directly 
abandons any of his earlier positions; instead he continuously seeks to reformulate, 
rearrange, re-integrate, re-situate or re-interpret his former works. As mentioned in the 
introduction, my overall orientation in Schelling’s development is guided by 
Theunissen’s thesis of three distinct approaches of Schelling: an egological approach, 
which he assigns to Schelling’s early thinking; an anthropological approach, which he 
assigns to his middle period (e.g. Freiheitsschrift and fragment of the Ages of the 
World); and finally an onto-theological approach, which he assigns to Schelling’s later 
thinking. My concern with Schelling’s notion of personhood seeks to understand its 
central formulations in the middle period against the background of the onto-theological 
framework of his later period. I tie these two late approaches together and refer to them 
as the ‘mature’ or simply ‘late’ thinking. What I refer to as Schelling’s ontology of 
freedom covers this tie. Michael Theunissen, “Schellings anthropologischer ansatz,” 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 47, no. 1–3 (1965): 174-189. 
136 See for example Edward Beach, The Potencies of God(s): Schelling’s Philosophy 
of Mythology (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); Andrew Bowie, 
Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction (London; New York: 
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A re-application of Schelling’s thought is neither sufficient nor what I 
intend to do here. Instead, my interest in Schelling relates directly to the 
question of the world, particularly as it pertains to the question of 
orientation. From the later Schelling, I seek to extract a theory of human 
embeddedness that situates the question of the world in a notion of 
personhood. Hence, the following study of Schelling’s thinking seeks to 
illuminate his notion of personhood through the question of human 
conditions of orientation as embedded and, as such, determined by the 
world. In Schelling’s multifaceted contribution to these matters, we find the 
human being explored not only in its characteristic as an autonomous being, 
but also as an ontonomous being, that is, in the way it is determinded 
through being. 
For the late Schelling, the question of being is the question of the world. 
The human being is engaged and participating in being because being is 
affirmed at the level of the world-relation. In light of this, we can say that 
being is determined by meaning. However, the thinking subject is taken to 
be a part of the world of objects and is not placed outside of it. There are, 
as a fact, meaningful impressions of reality as something given. By the 
given I mean that there are meaningful appearances in the form of a 
phenomenal world. This implies that whatever there is must (at least to 
some degree) be compatible with the procedure of being grasped by 
thought. This procedure, so Schelling, is itself a part of whatever there is. 
There are thoughts about the world. For Schelling, this means that thoughts 
about the world are themselves part of the world. This is due to the fact that 
thoughts derive from a free, but also embedded, thinking subject that exists 
in the world. What Schelling aims at is a radical integration of 
epistemology into ontology, which implies that being consists of objects 
qua objects of thought. In all this, personhood designates the thinking 
human being. 
Schelling’s notion of personhood is a renewed notion of the thinking 
subject and it derives from his later ontology. He developed this through a 
                                                                                                                       
Routledge, 1993); Bernard Freydberg, Schelling’s Dialogical Freedom Essay: 
Provocative Philosophy Then and Now (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2008); David Krell, The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing 
of God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Bruce Matthews, Schelling’s 
Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2011); Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996); Jason Wirth, The Conspiracy 
of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2003); Jason Wirth, Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Alistair Welchman and Judith Norman, 
eds., The New Schelling (New York; London: Continuum, 2004); Slavoj Zizek, The 
Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters (London; New 
York: Verso, 1996). 
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critique of rational immanentist thinking, which is represented both in his 
own philosophical tradition of post-Kantian idealism as well as within the 
broader tradition of onto-theological metaphysics (running [at least] from 
Plato to Spinoza). My presentation of Schelling’s notion of personhood 
must therefore be understood in the context of Schelling’s mature ontology. 
The philosophical value of the notion of personhood depends on the 
possibility of a valid and useful reconstruction of its systematic role in such 
a context. At a certain point in Schelling’s thinking, he initiates a 
development or reformulation of his earlier thinking in a reinforced critique 
of purely rationalistic thinking such as that found in Spinoza and Hegel. 
What changes in his development towards the grounding of a new 
philosophy, a positive philosophy, must be understood through his analysis 
and critique of the logical immanence in negative philosophy, that is, 
purely rational philosophy.  
In regard to the discussion in Part I, we can assume that the central 
aspects of Schelling’s ontology somehow enable a transformation of 
dichotomies from an epistemological setup, such as subject-object and 
mind-world constellations. Conceiving of Schelling’s employment of his 
notion of personhood requires that we reassess these dichotomies from 
within the standpoint of idealistic thinking. If the question of orientation 
can be sought in structures of embededness and features of movement 
rather than one-dimensional structures of flat causation and representation, 
then we have a broader and far more suitable basis for understanding what 
embeddedness means for an understanding of the human self. It is my 
claim that Schelling’s notion of personhood provides such a basis. 
Schelling achieved the turn that led to his mature ontology through the 
question of freedom as the way of relating the noumenal and the 
phenomenal. His ontology is an ontology of freedom whose central 
ambition is to show “that everything real (nature, the world of things) has 
activity, life and freedom as its ground.”137 More precisely, Schelling 
                                         
137 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 22. My italics. Schelling is from the outset of his 
approach to freedom in critical dialogue with both Kant and Fichte as the context of this 
quote from the Freiheitsschrift clearly shows: “es wird vielmehr gefordert, auch 
umgekehrt zu zeigen, daß alles Wirkliche (die Natur, die Welt der Dinge) Thätigkeit, 
Leben und Freiheit zum Grund habe, oder im Fichteschen Ausdruck, daß nicht allein die 
Ichheit alles, sondern auch umgekehrt alles Ichheit sey. Der Gedanke, die Freiheit 
einmal zum Eins und Alles der Philosophie zu machen […]. Nur wer Freiheit gekostet 
hat, kann das Verlangen empfinden, ihr alles analog zu machen, sie über das ganze 
Universum zu verbreiten. […] Es wird aber immer merkwürdig bleiben, daß Kant, 
nachdem er zuerst Dinge an sich von Erscheinungen nur negativ, durch die 
Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit, unterschieden, nachher in den metaphysischen 
Erörterungen seiner Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit und 
Freiheit wirklich als correlate Begriffe behandelt hatte, nicht zu dem Gedanken fortging, 
diesen einzig möglichen positiven Begriff des An-sich auch auf die Dinge überzutragen, 
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slowly initiated this ontology of freedom in the years leading up to his 
famous Freiheitsschrift in 1809. From that point on, Schelling was 
dedicated to the project of “making freedom the one and all of 
philosophy.”138 In the context of this development, and its concern with 
freedom, anthropology came to play a decisive role.139 What Schelling has 
in mind with his notion of personhood covers more than theoretical 
subjectivity. It is a more full human ground of reality as also indicated with 
activity, life, but ultimately designated freedom. 
Schelling’s critical move drove him beyond the limits of a logical 
concept of being, to a new concept of being that we can characterize as 
historical and contingent. It is in this context that Schelling introduces a 
notion of personhood, a notion that explicitly gives expression to the 
conditions of the unity of being and thought. Personhood is therefore not an 
anthropological issue independent from the question of being, but has its 
place directly in the question of being. Before we can move to the notion of 
personhood we must therefore form an idea of the ontological context. 
5.2 Post-Kantian Metaphysics 
Classical German philosophy, often referred to as German Idealism, took 
place in the fifty year period from the publication of Kant’s first critique in 
1781 to Hegel’s death in 1831. The foundation for Schelling’s philosophy 
(together with Fichte and Hegel) was Kant’s program of critical thinking. 
What Kant had started, developed into a modern kind of metaphysical 
thinking that was, on the one hand, idealistic in the way Kant could be said 
to be idealistic and, on the other hand, metaphysical in a way made 
possible only by Kant (albeit in a manner that Kant never pursued himself). 
Hence, due to the ambiguous relation to Kant, it seems more accurate to 
designate this tradition post-Kantian idealism.  
Even though post-Kantian idealists moved far beyond the scope of 
Kant’s thinking, especially his critique of metaphysics, they did so by 
means of the fundamental principles established by Kant’s transcendental 
program. “They all believed themselves to be true Kantians,” as Dieter 
                                                                                                                       
wodurch er sich unmittelbar zu einem höhern Standpunkt der Betrachtung und über die 
Negativität erhoben hätte, die der Charakter seiner theoretischen Philosophie ist.” SW, 
VII 352f. 
138 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 22; SW, VII 352. 
139 On the anthropological aspects of Schelling’s late thought see Jörg Jantzen and 
Peter L. Oesterreich, Schellings philosophische Anthropologie (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: 
Frommann-Holzboog, 2002); Jochem Hennigfeld, “Die Menschlichkeit des Absoluten,” 
in Philosophische Anthropologie im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Friedhelm Decher and Jochem 
Hennigfeld (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991), 37-50; Thomas Buchheim 
and Friedrich Hermanni, eds., “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem dunklen Grunde”: 
Schellings Philosophie der Personalität (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2004). 
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Henrich puts it.140 They never turned directly against or away from what 
Kant had initiated with the Critique of Pure Reason; rather, they moved on 
as Kantians who knew that the conditions of possibility for doing 
philosophy needed to be incorporated into philosophy as such. Post-
Kantian idealists knew more than anyone the extent to which Kant’s 
monumental philosophy had changed the conditions for doing philosophy. 
In their view, metaphysics had become possible in a new way that was not 
within Kant’s interests of formulating a philosophical science. Hence, the 
new tenets that characterize the post-Kantians reveal a shift of interests.  
Kant’s critique of metaphysics promoted arguments concerning the 
impossibility of accounting for the totality of noumenal reality. At the same 
time, Kant underlined that the problems of metaphysics, as well as the 
nature of metaphysics, lies in human reason as a natural disposition.141 The 
ambition of metaphysical thinking to seek an account for the totality of 
noumenal reality is natural, yet impossible, and it builds upon an illusion. 
Nevertheless, this illusion is where philosophy begins. The illusion of 
metaphysics can only be exposed through a procedure of refinement of 
reason. Hence, philosophy does not begin with truth. It is only because 
there is an original metaphysics that there can be a critique of metaphysics. 
This point gives rise to a new understanding of the task of philosophy and 
of the post-Kantian ambition to re-think metaphysics and to do this from a 
new level, a meta-perspective. The meta-perspective on metaphysics 
became itself the progress of metaphysical thinking.  
From its concern with accounts of ultimate reality, philosophy must turn 
its focus to the history of the illusions of philosophy, to the history of 
metaphysics.142 Decisively, post-Kantian idealists inherited this Kantian 
                                         
140  Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 31. Manfred Frank elaborates 
“Die Philosophie, so war Schellings Überzeugung, hat mit Kant einen ungeheuren 
Schritt nach vorn getan; zugleich war ein Reflexionsniveau definiert, hinter das nicht 
zurückfallen durfte, wer seinerseits sich anheischig machen wollte, Kant zu überbieten. 
Und eben das war Schellings Anspruch.” Manfred Frank, Eine Einführung in Schellings 
Philosophie, 2. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 25. 
141 The statement from the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason says: “For 
human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, inexorably 
pushes on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered by any 
experiential use of reason and of principles borrowed from such a use; and thus a certain 
sort of metaphysics has actually been present in all human beings as soon as reason has 
extended itself to speculation in them, and it will also always remain there. And now 
about this too the question is: How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible?” 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B21–22. 
142 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 29–45. “Before there can be an insight that 
there is some illusion in this metaphysics, there has first to be an original metaphysics. 
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turn: to account for the necessary occurrence of illusions about noumenal 
reality for the possibility of the emergence of truth as the primary task of 
philosophy. By unearthing the systematic structure of reason, philosophy 
would become able to see through the illusion of metaphysics. Behind the 
metaphysical illusions, the principles of reason are revealed in their a priori 
reality. The central aims were therefore to ‘see through’ the “illusion that 
keeps metaphysics in a state where no progress is possible”, “to develop a 
pure complete system of all metaphysical statements and proofs” and “offer 
a complete system of all ontological concepts that are used in 
metaphysics.”143 In this sense, idealists took the task of philosophy to be a 
translation of the ontological system of metaphysics into the complete 
system of reason. 
Kant’s arguments for the ‘transcendental illusions’ were crucial to the 
post-Kantian’s way of doing metaphysics. The whole idea of a noumenal 
world was therefore transformed in light of these fundamental traits of 
reason. The world was no longer approached as an object isolated from our 
thoughts about it. The idea of such a world is an illusory but necessary 
construction, a regulative idea that supports the form of experience we 
both have and possibly can have. Along this line of thought, we can speak 
of an integration of epistemology into ontology, which implies a genuine 
focus on being as something determined by the conditions of thinking. The 
nature of objects was therefore explored as objects of thought.  
The concept of being is taken out of a representationalist setting. The 
subject-object encounter is constitutive of being in the encounter itself. The 
world cannot be understood as something preceding the encounter, but only 
as the subject-object unity, as the given. Thoughts about the world 
therefore belong to the world. According to this transcendental ontology, 
the thinking subject must be conceived both within and as a part of the 
world of objects qua objects of thought. The meaningful character of the 
given implies that the given (at least to some extent) is compatible with the 
procedure of being grasped by thought. By integrating the appearance of 
the given and the conditions under which the given appears to thought – its 
phenomenalization – into being, the ontological gap between being and 
thought disolves. Hence, “thoughts about the way the world is are 
themselves a way the world is.”144  
                                                                                                                       
Only then can one start on the program of critical philosophy. Because, in his view 
[Kant’s], one cannot get to the truth all at once at the beginning, there are necessary 
stages of the development of philosophy.” Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 32. See 
also the section ‘The Logic of Illusion’ in Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short 
Introduction, Rev. ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 54–72. 
143 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 32. 
144 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, xii. 
Schelling and the Post-Kantian Idealism 
 
73 
This radical conception of the unity of being and thought was a central 
feature of the ontology of post-Kantians. As Kant had argued, this unity is 
established by the self-consciousness by means of which an object is an 
object only within the constitutive relation of self-consciousness to the 
content of thought.145 
The heritage of Kant formed this new sort of transcendental metaphysics. 
As much as transcendental thinking changes the way in which metaphysics 
is done, it remains metaphysics to the extent that it pursues a determination 
of the whole, a theory of totality. If metaphysics can rightfully be 
understood as a reaching out to the whole that seeks to determine what the 
whole is, then we can indeed speak of idealism as a metaphysical 
tradition.146 However, what changes is the way in which idealists approach 
and conceive of ‘the whole.’ At the transcendental level, the idea of the 
whole has transformed into reflections on the ontological conditions for the 
conditions of access to what there is. Idealists seek to incorporate these 
conditions of access to being into being.  
After Kant, metaphysical thinking itself became the object of 
metaphysics. The central component became the thinking subject and the 
conditions of reason. Despite all of Kant’s comprehensive analysis of the 
work of reason, he presupposed the existence of the thinking subject as a 
fact and never really accounted for its existence as such.147 Regardless of 
the fundamental importance of the thinking subject, Kant’s strict separation 
of ontology and transcendental philosophy made him refrain from 
exploring the ontological existence of the thinking subject. However, for 
idealists, reality is understood as something in which the existing, thinking 
subject is a central part. Moreover, the thinking subject is not merely an 
inherent part, it is the essential part. It is reason’s inevitable vantage point. 
Metaphysics has therefore come to center on the actual existence of the 
thinking subject and the question about what kind of world gives rise to 
such a subject.148  
The metaphysics of post-Kantian idealists derives from the ontological 
implications of the actual existence of the thinking subject, in which being 
                                         
145 “Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst 
würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches 
eben so viel heißt als: die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für 
mich nichts sein.” KrV, B131f. 
146 See the discussion on the metaphysical character of post-Kantian idealism in 
Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 3. 
147 See Frank, Eine Einführung in Schellings Philosophie, 39ff. 
148 Gabriel says: “The subject with its conceptual capacities actually exists; it is part 
of the world. Therefore the question arises: what conditions have to be fulfilled by 
being (the world) in order for it to appear to finite thinkers who in turn change the 
structure of what there is by referring to it?” Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, ix. 
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and appearance are no longer separated as distinct aspects. 
Phenomenalization means that the appearance of being is conceived as 
being. It is being’s way of being being. Being is radically understood as the 
given, as what gives rise to givenness as such. Being consists in its own 
appearing; to wit, being is constituted in the very feature of appearing. 
How can we, at least preliminarily, characterize this notion of being? To 
anticipate one of the points to be developed in the course of this chapter: 
being lies in the moment of intelligibility and through the feature of making 
sense. When reason is understood as the unity of being and thought it 
means that reason is the form of being through which it makes sense. Being 
does not represent something that is more real, or really real, like a ‘thing 
in itself.’ What is given is intelligible, comprehensible, meaningful, and 
makes sense. Whatever the conditions for sense could be said to be, they 
are fulfilled in givenness. Hence, the unity of being and thought is manifest 
in givenness. 
The idea of the given reflects the implication that objects are not objects 
independent of the way they make sense as objects. Additionally, the world 
(to which these objects belong), the reality of all there is, is not 
independent from the (illusory) ways in which it has been understood. At 
both levels we find a radical unity of thought and being. 
5.3 Knowledge and Nature 
In his first Critique, Kant established that reason reaches beyond itself 
towards a totality of the whole. This anticipation of the world in its totality, 
omnitudo realitas, is a transcendental idea that motivates, guides, and 
supports the constitution of knowledge. It provides reason with a unity of 
totality as a background that enables the faculty of understanding for 
grasping anything at all. However, this unity also provides a systematic 
form of knowledge.149  
The totality of the world is an inexorable transcendence, which is the 
fundamental condition that enables and motivates the work of reason. The 
only guarantee of systematic unity lies in this transcendence that precedes 
the constitution of any object of knowledge, any application of predicates, 
                                         
149  Kant says, “Übersehen wir unsere Verstandeserkenntnisse in ihrem ganzen 
Umfange, so finden wir, daß dasjenige, was Vernunft ganz eigentümlich darüber 
verfügt und zu Stande zu bringen sucht, das Systematische der Erkenntnis sei, d.i. der 
Zusammenhang derselben aus einem Prinzip. Diese Vernunfteinheit setzt jederzeit eine 
Idee voraus, nämlich die von der Form eines Ganzen der Erkenntnis, welches vor der 
bestimmten Erkenntnis der Teile vorhergeht und die Bedingungen enthält, jedem Teile 
seine Stelle und Verhältnis zu den übrigen a priori zu bestimmen. Diese Idee postuliert 
demnach vollständige Einheit der Verstandeserkenntnis, wodurch diese nicht bloß ein 
zufälliges Aggregat, sondern ein nach notwendigen Gesetzen zusammenhangendes 
System wird.” KrV, B673. 
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and the possibility of understanding. Nevertheless, this unity is provided by 
reason. 
There is no doubt that Kant’s transcendental philosophy was the 
philosophical basis for post-Kantian idealism. That being said, there was 
also a deep admiration for the great rationalists, Leibniz and Spinoza, with 
whom the idealists shared the ambition that philosophical knowledge could 
be presented in its systematic form as a coherent system. Kant had already 
provided the tools and Spinoza had showed how it could be done.  
The examination of reason was understood as the highest philosophical 
method for achieving knowledge. Due to the unity of reason, no knowledge 
stands apart from or without the coherence of its constitutive relations. 
Knowledge is coherent by nature and implicitly forms a coherent system. 
Philosophy can therefore take up the task of exploring the systematics of 
knowledge, that is, of exploring the system of knowledge. The 
philosophical system – in Fichte’s version a so-called ‘Science of 
Knowledge’ (Wissenschaftslehre) – was understood as the scientific form 
of philosophy that could bring together all of the knowledge of the different 
sciences. The philosophical system is a structured coherence that deduces 
its content from one single principle, a self-evident and self-grounding 
principle, a principle of the absolute.  
In pursuing this line of enquiry, Fichte followed Kant closesly, 
beginning with the notion of the self-consciousness of the subject. For Kant, 
self-consciousness consists in the subject’s enterprise of combining or 
synthesizing representations with each other. This synthesizing is 
independent of the content. The unity and structure of experience constitute 
the continuity of the conscious self. In Kant’s own thinking, this structure 
is not a property of reality in itself but a property of the thinking cognitive 
faculty. The principle of this unity, Kant's principle of apperception, ties 
the self to any cognitive activity, to thinking as such. 
If, as proposed by Dieter Henrich, the Kantian subject can be outlined 
with the three characteristics of unity, activity, and emptiness, then we find 
that each characteristic inseparably ties the subject to a world in a relation 
that is constitutive for both.150 The subject is defined by its way of having 
thoughts about something. The subject is only a subject because something 
is given (to it), hence, there is no subject unless something (anything at all) 
is given.151 The subject is characterized by the unity of thoughts and the 
active incorporation of thoughts into that unity. The subject is therefore not 
an entity independent from the world. This is why the subject is 
                                         
150 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 38–41. See Henrich’s exposition of the central 
transformation of Kant’s thinking into the idealist project of the philosophical system. 
Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, esp. 15–61. 
151 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 41. 
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characterized as empty. The content of the subject is always something that 
is not itself. Henrich calls this the ‘internal accusative’ in the ‘I think.’152 
The emptiness of the subject states the necessary relation of the subject to 
its content, that is, the thoughts about the world.  
In this notion of the thinking subject, Fichte identified the principle of 
the unconditioned, the absolute, from which to point out the coherence of 
knowledge, that is, to deduce a system.153 The self, as the inherent unity in 
the thinking enterprise, contains a reflective aspect, which is the self-
consciousness of the ‘Ich’. While thinking of something, the ‘Nicht-Ich,’ 
the Ich is aware of itself as the one thinking, which makes the Ich 
comprehensible only through the “indissoluble mutual correlation between 
the unity of self-consciousness and unity of the world.”154 Nevertheless, the 
unity of the world reflects the more fundamental unity of the Ich because, 
as Fichte saw it, objects of thought are produced by the Ich.155 Fichte 
therefore employed the principle of Ich as the principle of the absolute.  
Inspired by Fichte’s agenda, Schelling, and later Hegel, took up the task 
of formulating a philosophical system. However, in contrast to Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel posed the absolute not as the unity of the Ich, but as a 
unity underlying the thinking subject and its content, that is, a unity prior to 
their distinction. This move was actually a critique aimed against Kant for 
having abandoned the identity of the subject and the world and not having 
united the subject-object dichotomies in a vital connection.156 Schelling and 
                                         
152 Ibid. “There is always an ‘internal accusative’ in the “I think,” but its content is 
not an analytical implication of the meaning of the “I think.” What I am thinking is 
something different from the structure “I think” and is contingent in relation to it.” 
153 Following his short programmatic essay, Concerning the Concept of the Science 
of Knowledge, Fichte’s most influential philosophical treatise was his 1794 Foundations 
of the Entire Science of Knowledge. Among many other highly regarded publications, 
the different versions of his system bear witness to the fact that Fichte was occupied 
with the project of his Science of Knowledge throughout his entire life. 
154 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 22. See also Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 
15–28. 
155 Kant’s own argument for the unity of self-consciousness is that we can represent 
nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves. 
“[D]aß wir uns nichts, als im Objekt verbunden, vorstellen können, ohne es vorher 
selbst verbunden zu haben, und unter allen Vorstellungen die Verbindung die einzige ist, 
die nicht durch Objecte gegeben, sondern nur vom Subjekte selbst verrichtet werden 
kann, weil sie ein Actus seiner Selbsttätigkeit ist.” Kant, KrV, B130. 
156 Compare Andrew Bowie, who writes: “The vital factor which has sustained the 
actuality of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is its refusal to see the thinking subject as 
simply opposed to nature as a world of objects, because the subject is itself part of 
nature” Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 31. Frederick Beiser offers 
a similar explanation: “Rather than making nature the product of the transcendental 
subject, the absolute idealists [Schelling and Hegel] did the very opposite, deriving the 
transcendental subject from its place within nature. The rationality of the Kantian-
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Hegel’s idea of the absolute as the unity that underlies all differences has 
far-reaching ontological consequences. No matter how much the world and 
the thinking subject could be thought of as separate, they ultimately had to 
belong to the same deeperlying unity, which was in fact what explained the 
very possibility of a subject-object encounter.  
Schelling, who first exposed this idea in a philosophy of nature, was 
especially concerned with the question of origin: thought and its content 
(subject and object) are both parts of the world and must therefore derive 
from the same origin. Schelling’s radical inclusion of everything into a 
monism carries with it the idea of an absolute origin for everything. This is 
the ontological implication of the claim that the absolute is nature. In 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature, the argumentation follows the idea that 
being has itself organized the compatibility of thinking with the world in 
order to gain, through reason, knowledge about itself. Hence, the epistemic 
features of the subject must have a common origin with (or in) the rest of 
everything. The subject’s access to the world cannot be set aside, 
ontologically suspended, or excluded as an obscure exception from what 
exists. Experience manifests a compatibility, or fit, between the world and 
our access to it: the fact that we are granted some sort of access to 
something. Consequently, the thoughts we have about whatever we are 
granted access to cannot not be part of what is. They must derive from a 
common origin. 
The idea of the absolute as the common origin entails the auto-epistemic 
feature of post-Kantian idealism, which, in various expressions, asserts that 
being has a relation to itself through consciousness as such.157 The idea is 
that being reflects itself, that it is conscious of itself (Bewußt-Sein): the 
self-consciousness of being. The possibility of experience and cognition is 
both an achievement and a feature of being. The possibility of experience 
therefore documents a form of compatibility and connection between being 
and thoughts. To speak of the world as something real, separate from 
thoughts about the world, as objective, as external, inevitably runs into 
problems. Schelling is occupied with the idea that thoughts about the world 
also derive from the world. As Wolfram Hogrebe says, the cosmological 
implication of this idea is that human cognition echoes the existence of the 
world, insofar as the existence of the world causes there to be a world for 
us.158 Schelling is keen on this evolutionary speculation that the world 
                                                                                                                       
Fichtean subject now became nothing more than the highest manifestation and 
realization of the powers of nature” Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle 
Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 
2002), 4. 
157 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 51–58. 
158 Ibid., 23–25. Hogrebe offers an illuminating description of Schelling’s formation 
of this stance in his relation to Fichte: “Schelling erkannte, daß die kognitiven 
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gives rise to the perspective of the thinking subject on itself, or the fact that 
the world is conceivable for someone, ‘for us’. This influences his entire 
approach to ontology in which the epistemic and cognitive capacities are 
thought into the question of being as such.159  
In the early period, circa 1797-1799, Schelling’s primary concern with 
these matters of ultimate immanence was carried out as an attempt to 
formulate the system of nature.160 The concept of nature is derived from the 
possibility and the existence of a realm of experience. Schelling did not 
approach nature directly, as a philosophical exploration of physical-
biological nature. His concern was guided by the phenomenon of 
experience to which such a thing as nature appears. Thus, the central 
question is how a world ‘outside of us’, including nature and our 
experience of it, is possible at all.161 Schelling’s aim was to show the 
coherence between ‘the outer world’ and the fact that we, as thinking 
subjects, come to see it as outer. The question of origin does not therefore 
                                                                                                                       
Leistungen des Ich in ihrem transzendentalen Spielraum insgesamt ein Faktum vom 
Charakter des Nicht-Ich sind. Anders ausgedrückt: sicher gilt mit Kant und Fichte, daß 
wir die Welt nur soweit erkennen können, als wir sie erkennen können, aber daß wir 
dies können, so Schelling, ist nicht wiederum eine Eigenschaft unseres Könnens, 
sondern der Welt: Welterkenntnis ist jedenfalls auch ein Weltereignis. Es ist die Natur, 
die erkennende Entitäten hervortreten läßt, und so greift die Produktivität der Natur 
durch die epistemische Verfassung und Leistung der Subjekte noch hindurch in dem 
Sinne, daß wir selbst in unseren Erkenntnissen bloß Dokument einer sich selbst 
erkennenden Natur sind und mit dem Faktum des Erkennens jedenfalls nicht aus ihr 
herausspringen. Deshalb impliziert, so Schellings Argument, die Erkenntnistheorie 
letztlich eine kosmologische Option derart, daß die Weltenstehung ein Echo in unserer 
Welterkenntnis hat. Daß es überhaupt eine Welt gibt, hat zum Resultat, daß es eine Welt 
für uns gibt.” Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 23–24. 
159 In his early writings he says: “Die äußere Welt liegt vor uns aufgeschlagen, um in 
ihr die Geschichte unseres Geistes wieder zu finden” SW, I 383.  
160 Schelling’s first draft on a philosophy of nature was written in 1797, the Ideen zu 
einer Philosophie der Natur, followed by Von der Weltseele in 1798, on the organizing 
forces of nature. In 1799 Schelling published Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems 
der Naturphilosophie in which he laid the ground for the relation between 
transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature as two corresponding sciences. In 
Abhandlung über das Verhältnis des Realen und Idealen in der Natur, 1806, Schelling’s 
concept of nature in many aspects reached back to elements in his early unpublished 
studies on Gnostic thinking and Plato’s Timaeus, thereby giving warning of a greater 
change. For an introductory overview of the stages of Schelling’s philosophy of nature 
see Wolfgang Wieland, “Die Anfänge der Philosophie Schellings und die Frage nach 
der Natur,” in Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfängen, ed. Manfred Frank 
and Kurz Gerhard (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), p. 406-440; Hans-Jörg 
Sandkühler, ed., F.W.J. Schelling (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1998). 
161 The guiding question of Schelling’s philosophy of nature is: “Wie eine Welt 
außer uns, wie eine Natur und mit ihr Erfahrung möglich sey“ SW, II 12. 
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concern the outer world, but, even more fundamentally, the origin of our 
conception of it as an outer world, and hence, as an object of thought.162  
Kant failed by separating nature and reason by means of two different 
sets of laws. Accordingly, Schelling was therefore dedicated to developing 
a general theory of nature that could unite an understanding of the mental 
and the physical under a single idea. The very possibility of experience was, 
after all, a central expression of a subject-object split that reflects a split 
within a primordial unity.163 
Schelling’s first complete proposal of a transcendental system, the 
System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), has many architechtonic 
similarities with Fichte’s Science of Knowledge, and clearly foreshadows 
the method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Schelling’s 
philosophy of nature had countered Fichte’s subjectivistic approach to the 
subject-object identity with an objective approach. However, Schelling’s 
1800 system develops the subject-object identity from two opposite sides 
or poles: the realism of his philosophy of nature and the idealism of 
transcendental consciousness. The identity of the absolute is thereby 
developed both from the unconscious to the conscious (realism) and from 
the conscious to the unconscious (idealism).  
It is important to underline that for Schelling, knowledge carries with it 
an ontological feature, which makes consciousness itself an ontological 
principle understood as Bewußt-Sein. In the philosophy of nature, 
consciousness is articulated as soul. However, the conception of the 
absolute self-consciousness gives rise to individuality in the form of finite 
                                         
162 Beiser calls this concern with experience a naturalistic epistemology, that is, “one 
which attempts to explain the origin and possibility of knowledge by placing the subject 
and object of knowledge within nature as a whole” Beiser, German Idealism, 511. 
Elsewhere Beiser says, “If transcendental philosophy could postulate the absolute 
reality of the ego, Naturphilosophie could do the same for nature itself. The 
fundamental presupposition of Naturphilosophie is therefore the autonomy of nature, 
which means that the basic forces of nature must be sought within it. True to this new, 
more naturalistic standpoint, Schelling now called his Naturphilosophie ‘the Spinozism 
of physics.’” Beiser, German Idealism, 530. 
163 Early on, Schelling is aware of the gravity of these metaphysical questions and 
the problem of immanence. In Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1895) he asks 
“Warum gibt es überhaupt ein Gebiet der Erfahrung? Jede Antwort, die ich darauf gebe, 
setzt das Daseyn einer Erfahrungswelt selbst schon voraus. Um also diese Frage 
beantworten zu können, müssten wir vorerst das Gebiet der Erfahrung verlassen haben: 
hätten wir aber einmal jenes Gebiet verlassen, so würde die Frage selbst wegfallen” SW, 
I 310. The fact of experience is incomprehensible. Schelling calls it a tension or the 
original conflict in the human spirit. “[D]er ursprüngliche Widerstreit im menschlichen 
Geiste […] Dieser Punkt aber ist kein anderer als das Heraustreten aus dem Absoluten; 
denn über das Absolute würden wir alle einig seyn, wenn wir seine Sphäre niemals 
verließen; und träten wir nie aus derselben, so hätten wir kein anderes Gebiet zum 
Streiten.” SW, I 294.  
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consciousness and the dimensions of human action. Schelling’s system 
covers both theoretical and practical philosophy, as well as aesthetics, in 
the form of a history of art. The principles of nature reflect a necessity that 
Schelling, through the implementation of practical philosophy, expands and 
combines with second nature in the form of freedom and applies to 
individual subjects. The absolute is unfolded through its continuous 
development in the history of self-consciousness, which shows the 
development of second nature in the historical formation of right and the 
state, that is, in a moral world-order.164  
Schelling’s employment of a historical approach to the absolute as a 
history of self-consciousness, has severe consequenses for the 
understanding of the eternal and unchangeable nature of reason. To derive 
the history of being from the historical development of self-consciousness 
is to submit reason to a historical process of developmental stages. The 
implementation of history is decisive for the development of Schelling’s 
later thought in a historical philosophy, later identified as positive 
philosophy. 165  In his later work, the history of self-consciousness is 
explored through the history of mythology (the Philosophy of Mythology) 
and the history of religion (the Philosophy of Revelation). 
In 1801, Hegel entered the public philosophical scene by publishing a 
comparative analysis of Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophical systems 
entitled Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingean Systems of Philosophy 
(commonly refered to as the Differenzschrift). Hegel appears to sympathize 
more with Schelling, no doubt reflecting that Hegel was working closely 
together with him. Hegel’s analysis provides an important insight into the 
ambition of a philsophical system and the issues, components, and methods 
that surround Fichte’s and Schelling’s manner of formulating a 
philosophical system. Hegel’s own development towards a system had 
started by this point, though it would take many years to flourish into the 
                                         
164 “[A]lle Theile der Philosophie in Einer Continuität und die gesammte Philosophie 
als das, was sie ist, nämlich als fortgehende Geschichte des Selbstbewußtseyns.” SW, III 
331. 
165 In the 1821 lecture from Munich entitled System of Ages of the World, we find the 
first expression of discernment in Schelling’s philosophy between logical and historical 
philosophy. System der Weltalter: Münchener Vorlesung 1827-28 in einer Nachschrift 
von Ernst von Lasaulx (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1990), 10–14. Positive 
philosophy avoids reducing the content of mythology to principle or doctrinal form. It is 
the merit of Axel Hutter to have explored the nature of the historical philosophy in 
Schelling’s later works and its relation to the ideas of the early system. Axel Hutter, 
Geschichtliche Vernunft: die Weiterführung der Kantischen Vernunftkritik in der 
Spätphilosophie Schellings (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996). 
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all-embracing encyclopaedic work that has often overshadowed discussions 
of Schelling’s later and less public development of the same time period.166 
In a presentation of his system as an absolute system of identity 
(commonly refered to as the Identity Philosophy) in 1801, Schelling 
presented the unity of the twofold movement of the system as the point of 
indifference by which the philosophy of nature becomes identical with the 
standpoint of reason, the standpoint of transcendental philosophy.167  
Schelling’s idea of an absolute system of identity is conceived as a 
rationalistic monism. The world consists, in its totality, of one single 
indivisible substance, which is identical with reason and grounded on the 
principle of identity, A = A. This principle contains the complete unity and 
indifference of the subject and the object, of realism and idealism, and of 
the physical and the mental. However, the ideas of identity and indifference 
are obviously tied to the notions of difference and opposition, at least 
insofar as the latter serve as conditions for identity. Decisively, Schelling 
does not flatten out his monistic ontology and deny difference, as is often 
assumed by his critics. Instead, being is formulated in the feature of 
identity of difference, which is reason. In order to see this, we need to 
follow the aspect of vitality that characterized Schelling’s thinking since 
his early philosophy of nature, and the development of his philosophy of 
identity. 
5.4 Freedom 
Since his early work with the philosophy of nature, Schelling operated with 
a notion of vitality and an idea of organic and dynamic unity. Schelling 
describes the development of being towards a higher conception of itself 
through the emergence of more complex constellations of principles called 
potencies. The metaphor of an organism provides a structural model that 
characterizes the notion of an all-embracing monism.  
                                         
166 For the sake of presenting Schelling’s developments more clearly, I leave out 
further discussions on Fichte’s and Hegel’s own developments. This is not to say that 
their dialogue and the later disputes with Hegel do not play a part in Schelling’s 
development, but that these aspects take the focus of this study too far beyond my 
intentions and into further historical questions that cannot by covered within this 
presentation.  
167 Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801) followed up by System of the 
Whole of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature in Particularly (1804). Even fourty 
years later in the Philosophical Introduction to Philosophy of Mythology Schelling still 
explains the Identity philosophy in terms similar to the original introduction: 
“Indifferenz des Subjektiven und Objektiven […], womit sich der Sinn verband, daß in 
Einem und demselben mit völlig gleicher Möglichkeit das Objekt (die äußere Welt des 
materiellen Seyns) und das Subjekt als solches (die innere, bis zum bleibenden Subjekt, 
zu Gott führende Welt) gesetzt und begriffen sey.” SW, XI 371. See also Beiser, 
German Idealism, 551–595. 
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Essentially, the organism is a dynamic, living whole that cannot be 
reduced to its parts; it also offers a basis for understanding an immanent 
duality and polarity, that is, a difference in unity; it enables a notion of 
organization within the whole; and, furthermore, the metaphor of organism 
renders possible that several degrees, or ontological potencies, of nature 
can be treated separately (from an analytical perspective) without standing 
outside of the whole (ontologically). Hence, the organism is a metaphor 
that reflects the organization of the whole. Vitality, polarity, productivity, 
organization, and potencies are some of the key elements that support 
Schelling’s exploration of the dynamic nature of totality while avoiding 
dualism and static monism.  
In his 1798 text, Von der Weltseele, Schelling discusses the difficulties 
with the dualism implied in a vitalist position, as well as the problems of 
monism implied in static materialism.168  While advocating a dynamic 
monism, Schelling’s notion of vitality, a principle of life, is best understood 
as a fragile polarity in being that struggles with disturbances in a constant 
attempt to restore equilibrium.169 This early notion of vitality is further 
developed throughout the era of identity philosophy.  
In the 1809 Freiheitsschrift, we find a strong emphasis on the vitality of 
Schelling’s notion of system.170 From 1801, though far better expressed in 
1809, Schelling’s central ambition was to overcome the “one-sidedly realist 
system”171 by yoking the realist and the idealist parts of the system for the 
benefit of a new “higher realism.”172 In the Freiheitsschrift, the emphasis 
on vitality remains in a critique of mechanical materialism aimed 
particularly against Spinoza. A rather long introductory discussion of 
common understandings of pantheism serves to make this clear. However, 
the importance of vitality is construed as the systematic composition that 
enables the embracement of human freedom as “one of the system’s ruling 
                                         
168 See especially in the section entitled: Ueber den Ursprung des allgemeinen 
Organismus. SW, II 491–507. 
169 On the development of Schelling’s concepts of matter and life, see Beiser, 
German Idealism, 483–564.  
170 The full title is Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom 
and Matters Connected Therewith (Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der 
menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände) (1809). In the 
preface to the Freiheitsschrift Schelling explains the recent development of his thoughts 
on a system. In 1801, he says he had merely combined the real part of his system with 
the ideal part and goes on by saying that he will now (1809) expose the ideal part more 
thoroughly: “die gegenwärtige Abhandlung das Erste ist, worin der Verfasser seinen 
Begriff des ideellen Theils der Philosophie mit völliger Bestimmtheit vorlegt” SW, VII 
334. 
171 Ibid., VII 350. 
172 Ibid., VII 351. 
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centerpoints.”173 The question concerning the essence of human freedom is 
the question of where and how human freedom fits into the coherence of 
the totality of all there is. 
The question of freedom depends on how nature is constituted in order to 
produce free individuals within itself. The reality of freedom depends on 
the possibility of immanent independence. Central to this claim is 
Schelling’s increasing critique of Spinoza’s pantheistic monism. In 
particular, Schelling disapproves of Spinoza’s idea that all things contained 
in God are things; and, furthermore, he disapproves with Spinoza’s idea 
that God is thought of as a thing.174 This particular, materialistic variety of 
monism, Schelling suggests, is incapable of accommodating any notion of 
human freedom since it lacks the necessary vitality. Despite the great 
respect Schelling had for Spinoza, the bottom line is that he blamed 
Spinoza’s thinking for being lifeless due to its one-sided materialism.175  
It is in this middle period that Schelling undertook an anthropological 
turn, which had decisive implications for the systematic ambition of 
philosophy. The human being, and in particular human freedom, opens up 
new aspects of the conditions of a system and the way it is supposed to 
reflect an organized world. One of the central concepts that follows from 
this anthropological concern is the concept of personhood. This concept 
pertains to the human being and its conditions for existence, to the 
characteristic of a personal human nature with personality, and to a way of 
being-in-the-world that has its genuine expression in the relation of the 
human person to a personal God. The history of mythology and religion 
bares witness to this relation, and becomes an important point of focus in 
Schelling’s later ontology. 
Personhood is different from the notion of self-consciousness that has 
been defended since Kant. Kant’s notion of self-consciousness was the 
ground that itself guaranteed the organized world. As Kant had shown, all 
of the categories of logical thinking lie within subjectivity. For this reason, 
the Ich could function as absolute. However, the concept of personhood 
follows a radical change: Schelling’s claim of an absolute ground that is 
outside of or prior to self-consciousness, that is, the insight that ground 
precedes subjectivity as such.  
This influences the role of self-consciousness and ultimately makes it 
impossible for self-conciousness to be the absolute ground. The absolute 
withdraws in consciousness and becomes directly unavailable to 
                                         
173 Ibid., VII 336. 
174 Ibid., VII 349. 
175  “Daher die Leblosigkeit seines Systems, die Gemütlosigkeit der Form, die 
Dürftigkeit der Begriffe und Ausdrücke, das unerbittlich Herbe der Bestimmungen, das 
sich mit der abstrakten Betrachtungsweise vortrefflich verträgt; daher auch ganz 
folgerichtig seine mechanische Naturansicht.” Ibid.  
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consiousness. Ultimately, reason is left to conditions of contingency as no 
absolute can be obtained in thought. This is clear in a series of phenomena 
that Schelling takes up as part of his anthropological approach. For all of 
these phenomena, it counts that they somehow conflict with the idea of a 
rationally organized world and a rational absolute. Madness, chaos, evil, 
anxiety, and death are some of the topics taken up in this period of 
Schelling’s thinking, primarily covered by the Freiheitsschrift (1809), the 
Stuttgart Private Lectures (1810), and the drafts entitled Ages of the World 
(1811-15). The consequence of reason having its ground outside of itself 
makes the question of ground the central condition for ontology, beyond 
which there is nothing but a dark incomprehensible nothing. 
[E]verything in the world is, as we see it now, rule, order and form; but anarchy still 
[immer] lies in the ground, as if it could break through once again, and nowhere does 
it appear as if order and form were what is original but rather as if initial anarchy had 
been brought to order. This is the incomprehensible base of reality in things, the 
indivisible remainder, that which with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in 
understanding but rather remains eternally in the ground. The understanding is born 
in the genuine sense from that which is without understanding. Without this 
preceding darkness creatures have no reality; darkness is their necessary 
inheritance.176 
The central change that underlies these new aspects is the distinction 
between existence and the ground of existence. In order to get a hold of the 
meaning of this distinction, existence can be understood from the 
etymological meaning of ‘ek-stare’, as a standing-out or a stepping-out of 
the ground.177 It is the fate of reason to stand out from the ground. 
Schelling reflects on this ontic situation by asking how it can be that we 
stand out, and yet despite this situation an ordered and meaningful world 
lies before us: why is there sense at all and not rather non-sense? 
Fundamentally, the change marked by the ground of existence shakes the 
very condition of rational thinking in the sense that reason becomes opaque 
to itself. Being cannot be resolved in reason. Consequently, self-
consciousness can function as the grounding principle of knowledge but 
not as the absolute, because the self-relation of consciousness always takes 
off from a ground that is not of itself and that can never be resolved in 
consciousness. This finitude marks the impossibility of self-mediation in a 
fundamental heteronomy. Schelling calls it ‘the incomprehensible base of 
reality’, ‘the preceding darkness’, or the “dark remainder.”178  
                                         
176 Ibid., VII 360. 
177 This understanding of existence remains in Schelling’s later exposition. “[A]lles 
Seyn ist ein Hinausgesetzt-seyn, ein Exponirt-seyn, ein gleichsam Hinausstehen, wie im 
lateinischen Exstare.” Ibid., XII 56. Gabriel discusses the Platonic allusion on this 
matter, Der Mensch im Mythos, 336, n285.  
178 SW, VII 433. 
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The situation shows itself as a problem of beginning. Beginning as such 
becomes a way to approach the problem entailed in this thought of an 
unavailable and unprethinable ground. The beginning is out of the reach of 
the subject, its own beginning, the beginning of thought.179 This not only 
concerns the condition of subjectivity. The subject always finds itself 
thinking something that is determined; it always finds itself thinking what 
is already placed in thought, without access to that which precedes and 
enables thinking. The subject cannot initiate or start to think, but is 
captured in the immanence of thought. Due to this condition, the subject 
cannot completely know itself. It always finds itself thinking in the midst 
of thoughts. Thinking always comes too late to grasp its own beginning, its 
own ground. This is what it means to stand out from the ground and exist. 
To exist implies this detachement and unavailability of ground. 
As mentioned, Schelling reflects on the fact that we are in a state of 
sense, in a state where we already have meaningful knowledge of 
phenomena. The fact that the human being lives in an ordered world about 
which it can think is peculiar. Shelling’s thoughts on this clearly 
foreshadow the idea of thrownness taken up by Heidegger. Gabriel, who 
elaborates on these connections, puts it this way: 
We live de facto in an […] intelligible and through that structured world (essence). 
At the same time we have to accept its facticity and naked givenness, as we cannot 
ground the being of the world by preceding its being. The world is always already 
there regardless whether we want it to be or not. No thought precedes being.180 
The implication of this state of sense means that meaningful thoughts 
always derive from a context and a world of meaning in which meaning is 
given. This is also a world that we give meaning to. The point is that it is 
there. The unavailability of the ground shows itself in factic existence, e.g. 
the existence of an ordered world. The factual existence of the world 
cannot be explained (grounded) with the world, or as a part of that world. 
The ground of factual existence has withdrawn and precedes the given 
world unprethinkably.  
5.5 Thinking the World 
In his notion of unprethinable being, Schelling formulates an ultimate 
origin, one that is not only construed as prior in time, but is the constant 
                                         
179 This is the central topic of Schelling’s draft of the Ages of the World. It is the 
merit of Hogrebe’s work to have shown the transcendental ambition in the question of 
beginning and origin to Schelling’s thinking. Hogrebe shows how Schelling’s 
reflections on finitude in terms of time and past reflects the logical-ontological problem 
of origin to thinking. I shall address this in chapter 7. 
180 Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, 44. 
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and necessary origin of intelligibility as such. He later calls this “the 
absolute prius.”181 
In Schelling’s lectures in Erlangen in 1821, On the Nature of Philosophy 
as Science, we find an exposition that shows what the changes of this 
middle period meant for his understandings of system and of knowledge as 
such. We see in what sense the human being, as a rational being, is 
understood through the conditions of existence. For an understanding of the 
rational human being, Schelling’s reading of Kant’s ideal of pure reason 
becomes essential. Kant’s ideal of pure reason describes the conditions of 
determination in regard to an unlimited totality that forms the background 
against which everything else becomes determinate. Only against the 
background of the unlimited, the horizon of the absolute, can finite things 
be determined. In agreement with Kant, Schelling insists that the absolute 
is not only the horizon of determinate things. The absolute is only 
comprehensible through the rational being in which this idea is grounded, 
the rational human being. As Kant had argued, reason holds a natural 
disposition to reify its own conditions of knowledge in a notion of the 
world. Kant goes further into the specifics of this tendency in the 
antinomies chapter of his first critique. Schelling’s ontology of freedom 
develops through an interpretation of this illusion of the reification of the 
idea of the world. 
In his lectures from 1821, Schelling departs from the claim that the 
possibility of systematic knowledge requires a preceding condition of 
incoherence, “asystasia.”182 He points to the fact that the Greeks proposed 
several principles for the coherence of nature, all of which enabled Plato to 
arrive at the idea of system.183 Hence, there is a preceding knowledge of the 
plurality of systems and their disharmonic incompatibility that provides the 
basis of an understanding of system as such: “the systems precede the 
system. The need for harmony derives from disharmony.”184 Schelling 
claims that systematic knowledge presupposes a preceding state of 
ignorance and incoherence, a state relative to that of the system. 
Consequently, the idea of metaphysics, as a true system of totality, 
inherently depends upon the plurality of metaphysical systems. 
Schelling’s idea is to include this insight into metaphysical thinking 
itself. The understanding of the necessity of the plurality of systems 
becomes an insight through which metaphysical thinking avoids simply 
                                         
181 SW, X 286; XIII 67, 127, 164, 248. 
182 Ibid., IX 209. 
183 Schelling mentions the laws of nature proposed by the pre-Socratic philosophers 
of nature, the spirit-nature dualism, which he assigns to Anaxagoras, and the monistic 
unity, which he assigns to the Eleatics. Ibid., IX 209. 
184 “Also der Zeit nach sind die Systeme vor dem System. Bedürfniß der Harmonie 
kommt erst aus Disharmonie.” Ibid. 
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adding to the plurality of metaphysical systems, assuming instead the form 
of a meta-theory. The contents of this higher-level metaphysics are the 
conditions of possibility for metaphysical systems. What metaphysics, as 
meta-theory, can do (and what, according to this view, traditional 
metaphysics have failed to do), is incorporate its own conditions, and 
thereunder its negation, into its own construction. 
Schelling refers to this as the inner conflict of system.185 This inner 
conflict is located within human knowledge as the state of ignorance or 
non-knowledge.186 Moreover, no system should believe itself to be able to 
dissolve this conflict. The only radical consequence to draw from this 
inherent characteristic of knowledge is the integration. Metaphysics that 
aspire to be a meta-theory concerning metaphysics must therefore, in a 
radical sense, take the form of a “unity of unity and opposition,” as 
Schelling has characterized the absolute since his Identity-system.187  
In accordance with Kant’s ideal, the human being establishes knowledge 
by means of a transcendence through which it is beyond determinate things. 
Knowledge of determinate things is achieved by undertaking limitations on 
a horizon of an unlimited absolute. These limitations are carried out by 
human reason. However, it is impossible to carry out the same limitation 
(determination) when it comes to ‘the unlimited,’ the absolute, through 
which limitations become possible. Ultimately, this means that the absolute, 
as the grounding principle of knowledge, is unavailable to knowledge. The 
absolute escapes its own definition because definition requires limitation 
(de-finition). In constructing a system of the whole by deducing it from an 
absolute principle, reason has claimed a definition for what is 
indefinable.188 In its attempt to define its own grounding principle (self-
                                         
185 “Also die Idee des Systems überhaupt setzt den nothwendigen und unauflöslichen 
Widerstreit der Systeme voraus: ohne diesen würde sie gar nicht entstehen.” Ibid., IX 
211. My italics. 
186 “[D]er innere uauflösliche Widerstreit im menschlichen Wissen.” Ibid., IX 213. In 
Kant’s chapter on the ideal of pure reason we also find a note concerning reasons 
awareness or ‘knowledge of ignorance’. Kant’s example is the calculations of the 
astronomers who have “exposed for us the abyss of our ignorance, which without this 
knowledge [Kenntnisse], human reason could not have imagined [vorstellen] to be so 
great; reflection on this ignorance has to produce a great alteration in the determination 
of the final aims [Endabsichten] of the use of reason.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 
603. Translation slightly modified. 
187 “Einheit der Einheit und des Gegensatzes.” SW, IV 235f; IX 209. Decisively, this 
is a standpoint above the oppositions of individual systems, a standpoint that copes with 
the conflict of systems: “die Idee jenes höheren Ganzen zu fassen, in welchem die 
widerstreitenden Systeme durch ihr Zusammenbestehen jenes höhere Bewußtseyn 
erzeugen, in dem er wieder frei ist von allem System, über allem System.” SW, IX 214. 
188 SW, IX 216. 
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grounding absolute) and make the unavailable available, the infinite finite, 
the unlimited limited, the system has already failed. 
Nevertheless, it is natural for the rational human being to attempt to 
determine the absolute. The entire history of metaphysics shows how 
different conceptions of the absolute have been employed in order to 
ground the certainty of knowledge. Schelling’s Kantian point is that the 
condition that enables determination and definition as such (the ability to 
define) remains fundamentally indefinable.189 Schelling’s employment of 
Kant becomes an argument that all systems (or theories) that make 
universal claims generate an opaque structure that makes them ‘blind’ to 
their own constitutive ground. 
According to Schelling, the question concerning totality, or ‘all there is’, 
is not primarily a question of knowledge, that is, as something that can be 
solved or answered with the right knowledge. The idea of totality remains 
the condition of knowledge and can never become the object of knowledge. 
Knowledge has no access to any reality of totality aside from forms of 
constructed or illusory attempts, because the ground of knowledge is 
unavailable and therefore without any ultimate guarantee of knowledge.190 
This suggests that knowledge is exactly what will fail in its attempt to set 
us right in the world, insofar as knowledge will always ground itself on an 
illusion. The human aspiration to relate properly to the world through 
knowledge has its own impossibility built into it.191 
For Schelling, the conditions of knowledge mean that no epistemic 
security can be granted regarding the absolute, regarding that which, in any 
system, is supposed to secure its unity and coherence. Any systematic 
attempt to determine the absolute has already failed in its very ambition. 
Schelling, however, does not leave the question concerning the nature of 
being aside.  
If the initial ambition of ontology could be said to be to determine the 
nature of totality, then Schelling can be understood as having moved on to 
a new ontology, one which in Gabriel’s words could be called an ontology 
of incompleteness.192 This ontology is at ease with the brute fact of the 
unavailability of ultimate answers, that the absolute is fundamentally 
unavailable to reason.193  
                                         
189 “Hier also der Widerspruch, daß der Mensch das, was er will, durch sein Wollen 
zunichtemacht. Aus diesem Widerspruch entsteht jene innere umtreibende Bewegung, 
indem das Suchende das, was es sucht, gleichsam in einer beständigen Flucht vor sich 
her treibt.” Ibid., IX 235.  
190 Kant calls this idea a ‘focus imaginarius.’ KrV, B 672. 
191 See Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 15.  
192 Ibid., 17. 
193 We can say that this ontology accepts the condition that no ultimate perspective or 
‘ultimate domain’ is available. This acceptance rests on the insight that the withdrawal 
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Schelling removes the very feature of a determinate absolute and 
establishes his ontology on a constitutive ground that, in principle, cannot 
be a part of knowledge, namely, non-knowledge. In this “duplicity of being 
and non-being,”194 Schelling sees the focal point of the relation of the 
infinite to the finite. The undefinable becomes the only possible definition 
of the absolute. 195  Schelling thereby establishes an ontology on the 
constitutive relation between knowledge and non-knowledge. Hence, there 
is no claim that we cannot know anything, only that we cannot know the 
ground of knowledge, which is the being of the world.196 
Having established that knowledge depends on an absolute, which is 
unavailable, Schelling sees a danger. It is possible that the indeterminacy 
and indefinability of the absolute is merely negatively established from the 
side of knowledge and already determined, negatively.197 This would imply 
the existence of an opposition apart from the absolute. It would thereby 
compromise the unity of unity and opposition. Schelling’s solution is to 
grasp the absolute as a movement out of indeterminacy, that is, as the very 
process through which the indeterminate becomes determinate, as 
becoming. Indeterminate, the absolute holds the capacity to become 
determinate, to take a form, as well as to give up any determinate form. In 
this sense, the absolute is above all that is given.198 
From the idea that the indefinable absolute cannot be negated against an 
opposite (which would place an opposition outside the absolute), Schelling 
argues that the indefinability of the absolute consists in a capacity to 
become definite. It is this capacity, this freedom to take on a determinate 
form that positively describes the absolute. The absolute is not the form but 
the capacity (das Können) to take on a determinate form. Freedom is its 
                                                                                                                       
of the absolute is that which enables whatever knowledge we have. As Gabriel puts it, 
“the domain of all domains is not a thing, but a withdrawal constitutive of the 
possibility of something being given to knowledge.” Ibid.  
194 “Duplicität des Seyns und nicht-Seyns,” SW, IX 220. 
195 “Ich muß eben das Indefinible, das nicht zu Definirende des Subjekts selbst zur 
Definition machen.” Ibid., IX 216.  
196  Schelling calls it the absolute subject and further illuminates it with the 
designation ‘Urstand’: “Sie ist absolutes Subjekt = Urstand; wie kann sie denn 
Gegenstand werden? Unmöglich kann sie es werden als absolutes Subjekt, denn als 
solches steht sie zu nichts in gegenständlichem Verhältniß; es ist das absolute 
Urständliche, dem nichts etwas anhaben kann, insofern das eigentlich Transcendente.” 
Ibid., IX 225. 
197 “Denn selbst das Wort unendlich drückt ja doch eigentlich nur die Negation der 
Endlichkeit aus… Also wissen wir doch eigentlich nur, was jenes Subject nicht ist, 
nicht aber, was es ist.” Ibid., IX 218f. 
198 The arguments presented by Schelling involve an ability to be different, or to not 
being forced to be indeterminate, but being absolute in the sense that every option is 
available: not to have a form as well as to have form. Ibid., IX 219. 
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essence. The absolute is “nothing but the eternal freedom.”199  In the 
Freiheitsschrift this is already formulated in the statement that ‘will is 
primal Being.’ 
In the final and highest judgment, there is no other Being than will. Will is primal 
Being [Ursein] to which alone all predicates of Being apply: groundlessness, 
eternality, independence from time, self-affirmation. All of philosophy strives only 
to find this highest expression.200 
From this it follows that the absolute stands in a dependent and constitutive 
relation to a determination through which (and through nothing else) it can 
demonstrate its indeterminability. Another characterization of the primal 
being is yearning. The absolute, however, can only strive for what is 
ultimately itself. Schelling sees yearning as a movement towards self-
actualization, a stepping into being (existence). Already in the 
Freiheitsschrift, Schelling makes use of a notion of revelation to 
characterize the yearning nature of the absolute.  
The process through which the absolute takes on determinate form lies in 
finite consciousness, in the various attempts to formulate metaphysical 
theories and to determine the absolute subject. Throughout the history of 
philosophy, the absolute has demonstrated its indeterminacy in the plurality 
of determinate forms. The infinite is therefore likewise infinite capacity, 
and it is so in two ways: On the one hand, it is infinite capacity to take a 
form; on the other hand, it is infinite capacity to withdraw from that form. 
Schelling calls this withdrawal the “self-destruction” of the absolute.201 
While there is no final or proper determination of the absolute, improper 
determinations provide proper insight into its indeterminability. The meta-
theoretical level of this ontology lies in the insight into the non-
objectification of the absolute. This insight is drawn from the plurality of 
determinate forms (in various metaphysical systems), an insight achieved 
by finite consciousness. As pointed out by Gabriel, insight into the 
antinomy of human knowledge, achieved without objectifying the infinite, 
is itself the infinite.202 This insight (derived from the improper forms of the 
absolute), which reflects the constitutive relation of knowledge to non-
                                         
199 “Ich möchte es aber nicht so ausdrücken: es ist das, was frei ist, Gestalt 
anzunehmen. Denn so würde diese Freiheit als Eigenschaft erscheinen, die ein von ihr 
noch verschiedenes und unabhängiges Subjekt voraussetzt - sondern die Freiheit ist das 
Wesen des Subjekts, oder es ist selbst nichts anderes als die ewige Freiheit.” Ibid., IX 
220. 
200 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 21; SW, VII 350. 
201 “Selbstzerstörung” SW, IX 225. “[…] denn nur indem es Gestalt annimmt, aber 
aus jeder wieder siegreich heraustritt, zeigt es sich als das an sich Unfaßliche, 
Unendliche.” SW, IX 219. Gabriel further adds a note regarding ‘heraustretten’ (to step 
out) that alludes to the Latin term ‘existere.’ 
202 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 18. 
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knowledge, is the infinite in its non-objective form. Hence, in its attempt to 
determine the absolute in a determinate form, and in its capacity of being 
beyond determinate form, human knowledge is infinite. That human 
knowledge is the infinite, means that it is that in which the self-destruction 
of the absolute is achieved. This is Schelling’s reason for taking up the 
history of human consciousness in the history of mythology and religion in 
his later works.  
The central point is that the infinite is not simply determined negatively 
against the finite, but through it, placing human knowledge within the 
absolute and its self-conscious relation to itself (God). This self-relation is 
important in order to understand how human knowledge is to be 
understood within the infinite. Schelling refers to this relation as a co-
science, a “Mitwissenschaft, conscientia”,203 and he determines the tie of 
the finite to the infinite, which underlies human knowledge, as freedom. In 
the idea of the capacity of the absolute to become determined we see a 
central part of Schelling’s ontology of freedom as it pertains to the question 
of determination. As free, the human being is beyond determination. 
Freedom is that which drives knowledge to seek out its absolute ground, 
the infinite. Freedom is, in human knowledge, the transition of the infinite 
into finitude, of the unlimited into the limited, of the indeterminate into the 
determinate. 
Within the development of Schelling’s ontology of freedom, he 
confronts the problem of the concept of being as determinate being in the 
way it is employed within the tradition of rational metaphysics. In order to 
break out of this concept of being as determinate being, Schelling develops 
an alternative concept of being that is established within a separate, new 
philosophy – a philosophy concerned with the history of determinate being 
and hence with a historical concept of being. For these two concepts of 
being, Schelling formulates two separate but complementary philosophies, 
one negative and one positive.  
                                         
203 SW, IX 221. We find the same designation at the beginning of the Ages of the 
World in which Schelling makes an exposition on consciousness as science, or science 
as functioning through the act of recalling to consciousness. This idea covers a central 
anthropological point about the role of the human being. “Aus der Quelle der Dinge 
geschöpft und ihr gleich, hat die menschliche Seele eine Mitwissenschaft der Schöpfung. 
In ihr liegt die höchste Klarheit aller Dinge, und nicht so wohl wissend ist sie als selber 
die Wissenschaft.” SW, VIII 200. 
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6 Determination and Contingency 
6.1 Towards a Positive Philosophy 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom is based on a critique of rational 
metaphysics and its attempt to complete its self-constitution in thinking 
alone.204 The rational closure of totality became a problem for Schelling for 
various reasons. Centrally, the post-Kantian ambition to systematize forms 
of reason, knowledge, by means of a priori principles, carried with it the 
ideal of a complete science of reason that could incorporate all parts of 
reality into a coherent system of concepts and principles. Like Hegel and 
Fichte, Schelling had provided several attempts to carry out this vision of 
(Kantian) transcendental philosophy in the form of a (Spinozian) rational 
system. The system was conceived as the ideal rational form of the unity of 
being and thought. Kant’s notion of self-consciousness, as the capacity of 
combining representations, entailed the implication that philosophy can 
grasp reality because reality is (already) intelligible by the forms of reason. 
The idea of the systematic form of reason amounts to a complete 
immanence of rational thinking, a logical immanence. Directly aimed 
against this immanence, Schelling’s critique served to renounce the 
sufficiency and self-mediation of a priori thinking with regard to actual 
existence. Schelling’s central claim was that the unity of being and thought 
cannot be grounded in thinking because it is conditioned beyond the 
boundaries of thinking, by the fact of existence that precedes thinking. 
One of the driving forces behind Schelling’s later ontology is the notion 
of facticity, as it is expressed in the question: why is there something rather 
                                         
204 My reading of Schelling’s later thought follows many paths provided by the 
works of Schultz and Hogrebe: Walter Schultz, Die Vollendung des deutschen 
Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings.; Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis. 
Finally, the recent demonstration of the actuality of Schelling’s late ontology offered by 
Markus Gabriel has played an important role for this study. Gabriel, Der Mensch im 
Mythos; Markus Gabriel, Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German 
Idealism (London; New York: Continuum, 2009), 1–95; Gabriel, Transcendental 
Ontology. In their approach to Schelling, Hogrebe and Gabriel fundamentally agree in 
many regards. Nevertheless, Hogrebe is more directly concerned with Schelling’s 
logical argumentation and only occasionally unfolds the related anthropological aspects. 
In that regard, Gabriel has improved upon the basic components of Hogrebe’s reading 
by approaching the broader context of the positive philosophy. That being said, the 
agenda of transcendental ontology proposed by Gabriel also has its limits. In many 
regards, Gabriel seems to tie personhood too radically to the question of truth-apt 
thinking and an understanding of the human being as concerned with truth. In my view, 
this derives from his emphasis on skeptical arguments and from the fact that he hesitates 
to engage with many of the aspects of personhood from the Freiheitsschrift. My reading 
of personhood, as presented in chapter 7, seeks to include more of these aspects in a 
reading that follows many of his paths.  
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than nothing, why is there anything at all? The question hinges on the role 
of experience, as does the entire endeavor of Schelling’s mature thinking. 
Schelling wants to liberate experience from the grip of thought, from ‘the 
web of reason’. Reason cannot call anything into existence, it can only 
respond to the fact of their actual existence. In this sense, the fact of actual 
existence is a facticity prior to the experiencing subject.  
The question of facticity is conceived within the scope of human life. In 
other words, the fact of existence is a fact to the human being. Schelling’s 
concern with human life-phenomena is not secondary or marginal in his 
ontology of freedom: 
Thus far from man and his endeavors making the world comprehensible, it is man 
himself that is the most incomprehensible and who inexorably drives me to the belief 
in the wretchedness of all being, a belief that makes itself known in so many bitter 
pronouncements from both ancient and recent times. It is precisely Him, the human, 
who drives me to the final desperate question: Why is there anything at all? Why is 
there not nothing?205 
In another lecture Schelling poses the question in a different and rather 
illuminating way: “Why is sense at all, why is there not non-sense [Unsinn] 
rather than sense…”206 The questions addressed in many of Schelling’s 
texts reflect the tie of the question of being to the question of sense. The 
condition of the intelligible form of being is the central question of 
Schelling’s later ontology. The idea is that sense is taken for granted 
without providing the necessity of its own existence. The question is 
therefore why we take sense to be original, which we should not. Schelling 
says: “the entire world is trapped in the web of reason, but the question is: 
how is it fallen into this web.”207 This way of posing the question of 
existence as the question of sense ties ontology to the conditions of 
semantics. 
                                         
205 F.W.J. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), 94. “Weit entfernt also, daß 
der Mensch und sein Thun die Welt begreiflich mache, ist er selbst das Unbegreiflichste, 
und treibt mich unausbleiblich zu der Meinung von der Unseligkeit alles Seyns, einer 
Meinung, die in so vielen schmerzlichen Lauten aus alter und neuer Zeit sich 
kundgegeben. Gerade Er, der Mensch, treibt mich zur letzten verzweiflungsvollen 
Frage: warum ist überhaupt etwas? warum ist nicht nichts?” SW, XIII 7. 
206 “Warum ist Sinn überhaupt, warum is nicht Unsinn statt Sinn?”, F.W.J. Schelling, 
Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie. Münchner Vorlesung WS 1832/33 und SS 1833, 
ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1972), 222. See also Michelle Kosch, 
Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2006), 105–112. 
207  Schelling, Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie. Münchner Vorlesung WS 
1832/33 und SS 1833, 222; SW, X 143f. 
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6.2 Actual Existence 
At this point, we are trying to get a hold of Schelling’s critique of 
rational philosophy as a critique aimed at the conditions of logical 
immanence. Schelling’s motivation for supporting this critique with a new 
philosophy, positive philosophy, lies in the notion of actual existence. This 
notion derives from a distinction between two aspects of knowledge, which 
Schelling develops from a discussion on Kant’s critical philosophy. 
Schelling asserts a fundamental distinction between two things, a 
distinction that is present in all knowledge of something existing: the first 
is the essence (Wesen) of a thing as a matter of what a thing is, quid sit, and 
the second concerns the fact that (Daß) a thing really exists, quod sit. 
The former – the answer to the question what it is – accords me insight into the 
essence of the thing, or it provides that I understand the thing, that I have an 
understanding or a concept of it, or have it itself within the concept. The other insight 
however, that it is, does not accord me just the concept, but rather something that 
goes beyond just the concept, which is existence [Existenz].208 
This distinction leads to the central claim concerning the limits of reason 
and the essential function of experience. Schelling claims that reason alone 
cannot provide the proof for existence, that only experience can do that. 
Reason, rather than excluding experience, depends on it.209 With this claim, 
Schelling turns against central principles of the rationalistic tradition. The 
deeply rooted trust in the capacities of reason to discover itself from within 
itself shatters. Schelling’s critique points out that the ‘science of reason’ is 
ignorant about the decisive role of experience and to the fact that reason, 
regarding the question of actual existence, is insufficient and depends on 
experience. 
                                         
208 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 129. “Jenes – die Antwort auf 
die Frage: was es ist – gewährt mir Einsicht in das Wesen des Dings, oder es macht, daß 
ich das Ding verstehe, daß ich einen Verstand oder einen Begriff von ihm, oder es selbst 
im Begriffe habe. Das andere aber, die Einsicht, daß es ist, gewährt mir nicht den 
bloßen Begriff, sondern etwas über den bloßen Begriff Hinausgehendes, welches die 
Existenz ist.” SW, VIII 58. 
209  “Reason provides the content for everything that occurs in experience; it 
comprehends what is real [Wirkliche], but not, therefore, reality [Wirklichkeit]. This is 
an important difference. The science of reason does not provide what really exists in 
nature and its particular forms. To this extent, experience, through which we know what 
really exists, is a source of knowing independent of reason and, thus, travels right 
alongside it.” Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 131. “Die Vernunft gibt 
dem Inhalt nach alles, was in der Erfahrung vorkommt, sie begreift das Wirkliche, aber 
darum nicht die Wirklichkeit. Denn dieß ist ein großer Unterschied. Das wirkliche 
Existiren der Natur und ihrer einzelnen Formen gewährt die Vernunftwissenschaft nicht; 
insofern ist die Erfahrung, durch die wir eben das wirkliche Existiren wissen, eine von 
der Vernunft unabhängige Quelle, und geht also neben ihr her.” SW, XIII 61. 
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In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant said that knowledge has two 
sources: sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand). These two 
sources are distinguished in the way the object, through our reception, is 
given, and, through our understanding, is thought. Schelling struggles with 
the question as to how an object comes to appear as an existing object: is it 
to sensibility or to the understanding? For something to be recognized as an 
existing object, it needs to be determined as existing. According to Kant, 
this determination can only be provided by the understanding, which holds 
the capacity to apply categories. This means that an object exists due to the 
possibility of the understanding to apply the proper categories and concepts 
necessary for the determination of existence. Schelling says:  
The object as such […] presupposes that the categories have already been applied, at 
least that of the most general, namely, that of being. What is provided through 
sensibility can therefore not yet be the object, but can only be just the sensible 
impression.210  
What Schelling points out is that the object is an object only to thought 
(understanding), and not sensibility. All determination and conceptuality, 
including that of existence, lies in the understanding and not in sensibility. 
Sensible intuitions apply the (a priori) principles of sensation, the aesthetic 
forms of space and time, which are the conditional forms of all sensible 
intuition. However, they do not apply to concepts. Existence, the 
fundamental state that something exists and thereby can be said to be an 
existing object (as opposed to merely being thought and imagined), 
requires the application of the categories of understanding.211 
For Schelling, this is a tension that resides in Kant’s distinction of 
sensation and cognition. Schelling sees that for Kant, whatever precedes 
the categories is beyond determination and completely outside of concepts. 
The so-called thing in itself becomes ‘a thing’ only to the understanding, 
which holds the conceptual capacities to determine its existence and status 
as an object etc. Schelling objects to the sufficiency of this explanation: To 
place the fundamental determination of existence within the understanding 
alone creates a contradiction regarding whether we speak of an existing 
object or a mere thought object, it makes existence a complete matter of 
thought. Schelling’s notion of existence precludes the isolation of reality in 
thought. 
As little as can be said about what precedes the grasp of an object by the 
understanding, Schelling does require that it be uniquely present in sensible 
                                         
210 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 122. SW, XIII 47. 
211 Schelling says “[…] daß uns durch die bloße Receptivität unmöglich schon der 
Gegenstand gegeben seyn kann. Denn so allgemein und unbestimmt wir auch den 
Begriff Gegenstand denken mögen, so sind in diesem bereits Verstandesbestimmungen 
anzutreffen, doch wenigstens die, daß er ein Seyendes, ein Wirkliches ist.” SW, XIII 47. 
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experience, and therefore outside of the parameters of reason. Schelling 
speaks of this as the origin of the object. The object has its origin in what is 
indeterminable. This origin causes the possibility of the cognition of an 
object and is ‘the unprethinkable’ ground of being. However, the point of 
the problem that Schelling sees in Kant’s setting is that “we must apply the 
categories of being, of causality, and so on to that which according to the 
presupposition is external to all categories.”212 There must be something 
that precedes the categories, albeit completely unavailable to thought. 
This incomprehensible moment of existence prior to conceptual 
determination is best described as the fact of existence. Schelling derives 
this idea from a Kantian dilemma, or from the discovery of a dilemma in 
Kant: reason by itself cannot provide the proof that something exists. The 
distinction between what-ness and that-ness is central. Schelling accepts 
the condition that it is possible to have a concept without a real cognition 
while also accepting that it is impossible to have a cognition without a 
concept.213 However, the fact of existence – the mere positivity, the fact 
that something exists – cannot be granted by reason. It can only be taught 
by experience.214 Even though experience can say nothing about what it is 
that exists, the mere state that something appears to experience asserts this 
basic fact of existence. The condition that the existence granted by 
experience derives from a pre-determinable, pre-conceptual prius makes it 
pure that-ness without any what-ness; it achieves no further determination 
than mere existence. Schelling underlines that at this moment of mere 
existence the object is still not what it will be through the determination of 
reason. Hence, it is still reason that determines what it is, or, in Schelling’s 
temporal figure of speech: what will exist. 
The upshot of this argument, for Schelling, is a mark of the parameters 
of reason (and the science of reason). We cannot say much about these 
limits aside from asserting that they are there, precisely because they regard 
an existence that gives itself to reason from beyond reason, that is, from 
                                         
212 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 123. SW, XIII 49. 
213 The close tie between sensation and cognition that Schelling objects to is reflected 
in Kant’s famous quote: “Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and 
without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. 
214 “To prove that something exists cannot be an issue for reason, due to the simple 
fact that, by far, the most of what reason takes cognizance of from itself [von sich aus] 
occurs in experience and what is a matter of experience requires no proof that it exists 
precisely because it is already determined as something that actually exists.” Schelling, 
The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 129. “Zu beweisen, daß es existirt, kann schon 
darum nicht Sache der Vernunft seyn, weil bei weitem das Meiste, was sie von sich aus 
erkennt, in der Erfahrung vorkommt: für das aber, was Sache der Erfahrung, bedarf es 
keines Beweises, daß es existire, es ist eben darin schon als ein wirklich Existirendes 
bestimmt.” SW, XIII 58. 
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beyond rational discourse. Unprethinkable being is fundamental because 
reason is concerned with general aspects of existing things, but, as 
Schelling says, things do not exist in general but as particular things, here 
and now. This ties experience so close to reason that reason directly 
depends on experience. Without turning his thinking into a direct 
empiricism, Schelling has incorporated an empirical feature. He believes 
himself to have elevated experience from being a mere source of 
knowledge to being the escort of reason (Begleiterin).215  
6.3 Two Philosophies 
Any attempt to grasp totality in a conceptual logic, a logical immanence, 
will fall short in the question concerning the fact of existence. It is the fact 
of existence that Schelling frames in the question of why is there something 
rather than nothing – a question out of reach of any rational explanation 
and a fact upon which all rational discourse rests. Making his point, 
Schelling framed the purely rational philosophy as negative philosophy and 
the philosophy deriving from the insight into the limits of the purely 
rational philosophy as positive philosophy.  
In the attempt to grasp reality through eternal and conceptual essences, 
rational philosophy rejects and denies the particular and positive.216 It does 
this by negating it as unreal, or by sublating it into a concept. This negation 
of the positive is always present in rational philosophy, which only looks to 
the eternal and unchangeable essence of things, never to their particular, 
actual existence. The central move of Schelling’s later thinking is therefore 
to complement negative philosophy with a positive philosophy. The 
difference between negative and positive philosophy is that between “a 
science that grasps the essence of things and the content of all being and a 
science that explains the actual existence of things.”217 
Schelling’s critique of negative philosophy does not intend to abolish 
negative philosophy or what is achieved through it. The critique is aimed at 
                                         
215 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 131; SW, XIII 62. At a later 
point Schelling explicates this as follows: “If among the categories that stand at our 
behest for the designation of philosophical doctrines, empiricism can be opposed to 
nothing other than rationalism, then positive philosophy, as the antithesis of rationalism, 
will nevertheless be incapable of denying that it is also in some way and in some sense 
empiricism as well” Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 178; SW, XIII 
126. 
216 “[…] it has regarded everything that preceded it as nothing, as not being.” 
Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 195; SW, XIII 150. Already in the 
Freiheitsschrift Schelling considers what it would have meant to Kant’s thinking if this 
insight of existence would have been implemented into his thinking. SW, VII 352. 
217 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 155; SW, XIII 95. 
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“its fundamental error… that it wants to be positive.”218 Schelling does not 
even want to alter negative philosophy. His critique serves to point out that 
negative philosophy can only complete itself through a positive philosophy. 
The primary task is therefore to illuminate the parameters of negative 
philosophy and, through that, its dependency on a philosophy that deals 
with the positive. Ultimately, these two are not only meant to supplement 
each other, but can only be defined and discerned properly through each 
other.219 Through positive philosophy, negative philosophy is supposed to 
gain the necessary confidence concerning its limits. It is Schelling’s point 
to let negative philosophy play out and hit its limits in the encounter with 
the question of existence. Negative philosophy can work regardless of the 
fact that positive philosophy turns to that which is prior, because the 
transition to positive philosophy lies in the limit (itself) of negative 
philosophy; thinking does not begin with what is first or what is most 
fundamental. Even though both philosophies are required, Schelling 
ultimately concludes that positive philosophy is more fundamental because 
it does not depend on negative philosophy for its own grounding, because 
an act of willing suffices. The primal will to actualization, the freedom of 
the absolute, is the ground of positive philosophy.220  
                                         
218 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 145; SW, XIII 80. This is also a 
central point in the way Schelling turns his critique of negative philosophy against 
Hegel, “The philosophy that Hegel presented is the negative driven beyond its limits: it 
does not exclude the positive, but thinks it has subdued it within itself.” Schelling, The 
Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 145; SW, XIII 80. 
219  “Only the correctly understood negative philosophy leads to the positive 
philosophy; conversely, the positive philosophy is first possible only in contrast to the 
correctly understood negative. Only the latter’s withdrawal back into its limits makes 
the former discernable and then, not only possible, but also necessary.” Schelling, The 
Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 145; SW, XIII 80. 
220 SW, XI 564; XIII 93, 153. The relation of negative and positive philosophy has 
been a primary field of interest to scholars the last fifty years and a question of much 
debate. As there is no direct gain for this study, I refrain from going deeper into these 
disputes. The readings of Horst Fuhrmans and Walter Schultz represent the two central 
positions. On Fuhrmans reading, Schelling carries out an onto-theological project that is 
centered in a theory of the absolute and a theory of creation. This project is formulated 
by means of a personal divinity through which Fuhrmans gives clear priority to positive 
philosophy (cf. Horst Fuhrmans, Schellings letzte philosophie. Die negative und positive 
philosophie im einsatz des spätidealismus. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940); Horst 
Fuhrmans, “Der Ausgangspunkt der Schellingschen Spätphilosophie,” Kant-Studien 48, 
no. 1–4 (57 1956): 302-323.). On the reading of Schulz, Schelling attempts a 
completion of idealism through an incorporation of reason’s own other through the 
model of ‘mediated self-mediation’. Reason thereby becomes the absolute over against 
its other as its own transcendent being, which is the integration of its own history. 
Schulz does not read the late Schelling as a failed speculative philosophy, but rather as 
the most radical formulation of the nature of thinking (Schulz, Die Vollendung des 
deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings.). For a thoroughly exposition 
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6.4 The Logical Concept of Being 
The difference between negative and positive philosophy can be depicted 
using two different concepts of being: the one, a logical concept of being, 
and the other, a historical concept of being.  
The central characteristic of the logical concept of being is determinacy. 
Schelling refers to this as the “idea of being”, the “figure of being” or the 
“blueprint of being”221 The identification of a purely rational philosophy 
with a logical concept of being can retrieve this concept from Hegel. The 
same concept could, as suggested by Gabriel, also be explained with 
Plato’s model of determinacy in which it can be seen how determinacy 
further provides a linkage between being, determinacy, and totality. In 
Schelling’s later thought, the ‘idea’ designates the totality of meaning as 
the background that renders any determination possible and meaningful.222  
According to a common understanding, determinacy is the conceptual 
fixation of something as opposed to something else. If we follow Gabriel, 
this also amounts to Plato’s definition, where determinacy takes place 
within an understanding of the whole of being.223 On the platonic model, 
determinacy is what makes something distinguishable from everything else, 
and what defines things by virtue of their place in the whole. With this we 
find the representation of totality within determination, that is, in every 
determinate being qua its determinacy.  
                                                                                                                       
of the positions see Hutter, Geschichtliche Vernunft, 14–40. Furthermore, the 
assessment of the role of Schelling’s later thinking within the tradition of post-Kantian 
idealism has been varyingly interpretated, both as the completion of idealism (cf. Schulz, 
Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings.), and as 
the resignation of idealism (cf. Thomas Buchheim, Eins von Allem: die 
Selbstbescheidung des Idealismus in Schellings Spätphilosophie (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 
1992).), and even as the self-dissolving of idealism (cf. Michael Theunissen, “Die 
Aufhebung des Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings,” Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch, no. 83 (1976): 1-29.).  
221 SW, XI 291, 313. As will be further clarified, Schelling identifies the idea of 
being with Kant’s “ideal of pure reason”. As Gabriel captures it, idea here means “the 
totality of determinations from which all knowledge results, that relative to which the 
endeavour of capturing determinate beings and completely distinguishing them from 
one another takes place…” Transcendental Ontology, 63–64. See also Gabriel, Der 
Mensch im Mythos, 104–115. 
222 Gabriel makes several illuminating interpretations of Schelling’s late thought 
against the background of antique idealism. See Markus Gabriel, “Unvordenkliches 
Sein und Ereignis: Der Seinsbegriff beim späten Schelling und beim späten Heidegger,” 
in Heideggers Schelling-Seminar (1927-28): die Protokolle von Martin Heideggers 
Seminar zu Schellings “Freiheitsschrift” (1927-28), ed. Lore Hühn (Stuttgart-Bad 
Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2010), 83. 
223 Plato against Parmenides’ ontological monism. Plato, Plato: Complete Works, ed. 
John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 148a5f. 
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The understanding of totality as something present in the determination 
of particular beings is negative in the sense that it concerns absent beings – 
what a thing is not. Regarding a particular determinate being, the totality 
implied is negative, and therefore a sort of nothing. In Hegel’s logic, the 
understanding of being as determinacy, the idea that something is 
understood against its negation – nothing, requires for nothing to be a 
something (not something determinate, but not simply nothing), namely, 
that against which being is determined as something: a constitutive 
nothing.224  
The logical concept of being illuminates the unity of being and thought. 
We could emphasize what was already a central point in Plato: that being, 
understood as determinate being, is a matter of thought: being as being is 
recognized only in thinking. Furthermore, this logical concept of being 
requires a certain understanding of the judgment in which determinacy is 
acquired through the application of proper predicates. For the same reason, 
we find a theory of predication central to Schelling’s thinking. It is the 
merit of Hogrebe to show how Schelling’s mature metaphysics can be 
understood on the basis of this central theory of predication, which 
Schelling defends as a theory of judgment.225 This theory of predication is 
built into Schelling’s reading of Kant’s ideal of pure reason as the key to 
understanding Schelling new notion of judgment.  
6.5 From Ideal to ‘Urwesen’ 
Before we go deeper into Schelling’s reading of Kant’s ideal of pure reason, 
we should consult Kant directly. Kant argues in his first Critique that 
reason not only has the ability to go beyond its own boundaries, but that it 
does this according to its own nature. This excess lies in a production of 
ideas that regulate and provide the unity of thinking. Kant thoroughly 
analyses reason’s production of transcendental ideas and the assumption 
that they form a highest being, an ideal being – what Kant called the Ideal 
of Pure Reason. This ideal forms a philosophical basis that is very 
important to Schelling’s later development.226  
                                         
224 In the section just before commenting on Parmenides, Hegel writes: “Nichts 
pflegt dem Etwas entgegengesetzt zu werden; Etwas aber ist schon ein bestimmtes 
Seiendes, das sich von anderem Etwas unterscheidet; so ist also auch das dem Etwas 
entgegengesetzte Nichts, das Nichts von irgend Etwas, ein bestimmtes Nichts. Hier aber 
ist das Nichts in seiner unbestimmten Einfachheit zu nehmen.” a. Einheit des Seins und 
Nichts, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I. Erster Teil. Die 
objektive Logik. Bd. 5, 8th ed. (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 84. 
225 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 37. In Ages of the World Schelling asserts that 
“die Kenntniß der allgemeinen Gesetze des Urtheils muß die höchste Wissenschaft 
immer begleiten.” SW, XIII 214.  
226 SW, XI 282. 
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According to Kant, the pursuit of knowledge rests upon an anticipation 
of the world as the “idea of absolute totality.”227 This inherent notion of the 
world ensures the systematic unity of understanding, that is, of 
determination, by virtue of which everything that exists can be 
differentiated in its relations to each other.228 Hence, the notion of the 
totality of ‘all there is’ is a feature and a condition of knowledge that 
enables predication and determination. In this sense, the notion of ‘the 
world’ as a regulative idea is a condition of the appearance of objects as 
such. Kant’s ideal of pure reason is developed from the idea of a 
transcendental totality that forms a theory of the conditions of 
determination. Conceptual determination presupposes a totality from which 
all determining predicates used in a judgment stand in relations of either 
inclusion or exclusion. Whatever is made determinate is rendered through 
the totality of possible predicates. There is a comparison of predicates at 
work in all predicates employed for determination.  
From the principle of contradiction it follows that only one of two 
contradictory predicates applies in the determination of a thing.229 To put it 
differently, in the register of possible predicates some predicates are 
excluded due to contradiction. This is a logical principle, and it counts 
independent of experience. Through another principle, the principle of 
thoroughgoing determination, it counts that the determination of a thing is 
made possible only by means of the register of all possible predicates.230 
Kant calls this “the whole of possibility, as the sum total of all predicates of 
things in general.”231 In this register of all possible predicates a thing 
derives its own possibility “from the share it has in that whole of 
possibility.”232  
While the principle of contradiction, which regards predicates alone, 
determines which of two contradictorily conflicting predicates apply, the 
principle of thoroughgoing determination, which regards the object of 
predication, determines a thing in its relation to all other possible predicates. 
All things have characteristics that stand in inferential relations to each 
other. Additionally, as things that have characteristics, all things likewise 
                                         
227 KrV, B534. 
228 Kant’s treatment of the transcendental ideal Ibid., B595–B670. See also Hogrebe, 
Prädikation und Genesis, 59–66. 
229  Kant also calls it the ‘principle of determinability’ (Grundsatz der 
Bestimmbarkeit), KrV, B599. 
230 The ‘principle of thoroughgoing determination’ Grundsatz der durchgängigen 
Bestimmung, Ibid., B599f. Hogrebe uses the formulation “das Universalregister der 
Prädikate”, while Paul Guyer suggest the fomulation “pool of possible predicates.” 
Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 60; Paul Guyer, Kant (London: Routledge, 2006), 
146. 
231 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B600. 
232 Ibid. 
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stand in inferential relations to all other things. For example, when 
determining a dog, we not only relate it to all dogs, we also relate it to all 
species within which something can be specified as a dog. Even before that, 
we relate it to all instances within which something can be determined as 
being of a certain species, and so on. As the material – Kant even says 
‘matter’ (Materie) and ‘stuff’ (Stoff) – of every determinate thing, the 
register of all possible predicates defines the possibilities of the objects of 
predication. The comparison of predicates can never be completed because 
the amount of predicates itself is infinite. The totality is itself therefore 
inexhaustible, functioning only as a regulative principle for the epistemic 
orientation in the world. The complete determination of a thing, however, 
can never be presented in concreto in its totality. Furthermore, the register, 
as a condition of determination, is acknowledged and presupposed in every 
determinate thing. The idea of the sum total of all possible predicates 
(Inbegriff aller möglichen Prädikate überhaupt) is a prescription to reason 
for the employment of understanding: 
The proposition everything existing is thoroughly determined signifies not only that 
of every given pair of opposed predicates, but also of every pair of possible 
predicates, one of them must always apply to it; through this proposition predicates 
are not merely compared logically with one another, but the thing itself is compared 
transcendentally with the sum total of all possible predicates. What it means is that in 
order to cognize a thing completely one has to cognize everything possible and 
determine the thing through it, whether affirmatively or negatively. Thoroughgoing 
determination is consequently a concept that we can never exhibit in concreto in its 
totality, and thus it is grounded on an idea which has its seat solely in reason, which 
prescribes to the understanding the rule of its complete use.233 
The idea of the sum total of all possible predicates against which the 
determination of concrete things is made possible is itself indeterminate. It 
is the logical condition of determination. Every determination is a 
limitation of possibilities. Hence, the idea of the ‘All of reality’ (omnitudo 
realitatis) is the idea of the unlimited.234 We can say that the world, as this 
notion of totality, is understood as the condition of possibility for the 
content of the world, the things in (or of) the world, and ultimately of 
                                         
233 “Der Satz: alles Existierende ist durchgängig bestimmt, bedeutet nicht allein, daß 
von jedem Paare einander entgegengesetzter gegebenen, sondern auch von allen 
möglichen Prädikaten ihm immer eines zukomme; es werden durch diesen Satz nicht 
bloß Prädikate unter einander logisch, sondern das Ding selbst, mit dem Inbegriffe aller 
möglichen Prädikate, transzendental verglichen. Er will so viel sagen, als: um ein Ding 
vollständig zu erkennen, muß man alles Mögliche erkennen, und es dadurch, es sei 
bejahend oder verneinend, bestimmen. Die durchgängige Bestimmung ist folglich ein 
Begriff, den wir niemals in concreto seiner Totalität nach darstellen können, und 
gründet sich also auf einer Idee, welche lediglich in der Vernunft ihren Sitz hat, die dem 
Verstande die Regel seines vollständigen Gebrauchs vorschreibt.” Ibid., B601.  
234 KrV, B604. The discussion in section 5.5 foreshadowed the point here. 
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determination as such. Consequently, the idea of totality, the unlimited, 
cannot itself be an object of determination (limitation), save reification. As 
an idea that enables the pursuit of knowledge, and thereby belonging to 
knowledge, this concept of the world has no independent objective reality 
in itself. The totality of the whole is neither an object in itself, nor is it a 
possible object of knowledge. In sum, the world in which things are things 
is not an object because objects are determined, finite and limited.235 From 
this it is derived that the world, in its feature of totality, must be conceived 
as the unlimited (das Unbeschrängte).  
Reason comes, on natural grounds, to a conception of the idea of totality 
as an ideal being.236 Kant describes a natural, yet unnecessary, move from a 
conception of the a priori idea for the representation of totality to “a 
concept of an individual object that is thoroughly determined merely 
through the idea, and then must be called an ideal of pure reason.”237 
Reason does not presuppose the existence of a being that conforms to the 
ideal, but only the idea of such a being as an original image, a prototypon, 
of all things. Compared to this, objects – the defective copies of it – 
become ectypa. The ideal being is the highest reality, and it contains all of 
reality within itself. Every determinate being is derived from it and “takes 
from it the matter [Stoff] for their possibility.”238 The ideal being is their 
common substratum. 
Hence the object of reason’s ideal, which is to be found only in reason, is also called 
original being [das Urwesen] (ens originarum); because it has nothing above itself it 
is called the highest being [das höchste Wesen] (ens summum), and because 
everything else, as conditioned, stands under it, it is called the being of all beings 
[das Wesen aller Wesen] (ens entium).239 
Reason comes to an understanding of this original being as an existing 
being. Kant calls it a “transcendental affirmation, which is a Something, the 
concept of which in itself already expresses a being, and hence it is called 
reality (thinghood) [Sachheit], because through it alone, and only so far as 
it reaches, are objects Something (things).”240 Kant explains how the idea 
of the sum total is hypostasized, which is the case with the concept of God, 
in the transcendental sense. However, reason only grounds the 
thoroughgoing determination of things in general, never demanding that 
this thing should be given objectively. This is why Kant underlines that the 
                                         
235 “Die durchgängige Bestimmung eines jedes Dinges beruht auf der Einschränkung 
dieses All der Realität” Ibid., B605. 
236 Ibid., B528, B609. 
237 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B602. 
238 Ibid., B606. 
239 Ibid., B607. 
240 Ibid., B602. 
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sum total “does not signify the objective relation of an actual object to 
other things, but only that of an idea to concepts, and as to the existence of 
a being of such preeminent excellence it leaves us in complete 
ignorance.”241 The notion of the ideal as a particular being is a fiction and 
an illusion. However, it is a natural illusion. Kant therefore moves on to his 
discussion and groundbreaking critique of the classic proofs for God. 
Schelling provides a detailed discussion of Kant’s ideal of reason, 
showing the central moves in Schelling’s ontology. 242  For example, 
Schelling’s reading of the sum total of all possibility (Inbegriff alles 
Möglichen) involves an argument that enables a recasting of Kant’s ideal 
from its status as a highest being into a primordial origin of all possibility. 
Even though we cannot say this aspect was not present in Kant, it became 
central for Schelling. 
Schelling uses the example of the plurality of actually existing species of 
natural things to demonstrate the idea of a totality of possibilities.243 
According to Schelling it is a natural impression that these species could 
not possibly be original, nor could they be accidental. They must, therefore, 
derive from “the differences of the nature of being itself [Natur des 
Seyenden selbst].”244 Kant had already given the designation of an Urwesen, 
but not by means of a like argument to that of Schelling – Hogrebe calls 
this an evolutionary argument.245 Kant had used a geometrical argument 
concerning the Urwesen. However, Schelling’s idea is that all of the 
conditions of possibility lie inherent in primordial being. This is not a 
question concerning the origin of the organic world. That would be a 
matter for an empirical investigation. The question of the ultimate origin 
precedes the determinations that would be used in any empirical 
investigation. The question of an ultimate origin is completely independent 
of empirical interests. Instead, Schelling’s concern with an ultimate origin 
                                         
241 Ibid., B607. 
242  The place is found in the philosophical introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mythology, SW, XI 277–294. See also Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, §11–12; 
Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, §5–8. 
243  “Das Nächste wäre: als die Correlate dieser Möglichkeiten die wirklich 
existirenden Dinge nehmen und als deren Möglichkeit die verschiedenen Arten zu seyn 
erklären, die sie in sich ausdrücken; denn eine andere Art zu seyn hat das Unorganische, 
eine andere das Organische, in dessen Umkreis wieder eine andere die Pflanze, eine 
andere das Thier. Wer fühlt aber nicht, daß diese Arten zu seyn unmöglich 
ursprüngliche seyn können?” SW, XI 287f. 
244 “Anzunehmen ist vielmehr, daß diese durch Erfahrung gegebenen Arten, durch 
welche Mittelglieder immer, aber doch zuletzt sich ableiten von ursprünglichen, nicht 
mehr zufälligen, sondern zur Natur des Seyenden selbst gehörigen Unterschieden 
desselben.” Ibid., XI 288. 
245 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 67–68. 
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forms the basis of a “speculative cosmology,”246 and not an empirical 
cosmology. Hogrebe inserts a decisive question concerning whether there 
is a method that can secure the independency of a speculative cosmology 
from an empirical cosmology, and he takes Schelling’s central theory of 
predication to be such a method.247 It is of central interest to Hogrebe’s 
readings of Schelling to unearth the grounding of a speculative cosmology 
(formal cosmology) by means of a theory of predication. This theory, 
which Hogrebe translates into formal logic, is, in Schelling’s version, 
articulated through the subject-object structure of judgment. Primordial 
being, Schelling’s recast of Kant’s ideal, is what enables determinations by 
means of a semantic dimension of predication.248  
The approach to a formal cosmology can therefore be characterized as a 
logical-ontological ontology in the sense that it pursues the origin of 
intelligibility. Hogrebe draws the broader picture of Schelling’s 
primordiality as follows: 
The genesis of the universe is sub specie praedicationis the process through which 
structures emerge of the kind that can ‘grasp’ singular terms and predicates, i.e. 
individual things that have capacities and stand in relations. We have no concepts of 
these entities besides the rules of employment of our concepts, however, these rules 
presuppose a compatible universe. But such a universe has not fallen from the sky 
but is sub specie existentiae the realization of a possibility that we can infer along the 
lines of the formal structure of the incomplete predicate Fx.249 
                                         
246 Ibid., 68. 
247 “Die Frage is nur: gibt es tatsächlich ein methodisches Verfahren, das die 
Unabhängigkeit der spekulativen Kosmologie von der empirischen garantiert? Auf diese 
Frage sind wir inzwischen gut vorbereitet: ja, diese methodische Verfahren gibt es, 
nämlich als Erweiterung der Theorie der Prädikation ‘nach unten’ als Exhaustion der 
formalen kosmologischen Option jeder Prädikation.” Ibid., 69. 
248 Schelling procedes as follows: “Wer könnte z.B. sagen, daß das bloße reine 
Subjekt des Seyns nicht das Seyende sey, und müsste nicht vielmehr zugeben, daß eben 
dieses das erste dem Seyenden Mögliche sey, nämlich Subjekt zu seyn. Denn was 
immer Objekt, setzt das voraus, dem es Objekt ist. Zwar wenn Subjekt, so kann es nicht 
in demselben Gedanken, oder, wie man zu sagen pflegt, zugleich, das im aussaglichen 
Sinne seyende seyn, es ist mit einer Beraubung gesetzt, aber nur einer bestimmten Art 
des Seyns, nicht des Seyns überhaupt, denn wie könnte das ganz und gar Nichtseyende 
auch nur Subjekt seyn?” SW, XI 288. 
249 “So ist die Prim-Modalität zunächst bloß das, was die Möglichkeit für irgenetwas 
im Sinne singulärer Termini oder Prädikate bereitstellt. Anders gesagt: die Genesis des 
Universums ist sub specie praedicationis der Proceß, durch den Strukturen enstehen 
derart, daß singuläre Termini und Prädikate ‘greifen’ können; d.h. Individuen, die 
Eigenschaften haben und in Relationen stehen. Wir haben keinen Begriff dieser 
Entitäten als über die Verwendungsregeln unserer Termini, aber diese Regeln setzen ein 
mit ihm verträgliches Universum voraus. Aber ein solches Universum ist nicht von 
Himmel gefallen, sondern sub specie existentiae die Realisierung einer Möglichkeit, die 
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The point of a formal cosmology is to expose the fundamental structures of 
meaning in the origin and the existence of a semantic dimension, a field 
within which being is grasped. Schelling takes on a drastic strategy for his 
approach, depicting the origin of meaning in its transition from ‘whatever’ 
came before meaning. In the formal cosmology, judgment operates exactly 
in this transition, the transition from the meaningless to meaning. However, 
the point is that nothing meaningful can be said about what precedes 
meaning; no determination can be given regarding that which precedes 
determination. Schelling’s notion of the unprethinkable being refers to this 
sub-semantic motif. If the elementary predication establishes the nucleus of 
our epistemic capacity, a nuclear split or descent to the sub-atomic level 
implies “an uncontrollable dissipation into non-sense. What we want to 
understand under x and F, before any Fx-structure is established, is simply 
incomprehensible.”250 
Schelling has, in all of his later writings, expressions that attempt to 
designate this origin of the logical space of predication. What comes before 
the proposition is prior to meaning, to difference, to rationality, to sanity, 
and therefore unavailable to any propositional form. It is decisive to 
understand that this is the central transcendental ambition in Schelling’s 
project. Even though Hogrebe’s reading of Schelling’s ontology draws 
primarily from the fragments of Ages of the World, the theory of 
predication as a formal cosmology applies to the more general setting of 
the distinction between negative and positive philosophy. In the fragments 
of Ages of the World, Schelling investigates the evolution of primordial 
being and the potencies through which primordial being, as the oldest being, 
comes to itself. Hogrebe applies Schelling’s reading of Kant’s ideal of pure 
reason and provides a theory of an ultimate presupposition prior to possible 
determination. Primordial being, as the ultimate presupposition, is the past 
of cognition in the sense that it precedes any possible cognition, and it is as 
such unprethinkable. 
One way to approach Schelling’s notion of the unprethinkable lies in his 
conception of facticity, the quod sit of actual existence. We can imagine 
that two different propositions determine the same thing. The propositions 
‘This is a bike’ and ‘This is a construction of metal pipes’ can both be true, 
                                                                                                                       
wir am Leitfaden der formalen Struktur des unfertigen Prädikats Fx erschließen können.” 
Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 69. 
250 “Es kommt zu einer unkontrollierten Dissipation von Unsinn. Denn was wir unter 
x und F, bevor noch eine Fx-Struktur realisiert ist, verstehen wollen, ist schlechterdings 
unerfindlich. Den einzigen Anhalt, den wir haben, ist der, daß die subatomaren 
Elemente des zerstrümmerten prädikativen Kerns so behandelt werden müssen, daß sie 
die Möglichkeit einer Verschmelzung zur elementaren Sinnstruktur Fx repräsentieren. 
Und genau im Sinne dieser Strategie verfährt Schelling und genau das is seine 
Characterisierung der Prim-Modalität.” Ibid., 70. 
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and determine something that can never be exhaustively determined and 
therefore never completed in any form of determination. Hence, there is an 
infinite surplus of existence residing in the proto-reference that both 
determining propositions point to. Whatever goes before any proposition 
and is marked by predicates in the form of propositions is an existence that 
escapes but ultimately enables its own determination. It is without meaning 
in itself, and cannot be in a semantic relation as unprethinkable. It precedes 
the relations of determination with an ordered world. Nevertheless, 
unprethinkable being, which we cannot not think or grasp as such, is the 
fundamental presupposition of all determination.  
Another characterization of the unprethinkable within Schelling’s formal 
cosmology is the beginning that cannot be grasped or understood in any 
way. The world, as an ordered totality, is a semantic dimension, within 
which things can only be determined according to its own order. 
Unprethinkable being therefore implies a beginning that precedes the 
ordered logical space of a dimension of sense, that is, a beginning in non-
sense. Schelling says: 
Anything that enters the world and becomes actualized for and in the world needs a 
presupposition, a beginning, which is not what is true or what ought-to-be. But it is 
not instantly recognized as such. In order to be firmly rooted, this beginning has to 
consider itself as being for its own sake. Therefore, a higher potency is needed to 
liberate the development from its presupposition.251 
To Schelling, the semantic dimension that consists of an ordered world is 
this higher potency. Schelling’s formal cosmology is motivated by the 
question why is there sense, why is there not rather non-sense? Schelling 
sets forth to defend the idea that there is non-sense in the most radical way, 
namely, prior to any sense-making determination. Sense is dis-ambiguated 
non-sense. That is the meaning of the ‘blind beginning’. The conditions of 
possibility of sense lie beyond sense, which means that every judgment 
occupies a space that was made available through non-sense. The question 
concerning the existence of sense is not merely an ontological question, but 
“the logical-ontological ur-question.”252  
When Schelling says that the entire world is caught in the web of reason, 
he is pointing out how constitutive structures of meaning hold the world 
(together) in the form that makes it available to us, the form without which 
                                         
251 SW, XIV 315. As Hogrebe puts it: “Der Anfang ist blind, der Sache nach immer 
das Erstere, dem Begriff nach immer das Spätere; ist er sehend geworden, ist er 
vergangen. Auf dieser Vergangenheit ruht alles, alles was Gestalt angenommen hat, 
alles was existiert, auf einem Anfang, ‘der nicht aufhört Anfang zu seyn’.” Hogrebe, 
Prädikation und Genesis, 114. 
252 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 68. 
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we would dissipate in non-sense.253 What Kant had explicated in the ideal 
of pure reason forms the singular reality that enables the emergence of the 
logical space of predication. At least since the Freiheitsschrift the sub-
semantic, pre-predicative being becomes a central concern for Schelling as 
a concept of ‘ground’, which designates the vital matter that resides in the 
abysmal darkness of indeterminacy. 
Aside from this treatment of Kant’s ideal, a decisive employment of 
Aristotle permeates this part of Schelling thinking. From Aristotle’s 
concept of dynamis, Schelling reformulates a theory of possibility and 
realization, a theory of potencies. Central components from Aristotle’s 
substance metaphysics guide Schelling’s attempt to treat the pre-
predicative reality of the Urwesen. The intersection of Kantian and 
Aristotelian thinking shows two pivotal sources for Schelling’s late 
thought.254  
Regarding the claim of a primal being, or a prime-possibility of all 
existing things, Schelling points out that Kant’s use of the principle of 
contradiction only provides a formal possibility, while the principle of 
thoroughgoing determination provides a material possibility. The step from 
a formal to a material possibility is not indifferent to real existence, save 
experience, and is therefore not simply a logical or conceptual matter, but a 
matter of the existing thing itself. There is an advancement in actual being 
taking place that Schelling believes to be overlooked by Kant. In the 
principle of thoroughgoing determination, the thing is determined within 
the sum total of possibility as the thing it is and not merely as a concept; it 
is determined within its inferential relations to all other things. Schelling 
remarks critically: 
This is the place, where, if Kant was concerned with actual Being [das wirkliche 
Seyn] and not the mere representation, the comment should have been found that 
such a sum total of all possibility could not be for itself; Kant’s own expression of it 
as mere matter, the mere stuff of all possibility applies to the kind that according to 
Aristotle can never be said for itself but only by another.255 
                                         
253 “Die ganze Welt liegt gleichsam in den Netzen des Verstandes oder der Vernunft, 
aber die Frage ist eben, wie sie in diese Netze gekommen sey, da in der Welt offenbar 
noch etwas anderes und etwas mehr als bloße Vernunft ist, ja sogar etwas über diese 
Schranken Hinausstrebendes.” SW, X 143f. 
254 See also Alfred Denker, “Schelling und Aristoteles,” in Das antike Denken in der 
Philosophie Schellings, ed. Rainer Adolphi and Jörg Jantzen (Frommann Holzboog, 
2004), 305-320. 
255 “Hier war es nun, wo, wenn es Kant überhaupt um das wirkliche Seyn und nicht 
die bloße Vorstellung zu thun war, die Bemerkung ihre Stelle finden mußte, daß ein 
solcher Inbegriff aller Möglichkeit nichts für sich seyn Könnendes ist; nach Kants 
eigenem Ausdruck die bloße Materie, der bloße Stoff aller besonderen Möglichkeit, ist 
er von der Art dessen, was nach Aristoteles nie für sich, sondern nur von einem 
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This means that the principle of thoroughgoing determination not only 
provides the determination concerning the logical form of a thing a priori, 
it also provides determination through a comparison of “the thing itself 
with all possibility”256 through which the relation of reason to “actual 
Being [wirkliche Seyn]”257 comes about. As Gabriel puts it, “through this 
reason is lead to accredit its logical representation of an omnitudo realitas a 
being outside of representation.”258 Schelling recognizes Kant’s critique of 
the reification of the totality. For Schelling, however, the central merit of 
Kant’s analysis is the assertion that “everything that belongs to being” lies 
“prior to being.”259 This is why primordial being does not ‘exist’, but exists 
only potentially, as the potentiality (potency) of being. The condition of 
possibility of existing things does not itself exist, but it precedes what 
exists as its potency. As the material possibility (that is, potency), the 
unlimited cannot be in and of itself because it would then have to be 
determined. It can only be through determinate things, through the 
determination of another potency. 
Schelling’s reference to Aristotelian dynamis regards the characteristic 
of dynamis as the ‘material of the general’. Schelling says: “The totality of 
the possibilities […] cannot itself be as the mere general, it needs One 
through which it, as a selfless, has its Self, one that is to him as a self-being 
cause of being.”260 This relation depicts how primordial being actualizes 
itself as the indeterminate in determinacy. As the prime-possibility of all 
predication – Hogrebe makes this emphasis repeatedly261 – it is the ontic 
condition and prerequisite of the emergence of a universe that is 
compatible with the structures of predicating judgments. This implies that 
the primordial being, the prime-possibility, is without any predicates or 
completely predicatively unsaturated: “Prädikatlosigkeit.”262  
                                                                                                                       
Anderen zu sagen ist. Sollte er seyn, so müsste etwas seyn, von dem er gesagt würde, 
und dieses Etwas könnte nicht wieder bloße Möglichkeit, dieses müsste seiner Natur 
nach Wirklichkeit, und könnte daher auch nur Einzelwesen seyn. Allein Kant macht gar 
nicht die Voraussetzung, daß der Inbegriff aller Möglichkeiten sey.” SW, XI 284–285.  
256 Ibid., XI 284. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, 109f.  
259 SW, XI 285. 
260 Ibid., XI 313. 
261 See especially §9 and §10 in Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 47–58. 
262 In the Freiheitsschrift, where Schelling construes this momemt of indifferent 
being as ‘Ungrund’, he stresses the impossibility of predication at the sub-semantic: 
“Die Indifferenz ist nicht ein Produkt der Gegensätze, noch sind sie implicite in ihr 
enthalten, sondern sie ist ein eignes von allem Gegensatz geschiedenes Wesen, an dem 
alle Gegensätze sich brechen, das nichts anderes ist als eben das Nichtseyn derselben, 
und das darum auch kein Prädicat hat als eben das der Prädicatlosigkeit, ohne daß es 
deßwegen ein Nichts oder ein Unding wäre.” SW, VII 407. 
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6.6 The Ontology of Predication 
Schelling applies a theory of potencies to the form of judgment. In a 
modified form, he follows the Kantian understanding of thinking as 
judging and thoughts as judgments. In Schelling’s theory of judgment, 
thinking moves through three fundamental structural moments of subject, 
predicate (or object in the sense of opposing the subject), and the synthesis 
of both (subject-object) provided by the copula. By means of this structure, 
thinking determines everything that can be. Everything that can be thought 
can be, and everthing that can be thought must be presentable in the form 
of a judgment. 
Primordial being is the first position of judgment and hence the first 
potency.263 Schelling calls it “the mere pure subject of being”264 or the 
“originary subject.”265 However, a determinate thing (“the first possibility 
of being”266) is determinable through predicates, which always presupposes 
something to which the predicate is applied. This first potency is without 
predicates. It is a raw and indeterminate element prior to the existence of 
judgment. Hogrebe calls it ‘pronominal being’. It is clear that the idea of 
potencies is applied to enable an understanding of being on different levels. 
We cannot say that the being of one potency is more real than another. 
Being unfolds its possibilities through potencies as its actualizations. 
Pronominal being therefore needs to be distinguished from predicative 
being in order to separate two completely different levels of the 
actualization of being. 267 
                                         
263 Schelling’s theory of potencies, which draws on many Aristelian elements, was 
first formulated in his early philosophy of nature. Later however e.g. in the lectures of 
Philosophie der Mytologie, we find that Schelling employs Aristotle much more 
directly. We find a good example of Schelling’s use of potencies to explicate the 
structures of judgment in the fifteenth lecture: “denn wo Subjekt und Prädicat [ist], ist 
auch Potenz und Actus; das Erste verhält sich zu Letzterem als seine Potenz; z.B. der 
Mensch ist die Potenz des Prädicats gesund” Ibid., XI 352. 
264 “das bloße reine Subjekt des Seyns” Ibid., XI 288. Again: Schelling speaks of the 
subject and object as the subject and object of the judgment. 
265 “Ursubjekt” Ibid., XI 352 n3. 
266 Ibid., XI 288. 
267 Schelling elaborates on the different ways to explicate being. “Eine andere Art 
des Seyns ist die des Subjekts, eine andere die des Objekts; wenn wir nicht gern 
ungewöhnliche Ausdrücke vermieden, könnten wir jenes das bloß wesende nennen; 
auch das wird manchen ungewohnt scheinen, wenn wir das eine als gegenständliches, 
das andere als urständliches Seyn bezeichnen.” SW XI 288 my italics. Schelling also 
demontrates the differences with –A and +A, where –A stands for beings without or 
prior to any predication and +A stand for the predicatively articulatable being. “denn –A 
ist ja reines Subjekt, +A das seyende im rein aussaglichen Sinn, insofern Prädicat […] 1. 
das Ursubjekt (–A), 2. das Urprädicat (+A), 3. die Ursynthesis von Subjekt und Prädicat 
(± A), die nichts anders zu ihrem Prädicat hat, sondern sich selbst.” Ibid., XI 352 n3. 
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The second potency concerns the predicate, the second position in the 
judgment. Schelling calls it the “originary predicate.”268 However, the 
predicate alone does not complete the judgment as a proposition in the 
sense of an actualization. The predicate alone is still only a possibility, 
which Hogrebe calls ‘predicative being.’ The predicate, as a component of 
determination, enables articulation and cognition (primum cogitabile), 
which, in Schelling’s formulation, enables being “in the articulated 
sense.”269 Hence, a third potency is required, the copula, in which the 
subject and the predicate are bound together. Schelling calls this synthesis 
spirit, or the “originary synthesis of subject and predicate.”270 When the 
pronominal being and the predicative being are bound together in a unity, 
the third uniting form emerges, which Hogrebe calls “propositional 
being.”271  
The third potency is the key point of the logical space that we can call 
the fundamental semantic dimension of determination. Regarding the third 
potency, Hogrebe uses the designation “ontic media, within which a so-
and-so can be, i.e. as the possibility that something and the predicative 
determination can be connected.”272 Schelling’s ontotolgy of predication 
sets out to explain how, through the structure of judgment, sense is a fact 
that depends on an unprethinkable ground, which it can neither think nor 
think without. The structure of judgment, however, shows that sense does 
not derive from the unprethinkable, but depends on its withdrawal. 
From Hogrebe’s designation we are offered a way of following the 
actualization through the potencies. The relation of the first and the second 
potency entails a transcendental speculation, which we should not be afraid 
to admit. Schelling is fully aware that we, in the originary subject, speak of 
something of which nothing can be said. The first potency cannot even be 
explored as it is because we cannot approach it in its indeterminability. 
However, from the position of the complete judgment, we must assert the 
pronominal being as the origin. We must admit that something precedes the 
determinacy. In characterizing this state, Schelling speaks of a capacity 
                                         
268 “Urprädicat” Ibid. 
269 Ibid., XI 288. 
270 “Die Ursynthesis von Subjekt und Prädicat” Ibid., XI 352 n3. “[D]as eine und das 
andere […] aber jedes in anderer Beziehung, und nicht einem Theil nach das eine, 
einem andern Theil nach das andere, sondern es wird jedes unendlicher Weise, also 
ganz das eine und ganz das andere seyn, nicht sowohl zugleich als gleicherweise.” SW, 
XI 289–290. 
271 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 73. Schelling depicts it as ± A and says “weil 
es also was es ist auch nicht für sich, sondern nur in Gemeinschaft mit den andern seyn 
kann, läßt sich auch von dem Dritten (wir wollen es durch ± A bezeichnen), es läßt sich 
auch von diesem nur sagen, daß es ein Moment oder eine Potenz des Seyenden ist.” SW, 
XI 290. 
272 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 73. 
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(Können) of being in the first potency, which manifests itself in judgment. 
He depicts the pronominal being as “pure Capacity without any Being,” 
and the predicative being as “pure Being without any Capacity.”273  
Freedom lies at the bottom of all this, as the nature of primordial being. 
Schelling holds on to the indeterminability of being by characterizing the 
nature of being as a yearning and will, as is the point of his statement from 
the Freiheitsschrift that ‘will is primordial being.’274 Therefore, the Kantian 
assertion that the structure of determinacy is judgmental is combined with 
Schelling’s fundamental emphasis on freedom. Judgment, as the domain of 
sense-making, provides the domain of existence, a sense grounded in 
freedom due to the act of predication. This is the core of Schelling’s 
ontology of freedom, which he explicates and defends with an ontology of 
predication. The ambition of Schelling’s fundamental concern with 
freedom in an ontology of this kind is to break out of a logical concept of 
being as mere determinacy. This strategy leads to a concept of being that is 
characterized as both historical and contingent. Moreover, the central 
ramification of this ontology is that the propositional structure of being 
underlies the structure of the world, a structure that is not original but 
provided by reason. This is why the question of the system is so difficult, 
and why it is constantly revised throughout Schelling’s thinking. The 
consequences of the ontology of freedom for the claims of a system are too 
radical. The feature that the world is structured by means of the logical 
space of propositions necessarily puts the thinking subject, and thereby the 
human being, at the center.  
In the larger picture, this development in Schelling implies the 
replacement of the theoretical subject with the human being. Both a one-
sided idealism as well as a one-sided realism run into problems of the 
subject-world relation (as well as the subject-subject relation). Schelling 
does not conceive of the human being as mere subjectivity but more 
radically as freedom to be in the world, that is, to inhabit the world. This is 
the freedom of the human individual, which Schelling takes to cover action 
and life as well (“that everything real (nature, the world of things) has 
activity, life and freedom as its ground”275). This is what Theunissen calls 
Schellling’s anthropological real-idealism.276 The human being, therefore, 
cannot be determined outside of its involvement in the world, which is why 
the world and the human being, through the ontology of predication, stand 
in a relation of mutual determination. Human freedom is metaphysical in 
the sense that it is a freedom to inhabit the world (in activity and life) as 
                                         
273 SW, XI 292. 
274 Ibid., VII 350. 
275 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 22. 
276 Theunissen, “Schellings anthropologischer ansatz,” 178. 
Determination and Contingency 114 
“the clarification of the human being about itself and its place in the 
whole.”277 
Schelling’s break with a logical concept of being covers a certain 
conception of judgment. In that particular logical conception of judgments, 
any determinate, individual thing is recognizable only through its 
referential relations. However, this would imply that the individual is 
subordinated to the whole, as a mere moment of the whole. The problem 
with this idea is that the position of the thinking subject in this totality of 
differential relations is lost out of sight. Hence, the consequence of a strict 
concern with essence and universality is fundamentally apositional 
thinking that cannot apply reality to particularity. Schelling’s proposal of a 
new concept of being seeks to ground the idea of positional thinking, the 
sort of thinking that understands itself to be in being.  
The application of his theory of potencies enables Schelling to deploy 
another model of judgment. This model provides an understanding of the 
predicative mediation of reason and thereby provides an insight into the 
precedence of the ground of reason outside of reason.  
6.7 Facticity and Contingency 
Schelling’s interest in Kant’s ideal of pure reason not only concerns the 
functionality of the transcendental idea and predication, but also concerns 
the question of the reification of an ideal being. However, as Hogrebe 
makes clear, Schelling turns around the order of the reification.278 What for 
Kant is a regulative idea that happens to lead to its own reification in the 
conception of a highest being, is in Schelling’s construal reversed. Even 
before the question as to how meaning comes about, Schelling’s concern is 
why there is meaning already, as a factual situation and circumstance. As it 
is, things do make sense as part of an ordered world. This is the factual 
situation within which the question of sense is raised. From the factual 
experience of sense, Schelling infers the real existence of the potentialities 
that necessarily have preceeded, in particular the antecedence of primordial 
sub-semantic being. Meaning is not primordial being, but a consequence 
and a possibility (potency) of it. Primordial being is not the intelligible 
itself, but what has made inteligibility possible.  
Thinking is not primary, and it always comes too late. Primordial being 
always precedes thinking. It is “that which, no matter how early we come 
on the scene, is already there.”279 Consequently, all thought always already 
                                         
277 Markus Gabriel, Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift (Bonn: 
Univ. Press, 2006), 48.  
278 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 125–126. 
279 SW, XIV 341. Schelling discusses the relation of unprethinkable being to thinking 
in Another Deduction of the Principles of the Positive Philosophy. However, we find 
various expressions of this idea in the later writings, for example in his 1850 Treatise on 
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finds itself in being, as Gabriel puts it, “in a situation it has not itself set up 
in advance.” 280  
Against this Being which, no matter how early we come on the scene, is already 
there, I have often heard the following objection: such a reality, which precedes all 
possibility, is unthinkable. And indeed it is unthinkable for a thinking, which 
precedes Being and therefore for the kind of thinking to which we are accustomed. 
Thinking posits this Being as its point of departure in order to attain that which it 
deems as most worthy to and for knowing and thereby as the most desirable thing in 
knowledge, in order to attain it as a reality. And actual thinking only comes to pass 
when departing from this point—but just as the terminus a quo of a movement, in 
which, actually, the movement itself does not already exist, still belongs to the 
movement, so every Being through its progress, by its setting off from itself, 
becomes a moment of thinking [sc. namely the first potency!].281 
What precedes thinking therefore belongs to thinking, even though it is 
beyond what can be thought. This is the origin or beginning of our thinking 
that can never be the object of our thinking. It is not even the ground of 
logical space, only the ‘ground of ground,’ as Heidegger would have put it. 
It marks the impossibility of accounting for the fact of the existence of 
logical space, which is the contingency of logical space itself. 
The belatedness of thinking is ambigious insofar as thinking cannot 
illuminate its own ground, it cannot have its own ground as its object. The 
predicative mediation of thought, as expressed in the logical concept of 
being, is incapable of reaching outside logical space, outside of the 
semantic dimension of judgment. The existence of logical space is not itself 
explained, nor can it be explained with recourse to judgment.  
Unprethinkable being is not itself the ground of logical space, but the 
inevitable point of departure. In the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling designates 
the unavailability of a ground of the semantic dimension as the “non-
ground [Ungrund].” 282  There is no solid point, no determination or 
differentiation within unprethinkable being. There is no reflection. Hence, 
there is also no rational relation of the point of departure, the beginning, to 
the semantic mediation. Methodologically we can say that Schelling starts 
out from a pre-semantic basis in order to clarify the origin of logical space, 
any logical space, in which being is being. The mere facticity of sense, a 
                                                                                                                       
the Source of Eternal Truths: “Being is the first, thinking only the second or what 
follows.” SW, XI 587. In the introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology he says, 
“[A]n actuality that precedes all possibility cannot be thought. One can concede this in a 
certain sense and say that for precisely this reason it is the beginning of all real thought 
– for the beginning of thought is not yet itself thought.” Schelling, The Grounding of 
Positive Philosophy, 203; SW, XIII 162. 
280 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 65. 
281 SW, XIV 341. Translation from Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 70. 
282 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 70; SW, VII 406. 
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logical space that is disclosed by virtue of the structure of judgment, has no 
ground available for thinking with recourse to judgment, which means that 
there is ultimately no ratio determinans. The impossibility of accounting 
for the fact of the existence of logical space marks a contingency of logical 
space as such. 
Judgment provides the domain of existence because everything that 
exists is something. Judgment determines the domain of possible existence 
through which the determinability of existing things is made possible. 
Whatever can be (in this domain), can be something and can be asserted as 
a something. 283  Hogrebe makes many interesting observations and 
considerations about the necessity of stable structures for the functioning of 
logical space. For example, he points out the necessity of adequateness 
between what we seek and ask for (‘What is this?’) and the possible 
answers of what we find (‘This is a something?’), which all belong to the 
conditions of propositional thinking. The question conditions the answer. 
Metaphysics, as Hogrebe sees it, marks this field of possible existence as a 
stable semantic field. In “this optic metaphysics analyses the structures of 
the universal field of seeking [Suchfeld], which already needs to be stable 
in order for us to be assertoric finding [fündig].”284 According to Hogrebe 
this field of propositional structures consists of the original possibility of a 
connection between subjects and predicates that establishes the domain of 
possible meaning. Ontology is therefore always conditioned by a demand 
of knowledge and a demand of sense-making. Whatever makes sense does 
so due to its compatibility with propositional structures of a demand, due to 
its place within a domain of possible meaning, any domain.  
The point that Hogrebe draws from Schelling’s ontology of predication 
concerns the structure of logical space as the conditions of any space or 
domain as such. Theoretically, there could be infinite domains or ‘fields of 
sense’ that, by means of certain semantic rules, all contribute to some sort 
of determination. Nevertheless, any complete or ultimate determination of 
a thing remains impossible. The conditions of determination are constituted 
in such a way as to not eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding. There 
can always be something added by the employment of another field or 
domain. As Gabriel points out, this idea naturally supports Cavell’s concept 
                                         
283 Schelling elsewhere explains this ‘as’-structure of determinacy as “[…] das ewige, 
reine Seyn des Subjekts. Ewig ist, dem keine Potenz vorhergeht; in der Ewigkeit ist kein 
“als”; als etwas, z.B. als A, kann nichts gesetzt seyn ohne Ausschließung von einem 
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Reflexion – ein Reflektirtwerden –, also schon ein Contrarium voraus.” SW, XIV 106. 
284 “In dieser Optik analysiert die Metaphysik Strukturen des universellen Suchfeldes, 
die schon stabil sein müssen, sofern wir in ihm assertorisch fündig werden wollen.” 
Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 49. My italics. 
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of ‘fields of sense.’ 285  Furthermore, the concepts of ‘logical spaces’, 
‘semantic domains’, ‘a predicative ambience’, are all used synonymously 
here for a set of conditions, or rules, that enable a semantic structure. In 
Schelling, this idea of his ontology of predication serves to expose the 
incapacities of negative philosophy and judgement as employed with 
regard to the logical concept of being. Schelling formulates the more 
complete situation through his theory of predication as a theory of the 
structural condition of the possibility of determination and the necessity of 
positive philosophy. 
Schelling’s theory of potencies serves to show how the form of judgment 
reflects the unity of being and thought. In Schelling’s relation to Kant’s 
thinking, we find further cosmological aspects of these ideas. In Schelling’s 
view, the separation of ontology and transcendental philosophy in Kant is a 
fundamental problem, one that compromises the unity of being and thought. 
The skeptical consequence of this separation leaves us completely ignorant 
as to whether our conditions of meaning (such as propositional structures) 
really have sufficient compatibility with their content. Schelling’s recasting 
of Kant’s ideal therefore seeks to conjoin determinability and 
determination. We can conceive of this conjunction as the relation of form 
and content. In Schelling’s view, propositional structures do not cover up 
an ontological gap but manifest the intertwinement of being and thought. 
The propositional capacities of thought follow from the propositional 
structures that the world itself has provided.286 Being takes the form of 
judgment and judgment always moves in being. This is the facticity of 
sense. The thinking subject operates in being as a given field of 
propositional structures (Hogrebe calls this a ‘discrete ontology’). Gabriel 
characterizes the anthropological aspects as a “predicative being-in-the-
world.”287 This is an anthropological aspect to the extent that judgment is 
not a free-floating static form; it is a willed achievement of a predicative 
activity. This predicative activity is the enterprise of thinking because, as 
the Kantian teaching remains, thinking is propositional activity.288 
If we return to the problem of appositional thinking and the individual as 
subordinated to the whole, then it reflects an anthropological dilemma that 
Schelling identifies in negative philosophy. Kant asserts in the ideal of pure 
reason that the totality of possible predicates lies inherently, albeit 
negatively, present in determinate being. This notion of being as 
determinacy, the logical concept of being, assumes a certain conception of 
judgments by means of which any determinate, individual thing is 
recognizable through its referential relations. This conception of being 
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carries with it a fatal consequence for the thinking subject as an individual. 
In the totality of referential relations, the individual is subordinated to the 
whole, which is a problem for the human being and its attempt to come to 
terms and relate to its own being.289 The attempt to lead all determinations 
back to universality, for the sake of determination, reveals a dissonance in 
the particularity of determinate beings, first and foremost of the thinking 
individual, the finite being. 
The problem with negative philosophy is that the position of the thinking 
subject in being, that is, in this totality of differential relations, is lost out of 
sight. Against this, Schelling states that any judgment that gives form to 
being decisively has its place within being. The idea of being itself, through 
judgment, is achieved in a position within the whole. Thought is always 
already in being. Facticity can never be accessed from a neutral position 
outside of logical space. Determinacy depends on its position within logical 
space, which is also why no position can provide complete determinacy. 
This explains why the predicative act of determination is itself fallible. The 
consequence of positional conditions is that being cannot be assigned 
necessity. It is necessarily contingent. Determinacy is as such contingent, 
which is why being necessarily must be contingent. This contingency 
applies to the Aristotelian understanding of contingency as that which 
‘could have been otherwise’. And, in Schelling’s view, determinate things 
can always be determined differently. 
If it is the case that the facticity of actual existence can never be accessed 
from a neutral position outside of meaning, then it follows that it can only 
be accessed from within the meaning that being already has. It is the fate of 
being that determination is always achieved from within a particular logical 
space that enables determination. There is no place outside from which to 
access being. Being is. The meaning of the words ‘being is’ lies in the 
brute fact that precedes any talk about intelligibility: there is already 
meaning. Thought, therefore, always finds itself in being as a situation it 
has not itself provided. Being, in a sense, is inescapable, and yet it rests on 
a predicative enterprise in which the thinking subject moves. Movement, in 
                                         
289 Schelling unfolds this problem in the Philosophical Introduction to Philosophy of 
Mythology. In lectures twenty-two and twenty-three the particular concern is the state 
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concrete situations, witnesses the pre-existence of meaning to any 
judgmental activity. 
While negative philosophy is only concerned with the logical space in 
which it assumes the logical concept of being to be absolute, positive 
philosophy emerges from the insight into the contingency of logical space 
and the unavailability of the absolute. In the lecture entitled Another 
Deduction of the Principles of the Positive Philosophy, Schelling argues for 
both the possibility and the necessity of understanding being as 
contingent.290 Schelling confronts the traditional ways of thinking about the 
unconditioned as a necessary existing being. Against traditional 
conceptions of necessity, he claims a dependency of necessary being on 
contingency in order to be determined as necessary. Contingency is seen as 
a condition of necessity. Schelling’s point is that the contingency of being 
is already a necessary part of the unprethinkable being as the necessary 
“possibility of another being.” 291  The entire argument hinges on the 
movement into determination that Schelling calls origination. As soon as 
something exists, as soon as something originates, it is positioned in 
constitutive relations to something else. The determinate being of things 
reveals, in every moment, ‘the possibility of another being.’ This means 
that everything that exists is, as such, contingent in its determination. One 
could always have understood something differently. Whatever the case 
regarding the determination of something, it could always have been 
otherwise. The relation of the origin to that which originates is reflected as 
a mutual determination and, hence, as a necessity of contingency. This 
means that the relation of thought to objects (the relation of concepts to 
objects) is constitutively fallible. 
Schelling mobilizes his arguments retrospectively from the fact of sense, 
the fact that sense is available. The methodological importance of facticity 
becomes clear, insofar as it is only the fact of being that reveals the 
‘possibility of another being’, a point that could not have been established 
from unprethinkable being. This belatedness is itself what shows the origin 
and the ground to be unavailable. However, this fact remains a fact in the 
most radical sense, due to its groundlessness, the non-ground.  
In Schelling’s thinking on unprethinkable being, we find a reversal of the 
ontological proof of God. The ontological proof, which begins from the 
concept and infers to being (from essence to existence), does not prove the 
existence of God, if we follow Schelling. In the idea of the unprethinkable 
factic that, Schelling sees that the concept is preceded by an actual 
existence without which the concept would not have been applied to 
anything (from existence to essence). The ontological proof proves the 
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preceding sub-semantic existence (that) from which existence is 
determined.292 Unprethinkable being is not the existence of God, which 
Schelling (in the Christian sense) understands as spirit, that is, as self-
relation. Schelling’s onto-theological approach begins with unprethinkable 
being in order to reach its intelligibility. Schelling initiates a philosophy of 
the history of religion that explores the history of the coming-to-itself of 
consciousness: a history of consciousness. As Gabriel shows in his reading 
of Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology, Schelling understands the history 
of religion as a transformation from being into selfhood through the 
development of the notion of the person of God.293 
In the transition from negative to positive philosopy, this reversal of 
essence and existence becomes a central point. It is reason that comes to 
realize its own limits and its inability to complete its own self-mediation. 
The conditions of mediation are therefore exposed from within logical 
space. 
In this facticity of being (in factual sense), we come to see our actual 
existence as situated in being. As many commentators note, there is no 
doubt that Schelling articulates what later thinking (esp. Heidegger) came 
to name thrownness. 294  In Schelling, situatedness in being marks the 
conditions of the logical space within which we can move but from which 
we can never step out. We cannot escape the fact of being. In the question 
‘why is there sense and not rather non-sense’, Schelling reflects on the 
conditions of judgment and determination. Every determination could 
always be different, and indeterminacy remains impossible. Movement in 
the space of predication is movement in the contingency of being.  
If we briefly recapitulate the distinction and the transition from negative 
to positive philosophy, then the situation of the individual becomes clearer. 
Fundamentally, negative philosophy provides an a priori structure of the 
world without applying any reality to contingency. It is a philosophy that 
attempts to ground itself in logical concepts. It is the ambition of 
Schelling’s critical analysis to show how it ultimately and necessarily fails 
this task.  
Negative philosophy is concerned with the essence of things, without 
any concern for the actual existence of things, that a thing exists at all. 
Reason can show what a thing is with regard to its concept, but it can never 
determine a priori whether a thing exists or not. Negative philosophy 
therefore claims an immanent necessity within the logical identity of 
thinking and being. Negative philosophy has its truth in the immanent 
                                         
292 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 120–126. 
293 Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, 197–218. 
294 See the contributions to Lore Hühn and Jörg Jantzen, eds., Heideggers Schelling-
Seminar (1927 28): die Protokolle von Martin Heideggers Seminar zu Schellings 
“Freiheitsschrift” (1927-28) (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2010).  
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necessity of its progression. As Schelling sees it, negative philosophy is 
insufficient in dealing with the particularity of actual existence. In that, 
Schelling sees the lack of a foundation for negative philosophy regarding 
its own existence. Hence, reason cannot ground itself and comes short at a 
limit in thinking, a limit that calls upon positive philosophy. This transition 
is not a transition in thinking or a transition between two sorts of thinking. 
It is practical in the sense that the question that provides the transition is the 
question of will. Positive philosophy is needed, as a concern with the will 
of being as manifest in the positive, which Schelling approaches in the 
history of consciousness as the history of mythology and religion.295 
Negative philosophy is the attempt to get an overview of totality. The 
problem with this undertaking is the abstraction from the individual as 
something individual in order to conceive it on the horizon of totality. The 
human being is such an individual, existing being. The excess of purely 
rational philosophy therefore marks an anthropological prerogative in 
Schelling’s thinking. The insight into the anthropological dilemma of 
purely rational philosophy is provided by the distinction of quid and quod, 
most directly in the notion of actual existence. From this insight, it 
becomes clear that the dilemma cannot be solved from within purely 
rational philosophy. The dilemma is that the human being, as an active, 
living, free human being, is embedded in the question of being so as to be 
itself out of reach of a predicative mediation, that is, out of reach of reason. 
The dilemma does not regard the theoretical subject, but the life of a human 
being in the full sense of free individual human being. Schelling employs 
the designation of person. Hence, personhood stands at the end of negative 
philosophy as a problem of the concept of being and as the motivation for a 
new philosophy that is concerned with a different concept of being, a 
historical concept of being.  
                                         
295  “[M]it dem reinen Daß, dem letzten der rationale Philosophie, ist nichts 
anzufangen: damit es zur Wissenschaft werde, muß das Allgemeine, das Was 
hinzukommen, das jetzt nur Consequens, nicht mehr Antecedens seyn kann. Die 
Vernunftwissenschaft führt also wirklich über sich hinaus und treibt zur Umkehr; diese 
selbst aber kann doch nicht vom Denken ausgehen. Dazu bedarf es vielmehr eines 
praktischen Antriebs; im Denken aber ist nichts Praktisches, der Begriff ist nur 
contemplative, und hat es nur mit dem Notwendigen zu thun, wärend es sich hier um 
etwas außer der Notwendigkeit Liegendes, um etwas Gewolltes handeln.” SW, XI 565. 
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7 Personhood 
7.1 “Person Seeking Person” 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom develops a historical and contingent 
concept of being that can be understood through three central 
characteristics: proposition, position, and personhood, of which the latter is 
yet to be unfolded. Like the two first characteristics, personhood is a notion 
that reflects the sense in which the unity of being and thought is a unity of 
the world and the human being. Freedom is the central phenomenon of this 
unity, which is why it is an ontology of freedom. The essence of freedom is 
the contingency of being. However, the essence of freedom decisively finds 
its essence through being human freedom. Freedom, even in this 
ontological articulation, is therefore already a matter of the essence of the 
human being, of what a human being is.296  
Schelling’s notion of personhood embodies the intertwinement of being 
and freedom, and, as a result, he needs to give a voice to an alternative 
concept of being, a historical concept of being, by grounding a new 
philosophy. The logical concept of being is a concept in which being is 
framed by determination in judgments alone. The historical concept of 
being derives from the notion of unprethinkable being as a process of the 
transformation of unprethinkable being into selfhood. The point of positive 
philosophy is to understand being as coming to itself in the history of the 
understanding of being. An understanding of being, in the sense of an 
understanding of totality, is itself a part of being and formative of the 
history of being. Personhood becomes essential as the basis of the 
transformation within the process of this self-relation of being. 
                                         
296 In what follows, the interpretation of the notion of personhood takes off from the 
transition to a historical concept of being (7.1). In this context, the facticity of existence 
provides that reason becomes aware of its own finitude, in terms of the heteronomy that 
underlies its autonomy. From this, I turn to Schelling’s initial formulation of finite 
freedom in the Freiheitsschrift (7.2). Furthermore, I show how human finitude reflects 
the fallibility of freedom and the person as a groundless being. In this regard, I approach 
the aspect of personal character as a way the person engages actively with its own being 
as an agent (7.3). This reflects the interpersonal basis of personhood, which is further 
portrayed in the expression of divine personhood. Eventually (7.4), the question of the 
human world-experience comes in focus. In this regard, the emotional dimension of 
personhood comes into consideration, as it pertains to the world-relation and the aspect 
of divine personality, with which Schelling comes to understand the intelligibility of the 
world. In the final chapter (7.5), I present a summary that draws the main lines in 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom. 
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Positive philosophy can be characterized as a philosophy of “person 
seeking person.” 297  The fact that being is historical means that it is 
understood within the process of a self-relation that is historical. Hence, 
being is understood in its becoming. Through this process, being relates to 
itself both as being and as the transformation of being into selfhood. 
Schelling explores this self-relation in the historical notion of God. The 
human reflection of God (and the history of the reflection) reflects the self-
relation of being. The historical concept of being, insofar as it gives room 
for an ontology of personhood, reveals the intertwined conditions of being 
and the human being. This implies that all of being, i.e. the world, is the 
world of the human being insofar as being and the human being set the 
conditions for one another. 
The historical concept of being derives from the dilemma within 
negative philosophy (discussed in the last chapter). The facticity of actual 
existence (the factual that) lies beyond the limits of thinking in two 
respects: the fact of a content of reason, that is, a world that lies before us; 
and the fact of reason itself, that is, the existence of reason. This facticity is 
reflected in two questions: ‘why is there sense and not rather non-sense?’ 
and ‘why is there something and not rather nothing?’ The limit of reason 
shows itself in a belatedness of thinking. This is the experience that reason, 
in attempting to think the world, finds that it is already in the world and 
that it can never reach beneath or before ‘worldliness’ as such. The world is 
already implied in the possibility of thinking, which reveals to reason that it 
is preceded by unprethinkable being in every aspect of thought.  
The limit lies in the beginning of thinking and the impossibility of reason 
grasping its own beginning.298 The beginning is beyond what reason can 
grasp. As Schelling sees it, reason is too late to think its own beginning, 
which, for reason, is its unprethinkable ground, its origin outside of itself. 
Reason is thereby denied self-transparency and forced to give up its 
attempt to constitute itself.299 As the ambition of an absolute self-mediation 
of reason is given up, reason encounters its own heteronomy. This 
heteronomy, which precedes and conditions the autonomy of reason, 
reveals to reason its own finitude. In this regard, the transition from 
negative to positive philosophy is accompanied by an experience of 
                                         
297 SW, XI 565. This dictum is formulated near the end of the Philosophical 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. 
298 For instance: “The beginning of thought is not yet itself thought.” Ibid., XIV 162. 
299 This is the point that Schulz finds underlies Schelling’s actuality in modern 
philosophy. “Die ihrer selbst gewisse Vernunft, die angesichts ihres undenkbaren Das 
die Ohnmacht ihres Denkens erfährt, verzichtet darauf, sich selbst denkend zu ihrem 
Sein ermächtigen zu wollen, und gerade in diesem Verzicht nimmt sie sich als zu ihrem 
Seinsvollzug schon ermächtigt hin: sie begreift sich als “vermittelte Selbstvermittlung”.” 
Schulz, Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings., 8.  
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finitude. More directly, positive philosophy derives from an insight into the 
limits of reason. This insight provides the self-consciousness of finitude. 
This consciousness of finitude determines the characteristic of the self-
relation of the human being as an individual being.  
From the perspective of negative philosophy, it becomes clear that the 
human being seeks to come to terms with its position in being and its 
dependence on being for a proper self-understanding. This can be seen as 
an experience of being decentered, or a disoriented self-experience. The 
problem, however, arises as a disjunction between the individual human 
being and the logical concept of being. The individual human being cannot 
appropriate the world on the basis of a logical concept of being that does 
not allow for the particularity of the human being. This situation, as 
Schelling describes it in the introduction to Philosophy of Mythology, 
facilitates the transition to positive philosophy. 
The line that Schelling draws between essence and existence is the line 
between the universal and the individual. Existence is not something that 
can be determined in general concepts, but only in its particularity: 
existentia est singolorum.300 The question is therefore how individuality 
can be understood as individuality? The essence of the individual is part of 
the totality of predication. However, the actual and factual existence of the 
individual cannot be determined in its essence.301 There is therefore no 
rational ground available to individuality as such. The human being 
becomes aware of its own finitude. This is what Dieter Sturma calls 
conscious finitude.302 In this characterization, Sturma takes personhood to 
designate the consciousness of one’s own finitude as an individual being. 
In the dictum of ‘person seeking person’, Schelling accounts for the 
moment in negative philosophy when the person can no longer grasp itself 
as an individual, that is, on the basis of the logical concept of being. The 
                                         
300 SW, XI 279. 
301 We can recall Schelling’s words: “Jenes - die Antwort auf die Frage: was es ist - 
gewährt mir Einsicht in das Wesen des Dings, oder es macht, daß ich das Ding verstehe, 
daß ich einen Verstand oder einen Begriff von ihm, oder es selbst im Begriffe habe. Das 
andere aber, die Einsicht, daß es ist, gewährt mir nicht den bloßen Begriff, sondern 
etwas über den bloßen Begriff Hinausgehendes, welches die Existenz ist” Ibid., XIII 58. 
302 Sturma’s reading of Schelling’s theory of personhood as ‘bewusste Endlichkeit’ 
emphasizes the anthropological dilemma that shines through in the ‘person seeking 
person’ motto, “Das persönliche Ich verlange nach einen Grund, der nicht abstrakte 
Allgemeinheit, sondern auch Persönlichkeit ist.” Dieter Sturma, “Person sucht Person: 
Schellings personalitätstheoretischer Sonderweg,” in “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf 
einem dunklen Grunde”  : Schellings Philosophie der Personalität (Akademie-Verlag, 
2004), 69. Sturma has provided substantial explorations of the concept of personhood, 
not only in his writings on Kantian and post-Kantian idealism but in classical and 
modern philosophy as well. See Dieter Sturma, Philosophie der Person: die 
Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektivität und Moralität (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1997). 
Personhood 126 
turn to a historical, and in this aspect personal, concept of being is therefore 
motivated by the discomfort and dissonance caused by an impersonal 
notion of being. 
Fundamentally, the conceptual totality misplaces the individual in a 
universal context that can never be sufficiently sensitive to the fact of the 
particularity and situatedness that underlies the experience of finite being. 
Personhood is therefore not a principle and it cannot be conceptually 
determined. Personhood is existence as finite and determined by the 
awareness of one’s finitude. Principles are eternal. They have no beginning. 
Finite being has a beginning – and an end. The mark of the beginning is the 
condition of existence – a mark of finitude. Principles are eternal, where 
as the human person has a beginning. As a finite being, the person is 
marked by its beginning as a being that is conditioned and determined by 
its own limits. However, in as much as the beginning is there as a limit, it is 
a limit in the radical sense of not being available. Finitude reveals not only 
belatedness, but also the perpetual blindness of human existence to its own 
beginning.  
In Ages of the World, Schelling approaches this aspect of finite being in 
the form of a continuous blind spot of existence. He calls it the “beginning 
that never stops to be beginning.”303 Hogrebe explains how this blind spot 
underlies the historical aspect of the person. The transition in thought 
constitutes what Schelling refers to as past: 
The beginning is blind, according to the matter [die Sache] always the former, 
according to the concept always the latter; when it has become seeing, it has become 
past. On this past everything rests that has taken form, everything that exists rests on 
a beginning ‘that never stops to be beginning.’304 
For something to exist means that it has a beginning and, moreover, that it 
always and continuously has a beginning so long as it exists. Hogrebe 
explains the notion of beginning through the implication that something 
else no longer exists, or that it exists as that which does not exist any more, 
namely, as beginning. From this it follows that existence is bound to its 
time and to timeliness as the condition of having a past, of having a history. 
                                         
303 “Nur so ist wahrer Anfang, Anfang, der nicht aufhört Anfang zu seyn.” Schelling 
goes on “[…] der Anfang darf sich selbst nicht kennen; welches so viel heißt: er darf 
sich selbst nicht kennen als Anfang. Nichts ist oder erkennt sich gleich anfänglich bloß 
für Grund oder Anfang. Was Anfang ist, muß sich nicht als Anfang, sondern als Wesen 
(um seiner selbst willen Seyendes) ansehen, um wahrer Anfang zu seyn.” SW, VIII 314. 
I refer to the draft of Ages of the World in SW, which is one of the early drafts from 
around 1814-15. 
304 “Der Anfang ist blind, der Sache nach immer das Erstere, dem Begriff nach 
immer das Spätere; ist er sehend geworden, ist er vergangen. Auf dieser Vergangenheit 
ruht alles, alles was Gestalt angenommen hat, alles was existiert, auf einem Anfang, 
‘der nicht aufhört Anfang zu seyn.’” Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 114. 
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A central aspect of the consciousness of finitude is the belatedness with 
which thought relates to its beginning as absent. Consciousness concerning 
the absence of beginning is the constant presence of beginning. Thus, 
personhood stands out as something conscious yet ambiguous. Conscious 
finitude is an existence that relates to its own existence retroactively, as the 
witness of the absence of beginning. This existence can be understood as 
withdrawn beginning or, as Hogrebe suggests, as a suppression of 
beginning.305 The characteristic of finitude or of finite being, here described 
as a rational limit, further pertains to time to the extent that personal being 
is transformed through its continuous consciousness of its own past. The 
consciousness of finitude is therefore central to the self-relation of the 
person as a historical self-relation. The self-conscious finite being is a 
historical being because it relates to itself in the history of its being, which 
is its becoming. Personhood is therefore the composition of the ontological 
situation that underlies the domain of determinate being. As such, it must 
be understood as the historical being in which the determination of being 
takes place. Being can only be determined by a historical personal being. 
7.2 Freedom and Eternity 
The problem of beginning is manifested in freedom as the lack of a 
sufficient ground. The presence of the unprethinkable in everything 
determinate (its withdrawal) leaves freedom its traces as “the indivisible 
remainder” 306  that is the constant possibility of another being, the 
possibility of difference. As such, freedom is fallible. The historical 
character of personhood equally reflects the person as a free agent. The 
history of the person is the history of its freedom. Schelling’s approach to 
freedom, which initially gives rise to his notion of personhood, is not an 
ontological problem, independent of its implication of a practical 
philosophy. The person is a moral human being because it appropriates 
itself in the world by means of a freedom that is fallible in the sense of 
being without a sufficient ground. The constant possibility of another being, 
as well as the constant possibility of evil, provides the agency that is 
grounding only through itself. Groundlessness is the fate of the free being.  
                                         
305 Hogrebe’s reading of Schelling’s transcendental-ontological notion of time asserts 
that “Die Zeit ist die Art des Gegebenseins des Anfangs als Verdrängtes.” Ibid., 114f. 
Another very illuminating discussion of time is taken up by Oliver Florig in relation to 
personal self-formation as it is understood from Schelling’s notion of past in Ages of the 
World. See Oliver Florig, Schellings Theorie menschlicher Selbstformierung  : personale 
Entwicklung in Schellings mittlerer Philosophie (Freiburg; München: Alber, 2010), 
178–211. 
306 “[D]er nie aufgehende Rest,” SW, VII 360. 
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In Philosophy and Religion (1804), 307  Schelling explains the 
individuality of the free human being as “a fall [Abfall] from the 
Absolute.”308 In this context, the alluded ‘fall of man’ provides the idea of 
the primal split (Ur-teil) that enables the self-determination of the absolute 
self as the self-consciousness of the absolute in a meaningful determinate 
world. The consciousness of the free human being is this primal split. 
Freedom is therefore (though understood as a fall and as fallible) a 
necessary feature of the self-determination of the absolute. Schelling 
elaborates on the idea of fallible freedom in the Freiheitsschrift, in which 
he determines human freedom in terms of a capacity for good and evil: “the 
real and vital concept of freedom is the capacity for good and evil.”309  
[F]ree action follows immediately from the intelligible aspect of man. But it is 
necessarily a determined action, for example, to take what is nearest at hand, a good 
or an evil one. There is, however, no transition from the absolutely undetermined to 
the determined. […] In order to be able to determine itself, it would already have to 
be determined in itself, admittedly not from outside, which contradicts its nature, 
also not from inside through some sort of merely contingent or empirical necessity 
since all this (the psychological as well as the physical) is subordinate to it; but rather 
it would have to be its determination itself as its essence, that is, as its own nature.310  
                                         
307 A volume with many insightful interpretations of this text has been edited by 
Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski, eds., Philosophie und Religion (Freiburg; 
München: Alber, 2008). See especially Oliver Florig, “Die ideelle Reihe der 
Philosophie - Philosophie und Religion als Versuch, menschliche Freiheit im 
Identitätssystem zu denken,” in Philosophie und Religion, ed. Alfred Denker and 
Holger Zaborowski (Freiburg; München: Alber, 2008). 
308 “Mit Einem Wort, vom Absoluten zum Wirklichen gibt es keinen stetigen 
Uebergang, der Ursprung der Sinnenwelt ist nur als ein vollkommenes Abbrechen von 
der Absolutheit, durch einen Sprung, denkbar. Sollte Philosophie das Entstehen der 
wirklichen Dinge auf positive Art aus dem Absoluten herleiten können, so müsste in 
diesem ihr positiver Grund liegen […] Philosophie hat zu den erscheinenden Dingen ein 
bloß negatives Verhältniß, sie beweist nicht sowohl, daß sie sind, als daß sie nicht sind 
[…] Das Absolute ist das einzige Reale, die endlichen Dinge dagegen sind nicht real; 
ihr Grund kann daher nicht in einer Mittheilung von Realität an sie oder an ihr Substrat, 
welche Mittheilung vom Absoluten ausgegangen wäre, er kann nur in einer Entfernung, 
in einem Abfall von dem Absoluten liegen.” SW, VI 38. 
309 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 23. “Der reale und lebendige Begriff aber ist, daß 
sie ein Vermögen des Guten und des Bösen sey.” SW, VII 353. 
310 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 49–50. “Die freie Handlung folgt unmittelbar aus 
dem Intelligibeln des Menschen. Aber sie ist nothwendig eine bestimmte Handlung, 
z.B. um das Nächste anzuführen, eine gute oder böse. Vom absolut-Unbestimmten zum 
Bestimmten gibt es aber keinen Uebergang. Daß etwa das intelligible Wesen aus purer 
lauterer Unbestimmtheit heraus ohne allen Grund sich selbst bestimmen sollte, führt auf 
das obige System der Gleichgültigkeit der Willkür zurück. Um sich selbst bestimmen zu 
können, müsste es in sich schon bestimmt seyn, nicht von außen freilich, welches seiner 
Natur widerspricht, auch nicht von innen durch irgend eine bloß zufällige oder 
empirische Nothwendigkeit, indem dieß alles (das Psychologische so gut wie das 
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The question of good and evil serves to emphasize the nature of action as 
always determinate. In its transcendental aspect, this pertains to an original 
act of self-determination that enables the possibility of autonomous being. 
The nature of this act, as it pertains to Kant’s and Fichte’s notion of an 
intelligible act (or That-Handlung), is not an act in time, but the continuous 
(not un-timely) and eternal act of self-determination that underlies freedom 
as such:  
Man, even if born in time, is indeed created into the beginning of the creation (the 
centrum). The act, whereby his life is determined in time, does not itself belong to 
time but rather to eternity: it also does not temporally precede life but goes through 
time (unhampered by it) as an act which is eternal by nature. Through this act the life 
of man reaches to the beginning of creation; hence, through it man is outside the 
created, being free and eternal beginning itself.311 
Sturma has framed this idea as ‘prereflexive freedom,’312 which entails that 
freedom derives from the underlying self-determination that initially sets 
the self apart from the absolute: selfhood. Self-determination is an 
intelligible act, which means that it does not derive from any specific 
situations of decision-making, but from a transcendental necessity that 
underlies autonomy as such. For Schelling, this makes freedom an 
ontological matter first and foremost, prior to any moral matter. As Sturma 
points out, Schelling is not giving up on questions concerning guilt and 
responsibility. Rather, the notion of a predisposition, in the form of a self-
determination that enables the free acts of the person (as both good and 
evil), reflects the conscious identification with these acts through which a 
person feels guilt and responsibility.313  
                                                                                                                       
Physische) unter ihm liegt; sondern es selber als sein Wesen, d.h. seine eigne Natur, 
müsste ihm Bestimmung seyn.” SW, VII 384. 
311 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 51; SW, VII 385f. 
312 Dieter Sturma, “Präreflexive Freiheit und menschliche Selbstbestimmung,” in 
Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, ed. Otfried Höffe and Annemarie Pieper, 
1st ed. (Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 149-172.  
313 Sturma presents this as the central merit of Schelling’s concept of freedom for 
contemporary moral philosophy: “Die Herausforderung von Schellings Freiheitslehre 
für die Moralphilosophie der Gegenwart liegt in der These, daß das Bewußtsein, nicht 
anders gehandelt haben zu können, Zurechenbarkeit und Verantwortlichkeit nicht außer 
Kraft setzt. Auch diese These hat erkennbar eine Phänomenbasis: Personen fühlen sich 
ungeachtet der Zufälligkeiten von Handlungsumständen und ungeachtet der 
dispositionalen Festlegungen ihrer Handlungstendenzen, die innerhalb von 
Handlungssituationen durchaus zwanghaft wirken können, für sich selbst verantwortlich 
– auch wenn sie das oftmals sich selbst gegenüber oder in öffentlichen 
Rechtfertigungssituationen nicht kenntlich werden lassen. […] [Das Gewissen] kann 
Schuld empfinden, obwohl es ihm unmöglich gewesen ist, anders zu handeln. In dem 
merkwürdigen Bewußtseinszustand, sich trotz aller beigebrachten Entlastungen 
schuldig zu fühlen – etwa im Fall der ungewollten Schädigung anderer Personen –, 
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The phenomena of guilt and responsibility reflect the tragedy of 
belatedness in the inclination to identify with one’s deeds, good as well as 
evil. As free, the person is, on the one hand, necessarily bound to the 
conditions of selfhood as explained in an initial and intelligible act of self-
determination that sets it apart from any causal ground prior to itself; and, 
on the other hand, it is bound to these conditions in the form of a concern 
and idenitification with every action as a responsible and guilt-feeling 
being that seeks to steer its actions with which it understands itself. Sturma 
writes: 
The decision-making situations of a person are always determined by what a person 
carries from the past into the present for the future. It is these traces of time that 
weighs most heavily in the decision-making situations. Self-determination does not 
have the form of arbitrary decisions, but the carrier of tendencies in time and beyond 
time. And it is this notion of prereflective freedom that is of significance for the 
current philosophical theory of self-determination.314 
The personal agent is therefore always lacking a steady ground, always 
moving in a timely dimension in which the conscious relation to the deeds 
of the past becomes the motivational ground for future acts. 
Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift is a work on fallibility in a more radical 
sense than just the moral sense. Fallibility becomes essential because being 
is actualized will, and, as such, the basis for the contingency of being. 
What Schelling aims for in his ontology of freedom is an account of the 
common ontological structure that provides the ground for both 
epistemology and practical philosophy. This becomes clear in Schelling’s 
central move beyond a Kantian notion of autonomy, as a formal concept of 
freedom,315 to an ontological notion of freedom, human freedom. 
The ontological implication of this is that being finds its determination in 
accordance with a fallible freedom that provides ‘the possibility of another 
being.’ The person is an agent by relating to itself as the point of 
identification of free acts. Free acts are expressions of a freedom that has 
no beginning (causation) beyond the agent. Responsibility is the self-
identification of a person with its acts. This identification is the basis for 
personal self-understanding. As freedom is without sufficient ground, acts 
                                                                                                                       
erfährt Schellings Theorie präreflexiver Freiheit eine gewichtige empirische 
Bestätigung.” Ibid., 168–169. 
314 “Die Entscheidungssituationen einer Person werden dagegen von dem bestimmt, 
was die Person aus der Vergangenheit für die Zukunft in die Gegenwart immer schon 
mitgenommen hat. Es ist diese Spur der zeit, die in den Entscheidungssituationen am 
schwersten wiegt. Selbstbestimmungen hat denn auch nicht die Gestalt willkürlicher 
Entscheidungen, sondern die träger Tendenzen in der Zeit und über die Zeit hinweg. 
Und es ist dieser Gedanke der präreflexiven Freiheit, der für die gegenwärtige 
philosophische Theorie der Selbstbestimmung von Bedeutung ist.” Ibid., 170. 
315 “Begriff der formellen Freiheit” see SW, VII 350f.  
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are grounded only in personhood. Personality is the ground assigned to 
freedom, as freedom has no ground itself. The understanding of acts as 
good or evil (or kind, or mean, or hysteric, etc.) pertains to properties of the 
personality of the agents. These are generally referred to as personal traits, 
by means of which we understand the actions of an agent. Thus, acts are 
acts of the person because no ground of freedom beyond the person is 
available. Character pertains to the person as the active, responsible 
identification of one’s actions with one’s personal identity within the 
process of a self-formation. Character reflects the responsibility for one’s 
actions as the personal ground of one’s being as a free agent.316  
Unfortunately, Schelling does not provide a clear-cut theory of 
personality. Thomas Buchheim, who has attempted an exposition of a (non-
ontological) Schellingian theory of personhood, construes the fundamental 
aspects of personality and character with reference to the historical identity 
of a person. Buchheim refers to the ability of a person to change itself, 
which Schelling sees as an aspect of personhood in which the person is free 
(and sets itself free) from the general. “We call a being personal only to the 
extent that it is free from the general [Allgemeinen] and for itself, to the 
extent that he can be according to his own will and outside of reason.”317 
7.3 Personal Ground 
The fact that freedom has no ground beyond the person means that lacking 
a ground – Schelling calls it the ‘non-ground’ (Ungrund) – the character of 
a person is the product and the ground of, and for, its acts. This is an 
ontological condition in the sense that judgment and predication (the 
structures of meaning) are acts of the person in the radical sense: 
personhood is the unity of the semantic space or, as Gabriel calls it, ‘the 
open region of sense.’ The meaningful world is therefore the world in 
which the person can operate as a free responsible agent and in direct 
                                         
316 In the Freiheitsschrift and later writings, Schelling often explains how acts can 
never follow from a rational necessity but have to be carried out by a responsible 
character. However, character is the bold affirmation of the decision that grounds an act. 
In Ages of the World Schelling says, “Der Entschluß, der in irgend einem Akt einen 
wahren Anfang machen soll, darf nicht vors Bewußtseyn gebracht, zurückgerufen 
werden, welches mit Recht schon so viel bedeutet als zurückgenommen werden. Wer 
sich vorbehält, einen Entschluß immer wieder ans Licht zu ziehen, macht nie einen 
Anfang. Darum ist Charakter Grundbedingung aller Sittlichkeit; Charakterlosigkeit 
schon an sich Unsittlichkeit.” Ibid., VIII 314. 
317 “Persönlich nennen wir ein Wesen gerade nur, inwiefern es frei vom Allgemeinen 
und für sich ist, inwiefern ihm zusteht, außer der Vernunft nach eigenem Willen zu 
seyn.” Ibid., XI 281. See also Thomas Buchheim, “Grundlinien von Schellings 
Personbegriff,” in “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem dunklen Grunde”  : Schellings 
Philosophie der Personalität (Akademie-Verlag, 2004), 27–34. 
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relation with the formation of personal character and personality. Gabriel, 
who repeatedly emphasizes the ontological status of personhood, writes: 
Who we ultimately are at any given time depends on our freedom, since we are only 
what we make of ourselves (which include what others make of us), what we take 
ourselves to be. We are held accountable for our personality, for the way in which 
we see the world and our position in it, because we are the very open region in which 
fields of sense appear as such.318 
The condition of sense (whatever designation we provide for it: logical 
space, field of sense, or predicative ambience) is not something a person 
relates to beyond personal being; personhood is the foundation of meaning, 
it is the ground of meaning. It is in this sense that Schelling’s notion of 
personhood embodies the intertwinement of being and freedom. Freedom 
and being unite in the person. However, while manifesting the finitude of 
the human being, freedom also discloses a dimension of infinity. In 
freedom lies the ability to determine (de-fine, make finite), that is, the 
ability to form or to transform, the indeterminate into determinacy. Hence, 
freedom is beyond being in the sense that freedom, as an ability (Können), 
as will, is indeterminate. Consequently, freedom (the freedom of the 
person) is what sets the person out of reach for possible determination: 
there is no way to present a person in concepts. This further implies that the 
person has itself as an open horizon that can be formed by its free acts. The 
human being is “an undecided being […] only man himself can decide.”319 
The determination of a person is the formation of a personality that a 
person gives itself, not in concepts, but in its historical self-understanding 
and in its way of relating to itself through its historical identity. The basis 
for this conception of self-formation is Schelling’s anthropological 
statement: “the essence of man is fundamentally his own act.”320  
                                         
318 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 71. My italics. 
319 SW, VII 386. 
320 Ibid. In the Stuttgart Lectures, Schelling speaks of an instrumental relation to 
one’s being as a matter of advancing or developing as a person: “Unser Seyn ist nur 
Mittel, Werkzeug für uns selbst. Der Mensch, der sich nicht von seinem Seyn scheiden 
(sich von ihm unabhängig machen, befreien) kann, der ganz verwachsen ist und eins 
bleibt mit seinem Seyn, ist der Mensch, inwiefern er ganz in seine Selbstheit versunken 
ist und unfähig sich in sich selbst zu steigern - moralisch und intellektuell. Wer sich von 
seinem Seyn nicht scheidet, dem ist das Seyn das Wesentliche, nicht sein inneres, 
höheres, wahres Wesen.” Schelling, SW, VII 436. In the Ages of the World the same 
aspect is presented in a temporal image as a matter of distancing oneself from one’s past 
or ‘producing’ the present by overcoming one’s past: “Der Mensch, der nicht sich selbst 
überwunden, hat keine Vergangenheit, oder vielmehr kommt nie aus ihr heraus, lebt 
beständig in ihr. […] Nur der Mensch, der die Kraft hat sich von sich selbst (dem 
Untergeordneten seines Wesens) loszureißen, ist fähig sich eine Vergangenheit zu 
erschaffen; eben dieser genießt auch allein einer wahren Gegenwart, wie er einer 
eigentlichen Zukunft entgegensieht; und schon aus diesen sittlichen Betrachtungen 
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Fundamental conditions are given for the human being to become what it 
is. What a human being is, beyond these fundamental conditions, is not 
decided for it, is not given in advance. Personhood implies that a personal 
being takes form in a self-conscious relation to its own history. The form of 
a person, its personality, its identity, and its history are decided as matters 
of personal self-formation.321  
The focus of Oliver Florig’s study of self-formation in Schelling is the 
personal character of the person. “The person is one who has character, that 
is, one who gives his being and doing a ‘character’ [Gepräge] and is able to 
form oneself.”322 Florig emphasizes the gradual development of personal 
character in line with Schelling’s theory of potencies, which, according to 
Florig’s reading, becomes a normative feature of the formation of 
character. 323 Personal development derives from an assessment of the 
potential of one’s properties for a certain development (to become a certain 
person) that can be nurtured in specific directions. This becomes an 
organized character that provides a basis for further organized development. 
This is a “process through which the human being molds [bilden] itself and 
forms itself to a determinate personality. The properties that the human 
                                                                                                                       
würde erhellen, daß keine Gegenwart möglich ist, als die auf einer entschiedenen 
Vergangenheit ruht, und keine Vergangenheit, als die einer Gegenwart als 
Ueberwundenes zu Grunde liegt.” SW, VIII 259. 
321 Of the publications on the topic of personal self-formation in Schelling, two 
recent dissertation works ought to be mentioned: Rie Shibuya, Individualität und 
Selbstheit: Schellings Weg zur Selbstbildung der Persönlichkeit (1801-1810) 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005); Florig, Schellings Theorie menschlicher 
Selbstformierung. Shibuya has given a historical account of the development of the 
notion of individuality and selfhood in Schelling’s thought in the period of the Identity-
philosophy (from 1801-1810, unfortunately not including the fragments of the Ages of 
the World from 1811). The noteworthy merit of Shibuya’s work is her discussion of 
Schelling’s relation to Niethammer’s ideal of education and Schelling’s critical 
response as reflected in the formulation of his notion of personhood. In the work of 
Florig, who aims his focus on the writings from 1801-1811 (Florig particularly focus on 
the fragments of the Ages of the World), the account of Schelling’s notion of self-
formation receives a clearer systematic form that enables him to more securely position 
Schelling’s notion of personhood regarding central questions of practical philosophy. 
As much as both authors provide insightful expositions of Schelling’s development in 
this middle period, the ontological development of his later writings is completely left 
out. Even though their works both reflect the positions of their doctoral supervisors (in 
Shibuya’s case Manfred Frank, in Florig’s case Thomas Buchheim) this does not 
overshadow the fact that they both present many original and insightful reflections on 
Schelling’s thinking. 
322 Florig, Schellings Theorie menschlicher Selbstformierung, 63. 
323 Ibid., 134–140. 
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being gains in this way (in process) are in the narrower sense his personal 
properties.”324  
The point of self-formation is the idea that our actions are determinate 
actions, that they are always a formative feature of our character. Schelling 
stresses this in his definition of ‘the real and vital’ notion of freedom as 
freedom to do ‘good and evil.’ Our actions are so radically our actions that 
we are never without responsibility or the implied formation of character in 
everything we do. Schelling depicts this by distinguishing between two 
wills: the particular will (Partikularwille), or self-will (Eigenwille), and the 
universal will (Universalwille) that are combined in farvor of one over the 
other. Florig interprets this combination as the underlying orientation of 
our action. The universal will pertains to our fundamental orientation as 
free agents. Florig calls it ‘Grundorientierung’ (Taylor would call it ‘strong 
evaluation’). The universal will therefore pertains to the aspects of ultimate 
goods beyond any situational evaluation of our actions. As Florig says, the 
universal will is good in the sense that it enables our gradual formation of 
character in a twofold way: first, through the affirmation of our 
fundamental orientation; and second, as the trans-formation of our inherent 
drives for the benefit of our character and future decision-making.  
What Florig further brings to light is that self-formation entails a self-
depature in terms of a ‘Scheidung von uns selbst’ or ‘Selbst-Scheidung,’ in 
this gradual development. The point is to see that the individual decision, 
the ‘Ent-scheidung’, is formative for one’s character. Good and evil reflect 
the normative ground of the self-formation insofar as our decisions 
concretise our fundamental orientation as they become norms of our 
character. Correspondingly, the self-will is the reversal, or the compromise, 
of our fundamental orientation in the situational evaluation in which our 
fundamental orientation is not affirmed and fails to develop the basis (our 
character) for the benefit of future deeds. “A decision can with Schelling 
only be determined as evil when it derives from a wrong fundamental 
orientation.”325 In the decision-making, according to Florig, we mobilize 
                                         
324  “[E]ines Processes, durch den er sich selbst bildet, sich zur bestimmten 
Persönlichkeit gestaltet. Diejenigen Eigenschaften, die der Mensch auf diese Weise (im 
Proceß) erlangt, sind im engeren Sinn seine persönlichen.” SW, X 289. 
325 Florig, Schellings Theorie menschlicher Selbstformierung, 139. In accordance 
with Kant, Schelling does not say that the content of a decision makes it evil. Its form 
makes it evil. There is, in this regard, far more discussion on Schelling’s reception of 
Kant’s notion of ‘radical evil’ than can be treated here. As Florig makes clear, the 
central difference between the question of radical evil in Kant and Schelling is that 
Schelling establishes the question of good and evil in a worldprocess that he explicates 
in the notion of revelation of divine personhood. See Florig, Schellings Theorie 
menschlicher Selbstformierung, 141–177. 
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our properties and the organization of our character for the benefit of our 
decisions. When it comes to evil, this is what we fail to do properly.326 
Florig’s understanding of the universal will, as pertaining to fundamental 
convictions that can be nurtured, also relies on Schelling’s interpretation of 
religiosity. 327  Schelling describes religiosity as conscientiousness 
(Gewissenhaftigkeit) in the sense that one does not need to consult a law, 
but “that one act in accordance with what one knows and not contradict the 
light of cognition in one’s conduct. […] only the highest resoluteness in 
favor of what is right without any choice.”328 Schelling thereby seeks to 
move beyond a Kantian rational ethics. Schelling does not even provide 
any particular ethics. And one way of seeing this is that it is the form of 
actions, in terms of character, and not the content that determines their 
value. This, however, is a form we can never get in our control. In this 
sense, good and evil are central to the self-formation of character.329 It is 
                                         
326 “In der Sphäre des Handelns hingegen wird Scheidung zur Denkfigur, durch 
welsche die Entwicklung eines in seiner Entwicklung identisch bleibenden, 
menschlichen Subjekts gedacht wird. Diese Subjekt ist Geist, d.h. es verhält sich 
bewußt zu dieser Entwicklung, in dessen Verlauf es sich immer neu formiert, d.h. auf 
der Basis bestehender Eigenschaften neue entwickelt.” Florig, Schellings Theorie 
menschlicher Selbstformierung, 139. 
327 Schelling alludes to re-ligare. “Das Verhältniß beider Principien ist das einer 
Gebundenheit des finstern Princips (der Selbstheit) an das Licht. Es sey uns erlaubt, 
dieß, der ursprünglichen Wortbedeutung nach, durch Religiosität auszudrücken.” SW, 
VII 393. 
328 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 57; SW, VII 393. See also Temilo van Zantwijk, 
Pan-Personalismus: Schellings transzendentale Hermeneutik der menschlichen Freiheit 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000), 268–270. 
329 Many interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift draw more directly on the notion of 
good and evil than I do in my interpretation of personhood. See e.g. Günther Wenz or 
the rather famous interpretations in Otfried Höffe and Annemarie Pieper, Über das 
Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Akademie-Verlag, 1995); Günther Wenz, “Das Böse 
und sein Grund. Zur Rezeptionsgeschichte von Schellings Freiheitsschrift 1809,” 
Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Abhandlungen., no. NF 137, Bayerische Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (2010). As I do not present an interpretation of Schelling’s 
Freiheitsschrift per se, I am aware that I leave many intriguing aspects of the work 
unanswered. As mentioned, I primarily draw on Schelling’s later ontological 
development. As argued by Ulrich Barth, the Freiheitsschrift must also be understood 
as a difficult work, because of Schelling’s developing transition to a new emphasis of 
thought. This is seen in the many shifts between different vocabularies or levels of 
argumentation from very different contexts (e.g. metaphysics, theology, ethics, 
anthropology, philosophy of nature, and, not to forget, mysticism.). This reflects that 
Schelling is in the middle of a crucial development that challenges his philosophical 
language. See Ulrich Barth, “Annäherungen an das Böse. Naturphilosophische Aspekte 
von Schellings Freiheitsschrift,” in Gott, Natur, Kunst und Geschichte. Schelling 
zwischen Identitätsphilosophie und Freiheitsschrift (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 
2010), 171. Nevertheless, I am sure that this mixture is exactly what inspires a plethora 
of interpretations. 
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therefore also central to the formation of the world in which the person 
lives as a personal agent. Freedom is not just a matter of morality. The crux 
of Schelling’s ontology of freedom is that freedom is the turningpoint of 
being and of the world of the person.330  
Florig’s larger exposition of self-formation also engages with the drafts 
of Ages of the World, in which Schelling presents an interesting notion of 
the ‘communicability’ (Mittheilsamkeit) of personhood. Schelling develops 
this issue in relation to the divine personhood, as the inherent ambition and 
need of the person for communicating its personality, its personal 
identity. 331  Florig emphasizes that Schelling portrays the potency of 
personhood with moral aspects because personhood always stands in a 
moral relation to other persons, a relation that is consititutive of its 
personhood.  
The person is a person on interpersonal conditions. What is fundamental 
in the idea of ‘person seeking person’ is that the person requires another 
personal being (another person) to appropriate and communicate its 
personal being because concepts and principles cannot do that. 332 
Fundamentally, personal being implies the relation of personal beings. The 
logical concept of being cannot articulate the aspect of the free, moral, and 
historical life of a person.333 Personhood is actualized within a dimension 
of mutual relations. Fundamentally, personhood is of such a kind that it is 
only actualized in response to the call of a personal being. Schelling has 
formulated this aspect in the concept of revelation as the communication of 
divine personhood, which is brought to the fore already in the 
Freiheitsschrift. “God can only reveal himself [sich offenbar werden] in 
what is like him, in free beings acting on their own, for whose Being there 
is no ground other than God but who are as God is. He speaks, and they are 
there.”334 The request for a personal concept of being is therefore fulfilled 
                                         
330 Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 270. 
331 SW, VIII 210. 
332 “[…] so ist es auch das Ich, welches als selbst Persönlichkeit Persönlichkeit 
verlangt, eine Person fordert, die außer der Welt und über dem Allgemeinen, die ihn 
vernehme, ein Herz, das ihm gleich sey.” Ibid., XI 569. 
333  In the last lectures of the Philosophical Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mythology (especially lecture 24), Schelling discusses the dissonance of individuality 
and universality paradigmatically with regard to the state and moral law. As Schelling 
describes it, the human being withdraws to a contemplative life devoted to itself alone 
due to this dissonance. The desire for another concept of being, a personal concept of 
being, derives from the embeddedness of the person in the world. Because being 
provides the structure of the world, the person requires something more than general 
and universal concepts. The world must itself have the structure that can provide the 
basis of the self-conscousness of personal being. 
334 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 18. “Gott aber kann nur sich offenbar werden in 
dem, was ihm ähnlich ist, in freien aus sich selbst handelnden Wesen; für deren Seyn es 
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in the conception of a divine person whose person is formed in history as a 
historically based self-relation.335 The concept of a personal God (God as 
relating to himself as a person in history) is a way of conceiving being as 
personal. The history of religion is therefore essential, and positive 
philosophy is, for the same reason, an exploration of the actual historical 
religions, the mythological, and the revealed. The history of religion 
reflects the way the human person has related to its own condition as a 
finite being. The history of religion is the history of consciousness. 
Schelling’s concept of revelation pertains particularly to Christianity. 
The central doctrine of Christianity is “alone the person of Christ.”336 
Buchheim’s interpretation of Schelling’s notion of personhood unfolds the 
concept of revelation in relation to what he calls the empiricism of 
personhood.337 It is a revelatory act that establishes personhood as an 
intersubjective potency above empirical nature. It is persons alone that 
reveal and recognize a person as a person, that is, as a potency contingent 
upon the nature in which a person presents itself. With the potency of spirit, 
the human person rises above, or stands apart from nature. “[T]here arises 
in him something higher, spirit.”338 However, the person is still both in and 
of nature. It is a double nature of nature and spirit. In his Stuttgart Lectures, 
Schelling calls it a being “in the midst of nature, above nature.”339 In the 
Freiheitsschrift he says: 
Selfhood as such is spirit; or man is spirit as a selfish [selbstisch], particular being 
(separated from God)—precisely this connection constitutes personality. Since 
                                                                                                                       
keinen Grund gibt als Gott, die aber sind, sowie Gott ist. Er spricht, und sie sind da.” 
SW, VII 347. 
335 “[W]ir fordern, daß die Gottheit dem Bewußtseyn der Menschheit immer näher 
tritt; wir verlangen, daß sie nicht mehr bloß in ihrer Folge, sondern selbst ein 
Gegenstand des Bewußtseyns wird; aber auch dahin ist nur stufenweise zu gelangen 
[…]. In diesem Sinne vorzüglich auch ist die positive Philosophie geschichtliche 
Philosophie.” SW, XI 571. 
336 Ibid., XIV 35. A central aspect is the understanding of the revelation as a free act 
because the person is the implication of freedom. For an informative study in 
Schelling’s Christology and the concept of the personal God in Schelling see Christian 
Danz, “Der Gedanke der Persönlichkeit Gottes,” in “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem 
dunklen Grunde”  : Schellings Philosophie der Personalität, ed. Thomas Buchheim 
(Akademie-Verlag, 2004), p. 179-195; Christian Danz, Die philosophische Christologie 
F.W.J. Schellings (Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1996). 
337  Buchheim, “Grundlinien von Schellings Personbegriff.” Buchheim’s 
interpretation focus on the aspects that Schelling took personhood to be something that 
can only be encountered in experience. “Alles Persönliche kann nur dadurch ins Denken 
einbezogen werden, dass es ihm nicht ein gedachtes Objekt, sondern vielmehr dem 
Denkenden ein empirisches Gegenüber, d.h. eine andere Person außer ihm ist und als 
solche genommen wird.” Buchheim, “Grundlinien von Schellings Personbegriff,” 13. 
338 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 32; Schelling, SW, VII 364. 
339 SW, VII 458. 
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selfhood is spirit, however, it is at the same time raised from the creaturely into what 
is above the creaturely; it is will that beholds itself in complete freedom, being no 
longer an instrument of the productive [schaffenden] universal will in nature, but 
rather above and outside of all nature.340  
What Buchheim takes Schelling’s empiricism of the person to imply is that 
the revelatory manifestation of a person is no mere phenomenon, but 
something that can only be perceived by what is itself above nature. 
“Nature shows itself, a person reveals itself – but only to such that is itself 
capable of exceeding nature.” 341  Revelation is descriptive of the 
interrelation of persons as the empirical relation of persons.342 In the 
revelation of personhood the person is perceived in nature. However, 
nature cannot provide the revelation. Only free acts can do that. Hence, the 
person reveals itself through the actions assigned to it as a person. 
These aspects of ‘person seeking person’ underlie various aspects of the 
interpersonal dimensions of personhood. However, in that context the 
question at issue is still that of the intelligible world. A person inhabits the 
world in a plethora of ways, all of which contribute to the multi-faceted 
being of an (social, moral, emotional, historical etc.) individual person. The 
totality of the aspects that contribute to a person’s self-understanding is a 
world in which the person lives as a person. This shows itself in the mutual 
determination of person and world: the person-making world and the 
world-making person. 
7.4 Personhood and World 
As already described, the role of experience moves to the fore within 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom in a way that is slightly different from the 
epistemological aspects treated in the early philosophy of nature. The 
ontology of freedom does not simply re-approach a traditional question of 
                                         
340 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 33. “Die Selbstheit als solche ist Geist, oder der 
Mensch ist Geist als ein selbstisches, besonderes (von Gott geschiedenes) Wesen, 
welche Verbindung eben die Persönlichkeit ausmacht. Dadurch aber, daß die Selbstheit 
Geist ist, ist sie zugleich aus dem Creatürlichen ins Uebercreatürliche gehoben, sie ist 
Wille, der sich selbst in der völligen Freiheit erblickt, nicht mehr Werkzeug des in der 
Natur schaffenden Universalwillens, sondern über und außer aller Natur ist.” Schelling, 
SW, VII 364. 
341 “Ein empirisches Verhältnis zu einer Person gibt es nach Schelling also nur durch 
‘Überwindung’ oder Überschreitung der Natur, in der sie sich darbietet. Die Empirie der 
Person ist deshalb nach Schelling wesentlich “Offenbarung” oder “Manifestation”, nicht 
bloßes Phänomen oder empirische Erscheinung allein. Die Natur zeigt sich, eine Person 
offenbart sich – aber nur dem, der selbst in der Lage ist, Natur zu überschreiten.” 
Buchheim, “Grundlinien von Schellings Personbegriff,” 15. 
342 “Sobald also überhaupt Offenbarung stattfindet, sind mehrere Personen in einem 
Verhältnis miteinander, in dem sie sich gegenseitig als Personen wahrnehmen.” Ibid., 
20. 
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being, but seeks clarification on the status of being in terms of the being 
that is engaged with the determination of being. This is the ontological 
situation in which the question of the human being becomes essential. In 
his early period, Schelling was already aware that the human being is the 
“visible and wandering problem of all philosophy;”343 and his later thinking 
still echoed this problem. Within the ontology of freedom, the central 
aspect of the unity of being and freedom is that being becomes determinate 
on the premises of the human being as a person. A passage discussed 
earlier can illuminate this point further: 
Thus far from man and his endeavors making the world comprehensible, it is man 
himself that is the most incomprehensible and who inexorably drives me to the belief 
in the wretchedness of all being, a belief that makes itself known in so many bitter 
pronouncements from both ancient and recent times. It is precisely Him, the human, 
who drives me to the final desperate question: Why is there anything at all? Why is 
there not nothing?344 
The human being, as the human being that attempts to make the world 
comprehensible, escapes our understanding. The human being is that part 
of the world that cannot be made comprehensible. The human being, in 
being, attempts to make being comprehensible. This is precisely the feature 
of the human being that escapes our understanding. The human being, as 
the basis of a comprehensible world, is elusive. Consequently, the human 
being cannot be understood through concepts and, furthermore, cannot be 
understood isolated from its attempt to conceptualize the world.  
Schelling articulates the wretchedness of all being through experiences 
of human existence. These can be thought of as experiences of the human 
being itself. These experiences reflect the emotional and moral aspects of 
the embeddedness of human existence in the world. Schelling describes 
several emotional aspects, both figuratively (e.g. when he speaks of the 
yearning of the absolute), as well as more directly with regard to the human 
self-relation (e.g. anxiety). These more ambiguous aspects do not 
compromise the idea of the propositional structures of judgment. Temilo 
van Zantwijk proposes an understanding of this as premonition or 
presentiment in the form of an emotional sense that first becomes a part of 
discourse in the form of judgments. 345 This does not make emotions 
reducible to any judgmental form. Judgments are produced by the 
                                         
343 SW, II 54. 
344 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 94. “Weit entfernt also, daß der 
Mensch und sein Thun die Welt begreiflich mache, ist er selbst das Unbegreiflichste, 
und treibt mich unausbleiblich zu der Meinung von der Unseligkeit alles Seyns, einer 
Meinung, die in so vielen schmerzlichen Lauten aus alter und neuer Zeit sich 
kundgegeben. Gerade Er, der Mensch, treibt mich zur letzten verzweiflungsvollen 
Frage: warum ist überhaupt etwas? warum ist nicht nichts?” SW, XIII 7.  
345 Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 274. 
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propositional capacities of the (same) person experiencing the emotions. 
However, the articulation of emotions, or the role they can be assigned 
within meaningful discourse, requires a minimal awareness that will always 
be in the form of a judgment. Schelling indicates, in the opening to the 
Freiheitsschrift for example, that the freedom (as a fact) is something felt.  
[…] the fact of freedom, no matter how immediately the feeling of which is 
imprinted in every individual, lies in no way so fully on the surface that, in order 
merely to express it in words, an uncommon clarity and depth of mind would not be 
required.346 
Another is when Schelling speaks of madness. In the Stuttgart Private 
Lectures, Schelling asserts that the rational mind, the understanding, 
derives from an irrational ground, which is that which is without 
understanding.347  
The basis of the understanding [Verstand] is itself the madness. That is why the 
madness is a necessary element that simply does not appear and simply should not be 
actualized. What we call understanding, when it is real, living and active 
understanding is nothing but madness that is brought to order [geregelter Wahnsinn]. 
The understanding can only manifest and show itself in its opposite, that is, in that 
which is without understanding [im Verstandlosen].348 
This is not merely an inner felt irrational depth. Schelling assigns this depth 
to reality as such, to anything that can become intelligible and 
propositionally lucid. In Hogrebe’s view, Schelling’s notion of madness in 
Ages of the World plays an important role.349 Hogrebe’s reading explores 
                                         
346 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 9. My italics. “[…] die Thatsache der Freiheit, so 
unmittelbar das Gefühl derselben einem jeden eingeprägt ist, doch keineswegs so sehr 
an der Oberfläche liegt, daß nicht, um sie auch nur in Worten auszudrücken, eine mehr 
als gewöhnliche Reinheit und Tiefe des Sinns erfordert würde.” SW, 336. 
347  “Was ist der Geist des Menschen? Antwort: Ein Seyendes, aber aus dem 
Nichtseyenden, also der Verstand aus dem Verstandlosen. Was ist also die Basis des 
menschlichen Geistes in dem Sinn, in welchem wir das Wort Basis nehmen? Antwort: 
Das Verstandlose.” SW, VII 469. 
348 “Die Basis des Verstandes selbst also ist der Wahnsinn. Daher der Wahnsinn ein 
nothwendiges Element, das aber nur nicht zum Vorschein kommen, nur nicht aktualisirt 
werden soll. Was wir Verstand nennen, wenn es wirklicher, lebendiger, aktiver 
Verstand ist, ist eigentlich nichts als geregelter Wahnsinn. Der Verstand kann sich nur 
manifestiren, zeigen in seinem Gegensatz, also im Verstandlosen.” Ibid., VII 470. 
349 In Ages of the World, Schelling describes this understanding as bringing ease to 
an ‘inner restlessness.’ “Wie das Naturleben im Menschen, wenn es die höhere geistige 
Potenz nicht finden kann, der innern Unruhe, jener Hin- und Her-Bewegung ohne Sinn 
und Zweck, die das Eigenthümliche des Wahnsinns ist, anheimfällt: so scheint im 
Großen die Erde ihre Gliederung, den Einklang aller ihrer Schöpfungen und damit die 
Ruhe erst gefunden zu haben, nachdem sich das Natürliche in ihr bis zur Berührung mit 
dem Geistigen durch den Menschen erhoben. Aber auch im natürlichen Leben findet 
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this work as a speculative account of the genesis of reason and the 
emergence of rationality from a preceding irrationality or madness, the sub-
semantic. By understanding the fundamental will of the free human being 
as a will to knowledge, Hogrebe explores the conditions of intelligibility as 
the conditions of the meaningful world. He takes Schelling to promote the 
notion of the human being as an interpretational being (Deutungswesen). 
In his reading of Schelling, Hogrebe therefore employs a concept of the 
mantic developed elsewhere.350 The mantic is what precedes the semantic. 
The mantic means ‘premonition’, or, in German, ‘Ahnung’, and it is a 
central part of the impressions that preceed a direct propositional 
articulation, which the human being, as a ‘Deutungswesen’, provides.351 
The basic components of madness underlie the semantic dimension as that 
out of which clear(-er) semantic cognition comes about. 
They [the components of madness] anticipate the complete semantic dimension that 
is provided by consciousness and hold the connection to something that this 
dimension always only claims but never provides itself: the orientation by a 
something. This ‘mad’ mantic relation is something that lets us be oriented by unity, 
provided we want to arrange our semantic relations uni-vocally. Since we are always 
semantically biased through the endeavors of this arrangement, the deep lying 
semantic relation rarely comes in view.352 
Hogrebe points out that Schelling takes the sensorial capacities of the 
human being to be sensitivities to facticity, that is, sensible components 
beyond the semantic dimension. The human being is fundamentally beyond 
                                                                                                                       
sich eine solche Folge von Zuständen, da immer der vorhergehende dem folgenden zur 
Vergangenheit wird.” Ibid., VIII 260–261. Another place Schelling says, “Wo aber kein 
Wahnsinn, ist freilich auch kein rechter, wirkender, lebendiger Verstand (daher auch der 
todte Verstand, todte Verstandes-Menschen); denn worin soll sich der Verstand 
beweisen als in der Bewältigung, Beherrschung und Regelung des Wahnsinns?” SW, 
VIII 338. 
350 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 118–126; Wolfram Hogrebe, Ahnung und 
Erkenntnis (Franfkurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996); Wolfram Hogrebe, Mantik 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005). 
351 “Denn der ursprüngliche Wahnsinn, von dem hier die Rede ist, ist die mantische 
Voraussetzung für die Entstehung eines sich selbst semantisch organisierenden 
Bewußtseins und bleibt als diese Voraussetzung die wirksame Energiequelle seiner bloß 
dissipativen Struktur, die eben deshalb immer gefährdet bleibt.” Hogrebe, Prädikation 
und Genesis, 119. 
352  “Sie [die Wahnkomponente] greift nämlich der gesamten semantischen 
Dimension, die sich das Bewußtsein erarbeitet, voraus und halt den Anschluß an etwas, 
was diese Dimension immer nur in Anspruch nimmt, aber nicht selbst erzeugt: die 
Orientierung an Irgendeinem. Dieser “wahnsinnige” mantische Bezug ist etwas, was 
uns an Einheit orientiert sein läßt, wenn wir unsere semantischen Verhältnisse ein-
deutig ordnen wollen. Weil wir durch die Bemühungen um diese Ordnung 
gewissermaßen immer Semantisch befangen sind, gerät dieser tieferliegende mantische 
Bezug selten in den Blick.” Ibid., 120. 
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itself, or outside of the dimension in which the human being relates to itself. 
Hogrebe takes Schelling to promote a view so radical that the human being, 
in every consious moment, comes to itself from beyond itself. 
Consciousness consists of an arrival at oneself from beyond oneself. In this 
regard, thatness shows itself as primary, as the state from which meaning 
arises in the coming-to-itself of consciousness from beyond itself. The 
movement of consciousness is not from the world, it is from the 
indeterminate, which is different from and beyond thought. In the 
introduction to Philosophy of Mythology, Schelling describes this as an 
ecstatic being of reason: 
Reason can posit being in which there is still nothing of a concept, of a whatness, 
only as something that is absolutely outside itself (of course only in order to acquire 
it thereafter, a posteriori, as its content, and in this way to return to itself at the same 
time). In this positing, reason is therefore set outside itself, absolutely ecstatic.353 
According to this ‘concept’ (or non-concept) of factic existence, the human 
being is beyond itself in being beyond the meaning it has of existing things 
in their pre-conceptual being. Hogrebe calls it the “ecstacy of reason in its 
pronominal relation to something.” 354  To the extent that this ecstatic 
movement of reason is primary (from outside of itself), Schelling’s notion 
of madness becomes all the more clear. The pre-predicative and un-
arranged is that from which thinking arrives at a meaningful concept. 
The world applies to the conditions of intelligibility of determinate 
things. Even though the concept of world is often understood as the infinite 
totality of all there is, the world can here be understood only within a 
distinction between background and foreground, between the world and the 
contents of the world. The world is an ‘ultimate background’ that enables 
the foreground of meaning. When the issue in question is that of a world of 
determinate things, then the concept of the world is inevitably written into 
the setting as the premises that enable the foreground to build a meaningful 
whole. Hence, the world is the background that is never in sight, always 
covered by the foreground of meaning. 355  It is in thinking that the 
background and the foreground differentiate themselves; without the 
thinking person there would be no foreground. 
The world, as a background or as a semantic domain that enables the 
determination of objects (the content of the world), is not itself an object. 
                                         
353 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 207. “Die Vernunft kann das in 
dem noch nichts von einem Begriff, von einem Was ist, nur als ein absolutes Außer-sich 
setzen (freilich nur, um es hintennach, a posteriori, wieder als ihren Inhalt zu gewinnen, 
und so zugleich selbst in sich zuru ̈ckzukehren), die Vernunft ist daher in diesem Setzen 
außer sich gesetzt, absolut ekstatisch.” SW, VIII 162–163. 
354 Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 122. 
355 Wolfram Hogrebe, Das Absolute (Bonn: Bouvier, 1998), 5. 
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When we think the world it withdraws. The world is the condition of sense-
making. The things that exist in the world do not themselves bring about 
the world, and yet nothing exists without a world. In thinking, the world is 
posited. From the sub-semantic and unprethinkable being reason sets out 
“to establish a ground in advance”356 of determination.  
So, why is there anything at all? Why is there not nothing? This question 
follows the idea of the question: ‘Why is there sense, why is there not 
rather non-sense?’ The point is that the fact that there is sense, that there is 
being, is a fact to the human being. The entire question of sense rests on the 
human being alone. The ‘endeavors making the world comprehensible’ that 
Schelling applies to the human being refers us to the condition that the 
work of sense-making is a work of the human being, and that the work of 
the human being is a work of making the world comprehensible. To make 
sense of non-sense is the work of a free act that is willed. Nothing is 
provided by necessity or a priori. Will is the only ground of being. “Will is 
primal Being.”357 The contingency of being implies that being cannot be 
the object of a priori knowledge. It can only be captured by experience. 
“What proceeds from a will, and therefore is contingent, as it could be as 
well as not be, can only be experienced, and not, as it is said, be known a 
priori.”358  
The notion of personhood pertains to the role of experience because the 
self-consciousness of the person reflects an experience of the world and of 
the fundamental difficulty of getting hold of the world due to the fact that 
the person is itself part of that world. The fact of sense is therefore not only 
a fact that there is a world, but that this world shows itself to be incomplete 
and contingent. In the metaphor of the ‘web of reason,’ Schelling seeks to 
show in what sense the world is not what is original, but a web that carries 
propositional meaning. 
In his Munich lectures, entitled Grounding of Positive Philosophy (1832-
33), Schelling describes this experience of the contingency of the world: 
“[The] first impression [that this]… so highly contingent thing we call the 
world [makes on us]… can in no way be an impression of something that 
                                         
356 Schulz describes this experience: “Die sich in der Möglichkeit ihres Setzens 
begreifen wollende Vernunft scheitert: sie erkennt die Unbegreiflichkeit ihrer selbst, 
denn ihrem Denken kommt das factum brutum ihres reinen Daß schon immer zuvor. 
Aber diese negative Erkenntnis birgt die positive Einsicht in sich: die Vernunft erfährt, 
daß sie sich voraus einen Grund setzen muß, der, an ihm selbst nie in das Denken 
eintretend, die ständige Möglichkeit ihres Setzens ist.” Schulz, Die Vollendung des 
deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings., 7. 
357 SW, VII 351. 
358 “[W]as die Folge eines Willens, und demnach zufällig ist, da es ebenso gut nicht 
seyn könnte, kann bloß erfahren, nicht wie man sagt a priori gewußt warden.” Ibid., XI 
579. 
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has emerged through the necessity of reason.”359 He continues: “In every 
respect the world looks much less than a product of pure reason. It 
contains such a preponderant mass of that which is not reason, that one 
could almost say that what is rational is what is accidental.”360 The 
experience is not an experience of an object, but an experience of the 
human being as embedded in a reality that is grounded on the act of 
determination and not on a necessary or eternal absolute. 
The world is a limit. The world, as a semantic structure (as opposed to an 
uncontrollable mess of madness), emerges in the rational response to an 
unprethinkable otherness beyond the boundaries of reason. Gabriel points 
to this as the transcendence of freedom. Freedom needs a limit that it can 
exceed and to which it comports itself. Without something given, 
transcendence would have nothing to go beyond.361 The world derives from 
the transcendence that is the ascent to the semantic. In this respect, 
Schelling presents personhood in reference points to the person of God: 
The whole of nature tells us that it in no way exists by virtue of a merely geometrical 
necessity; in it there is not simply pure reason but personality and spirit. […] The 
creation is not an occurrence but an act. There are no results from general laws; 
rather, God, that is, the person of God, is the general law, and everything that 
happens, happens by virtue of the personality of God.362 
In the notion of a personal God the world is semantically structured. At this 
stage (1809), Schelling seeks to posit his system on the terms that 
personhood is the principle (or rather, the non-principle) of the system. 
Schelling develops his notion of system from a notion of the rational 
composition of being as the transparency of being itself, a transparency that 
is informed by the limits of reason. In the Freiheitsschrift, this is seen in 
the way Schelling explicates the notion of system with the terminology of 
life, vitality, and personality.363 The point of the onto-theological discourse 
in the ontology of freedom is the explication of the central aspect of 
personhood and the transformation of being (unprethinkable being) into 
selfhood on the terms of real living persons. Schelling’s concern with 
historicity turns the focus to the meaning human beings actually have of the 
world, in which he sees that the human being necessarily inhabits the world 
on the terms of personhood, as reflected in the person of God. In positive 
                                         
359  Schelling, Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie. Münchner Vorlesung WS 
1832/33 und SS 1833, 99. 
360 Ibid., 100. 
361 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 89. 
362 SW, VII 395f. My italics. 
363 E.g. “Gott selbst ist kein System, sondern ein Leben,” Ibid., VII 399. 
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philosophy, the human being is determined as a God-positing creature.364 
The divine personhood is therefore an expression of ‘what’ makes sense to 
the human being, considering that the world-experience reveals the world 
as contingent.  
In his monograph entitled Pan-Personalism, Temilo van Zantwijk has 
proposed that the onto-theological aspect of Schelling’s thinking entails a 
transcendental hermeneutics of human freedom, which Zantwijk develops 
in discussion with Heidegger’s, Theunissen’s, and Hennigfeld’s reading of 
the Freiheitsschrift. 365  Zantwijk takes the uncommunicativeness 
(Unvermittelbarkeit) of freedom as the principle for an interpretation of 
human existence. This reading is concerned with the aporia that the attempt 
to understand human existence struggles with, something that in itself 
counters the premises of understanding. Freedom, as the basis of all 
determinate being, is impenetrable and, when all is said and done, carries 
the traces of the unprethinkable as “the indivisible remainder, that which 
with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in understanding but rather 
                                         
364 Besides the revelatory relation of God and the human being, Schelling later 
develops this idea of the human being as a God-positing creature in the course of his 
Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology (especially in the eighth 
lecture). Here he says: “Man has in his original essence no other meaning but to be the 
God-positing nature because he only existed originally in order to be this God-positing 
creature […]” Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Mythology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 
129. “[…] weil der Mensch in seinem ursprünglichen Wesen keine andere Bedeutung 
hat, als die, die Gott-setzende Natur zu seyn, weil er ursprünglich nur existirt, um dieses 
Gott-setzende Wesen zu seyn […]” SW, XI 185. As presented by Gabriel, this idea 
offers an interpretational key to Schelling’s onto-theology that applies to his middle-
period as well. Schelling establishes, in the notion of God, the feature of self-
consciousness of the world, and therefore a self-relation of the world, which comes 
about in and through the human being. From the history of God-positing thinking, 
Schelling draws the history of consciousness of being as such. God is therefore essential 
to Schelling’s understanding of subjectivity, an understanding reflected in the notion of 
personhood. See Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, 234–367. 
365  Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, esp. 145–272. Zantwijk reads Schelling’s 
Freiheitsschrift almost exclusively from within the context of the pantheism 
controversy. I definitely think that this controversy was important for many of 
Schelling’s reflections, but not nearly as decisive as assumed by Zantwijk. In taking this 
course, Zantwijk follows the discussion on system much closer than I have intended. 
The point of Schelling’s discussion on system, as I see it, is the discovery of its 
incompatibility with human freedom. I contend that the later development of his 
ontology in terms of the historical concept of being reflects what could not be achieved 
with the rational system. 
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remains eternally in the ground.”366 Personhood is therefore the non-
conceptual ground of conceptual determination.367 Zantwijk further says:  
Personhood is only immediately recognizable [anschaulich] and immediately 
sensible and not a concept. There can be no adequate definition of the person. 
However, the person stands the concept nearer than life. It is the concept-positing life. 
[…] The person is productive spirit.368 
Schelling initialy employed the notion of productivity in his early 
philosophy of nature (especially On the World-Soul, 1798). However, as 
Zantwijk aims to show, personhood provides the basis for a transcendental-
hermeneutical ontology in parallel to that which is here drawn from 
Hogrebe’s reading of Schelling’s ontology of predication. 
The world, as something the human being seeks to understand as 
meaningful, is itself a result of fallible freedom. It is neither ‘emerged 
through the necessity of reason’ nor the ‘result of general laws.’ Schelling 
articulates world-consciousness, on the basis of personhood, as the only 
lens that can recognize that the world is not the result of general laws. The 
world-experience can be said to reveal that the semantic structures are 
always limited and always applied from a personal perspective, from a 
position. The fundamental experience of the contingency of being in the 
world manifests the condition of position as the condition of embeddedness 
in the world without an available absolute ground, that is, with a ground 
that withdraws. The world is therefore never experienced as complete. This 
is a fundamental experience of groundlessness. Schelling explains this 
ambience of groundlessness as an “anxiety of life [Angst des Lebens].”369 
The consciousness of the groundlesness is the condition of finite being as 
groundless being. Moreover, this experience provides the insight that the 
human being cannot change this condition. Schelling takes this condition to 
be the basic condition of finite existence. Schelling even calls it personal 
existence.  
All existence demands a condition so that it may become real, namely personal 
existence […] Man never gains control over the condition, although in evil he strives 
to do so; it is only lent to him, and is independent from him; hence, his personality 
and selfhood can never rise to full actuality [zum Aktus]. This is the sadness that 
                                         
366 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 29; SW, VII 360. 
367 Zantwijk calls this aspect of personhood, as semantic ground, the horizon of 
personhood or the personal organization. “So vollzieht sich nach Schelling jede 
begriffliche Bestimmung von etwas als etwas bereits im Horizont der Personalität und 
ist eine bestimmte personale Organisation dieses Grundes unter unendlich vielen 
anderen.” Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 219. 
368 Ibid. My italics. 
369 SW, VII 381. The English translation reads “fear of life.” Schelling, On Human 
Freedom, 47. 
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clings to all finite life […] Hence, the veil of dejection that is spread over all nature, 
the deep indestructible melancholy of all life.370 
The world is marked by the contingency that is the condition of personal 
existence. This is a condition of freedom, or rather, a condition of the 
fallibility of freedom. The meaningful world is a product of predicative acts. 
Unprethinkable being is never dissolved, never left behind or beneath, 
which means that “anarchy still lies in the ground, as if it could break 
through once again.”371 The act of predication brings an object and a 
concept into relation because they are not inherently related. The fact that 
our predication makes the object, as object, available, decisively makes our 
relationship to objects fallible.  
Schelling points to the fundamental lack of an absolute point of 
reference for knowledge in the form of a grounding principle, a principle of 
the absolute. In these terms the person is itself a “derived absoluteness or 
divinity.”372 Consequently, conceptually established relations are without 
absolute guarantees. That freedom is a non-conceptional constituting 
moment of being implies that the transition from unprethinkable being to 
determinate being can never be illuminated. More radically, there is “no 
transition from the absolutely undetermined to the determined.”373 The 
transition in judgment, as a ‘potentialization,’ is an act of determination in 
which the differentiation and even the idea of distinction lies only in the 
will.  
The primacy of the person implied in what Schelling calls ‘personal 
existence’ is a practical primacy. The will, as the ground of the sense-
dimension of all being, cannot be conceptually anticipated, only stated 
belatedly. “The understanding is born in the genuine sense from that which 
is without understanding. Without this preceding darkness creatures have 
no reality; darkness is their necessary inheritance.”374 Freedom shows itself 
as an ontological problem insofar as it cannot be made transparent on the 
premises of being. The problem is the non-transparency of freedom. 
                                         
370 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 62. “Alle Existenz fordert eine Bedingung, damit 
sie wirkliche, nämlich persönliche Existenz werde […] Der Mensch bekommt die 
Bedingung nie in seine Gewalt, ob er gleich im Bösen darnach strebt; sie ist eine ihm 
nur geliehene, von ihm unabhängige; daher sich seine Persönlichkeit und Selbstheit nie 
zum vollkommenen Actus erheben kann. Dieß ist die allem endlichen Leben 
anklebende Traurigkeit […] Daher der Schleier der Schwermuth, der über die ganze 
Natur ausgebreitet ist, die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancholie alles Lebens. Freude muß 
Leid haben, Leid in Freude verklärt werden.” SW, VII 399. 
371 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 29; SW, VII 359. 
372 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 18. “[D]erivirten Absolutheit oder Göttlichkeit.” 
SW, VII 347. 
373 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 49; SW, VII 384. 
374 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 29; SW, VII 360. 
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Nevertheless, freedom is active, neither absolute nor grounded on anything 
absolute. Freedom is contingent upon a process that is not itself part of 
freedom. This fundamental heteronomy of autonomy implies that the 
possibilities of choices are not themselves chosen. They are always given. 
The free person always comports itself towards something that it has not 
posited.375 This is the unprethinkable being of the person, its situatedness. 
There is a central part of the sense-making of the person that is not in the 
hands of the person, including the most fundamental part, namely, its own 
personal being as the domain of sense and intelligibility.  
That the person has no other ground of the world than its own personal 
being means that it can only make sense of things to the extent that it can 
integrate them into a semantic coherence of its own personal being. This 
means that the way one is a person pertains to the way one discloses one’s 
surroundings as the inventory of a meaningful world. This ontological 
situation is the inhabitation of the world. Inhabitation, as the mutual 
process of world-shaping person and person-shaping world, is never 
complete. The unity of the world, as something that depends on 
personhood, is incomplete or ongoing, because the contingency of being 
implies ‘the possibility of another being.’ Personhood, as the free 
predicative agent, is this possibility. This is the central aspect of 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom, presenting personhood as the ground of 
the world on the basis of human living in the world.376  
The onto-theological background (and method) with which Schelling 
develops his ontology of freedom describes, in the notion of God, the self-
referential structure of the world. 377  The idea is that being becomes 
conscious of itself in taking a determinate form through the rational 
                                         
375 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 89. 
376 Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 275. 
377 Gabriel interprets Schelling’s notion of God as the becoming of the domain of 
intelligibility as a fact of sense-making that is beyond one’s control. See Gabriel, 
Transcendental Ontology, 82. That is, the determination of beings, as part of a world, 
pertains to a unity that is ultimately personal. A quote from the Freiheitsschrift further 
supports this reading: “Only in man, therefore, is the word fully proclaimed which in all 
other things is held back and incomplete. But spirit, that is, God as existing actually, 
reveals itself in the proclaimed word” (VII 364f). Schelling’s onto-theological 
framework consists of far more than that. One of the central aspects of his employment 
of a theological subtext (which exceeds the aim of this study) is that Schelling, in the 
person of God, not only wants to explain the structural composition of a transcendental 
ontology, but to ask for and propose underlying motifs for the person of God to step out 
of his initial unity or indifference. This is a deeper lying consideration that discloses the 
circular movements in which God is made accountable for the ontological conditions as 
a moral being. A central example of this level of discourse is the theodicy that Schelling 
develops in the Freiheitsschrift. Interpreters treat this theodicy rather differently, e.g. 
Zantwijk believes that Schelling, independent of his transcendental ontology, directly 
fails at this level. See Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 228–259. 
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capacities of the human being. The free human being is not God, but the 
ground of the self-consciousness of being that is God. Schelling calls it 
“that which in God himself is not He Himself […] that which is the ground 
of his existence.”378 Moreover, this is the panentheistic principle that 
provides that ‘all things are in God.’ Everything is determined, and, as such, 
exists on the basis of the semantic unity of being and thought.  
As a result of this notion of God Schelling was accused of 
anthropomorphism. Schelling found his writings highly misunderstood, not 
because he thought that God was understood as personal, but because 
Schelling claimed to have shown why this was not a problem.379 For 
Schelling, the notion of personal existence implies that the highest being 
can only be a personal being. The human person and the divine person 
should not be understood apart from each other in the way 
anthropomorphism implies. The deep intertwinement of the human being 
and the world, as expressed in divine nature, is exactly what the notion of 
personhood seeks to make lucid.380 
Schelling establishes the theoretical premise of incorporating the 
conditions of possibility for having a notion of the world into the notion of 
                                         
378 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 28. Schelling also says “This ground of his 
existence, which God has in himself, is not God considered absolutely, that is, in so far 
as he exists; for it is only the ground of his existence.” Schelling, On Human Freedom, 
27. “Dieser Grund seiner Existenz, den Gott in sich hat, ist nicht Gott absolut betrachtet, 
d.h. sofern er existirt; denn er ist ja nur der Grund seiner Existenz, Er ist die Natur – in 
Gott; ein von ihm zwar unabtrennliches, aber doch unterschiedenes Wesen.” SW, VII 
358. 
379 In a personal letter from Schelling’s consistently critical yet faithful reader, the 
Tübingen professor Karl August Eschenmayer (18 October 1810), Schelling was 
presented with an objection of anthropomorphism based on the descriptions of divine 
nature in the Freiheitsschrift. The correspondence is printed in SW, VIII 145–189. This 
was a highly disputed subject of the time as the question whether “the only possible 
system of reason is pantheism” (SW, VII 338.) and furthermore whether this system 
inevitably leads to fatalism, or more specifically, excludes human freedom and divine 
personhood. Schelling refused the critique because it presumes a concept of personhood 
independent of the notion of God: “Diese ganze Argumentation ist mit der Kantischen 
Philosophie zugleich veraltet, und sollte billig nicht mehr gehört werden. Wenn wir 
sagen: Gott darf nicht nach menschlichen Begriffen gedacht werden, so machen wir die 
Beschaffenheit unserer menschlichen Begriffe – nur zum negativen Maß der Gottheit, 
wie Protagoras das wirklich bloß Subjektive des Menschen zum Maß aller Dinge 
machte.” SW, VIII 168. See also Jochem Hennigfeld, “Der Mensch im absoluten 
System: Anthropologische Ansätze in der Philosophie Schellings,” in Schellings 
philosophische Anthropologie, ed. Jörg Jantzen and Peter L. Oesterreich (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002), 1-22. 
380 “Entweder überall keinen Anthropomorphismus […] oder einen unbeschränkten 
Anthropomorphismus, eine durchgängige und (den einzigen Punkt des nothwendigen 
Seyns ausgenommene) totale Vermenschlichung Gottes” SW, VIII 167. 
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the world.381 Construed from a theoretical perspective, we could say that 
the concept of the world is a second-level achievement by a reflective 
move initiated at the first level (from within the world), namely, by the 
person. The entire question of ‘origin’ and ‘beginning’ hinges on this 
premise that the question of the world can only be raised from within the 
world. Schelling’s employment of the notion of God establishes that being, 
in the widest sense (‘all there is,’ the totality of being), becomes transparent 
to itself in a self-relation.  
It is within this understanding of the world, as God, that we can 
understand the statement that there is something in God that is not God but 
the ground of His existence.382 If God designates the self-reference of being 
in its determination, then God is not the point of departure for this self-
reference, the human being is. This being in God is the free, individual 
human being, the person. This sets the human being apart from things in 
the world in a decisive way. “Only man is in God and capable of freedom 
exactly through this Being-in-God [in-Gott-Sein]. […] just as God only 
accepts nature and ties it to himself through man.”383 Because God is the 
self-reference of the totality of being only the human being can be said to 
be in God, because only the human being is a world-inhabitor. World-
inhabitation resides in the capacity and disposition to reach out for the 
world, beyond itself, a movement that grounds the semantic dimension as 
the necessary basis of determination. 
In Schelling’s notion of existence lies the idea that the world entails 
structures that are mutually incompatible. On the one hand, this reflects the 
unity of the world on the basis of fallible freedom, and on the other hand, 
this is the inevitable vital character of a human life. The world, as a living 
system, is not a system of principles, but of particularities: persons. The 
full scope of personhood includes the co-existence of persons as particular, 
yet mutually relating, depending, and affirming beings. The scope of 
personhood is the fate of a finite being in the way its particularity stands in 
dependent relations beyond its particularity. Personhood is a way of filling 
out one’s personal identity through these relations. Stability of identity 
requires a world that, though always in danger of incompatible structures, 
                                         
381 This is a central claim that shows the foundation of Gabriel’s appropriation of 
Hogrebe’s thought. See Gabriel, Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings 
Freiheitsschrift. 
382 SW, VII, 359. “Gott selbst, damit er seyn kann, bedarf eines Grundes, nur daß 
dieser nicht außer ihm, sondern in ihm ist, und hat in sich eine Natur, die, obgleich zu 
ihm selbst gehörig, doch von ihm verschieden ist” SW, VII, 375. Here it shows that 
thinking is the ground of God in God by having the world as its content, in nature.  
383 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 72. “Nur der Mensch ist in Gott, und eben durch 
dieses in-Gott-Seyn der Freiheit fähig. Er allein ist ein Centralwesen und soll darum 
auch im Centro bleiben. In ihm sind alle Dinge erschaffen, so wie Gott nur durch den 
Menschen auch die Natur annimmt und mit sich verbindet.” SW, 411. 
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can ground the life and living of the human person. Hence, the world is the 
world of personhood in the sense of always being in danger of semantic 
restrains. This is the “fear of life,”384 what the human being has as the basic 
motivation for seeking a proper life, a threat to semantic stability. The 
existence and consistency of the world is in the hands of personal living 
and the formation of a personal life, that is, in the hands of the person as 
the world-inhabitor. The world-inhabitor alone possesses the capacity to 
transcend its particularity towards totality, which is the transcendent 
movement that constitutes the world of a personal living. The world exists 
within the transcendent movements of the world-inhabitor, in the space 
inhabited. Therefore, personhood is itself the vulnerability to 
meaninglessness. As Schelling says: “Only in personality is there life, and 
all personality rests on a dark ground that indeed must therefore be the 
ground of cognition as well.”385 
7.5 In Summation 
It is important to understand in what sense personhood is more than an 
anthropology. Personhood is an ontological situation in the sense that the 
human being is situated in relation to being, as well as situated in being. 
Likewise, being is understood as something that can only be determined on 
the basis of the world-positing human being. The notion of personhood 
serves to characterize the way in which the human being is understood as 
being enrolled in the question of being as the determination of the world. 
Obviously, personhood also pertains to many other aspects that could be 
the object of a strict anthropological reading. The significant aim of this 
reading has been to show that the development and condition of human 
personhood is enrolled in a sense-making process. In what follows I shall 
attempt to draw a concise picture of how the human being relates to the 
world in fifteen steps. 
1. Schelling’s notion of personhood is developed in the context of his 
ontology of freedom, which he explicates and defends with an ontology of 
predication. The central ambition of Schelling’s turn to freedom is to break 
free from a logical concept of being that understands being as determinacy; 
Schelling develops a new concept of being that is characterized as 
historical and contingent to serve this purpose.  
2. From the ontology of predication the question of intelligibility 
becomes central, which brings us into the semantic question of how being 
makes sense, and what the true ground of sense is. There is no rational 
ground beyond the propositional structure provided by thought. Beyond 
thought there is only unprethinkable being. Sense is grounded in freedom 
                                         
384 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 47; SW, VII 381. 
385 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 75; SW, VII 413f. 
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by the act of predication. The Kantian assumption that the structure of 
determinacy is judgmental is, in this regard, combined with Schelling’s 
emphasis on freedom: judgment provides the semantic dimension that 
underlies the domain of existence, that is, the domain that enables that 
something can be recognized as existing. Only actual existence, what 
Schelling calls the factic that, cannot be made sense of a priori. It must be 
accepted as a fact residing outside of reason. From the ontology of 
predication it is clear that Schelling proceeds by logical-ontological 
argumentation. 
3. Kant’s ideal of pure reason affirms that the totality of possible 
predicates lies inherently, albeit negatively, present (presupposed) in 
determinate being. This notion of being as determinacy (a logical concept 
of being) assumes a certain conception of judgment by means of which any 
determinate, individual thing is recognizable through its referential 
relations. Schelling finds that something important is missing in the way 
Kant understands the role of judgment. The problem is the thinking subject: 
first, that it exists, and second, that it exists within the same whole of 
totality that it seeks to make sense of. Schelling finds that, in this 
conception, the individual thinking subject is subordinated to the whole, as 
a mere moment of the whole. A further problem with this idea is that the 
position of the thinking subject, in this totality of differential relations, is 
lost from sight. It is apositional thinking in the sense that determinacy is 
not recognized as holding a position within this totality. 
4. Against this conception of judgment, Schelling states that the 
judgment (the act of predication) that gives form to being has its place 
within being. The idea of being is itself produced from a position in the 
midst of the whole of being. Schelling’s new concept of being is 
understood as that which makes the determination of being possible and 
actualizes itself within that determination. The position of a proposition is 
not a necessary position, but a contingent position. This fundamentally 
changes the conditions of ontology to the extent that no position can ever 
provide complete determination of the given. Hence, being must be 
understood as contingent. It is contingent in the sense that it could have 
been otherwise or been determined otherwise. Contingency is actual 
because of the individual. This condition is fundamental. It cannot be 
avoided. There is no absolute ground for objective knowledge because the 
fact of being can never be suspended or accessed from a pure or neutral 
position. 
5. Being is. The meaning of the words ‘being is’ is that being stands as a 
fact that cannot be denied. In the question of being, we are always already 
in the midst of being, already asking a determinate question. Thought 
always finds itself in being, as a situation that it has not itself provided. 
Being is inescapable. It rests on a predicative enterprise in which the 
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thinking subject moves and can never step out of. Gabriel calls this a 
“predicative being-in-the-world.”386  
6. Schelling’s ambition is to counter the traditional notion of the 
unconditioned as characterized by necessity and eternity with a historical 
and contingent concept of being. This concept of being is characterized by 
its actualization in the free, predicative act of determination. It is through 
this determination (origination) in propositional thinking that the 
contingency of being is made manifest. Unprethinkable being is 
undetermined, and, as such, only determined through the not-yet of another 
being, determinate being. The contingency of being is ‘the possibility of 
another being’ in the sense of another determination. In this sense, 
Schelling understands unprethinkable being as the origin of determinate 
being (that which originates).  
7. In asking ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ Schelling 
approaches the question of an ultimate ground for determinacy. From 
Hogrebe, we learn that Schelling answers this question with recourse to the 
origin of judgment.387 In the structure of judgment, the unity of being and 
thought becomes clear. The unity of being and thought entails that thinking 
and being are both subject to the conditions of determinacy. Schelling 
responds to the question of the ground of determinacy with a theory of 
potencies, which he reconstructs in his theory of predication. 
The first potency consists of the ‘originary subject’ and regards the 
determinable. This is not a potency prior to the judgment, but is recognized 
as such in the structure of judgment. Prior to the judgment, the first potency 
is unprethinkable being. The second potency consists of the ‘originary 
predicate’ and is the structural counterpart in the split that establishes the 
structural basis of logical space. The third potency consists of the copula, 
or the ‘originary synthesis of subject and predicate,’ which Schelling refers 
to as spirit. From this theory of potencies, he manages to establish the 
unthinkable moment of thinking within a theory of thinking. The 
ontological character lies in the logical-ontological premise provided by the 
determinate concept of being.  
8. Schelling adds to this the decisive point that thinking is belayed and 
that unprethinkable being is that which, no matter how early we come on 
the scene, is already there. In the very moment when thinking turns to the 
unprethinkable it vanishes. This is the origin, or the beginning, of thinking. 
It can never be the object of thinking because thought is always already 
predicatively mediated sense. Unprethinkable being is not the ground of 
logical space. It is a ‘non-ground’ (Ungrund). 
                                         
386 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 84. Gabriel makes the point that the facticity 
of being (our being in sense) reflects an experience of a thrownness in the way 
characterized by Heidegger. Within being we can only move on, never step out. 
387 SW, XII 53. 
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Methodologically, it can be said that Schelling starts out from a pre-
semantic basis in order to clarify the emergence of the semantic dimension 
in which being is ‘as’ being (as something determinate überhaupt).388 The 
mere facticity of sense, a logical space that is disclosed by virtue of the 
structure of judgment, is not available to thinking with recourse to 
judgment (no ratio determinans); the impossibility of accounting for the 
fact of the existence of logical space is the contingency of logical space 
itself. Schelling understands the application of existence to the 
transcendental ideal (as treated by Kant) to be logically prior to the 
transcendental ideal and not an effect of it. Schelling reverses the 
ontological proof of God by stating that concepts are preceded by the 
necessary (unprethinkable) being, and not that the concept of necessary 
existence implies existence. This condition is the belatedness of thinking.  
9. Regarding the distinction between negative and positive philosophy, it 
applies that negative philosophy only examines the constitution of logical 
space and generally assumes the sufficiency of the logical concept of being. 
Correspondingly, positive philosophy derives from an insight into the 
severe contingency of logical space and proceeds as a historical philosophy.  
10. The ontology of predication provides an explanation of the transition 
from unprethinkable being to determinate being as an act of freedom, 
which Schelling characterizes as a “potentialization.” 389  This 
potentialization is an activity that takes place without sufficient reason. 
Freedom is groundless and freedom is human. Therefore, freedom pertains 
to a being that gives it an ontological status, which is personhood, as 
reflected in the divine person. The engagement of human freedom in the 
question of being moves Schelling’s attention from a mere transcendental 
ontology into a notion of personhood.  
11. Freedom has its essence through being human freedom. The 
important anthropological turning point (the ontological situation of 
personhood) is that this in ontology is determined in the question of what a 
human being is. The personal concept of being reveals the intertwinement 
of being and the human being. The merit of Zantwijk’s and Gabriel’s 
readings of Schelling’s ontology of freedom is an insight into this link 
                                         
388  Zantwijk provides a helpful description of this. “Die interessanteste 
Grundüberzeugung Schellings ist ohne Zweifel seine These, daß ein Urteil nur auf der 
Grundlage eines vorprädikativen Wirklichkeitsverstehens möglich ist. Sie wendet sich 
gegen das Vorurteil, die Vorprädikative Grundlage des Urteils sei ein chaotisches 
Gemenge von Einbildungen. Schellings transzendentale Hermeneutik erkennt zwar an, 
daß logisch konsistente und genau analysierbare Beziehungen nur zwischen Urteilen 
möglich sein können. Sie bestreitet nur, daß daraus folgt, daß die vorprädikative 
Einbildung völlig chaotisch ist. […] Man kann über Emotionen urteilen, aber auch 
Urteile vorausahnen.” Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 275–276. 
389 SW, XIII, 264f, 267, 279. 
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between the semantic dimension and personal identity as “the very open 
region in which fields of sense appear as such.”390 
12. Personhood is that which sets the human conditions for meaning. 
From Schelling’s notion of the contingent concept of being it follows that 
no ultimate, objective reference point is given beyond the person. 
Personhood is the only available basis for predicative agency. It is as a free 
predicative agent, lacking sufficient ground, that the person comes to see 
the world in particular ways depending on its particular position in the 
world.  
13. From the notion of unprethinkable being (that which we cannot not 
think yet can never grasp as such), Schelling derives the structure of the 
presupposition of all determination. This is the necessity of the world for 
thinking. Any determination takes form as part of a world without which 
no determination is possible. The presupposition is the meaningful 
structures of logical space underlying any particular determination. 
Nevertheless, every structure of meaning finds its limits due to the 
condition of the finitude of reason that produced it. In Schelling’s ontology 
of freedom this is the fallibility inherent to freedom. The fact that our 
predication makes the object, as object, available, also makes our 
relationship to objects fallible. Conceptually established relations are, as 
such, without guarantees.  
14. The belatedness of thinking is the reason that the transition from 
unprethinkable being to determinate being can never be illuminated. The 
transition, as ‘potentialization’, is an act of determination in which the 
differentiation and the idea of distinction is made possible, and this only by 
the will. Hence, the transition is willed (Will is primal Being). The will, as 
the ground of the semantic dimension of all being, cannot be conceptually 
anticipated, only stated belatedly.  
15. The person has its own finitude as the basis of being. The 
unprethinkable is absolute in the sense of being unrelated or without 
relations. The person is a finite being in the sense of being a related being 
that is positioned in being, and in this sense determined by the relationless 
absolute, an unrelated relation. The person therefore consists of a middle-
ground, between the unavailability of an absolute ground and its own self-
mediation on the basis of determinate being. This is the 
incomprehensibility of personhood. The person always encounters, in its 
self-relation, something that it has not posited itself. This is what 
conditions the person and the condition of personhood itself.  
 
In a certain way, a modern way, Schelling’s notion of personhood invites 
us to give up our conception of the world as an entity out there, about 
                                         
390 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 71. 
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which we are to uncover true properties. The world is decisively 
understood as a limit-concept, and it holds the function of a limit concept 
that enables meaningful speech about objects. The cosmological function 
of the world, as a limit-concept, derives from the person who, as a personal 
being, arranges and orders the world as a free, responsible, and personal 
being. There is no absolute criterion of ordering. There is personhood. 
If the world pertains to the conditions of the order that we assign to ‘all 
there is,’ then this order provides organizational domains or classes for 
what a possible object, phenomena, species, category, etc. is. The order of 
multiple domains is available for a meaningful discourse in reason. 
Personhood is a conscious basis in which multiple domains of orders are 
anchored and deployed for the benefit of a functional semantic dimension. 
Personhood is all about providing and maintaining a stable semantic 
dimension. Hogrebe has taken Schelling’s logical-ontological reflections 
on judgment and predication far but, as I shall show in the next chapter, 
Gabriel has offered a presentation of Schelling’s thinking in a domain-
ontological setting that provides a more formal form to Schelling’s 
arguments. The dimensions of personhood, as they have been portrayed in 
this chapter, might not be able to follow through on formal arguments. 
However, the merit of Schelling’s depiction of personhood is to have 
placed these arguments in a human setting that pertains to the human 
lifeworld. As Zantwijk says, “the self-construal of the human being is 
always placed in the context of the construal of the world and of being.”391 
The reason for this lies in the fact that the human being is itself a part of the 
world. Schelling’s notion of personhood, in its central feature, serves to 
make this clear. 
 
                                         
391 Zantwijk, Pan-Personalismus, 275. 
  
 PART III 
 
The World-Inhabitor 
8 Orientation and Religion 
8.1 Schelling’s Domain-Ontology 
The aim of this final part is to show how the reading of Schelling’s notion 
of personhood can be made available to contemporary philosophy of 
religion, and in this regard, be grafted onto the discussion of human 
religiosity. It is through the composition of embeddedness in Schelling’s 
notion of personhood that his thought can be disclosed and made available 
to a contemporary discussion concerning the relation between religion and 
selfhood. The aim is to unfold the potential of Schelling in discussion with 
Dalferth’s philosophy of orientation. 
The onto-theological aspect of Schelling’s thinking admittedly provides 
an interpretation of religion that has only gained marginal attention in this 
study. Among the interpreters of Schelling’s later thought, it is clear that 
Schelling’s philosophy of religion has garnered some disagreement in 
regard to Schelling’s theological ambitions (e.g. Fuhrman and Schulz). In 
order to limit my exposition of Schelling, I have therefore intentionally 
avoided Schelling’s theological interpretators as well as his treatment of 
particular mythologies or religions.  
Schelling’s onto-theology, insofar as it reflects a methodological 
procedure, enables Schelling to construe the ontological situation that 
surrounds the notion of personhood. Schelling does not promote a religious 
philosophy, but an interpretation of religion that contains a vision of 
philosophical religion. It should, on the one hand, be understood that 
Schelling’s treatment of religion exceeds the scope of this study. However, 
the attention that Schelling gives to religion could, on the other hand, have 
been the basis for another and a more comprehensive study of the ontology 
of freedom In this study, however, Schelling’s onto-theological discourse is 
situated as belonging to the metaphysical setting in which he develops the 
notion of personhood.  
The potential of Schelling’s notion of religion for this study therefore 
consists of the form of his reflections on the human world-relation that 
becomes essential to the ontology of freedom as it develops from his 
middle-period. This world-relation – I have characterized it as an 
ontological situation – is to be made available for further discussion. First, I 
show how Schelling’s notion of personhood can be presented in the form of 
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a domain-ontology, as has been proposed by Gabriel in his formalization of 
Hogrebe’s approach to Schelling’s ontology of predication. This will show 
a model that is descriptive of the finitude of reason, insofar as it can be 
addressed as a matter of meaning in human life, and a way to explicate the 
structures and limits that prove incompatible and insufficient in (what 
existential thinking understands as) the limit-phenomena of human living. 
Second, I consult Dalferth’s notion of religion as it pertains to the 
challenge of human life-orientation, in order to clarify how a composition 
of first-person cosmology can be explicated through a translation of 
ontology into a life-worldly understanding of religion. I contend that the 
latter enables a further understanding of Schellingian personhood as world-
inhabitation. In a preliminary sense, world-inhabitation can be described as 
the endeavour to live through proper orientation. Dalferth, in this regard, 
offers a way in which to understand religious orientation in the form of an 
absolute aspect, called absolute orientation. I seek in the final part to unfold 
this idea in relation to the heteronomous being of personhood in its 
interpersonal aspect and, in a brief final section, to propose a way of 
understanding the relation of transcendence and orientation with 
Schelling’s domain-ontology.  
If a common conception of the world in contemporary thinking can be 
said to derive from a view of the world as a determinate thing, then 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom provides a critical, and/or provocative, but 
also highly relevant, sort of thinking concerning the question of the world. 
It is along the same lines as Taylor’s critique of the dis-engaged, modern 
rationality. Taylor seeks to counter and correct the object-oriented view of 
the world by means of his theory of background framework. Schelling can 
most certainly be understood as belonging to the same trajectory of Kantian 
argumentation that counters this common view of the world.392 The notion 
of background framework pertains to the notion of personhood insofar as it 
shows the engagement and embededness of the human being in meaning, 
and that the parameters of meaning are determined by this embeddedness. 
In line with Kant, Schelling argues that the condition that enables the 
determination and definition of things remains fundamentally undefinable. 
As in the Erlangen Lectures, Schelling argues that all systems (or theories) 
that lay universal claim generate a nontransparent structure that makes 
them ‘blind’ to their constitutive grounds (see section 5.5).393 According to 
Schelling, the question concerning totality, the question concerning ‘all 
                                         
392 See Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology”; Taylor, “Lichtung or Lebensform: 
Parallels Between Heidegger and Wittgenstein”; Taylor, “Engaged Agency and 
Background in Heidegger.” 
393 In discussion with Hegel and modern set theory, this text becomes decisive for 
Gabriel’s development of the Schellingian domain-ontology. See Gabriel, 
Transcendental Ontology, 104–136. 
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there is’, is not primarily a question of knowledge. ‘All there is’ is not 
something that can be determined with correct knowledge. The idea of 
totality remains the condition for knowledge, and it can therefore never 
become the object of knowledge. The idea of totality leaves us with a 
notion of finitude regarding our epistemic capacities. The absolute, as 
unavailable and indeterminable, remains necessary. It is a necessary infinite 
in which we become aware of our finitude. It is the fundamental 
contrasting feature that illuminates our finitude.394 
One of the central features of Schelling’s ontology of freedom is the 
introduction of unprethinkable being that shows how the propositional 
form of reason is always mediated and grounded on a presupposition of the 
world. It follows that the ground of knowledge is without any ultimate 
guarantee. Knowledge is a mediated response to absolute otherness, to non-
knowledge. This is an argument for the brute condition that knowledge is 
exactly what will always fail in its attempt to set us right in the world 
definitely, because knowledge is grounded on will, on a fundamental 
yearning. Hogrebe calls it will to knowledge or will to truth. I would call it 
will to world. It is the basis of the presupposition of the world, but it does 
not in itself guarantee knowledge. Our engagement with knowledge we 
have concerning the world (that we ask for the world on our own terms) 
makes any such thing as original or pure knowledge impossible. The point 
is that the human aspiration to relate properly to the world through 
knowledge has its own impossibility built into it. This point can be clarified 
with the problem of finitude that derives from Schelling’s motif of 
‘beginning.’395 Hence, finitude provides us with insight into our relation to 
the world, of which we cannot have absolute knowledge. This insight is 
conscious finitude. 
Personhood is a consciousness about one’s being in relation to oneself as 
an agent. This consciousness entails one’s fundamental need to inhabit the 
world as an agent, and to disclose the world to one’s personal being. It is as 
much the basis for understanding as it is intertwined with that which one 
seeks to understand. The person is a world-being, a world-inhabitor, which 
means that the world is the world by means of the being that lives in it. 
There is a central sensitivity to the limits of rational procedures in 
Schelling’s thought. In conscious finitude, we encounter the human 
condition of operating and orientating one’s living without any clear-cut 
                                         
394 As Gabriel puts it: “Das Absolute ist daher keine mythische Entität (was kein 
ernsthafter Denker jemals gemeint hat), sondern lediglich der Name für eine Stelle, die 
immer schon markiert sein muß, wenn wir uns dort befinden sollen, wo wir uns de facto 
vorfinden: In einer Welt mit bestimmten Zustanden.” Gabriel, Das Absolute und die 
Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift, 37 n69. 
395 Again, this is Hogrebe’s point concerning the ‘Erkenntnissuche’ that precedes all 
‘Erkenntnissicherung’. Hogrebe, Prädikation und Genesis, 47. 
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answers or absolute points of orientation. These limitations of reason are 
not something we are supposed to abandon, but something we have to give 
in to and come to terms with. From the outset, Schelling unearths these 
limitations in discussions with Kant’s critical philosophy.  
Reason is not primary, nor is it fundamental. Reason does not answer to 
a world that it can ever come to grasp in its entirety. Reason is presented 
with a world that is already given. From this state of factual being, 
reflection uncovers the underlying unprethinkable otherness, an all-
pervasive non-reason. All reason (Sinn) rises from a preceeding ‘madness’ 
(Wahn-sinn) to an order that it maintains in the idea of a world. The 
‘Verstand’ (under-standing) is that which brings the ground of madness to 
a ‘standing,’ in an act of ‘ver-stehen.’ This is the fundamental movement of 
meaning-making that is the potentialization of being. To make sense of 
non-sense is to rise to order. It is a move from the unprethinkable to a 
standing in a semantically ordered world. 396  This movement is also 
expressed as an escape from the grip of the unprethinkable: “We must 
move away [hinwegkommen] and get away [loskommen] from the 
unprethinkable in order to get to the Idea.”397 The movement into a logical 
space in which determinate things make sense, as part of a world, is a 
movement of will. Human life always inhabits a world according to the 
meaningful structures that it can establish. The threat of meaning, the threat 
that is always present in phenomena that reveal the insufficiency or 
incompatibility of the world posited (the meaningful structures that we 
apply), is therefore unavoidable. Gabriel explains: 
Understanding always reaches into the dimension of non-knowledge in the attempt to 
determine something. Because determination is not only incomplete but furthermore 
presupposes an indeterminable dimension of distinction, the sense-dimension 
[Sinndimension] of understanding always constitutes itself so that it cannot rule out 
its own breakdown.398 
When Schelling speaks of freedom as will or as yearning he is alluding to 
fundamental drives and impulses. He refers to the will as a “source of self-
movement [Selbstbewegungsquelle].” However, the notion of the will 
entails a rather ambiguous account of the active aspect of this movement. 
Schelling describes the transition from unprethinkable being to determinate 
being as a movement away from the unprethinkable. However, at the same 
time, he also describes this movement as a withdrawal on the part of 
                                         
396 Thus the words, “Aus diesem Verstandlosen ist im eigentlichen Sinne der 
Verstand geboren. […] Alle Geburt ist Geburt aus Dunkel ans Licht.” SW, VII 360. 
397 Ibid., XIV 337. 
398 Markus Gabriel, “Zum philosophischen Ansatz Wolfram Hogrebes,” in Die 
Wirklichkeit des Denkens, ed. Jens Halfwassen and Markus Gabriel (Heidelberg: Winter, 
2007), 98. 
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unprethinankable being. This transition cannot be illuminated, only 
understood retrospectively:  
[Only after] I have decided between +a and –a [can it be said that] my ‘being +a’ is 
not resultant of a mere, blind whim, which would always and necessarily require 
thinking its contingency. Now it is not seen as a contingency because it is an 
intention, something willed.399 
The way something becomes a content for consciousness and for reason is 
not itself rational (in the sense that it does not have sufficient ground). 
Instead, it is ‘willed.’  
Insofar as this can be understood as an act of consciousness, Schelling 
calls it production. Consciousness ‘produces’ its object by means of 
judgment: by determining something as something this something becomes 
an object of thought, and, as such, it becomes an existent (in a particular 
domain of rational discourse). However, it remains fundamental that the 
will wants something. This something is neither itself nor something of 
itself. The content of thought is given from outside of thought: “In 
producing, the human being is not occupied with itself but with something 
outside itself.”400 Consciousness is therefore already beyond or outside 
itself when thinking. Thinking is a movement from outside into thinking. 
As such, it entails a movement of transcendence, not to a beyond, but from 
a beyond, from beyond semantic immanence. Schelling portrays this 
movement as the creation of the world (the Christian creation myth is the 
subtext in use) by taking this movement as the world-constituting 
movement. At the same time, this movement of determination is portrayed 
as the withdrawal of unprethinkable being: 
[as a] process of suspension, and through that, [as a] posited or mediated re-
establishment [of] necessary being. However, between this sublation and this re-
establishment lies the entire world. The unprethinkable being is only withdrawn in 
order to give place to creation (therefore, because something is withdrawn, in order 
for creation to emerge, is the space the a priori form of all finite being).401 
The movement of consciousness posits the world as the presupposition in 
which the object becomes determined as object. The object requires (for its 
determination) the world of which it is an object, which is why the world is 
                                         
399 SW, XIV 338. 
400 Ibid., XIV 352. 
401  “[D]er Proceß einer Suspension und dadurch gesetzten oder vermittelten 
Wiederherstellung seines nothwendigen Seyns. Aber zwischen jener Aufhebung und 
dieser Wiederherstellung liegt die ganze Welt. Das unvordenkliche Seyn wird nur 
hinweggenommen, um der Schöpfung Raum zu geben (darum, weil etwas 
hinweggenommen ist, damit die Schöpfung entsteht, ist der Raum die apriorische Form 
alles endlichen Seyns).” Ibid., XIV 352–353. 
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a necessary presupposition. It is a pre-supposition insofar as it precedes any 
determination or existence that becomes possible through it. It is a pre-sup-
position because it underlies any determination as a semantic dimension. It 
is both an underlying movement and a movement from below. It is a pre-
sup-position insofar as it is positioned in (and by) logical space.  
What does this mean? Any conception of the world remains, logically, a 
step behind. It is only retrospectively that one can examine the procedure. 
The world comes about in the form of a withdrawing that conditions 
thinking when something determinate is thought. We can understand 
world-shaping as an unconscious act of consciousness. This act provides 
the fundamental distinction between form and content, in which it posits 
the content as something that is already there to be discovered through 
representation.402 As soon as something determinate is thought, the domain 
in which this determinate thing is established as a proper content is already 
presupposed. Schelling concludes his understanding concerning 
anthropomorphism in light of this point. Any determination has already 
established the background against which it is represented. “Either 
everywhere no anthropomorphism […] or an unlimited anthropomorphism, 
a thorough and [...] complete humanization of God.“403 It is of little to no 
concern for Schelling because we cannot determine the one without the 
other. We cannot know what a human being is without the preceding 
establishment of that through which it is determined.  
The form-content dialectics in Schelling’s transcendental ontology of 
freedom become the point of departure for Gabriel’s exposition of a 
Schellingian domain-ontology (that by means of which Schelling puts the 
human self at the center of his theory of the world). This theory has both 
merits and limits. On the one hand, it makes Schelling’s thought far more 
formal and concrete, and this in a way that makes it easier to apply to 
contemporary thinking. On the other hand, it tends to lose sight of two 
important aspects: the one being that Schelling did not settle on logical 
categories alone, but developed a severe sensitivity to the emotional and 
psychological aspects of human self-understanding; the other being this 
very self-understanding, which is formatively already in play at the outset 
of any act of consciousness. As long as we bear in mind that no 
formalization is exhaustive, we can still learn a lot from his ontology of the 
domains of sense.  
The domain-ontology should be understood as a logical-ontological 
setting that accounts for the radical sense-dependency of being in the form 
of logical domains (what I have primarily refered to as logical space or the 
semantic dimension). Without a fundamental understanding of the 
                                         
402 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 130. 
403 SW, VIII 167. 
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conditions implied in the ways in which the semantic dimension works as 
operations in logical domains, we never get beyond the self-grounding 
totality-thinking provided by negative philosophy.  
The most fundamental characteristic that has been drawn from 
Schelling’s ontology of freedom is that only the semantic domain affirms 
existence of particular things. In other words, existence is a property of 
domains. What can exist can only exist as part of a domain or as belonging 
to a domain. However, the existence of a particular thing (belonging to a 
particular domain) requires the existence of other domains in which this 
particular object does not belong. Hence, there must necessarily be multiple 
domains in order to provide proper determination. Gabriel explains: 
Whenever we decide to quantify over a particular domain of objects and what exists 
in its scope, we necessarily posit that in this domain something happens that is 
different from what happens in other domains. The existential quantifier picks out 
something that is determined in contrast with others, both on the level of the 
elements it discriminates within a particular object and on the level of the domain, 
within which the object is distinguished as an element, because there are no domain-
transcendent elements to be registered in any discourse. Therefore, to claim that 
something exists is to claim that there is a plurality of domains, given that domains 
exist and, hence, only exist in contradistinction to other domains. Were there only 
one domain, there would be none; the form and content of any given domain consists 
among other things in its difference from all others.404  
Scientific discourses and discourses in general generate domains of objects whose 
regularities they methodically investigate in order both to determine what can 
(possibility) appear in a given domain and to investigate what actually appears within 
it and if the relations between what appears within them are necessary or contingent; 
in this way, the modalities are circumscribed by and within discourses and the 
domains of objects they generate and cultivate. So whatever ontological structures 
are presupposed by the formation of domains, they have to affect our way of thinking 
about objects, for there are no objects outside of a domain, because the set of all 
objects outside of a domain would simply be another domain defined by rules of 
inclusion and exclusion.405 
A domain is an intelligible structure that is characterized by rules for the 
determination of the properties and possibilities of its content as proper 
objects. The qualification of an object as belonging to a domain makes the 
domain dependent upon other domains. A domain is therefore always 
established in contrast with another domain, which is a relation that 
                                         
404 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 122. Gabriel’s presentation of a Schellingian 
domain-ontology is elaborated upon in discussion with Hegel’s Logic and modern set 
theory as presented by Georg Cantor, which shall not be brought in to the current 
discussion. See Georg Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of 
Transfinite Numbers. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952). 
405 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 123. 
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logically cannot be illuminated from within a domain, only from a broader, 
more fundamental domain. The possible regress is infinite. 
Schelling’s theory of predication, which underlies this theory of domains, 
provides an insight into the fact that there is no access granted from within 
a domain to the constitution of the domain. The rules of a domain cannot 
illuminate its structure; only another domain can do that. The structure of 
domains can only be accessed from another, higher-order domain. This 
establishes an important logical principle: the question of constitution is the 
inherent point of transgression through which any domain can be said to 
exceed itself. The question of origin and constitution is what necessarily 
leads beyond its own structures. This is what it means to say that the rules 
of a particular domain cannot account for the domain and its relation to 
other domains, that only another domain can do that.406 In Schelling’s 
thought, this is the blind spot of existence that he explicates with the motif 
of the beginning. A domain, qua domain, always generates its own blind 
spot. For Schelling, this articulates a far more general aspect, namely, a 
severe problem within thinking as such, insofar as thinking is domain-
ordered thinking. 
In Schelling’s reflections on metaphysical thinking as an attempt to 
grasp the totality of the world, this is expressed in the condition that any 
metaphysical system, or any theory that lay universal claim, in principle 
generates its own blind spot, which is the impossibility of illuminating its 
own structure by itself. The problem with any metaphysics can be stated as 
a logical problem: the attempt to think totality necessarily generates a 
nontransparent structure. Theories that make universal claims somehow 
seek to go beyond object-domains, they claim to be the ultimate domain, 
the domain of all domains. Such theories thereby lose sight of the fact that 
they are themselves domains and that they work in accordance with the 
same conditions as any other object-domain. The domain-ontology 
provides that the illumination of an object-domain can only be achieved 
from outside the domain, that is, from another domain. From higher order 
domains one can achieve a “perspective of comparison that surveys many 
different object domains, each of which is determined solely over against 
the others.”407 
                                         
406 Gabriel explains this transgression as the contingency of any domain. “Given that 
domains are only individuated in a context of domains, transgression is always possible, 
because the other domains are present as excluded. Therefore, the possible transgression 
of a domain is built into its constitution, even though it cannot be determined by its 
constitutive rules. Therefore, a possibility, which is not a possibility determined by its 
constitutive rules, is implicit in every domain. This possibility is its contingency.” Ibid., 
125. 
407 Ibid., 123. 
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On what basis are object-domains connected? What can, in the widest 
sense, be said to be the ‘domain of all domains’, without compromising the 
domain-ontology itself (that is, a non-domain superiority)?  
Instead of a direct domain, it might prove helpful to understand this as a 
capacity of operating and combining domains. The capacity of combining 
domains, as a capacity underlying all domains, cannot in a sufficient way 
be understood as a domain itself. Hogrebe calls this the “dimension of 
distinctions [Distinktionsdimension]” or the “domain of distinction”. The 
most fundamental domain (or non-domain) is that which contains all 
possible differences.408 Gabriel calls this ‘logical space’, which designates 
the logical dimension in which all object domains are interrelated and can 
be distinguished. Logical space cannot be accounted for as a domain 
among other domains. It must be acknowledged, in its ‘non-existence’, as 
the necessary condition of possibility for the existence of domains. Logical 
space does not exist. It cannot be considered as belonging to a particular 
domain, or else there would be a need for the generation of a higher-order 
domain, which would itself be dependent on logical space. Hence, logical 
space is the necessary presupposition of existence (in domains) as such. 
8.2 Cosmological Models 
When we think about the world we do so by means of cosmological models 
that aim to make the world intelligible and bring the world to order. The 
world can be approached in many different ways. However, regardless of 
which way or which model is set up to approach the world, we can only do 
so in adherence with the conditions of logical space. If the world is ‘all 
there is,’ then we can only rightfully approach the world by articulating the 
logical space that underlies it. The possibility of its determination (logical 
space) precedes its determination. This possibility is the intelligibility of 
anything determinate. Hence, in seeking answers about ‘all there is’, we 
have already reached out for more than can be determined. As soon as an 
articulation of logical space is sought, it withdraws from us and falls into 
the background.409 As Gabriel says, we can only refer to the background 
                                         
408 “Any claim about fundamental distinctions takes this dimension from the outset 
as given and complete. It cannot be distinguished from other spaces and simply cannot 
be positively identified: nevertheless, we need it because otherwise we could not create 
a universe through our distinctions. It is the semantically completely diaphanous 
background or protoplasm of all semantic contrasts, the transcendental condition of 
their possibility.” Wolfram Hogrebe, Echo des Nichtwissens (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2006), 317f. Quoted from Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 123 n87. 
409 “Logical space as such can only be glimpsed in its withdrawal, that is, only when 
we determine something. We must not forget, too, that upon referring to logical space as 
the background of our determinations, qua that which retracts upon our determining 
something or other, we determine it as such (logical space qua background) only by ipso 
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under excessive and improper terms, which will always fail to provide an 
exhaustive articulation (even the one I attempt to give now). Schelling 
writes: 
In eternity there is no “as”; something, call it A, cannot be anything without the 
exclusion of that which it is not, not A. Here, however, the subject is merely pure, 
that is, straightaway and utterly irreflective Being, not being posited as such. For any 
“being posited as such,” anything “as,” as such is posited in and presupposes a 
reflection – is a “being reflected” – is, in other words, already a Contrarium.410 
Schelling fully acknowledges the fatal consequences of these limitations of 
thinking. Thinking always comes too late. It is the fate of finitude, albeit an 
incomprehensible fact, that thinking can even be aware of its own finitude, 
even retrospectively. Thinking can relate to (and reconcile with) its own 
finitude in the form of a belayed retrojection. As soon as somthing is 
thought this something is already posited in a domain of logical space. 
Hence, the world is not exclusively the physical whole found in scientific 
images of the world, nor is it a phenomenologically formulated life-world 
(or any other version of the world for that matter). These are retrojections. 
A theory, or myth, of origin is such a retrojection. It is a way of providing 
an understanding of the present domain, the present world. In this sense, 
the question of the world is an expression of the need for ‘another domain,’ 
a broader, underlying domain from which one can illuminate the present 
domain, which in its cosmological aspect is the scope of human life.  
Such a theory or myth can only be established from within a version of 
the world for which a beginning is requested: “All efforts to determine the 
origin of reflection and all candidates for such determinate origins are 
myths of origin designed by the residents of a world.”411 In order to reach 
out for ultimate questions concerning the world (the need for another 
domain), one necessarily already inhabits the world, an inhabitation by 
virtue of which such questions arise. Regarding an understanding of 
religion, this enables an understanding of the distinction and relation 
between transcendence and immanence. Transcendence (a transcendent 
world, power, or God) need not be understood as the claim of another 
world, or a realm beyond the world. Transcendence can also be understood 
as ‘a need for another domain’, and thereby as tied to the immanence 
(world) as a matter and a need for illumination of an immanent, present 
situation. There is a fundamental being-in-the-world from which all 
questions concerning the world derive. Such questions reflect this being-in-
the-world. 
                                                                                                                       
facto bringing it into the foreground and generating yet another background.” Gabriel, 
Transcendental Ontology, 126–127. 
410 SW, XIV 106. 
411 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 128. 
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Gabriel understands these domain-ontological implications of 
Schelling’s thought as the ontological shift of modernity.412 I find Gabriel’s 
elaborations on Hogrebe’s take on Schelling, in the form of a domain-
ontology, provide an eminent way for formalizing the meaning of finitude 
insofar as it pertains to our rational capacities and our need for meaning. 
Schelling’s speculative theology is, of course, far richer in terms of 
potential interpretations, and there is no way in which any formalization 
can replace the depth of Schelling’s thought. However, the domain-
ontology might enable a bridging platform that can be useful for the 
question of orientation.  
The question that needs to be addressed (as is the case with any 
ontology) is: what does this mean to the human being? How does one live 
in this? What are the ramifications of a person developing a self-
understanding in accordance with these conditions? Regarding the question 
of the world, orientation pertains to cosmology as a procedure of ordering 
the world. In this sense, orientation reflects human world-inhabitation. 
While Schelling articulates a condition of non-knowledge, orientation 
reflects a state of dis-orientation (implied by the circumstance of the 
contingency of the world). The goal of orientation is to disclose the world 
for a meaningful life. Fundamentally, the notion of orientation contributes 
to an explication of personhood, to the ontological situation of personhood, 
as an illumination of why first-person cosmology cannot be achieved with 
universal claim of ‘all there is.’ In religious orientation the fundamental 
relation of the human being to the world is established, not as a matter of 
knowledge about the world, but as a matter of establishing a meaningful 
life in the world. Religion is a way in which this can be done; that is, 
religion is not itself meaning, religion is method to a meaningful life. 
8.3 Religious Orientation 
Dalferth’s philosophy of religion is a theory of orientation. Orientation is 
understood as a fundamental aspect of human living and thinking, 
including the form of religion.413 Dalferth calls this life-orientation.414 Life 
                                         
412 The ontological shift of modernity in which “being becomes its own belated 
retrojection: Being, the domain where everything, and therefore a plurality of fields of 
sense, takes place, only takes place as the imaginary whole generated from within a 
particular field of sense.” Ibid., xxix. 
413 Dalferth, to a great extent, derives his concept of orientation from the work of 
Werner Stegmaier. See Werner Stegmaier, “Weltorientierung,” ed. Joachim Ritter, 
Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 
(Basel: Schwabe, 2007 1976). See also Werner Stegmaier, Philosophie der 
Orientierung (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2008). Stegmaier’s guiding definition of 
orientation concerns the disclosure of situations for the possibilities of action. 
“Orientierung als die Leistung [...] verstehen, sich in wechselnden Situationen 
zurechtzufinden und in ihnen Handlungsmöglichkeiten zu erschließen.“ Werner 
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is a concept that pertains to the totality of aspects of human living, human 
self-understanding included. Dalferth centers his understanding of human 
life on a world-experience that is marked by contingency, uncontrollability, 
and a deficit meaning. Moreover, this is an experience of the insufficiency 
of our rational capacities and our existential expectations from life, a need 
for meaningful living. Due to a lack of meaning, human existence becomes 
a problem. These tensions, inherent to human life, motivate and necessitate 
a fundamental need for orientation. Religion is a way of dealing with these 
conditions from the side of our rational (albeit limited) capacities. 
Religions are not counter-rational [vernunftwidriger] superstition, but rather the 
rational attempt exactly in view of the complete meaningless [Sinnlosen] and the 
inevitability of the unavailable to live a decent life.415 
Dalferth’s central point is that religion (as a form of life-orientation) 
provides a way in which to relate to the inconceivable; that is, religion 
conserves the inconceivable without making it conceivable.416 Religious 
articulations of these conditions by various systems of symbols provide 
cognitive and emotional structures for living with the uncontrollable in the 
controllable. “The point of religions is not to make the uncontrollable 
controllable but to enable us to live with the uncontrollable in a 
controllable way.”417 This notion of religion as life-orientation is developed 
on the basis of human life in the world and the conditions of this relation.  
                                                                                                                       
Stegmaier, “Einleitung,” in Orientierung: philosophische Perspektiven, ed. Werner 
Stegmaier (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), 16. Many central thoughts of 
Dalferth’s employment of the orientation-model are further derived from Kant’s 1786 
essay ‘Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?’. 
414 Dalferth operates with a basic distinction between living and thinking, which 
constitutes two dialectic domains of orientation. Philosophical reflection is understood 
as an attempt to obtain orientation in thinking, and religion is correspondingly 
understood as a way of orienting oneself in life. “Im Denken orientieren wir uns, indem 
wir reflektierend zu verstehen suchen, wie wir uns und unsere Welt verstehen und 
verstehend deuten. Im Leben orientieren wir uns, indem wir uns und die Welt, in der 
wir leben, in bestimmter Weise verstehen und deuten, so dass wir gemeinsam in ihr 
leben und handeln können.” Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 6.  
415 Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung,” 252. 
416  “Auf verschiedene Weise versuchen Religionen, die Bereiche des 
Unbestimmbaren, Unzugänglichen, Chaotischen, Sinnlosen, Unverfügbaren, 
Unfaßbaren und nicht Kontrolierbaren an die Bereiche vernünftig bestimmter 
Ordnungen und sinnvoll verstehbarer Strukturen zurückzubinden, sie also als das 
Andere und als die für sich und als solche nicht faßbare Rückseite des Sinnvollen, 
Verfügbaren und Kontrollierbaren zu thematisieren.” Ibid., 251. 
417 “Die Pointe von Religionen ist nicht, das Unkontrollierbare kontrollierbar zu 
machen, sondern es uns zu ermöglichen, auf kontrolierbare Weise mit dem 
Unkontrollierbaren zu leben.” Ibid., 252.  
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Dalferth’s The Reality of the Possible (2003) concerns the world and the 
way in which the world is formative for human existence. Fundamentally, 
Dalferth promotes a phenomenological approach that turns to the human 
life-world for an understanding of Kant’s conception of the world as the 
horizon of possibilities. At this level, with Kant’s ideal of reason as the 
common denominator, a conversation between Schellingian personhood 
and religious orientation (as it is presented by Dalferth) can be established. 
Particularly, this presentation aims to show how Dalferth’s interpretation of 
religion as orientation can provide a recasting of the ontological situation 
of Schellingian personhood. This recasting enables a phenomenological 
explication of Schelling’s ontology that illustrates how it pertains to the 
composition of a first-person cosmology in a religious setting.  
8.4 The World of Orientation 
The world is the world of orientation. The basic idea of orientation consists 
in finding one’s way in situations of one’s life in the world, and in 
disclosing these situations for possible action. The world is a matter of 
concrete situations for the human agent. The meaning of the world is made 
manifest in meaningful situations. Orientation works in virtue of the order 
of the world and the ability to locate oneself within that order.  
Human beings do not only exist in the world, they live in it. They cannot do that 
without orienting themselves in the world, that is, to order [ordnen] the world in a 
way that is meaningful to them as well as locating themselves in the world both 
individually and together. A world is ordered for us when we have a set of rules to 
our disposal that enable us to navigate [zurechtzufinden] in ever new situations; and 
we can locate ourselves in the world when we employ these rules in living and action, 
that is, to use them for the benefit of orientation in new situations.418 
Dalferth’s thinking is informed by both phenomenological and 
hermeneutical tenets, by a notion of the world that is articulated on the 
basis of human life and the way the world pertains to meaning (or lack of 
meaning) in the context of human life. The way in which this conception 
squares with the model derived from Schelling’s ontology is not 
spectacular. The domain of human life amounts to ‘logical space’ as the 
personal basis for consciousness and cognition.  
                                         
418 “Menschen existieren nicht nur in der Welt, sondern leben in ihr. Das können sie 
nicht, ohne sich in ihr zu orientieren, sie also in einer für sie sinnvollen Weise zu 
ordnen sowie sich individuell und gemeinsam in ihr zu orten. So ist eine Welt für uns 
geordnet, wenn wir über ein Regelrepertoire verfügen, das es uns ermöglicht, uns in 
immer neuen Situationen zurechtzufinden; und wir können uns in ihr orten, wenn wir 
diese Regeln im Leben und Handeln gebrauchen, sie also zur Orientierung in neuen 
Situationen anwenden können.” Ibid., 245; see also Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des 
Möglichen, 34–41. 
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The interpretational capacities in focus within Dalferth’s approach echo 
Hogrebe’s characterization of the human being as a ‘Deutungswesen.’ 
According to Dalferth’s view, the world is part of a cosmological project, 
as an orientational field, a horizon, by virtue of which we can determine 
our actions and reasons. Orientation is an achievement of our 
interpretational capacities, which determine situations according to 
possibilities for action. This means that a particular situation of orientation 
is determined through our possibilities for changing it by means of our 
actions. The ‘reality of the possible’, as Dalferth puts it, is therefore a 
fundamental part of the interpretational basis with which humans 
understand their world, a world they share. 
Dalferth presents his phenomenological notion of the world by 
emphasizing reality (what is real) rather than existence. In so doing, 
Dalferth explains that reality is always more than what is the case. This 
means that the real always exeeds itself by being a reality that provides 
certain possibilities. “The world in which we live is more than what is the 
case, it is also what could be the case.”419 Dalferth thereby characterizes the 
world in which we live as the totality of both what is actual, and what is 
possible, in the sense that the world forms an interpretational basis that is 
fertile with various possibilities that underlie any understanding we might 
have. Possibility thereby provides the horizon (or background) upon which 
we have meaningful experiences.  
In its feature of life-orientation, Dalferth understands orientation as an 
orientation in the world that is rendered real against the background of its 
possibilities. The background of reality, or the background against which 
the real is real (the possible), is the central basis of Dalferth’s treatment of 
orientation as a model for religion. 
Dalferth explores ontological and metaphysical concepts both with 
regards to classical proofs for God’s existence and with regards to 
traditional understandings of the absolute. His goal is not to develop an 
ontology, but to explicate and translate the meaning of ontological 
statements within his phenomenological-hermeneutic discussion of the 
                                         
419 “Die Welt, in der wir leben, ist mehr als das, was der Fall ist. Sie ist immer auch 
das, was der Fall sein könnte, und nur indem wir das, was der Fall ist, in diesem 
Horizont verstehen, können wir handeln.” Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 35; 
Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung,” 245. This dictum reveals the Wittgensteinian tenet in Dalferth’s 
thinking. The opening propositions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus read “1. Die Welt ist 
alles, was der Fall ist. 1.1 Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.” 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Logisch-philosophische 
Abhandlung. (Franfkurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 9. 
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real.420 Dalferth writes: “This is not about the part-whole relation but about 
the phenomenon and the horizon, and that is something fundamentally 
different.”421 The possibilities of the world are not unreal or free-floating 
possibilities, but possibilities of the real and possibilities of a manifest 
reality.422 As Dalferth underlines, in every proposition a world-horizon is 
expressed, and this contains the possibilities of the real.423  
A central feature of the phenomenological concept of the world is the 
transformation of the notion of the world from a noun to an adjective, form 
‘world’ to ‘worldly’. The adjective aspect of the phenomena lies in the way 
experienced reality appears worldly. Phenomena become meaningful 
against the background of a worldly ambience, a character that provides a 
meaningful coherence. The given presents itself in a worldly way, that is, as 
pertaining to the horizon of possibilities on which they are understood. 
Dalferth derives the adjective notion of the world from Kant’s notion of 
the world as a transcendental, regulative idea that enables us to understand 
the given under the unity of appearance. The world of reality, as Dalferth 
asserts, becomes the world for us, and “only the world that we can perceive 
and grasp by means of our understanding, is for us.”424 However, Dalferth 
further proposes a semiotic extension of the adjective concept of world. 
While Kant’s ‘worldliness’ was applied to the perspective of perception, 
Dalferth extends this to the broader spectrum of what can be designated.425 
The worldliness of the world applies to everything that can be perceived or 
                                         
420  In what follows, I focus my discussion on the chapter entitled E. 
Möglichkeitsdenken und Gottesgedanke. Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 
116–168. 
421 Ibid., 137. 
422 “In phänomenologischer Lesart ist die Welt wirklich, weil und insofern sie der 
Möglichkeitshorizont von Wirklichem ist. Dieser Möglichkeitshorizont ist nicht 
dadurch wirklich, dass er eine eigene Wirklichkeit wäre, sondern dass er der Horizont 
von Wirklichem ist. Horizonte sind keine Eigenschaften des Wirklichen, deren 
Horizonte sie sind, sowenig der Horizont hinter dem Zürichsee eine Eigenschaft der 
dort sichtbaren Berge ist. Die Möglichkeiten eines Wirklichen sind daher selbst nicht 
wirklich, sondern eben möglich, aber nur deshalb, weil sie Möglichkeiten eines 
Wirklichen sind. Und entsprechend ist die Welt nicht deshalb wirklich, weil die 
Möglichkeiten wirklich wären, die sie umfasst, sondern weil sie der 
Möglichkeitshorizont von Wirklichem ist.” Ibid., 141–142. 
423 Ibid., 141–149. 
424 “Man kann dieses erkenntniskritische Weltkonzept semiotisch erweitern, indem 
man das Weltliche nicht auf das Erfahrbare beschränkt, sondern mit dem 
Bezeichenbaren gleichsetzt. Dann verliert es seine kritische Pointe, weil es nichts gibt, 
was nicht bezeichnet werden könnte und damit nicht ‘weltlich’ wäre. Man kann den 
Akzent zur Bestimmung des Weltlichen auch von der Für-Relation (‘Welt für …’) auf 
die Von-Relation (‘Welt von …’) verlagern und phänomenologisch ‘Welt’ als das 
bestimmen, was als Bestimmbarkeitshorizont von Wirklichem fungiert.” Ibid., 143. 
425 Ibid. 
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designated. This pertains to a heuristic notion of the world. It is a notion 
explained by Dalferth as a “horizon of the determinable 
[Bestimmbarkeitshorizont].”426 
‘World’ becomes a heuristic concept by which we disclose the possibilities of the 
real. It designates the horizon of possibilities that is co-posited by every instance of 
reality but that is not itself an independent reality. The world, so understood, would 
not appear in an (imaginary) inventory of all that is real; rather what would appear 
would always have the determination of the worldliness of the horizon: The world is 
real because everything real exists worldly, that is, in a horizon of possibilities that 
allows it to be different than it is.427 
The idea of horizons employed by Dalferth in his explication of different 
aspects of the concept of world applies to the model of domains as 
unfolded in the Schellingian domain-ontology.428 That something is real is 
a question of the worldliness provided by the horizon of possibilities. In 
domain-ontological discourse, this pertains to determination as positing in a 
domain. While the ontological discourse has a focus on existence as the 
worldliness of domains, Dalferth’s phenomenological explication refers 
directly to the reality-aspect as the worldliness of horizons. I take these to 
be mutually illuminating. Schelling’s domain-ontological model is left 
open to a phenomenological explication. This compatibility can also be 
seen in Dalferth’s semiotic extension of Kant’s ideal of reason. 
That we have a world is due to its disclosure in language and signs. The 
world is that in which we live and relate to other human beings. The world 
is not present to us in a mysterious way, but in the fact that we are engaged 
in determinate relations. That the world consists of our determinate reality 
shows the ways in which language is ever so deeply implied. Language 
reflects the way in which we have the world, namely, as a way of living. 
Dalferth underlines this aspect of world-inhabitation. “[W]e not only ‘have’ 
a world, we live in it.”429 Human life therefore determines the way in which 
                                         
426 Ibid. 
427 “‘Welt’ wird damit ein heuristisches Konzept zur Erschließung der Möglichkeiten 
eines Wirklichen. Es bezeichnet den bei jedem Wirklichen mitgesetzten 
Möglichkeitshorizont, aber ist nicht selbst ein eigenständiges Wirkliches. In einem 
(imaginären) Inventar alles Wirklichen käme die so verstandene Welt nicht vor, sondern 
was in ihm vorkäme, hätte stets die Horizontbestimmung des Weltlichen: Die Welt ist 
wirklich, weil und insofern alles Wirkliche weltlich existiert, also in einem Horizont 
von Möglichkeiten, die ihm anders wirklich zu sein erlauben, als es ist.” Ibid. 
428 The Kantian ambience of Dalferth’s thinking supports this linkage. In this regard, 
it should be noticed that Kant himself employed the metaphor of horizon. “Every 
concept may be regarded as a point which, as the Station for an observer, has its own 
horizon, that is, a variety of things which can be represented, and, as it were surveyed 
from that standpoint.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 686f. 
429 Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 116. 
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we have a world. Dalferth makes clear that human beings not only relate 
through language, but also fail to ever relate without or outside of language. 
[It] applies to our relationship to the world that it takes place in a space of our 
common lived, understood, and spoken language, in which the world is always 
already disclosed, by each of us, in a specific, contingent and quite variable and 
understandable way. Only in this way is it our world, and the only reason why it can 
be incomprehensible and closed in so many respects. 430  
Hence, the world in which we live is a world that we can articulate. The 
world is therefore more than the sum total of the real and the possible, but 
also the world in which we interact in concreto with the aspects of the real 
and the possible. These are the ‘sense-coherences’ (Sinnzusammenhänge) 
expressed in human co-existence. Consequently, the worldliness of the 
given is always anchored in our particular life, which squares with the 
ontological situation developed in Schelling’s notion of personhood. 
Within Schelling’s ontology, personhood serves as a bridge to 
phenomenological explication. 
Finally, Dalferth points out that the world (as the worldliness of the 
given) is disclosed in determinate situations. This does not imply that every 
situation has one determined meaning or right way of being understood. 
The reality of the world is the reality of phenomena.431 Phenomena are real, 
as objects of interpretation, and do not represent any reality behind 
themselves. Phenomena are meaningful as worldly. Phenomena are always 
phenomena for someone; phenomena are experiences for someone who 
interprets phenomena through the possibility of the real, which is their 
particular possibility.432  
With the concept of phenomenon we can understand the notion of 
determinate being as it is presented in Schelling. According to Schelling’s 
model, things are made determinate on the basis of the predicative being-
                                         
430 “[Es] gilt für unser Verhältnis zur Welt: Es vollzieht sich im Raum einer 
gemeinsam gelebten, verstandenen und gesprochenen Sprache, in der jedem von uns die 
Welt immer schon in bestimmter, kontingenter und durchaus veränderlicher Weise 
erschlossen und verständlich ist. Nur so ist sie unsere Welt, und nur deshalb kann uns 
unsere Welt auch in so vielen Hinsichten unverständlich und verschlossen sein.” Ibid., 
116 n1. 
431 Ibid., 127–132.  
432  “Was aber sind Phänomene? Nicht das, was in platonisch-augustinisch 
inspirierten Zugängen zuweilen als Verleiblichung oder Wirklichwerden des Wortes 
beschrieben wird, sondern das, was man das Wortwerden von Wirklichem im Horizont 
der Sprache bzw. Allgemeiner: das Zeichenwerden von Wirklichem im Horizont einer 
Deute- oder Interpretationspraxis nennen könnte. Genauer gesagt: Ein Phänomen ist 
ein Akt lebensweltlichen Verstehens im Horizont einer eingespielten Verstehenspraxis. 
Dieser Akt ist zugleich wirklichkeitsinformiert und wirklichkeitsinterpretativ.” Ibid., 
127f. 
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in-the-world of the person. As Dalferth points out, phenomena are 
meaningful insofar as they pertain to a concrete, particular human person. 
Hence, phenomena are always already determined within a particular 
horizon and interpretive praxis. Phenomena have the form of so-called as-
structures, through which their structure takes a determinate form. They are 
understood as something determinate.433 The as-structure is not itself what 
is understood, only the structure of the phenomena. According with 
Schelling, we would say that it is the way in which they are posited in 
logical space. Phenomena are not themselves experienced as phenomena, 
but as determinate things within determinate situations. It is the 
determinate things that are the objects of our experience. It is only 
phenomenological reflection that discloses the phenomena as such. 
8.5 Contingency and Orientation 
Orientation requires order (das Ordnen). Furthermore, orientation serves to 
support one’s ability to locate oneself within that order (Dalferth calls it 
‘das Orten’). 434  For the sake of successful orientation, the world, as 
reflected in meaningful situations, is ordered when one has obtained a 
certain familiarity with the phenomena of the world. An order enables us to 
determine how phenomena relate to each other. However, orientation also 
requires that we are able to locate ourselves within this order. Phenomena 
are not sufficiently ordered when they are only ordered in themselves. 
Familiarity reflects that the order of phenomena provides the possibility of 
the person to locate oneself in the world, that is, when the world is ordered 
for me. Lacking the ability to locate ourselves within the order, we fail to 
establish the necessary relation and order for us. The relations of ordered 
things enable our orientation when they are put into relation with us, that is, 
when being becomes relative to us. It is in this condition of relative 
location that the problem of contingency resides. 
Cosmology is the underlying idea of an order of the world in the life-
worldly dimension. This is how Dalferth’s theory of orientation pertains to 
a composition of a first-person cosmology. However, in Dalferth’s 
existential-phenomenological view, cosmology is understood first-
personally in its verbal form as a cosmologizing that we provide as a matter 
of interpretation. In religion, human beings interpret their world as the 
world in which they live and interact. Dalferth explains that the idea of an 
order amounts to sketching out or proposing a mapping. Any order is 
incomplete, insofar as it has been sketched from a standpoint that is not 
itself within that order. The point of vantage from which an order is 
                                         
433 Ibid., 128. 
434 Dalferth sketches these basic conditions of orientation in chapters A 11 and 12. 
Ibid., 34–41. 
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sketched is not itself a part of the order. Dalferth’s idea of orders, therefore, 
echoes the problem of origin as derived from Schelling’s domain-ontology.  
Dalferth asserts that every order has a ‘blind spot’, which is its own point 
of conception (its origin). The order is not necessarily sketched from the 
aspect of its use in orientation. The conception of any order always lies 
outside of the order itself (lying instead within another order). In principle, 
there is no way of stepping outside of order (as such), or of ordering 
anything from a neutral stance. When order has been established, it is, in 
principle, from within another order, which means that any regress to prior 
or more fundamental (original) orders can be infinite, and hence, there is 
no “order of all possible orders.”435  
Given that the conception of an order is never a part of the order itself, 
the world is inevitably conceived through perspectives, perspectives that 
are constitutive of orders. Dalferth employs a notion of perspectives, not 
necessarily in the sense used by Nagel, but in the sense of a position, as is 
discussed in Schelling. Perspective pertains to position in the sense that it 
evokes contingency. No perspective has everything in its reach. 
Consequently, the world comes into view from particular standpoints that 
belong to the world itself. This implies different levels of contingency, 
which pertain to a multi-dimensional space of contingency. Dalferth 
sketches a structural contingency of orders within which there is an 
individual contingency of orientation that makes use of these orders. These 
dimensions of contingency (one of order and one of localization) form a 
space of infinite possibilities without absolute coordinates. This is the 
space within which human living and interaction takes place, it is the space 
of orientation.436  
The condition of the world, as a world that comes in view through a 
multiplicity of standpoints, reflects a social reality. In practice, in human 
society, orientation involves the encounter and exchange of multiple 
cognitive and normative differences. Social interaction is fundamental to 
our orientation, through which one can adapt and adjust to common paths 
of orientation. Dalferth emphasizes the fundamental factor of emotional 
qualities involved in successful interaction. Structures and patterns of 
                                         
435 Ibid., 37. 
436 “Die strukturelle Kontingenz der Ordnungen, mit deren Hilfe wir uns im Leben 
orientieren, und die individuelle Kontingenz unserer Orientierung mit Hilfe dieser 
Ordnungen (also unseres Gebrauchs dieser Ordnungen) ergeben einen nie 
auszuschöpfenden Spielraum, in dem wir unser gemeinsames Leben in Beziehung 
zueinander und zu Dritten gestalten können. Weil uns weder die Ordnungen, in denen 
wir uns orientieren, definitiv festlegen, noch die Ortungen, die wir in ihrem Horizont 
vornehmen, unveränderlich fixieren, können wir in einer immer wieder Neues 
erschließenden und entdeckenden Weise unser Leben gemeinsam vollziehen.” Dalferth, 
“Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung,” 248. 
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social interaction and organization, such as those found amongst family, 
friends, colleagues, or other group-patterns, are all part of our orientational 
structures, serving as means of orientation. Situations of orientation are 
always determined through the orientational order available to us, and are 
further determined by unarticulated emotional intuitions and impressions as 
well. Every orientating agent carries certain impressions from experiences 
that further influence the situational orientation. In everything we do, we 
order our world and determine our position in it for the benefit of the life 
we enjoy as human beings.  
Despite the similarities between Dalferth’s notion of orientation and the 
components of Schelling’s domain-ontology, there seems to be a difference 
that opens up for a critique of Dalferth at this central place: the order of 
orientation that provides localization seems inevitably to establish the 
human being (the one localizing) at the center of orientation. The 
orientation is in this sense first-personal. However, since we can never be 
outside order, the aspect of disorientation seems to require something else, 
which conflicts with this composition of first-personal ordering and 
localizing. We are in the world, but if we follow Schelling, we are not 
placed at the center. The contingency of the world has the effect that we are 
never in the world as a center, we are always in a kind of allocation, 
because we are determined by an otherness to which we respond as 
decentered. As far as I know, Dalferth does not consider this aspect. 
Schelling’s notion of unprethinkable being provides this aspect of his 
anthropology that we are never in control of our world, we have never 
chosen the challenges it confronts us with. I would suggest that the 
contingency of the world implies, for the orienting human being, that the 
center is that which we can never arrive at. And that is the world of 
orientation, as it pertains to contingency. Orientation is itself the condition 
of being decentered. As Schelling puts it: “The fear of life itself drives man 
out of the centrum.”437 Orientation, even in the form Dalferth presents it, 
should be understood as decentered or never resting at a center. 
8.6 Transcendence and Religion  
Conditions of orientation apply to religious orientation. Religion becomes a 
way of ordering the world and obtaining proper means for orientation to the 
extent that orientation is a matter of human life. The symbolic structures of 
religion, according to Dalferth, reflect the experiences, the understanding, 
and the order of the world and the lives of human beings.  
Religious practice supports the task of locating oneself and employing a 
symbolic order that enables situational orientation in life and world 
experiences. The symbolic register of religions relates to both cognitive as 
                                         
437 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 47; SW, VII 381. 
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well as emotional dimensions of human experience. As an expression of 
these experiences, the symbolic systems of religion further support the 
orientational challenges in one’s life and world experiences. The collective 
dimension of religious practice, which is fundamental, remains anchored in 
personal and individual experiences. Participation in religious practice 
provides collective experiences that are constituted by individual 
experiences that serve as correctives for the collective. 
Fundamentally, religious orientation responds to the contingency of the 
world. Religious orientation does not dissolve the conditions of 
contingency, but is conditioned by these same premises. A religious 
orientation towards an absolute divinity nonetheless remains orientation, 
and it remains a contingent orientation not unlike other forms of orientation. 
Religious orientation is (like every other sort of orientation) working 
amongst alternatives such as other religions or non-religious forms of 
orientation. Atheistic orientation is always an option and an alternative to 
religious orientation. However, it is decisive to note that while atheism can 
be an alternative to religion as a form of orientation, it is not an alternative 
to orientation as such. Orientation, in whatever form it takes (cultural, 
ideological, or religious), is fundamental to the lives of humans, and this 
without exception. 
A human life is in need of orientation insofar as meaning is never 
complete and phenomena of various irrational characters reveal that 
orientation can never rule out the contingency of our orders of orientation, 
their incompatibility, and their limited functionality. Life entails 
uncontrollable and incomprehensible situations. From one of the roots of 
the word ‘religion’, religare (‘ligare’), we find the etymological meaning 
‘to bind,’ or ‘to re-attach’ something that has been separated or detached. 
Dalferth draws on this meaning for his understanding of religion as 
providing coherence to both the comprehensible and the incomprehensible.  
In many regards, Darlferth follows Luhmann’s reflections on religious 
phenomena.438 For Luhmann, religion represents a parallel structure to 
reality by virtue of an immanence/transcendence encoding. 439  In the 
religious convictions of transcendence (a transcendent world, or a 
transcendent God), religious practice addresses ‘a beyond’ which it seeks 
to relate to. Luhmann’s understanding of the immanence/transcendence 
code aims to distinguish the familiar from the unfamiliar, and the 
                                         
438 Niklas Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2000). 
439 The religiously articulated transcendence is here understood as a procedure of 
meaning-making. “Irgendwelchen Dingen oder Ereignissen wird eine besondere 
Bedeutung verliehen, die sie aus der gewöhnlichen Welt (in der sie zugänglich bleiben) 
herausnimmt und mit einer besonderen ,Aura’, mit besonderen Referenzkreisen 
ausstattet.” Ibid., 58. Quoted from Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 81. 
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determined from the indeterminable.440 Luhmann’s idea of religion as a 
social communication provides an understanding of religious phenomena 
as binding the indeterminable to the determinable by means of a ‘re-entry’ 
of the transcendence/immanence distinction into the immanent.441  
Dalferth employs Luhmann’s take on religion as a system-theoretical 
approach and a reformulation of phenomenological insights. He follows 
Luhmann’s over-all characterization of religion: religion is the guarantor of 
determinability of all sense against a fundamental experience of 
indeterminability. 442  Dalferth’s notion of orientation is therefore a 
phenomenological application of Luhmann’s system-theoretical approach 
to religion. This implies that a central feature of religious forms of 
orientation lies in their ability “to keep transcendence in sight as the 
backside of immanence, to place the familiar against the background of the 
unfamiliar.”443 This must be understood as a consciousness about the 
meaning we have in a way that enables us to hold on to it, despite the threat 
of meaninglessness and chaos (madnees, as Schelling sees it).444 This 
notion of transcendence is phenomenologically formulated along with the 
idea of the appearing or showing of the phenomenon, a showing that 
always entails the presence of something concealed, something that 
withdraws. In what shows itself, such showing comes about against the 
background of that which withdraws. This phenomenological application 
articulates features that are, in Schelling’s ontology, implemented in the 
notion of unprethinkable being.  
                                         
440 Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 78–82. Luhmann does not claim to 
provide a definition for religion, but addresses religion as that in society which 
describes itself as religion. “Wir schreiben nicht vor, wir nehmen hin, was sich selbst als 
Religion beschreibt.” Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellschaft, 58. Dalferth adds, 
“Religion ist das, was in einer Gesellschaft als Religion beobachtet werden kann; und 
was das ist, entscheidet sich in der Selbstbeobachtung des Religionssystems einer 
Gesellschaft.” Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 82. 
441  If religion is understood through the familiar/unfamiliar dinstinction “dann 
entsteht Religion erst durch ein re-entry dieser Form in die Form: durch einen 
Wiedereintritt der Differenz von vertraut/unvertraut ins Vertraute und Umgängliche. 
Denn nur so kann man das religiös Unvertraute (die Transzendenz) unterscheiden von 
dem, was bloß unbekannt oder ungewöhnlich ist.” Luhmann, Die Religion der 
Gesellschaft, 83. 
442  “Religion garantiert die Bestimmbarkeit allen Sinnes gegen die miterlebte 
Verweisung ins Unbestimmbare.” Ibid., 127. 
443 “[…] Transzendenz als permanente Rückseite der Immanenz in Erinnerung halten, 
das Vertraute also vor dem Hintergrund des Nichtvertraute plazieren.” Dalferth, “Leben 
angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser Lebensorientierung,” 250.  
444 The potential of Dalferth’s thinking, for an actualization of Schelling’s thinking, 
lies in the way that Dalferth, in the question of orientation, offers a way to understand 
Schellingian personhood as the basis for orientation in the world. Personhood, as 
mentioned, portraits this as decentered.  
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The composition of the phenomenon reflects the dual structure of 
religion; Dalferth goes so far as to call it the paradoxical structure of 
religion, which 
can be described as the differentiated attempt to connect [zurückzubinden] the areas 
of the indeterminable, the inaccessible, the chaotic, the meaningless, the unavailable, 
the incomprehensible, and not controllable to the areas of rationally determined 
orders and meaningful comprehensible structures, that is, to articulate them as the 
other and as the (in themselves and as such) not tangible backside of the meaningful 
[Sinnvollen], the available and the controllable.445 
Understanding religion as ‘connecting’ these areas, Dalferth highlights four 
traits of religion. These traits illuminate the notion of transcendence and 
thereby reflect the semantic role of religion in human life. 1) The first trait 
is a universalistic tendency of religion concerning the withdrawal implied 
in every showing of a phenomenon, in which religion refers us to 
something that is always there in and with everything. Because all meaning 
stands out from meaninglessness, the universal aspect is fundamental. 2) 
The second trait pertains to the unique categorical difference of that which 
is present with everything as the ‘presence of the concealed’ (die 
Anwesenheit des Nichtwahrnembaren). In this regard, the nature of the 
concealed implies that it does not appear like other things and that an 
awareness of it requires special occasions. Religion offers different ways of 
disclosing the presence of the concealed in the form of revelations, myths, 
and rites.  
3) The third trait concerns the same categorical difference that makes it 
impossible to determine the concealed, which is why religion enables an 
indirect articulation. Only with reference to a showing can the concealed 
be articaluted. Religions provide fundamental differences, distinctions, and 
paradoxes that outline the categorical difference between that which is 
determinable and that which escapes any possible determination. 4) The 
fourth trait follows from the impossibility of determining the 
indeterminable. Religions offer no ultimate illumination, only continuous 
attempts to articulate the ‘inconceivable backside of the conceivable’ and 
to communicate and symbolize this fundamental distinction between that 
which shows itself and that which makes the showing possible by 
withdrawing itself (what is concealed in the showing).  
Dalferth’s point is that religion conserves and maintains the 
inconceivable as such, and that it does so without making it conceivable. 
Recognizing the boundaries of these fundamental distinctions enables a 
protection of the boundaries within human practices of living by offering 
cognitive and emotional structures for living with the uncontrollable in the 
controllable. “The point of religions is not to make the uncontrollable 
                                         
445 Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 83. 
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controllable but to enable us to live with the uncontrollable in a 
controllable way.”446 
Dalferth explicates that coping with these areas of the incomprehensible 
and the indeterminable requires an articulation of the passivity that is 
experienced when one’s life and usual living is interrupted (e.g. death, 
misfortune, greater changes, despair).447 Religious language, signs, and 
symbols approach the unavailable in either a descriptive or a non-
descriptive manner. This is a hermeneutical reference to the understanding 
and self-understanding of religious orientation. In this distinction, it counts 
whether a religion gives positive expression to the uncontrollable and 
unavailable (what Dalferth calls imaginative religion), or whether it gives 
expression by means of limit-concepts (what Dalferth calls reflective 
religion). 
Imaginative religion seeks to give meaning to the uncontrollable through 
descriptions of a religious counter-world over and against the present world 
(e.g. a spiritual world). The strategies of the religious cult concern the 
means for relating to this ‘other world.’ The rational structures of the 
religious symbols of the counter-world enable an articulation of the 
experienced world (this world), as well as the conditions of life within such 
a world in such a way as to provide patterns that are formative of the 
experiences of the present world. These (rational) structures provide a 
strategy for orientation. Saying something concerning the counter-world, 
for example to say that it is the real world of which this world is only a 
fraud, is a way of forming one’s life in the present world. Hence, doctrines 
of a transcendent world, e.g. as the real world, pertain to a way of living in 
the present world through a transcendent perspective. It is a way of 
                                         
446 “Die Pointe von Religionen ist nicht, das Unkontrollierbare kontrollierbar zu 
machen, sondern es uns zu ermöglichen, auf kontrolierbare Weise mit dem 
Unkontrollierbaren zu leben.” Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die 
duale Struktur religiöser Lebensorientierung,” 252.  
447 “In Religionen verarbeiten Menschen auf kulturproduzierende und kulturprägende 
Weise gemeinsame und individuelle Erfahrungen des Einbruchs von 
Unkontrollierbarem und Unverfügbarem in ihr Leben. Was so unverfugbar und 
unkontrollierbar in das Leben hereinbricht und den Gang des Gewohnten unterbricht, 
kann als ein unerwartetes Glück oder als etwas undurchschaubar Sinnloses erfahren 
werden. In beiden Fällen erleben Menschen sich ihm passiv ausgesetzt, und zwar in 
doppelter Hinsicht. Sie können das, was über sie hereinbricht, nicht nur nicht aktiv 
bewirken, kontrollieren und gestalten, sondern sie können sich ihm auch nicht entziehen 
oder auf Dauer leben, ohne solches zu erleben und Erfahrungen von Unverfügbarem zu 
machen. Insofern versuchen Menschen in Religionen etwas symbolisch zu bearbeiten, 
von dem sie wissen oder wissen können, dass sie es aufgrund seiner 
Unkontrollierbarkeit nicht bearbeiten und kontrollieren können, zugleich aber auch, 
dass sie angesichts der Unvermeidbarkeit von Unverfügbarem nicht leben können, ohne 
den Versuch zu machen, es zu bearbeiten.” Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 
83–84. 
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orienting one’s life in this world. The ‘other world’ can, in some religions, 
be depicted as perfect, as a desirable alternative to the present world, or it 
can entail a horrific thread by virtue of which the present life is put into 
perspective. This dualism can, in some instances, concern not only a 
distinction between this world and a counter-world, but also a distinction 
within the counter-world itself. A traditional example mentioned by 
Dalferth is the distinction between light and heaven over against darkness 
and hell. 
Because both aspects of ‘the other world’ are described as realities by which the 
reality of the present world is determined, the religious semantics of religions is more 
than ontologically realistic, it is also axiologically valuing and methodologically 
strictly contrasting.448 
Reflected religion does not articulate any meaning of the uncontrollable. It 
simply keeps the uncontrollable in sight, as the backside of the meaningful, 
which is both available and controlable. In other words, reflected religions 
articulate the genuine otherness as an otherness of this world, and, in so 
doing, they maintain focus on this world as a religious world in which the 
meaningless and uncontrollable is accepted as all-pervasive. Both 
imaginative and reflected religion respond to a fundamental existential 
anxiety for “life’s radical threat of the comprehensible possibility of 
absolute chaos, counter-rational, uncontrollable, meaningless, evil.”449 
Thus, religion is to understand in both its rational and non-rational 
(irrational) side, that is, in its feature of providing a meaningful relation 
between the meaningful and the meaningless. The relation of both sides is 
the decisive aspect without which a religion cannot provide its basic 
function. Dalferth points to ‘rational religion’, as it is advocated in the 
enlightenment, as an example of a conception of religion that lost its ability 
                                         
448 “Weil sie beide Aspekte der ‘anderen Welt’ als Wirklichkeiten beschreibt, von 
denen die Wirklichkeit dieser Welt bestimmt werden, ist die religiöse Semantik 
imaginativer Religionen nicht nur ontologisch realistisch, sondern auch axiologisch 
wertend und methodisch strikt kontrastierend.” Ibid., 85. Dalferth goes on explicating, 
“Sie stellt das gegenwärtige Leben in das Licht einer Gegenwelt, die ihrerseits dual als 
‘Himmel’ und ‘Hölle’ und als solche durch einen nicht selten als Kampfgeschehen 
dargestellten Grundgegensatz zwischen Licht und Dunkel konzipiert ist. Entsprechend 
wird auch die gegenwärtige Welt im Licht dieser Kontraste dualistisch verstanden als 
eine Welt, die erhellt wird durch das Licht bzw. verdunkelt wird durch die Schatten, die 
von der ‘anderen Welt’ her in sie einfallen. Und die Aufgabe religiösen Lebens wird 
darin gesehen, in der Orientierung an der Gegenwelt, in der die Gegensätze von 
‘Himmel’ und ‘Hölle’ in ihren Prinzipien durchschaubar werden, die Schatten des 
Dunklen zu meiden und die Helligkeit des Lichtes zu suchen, die von dort in diese Welt 
einfallen und sie bestimmen.” Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 85f. 
449 Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 86. 
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to relate to the “unavailable otherness.”450 This remains illuminating for the 
motivations behind criticisms of religious worldviews. Dalferth writes: 
“Against the tendencies of society to limit life to the mere rational, religion 
is the disturbing reminder of the appresence of the non-rational in the 
rational.”451  
Another central way in which religion provides connectivity between the 
rational and the non-rational is in conceptions of God (or Gods) and the 
divine. Starting from the theistic conception that God is “the ground and 
guarantee of sense and order as well as the background, lord and limit of 
the senseless and chaotic […],”452 Dalferth goes on to describe different 
constellations where either different Gods or the one God represent 
meaning or the meaningless. Religions articulate notions of both God(s) 
and of ‘the divine.’ Particularly, Dalferth stresses a lack of semantic 
correspondence between understandings of the concept of the divine across 
religions. Nevertheless, he claims that an underlying consensus lies in the 
pragmatic function of the divine, which symbolizes the polar tension 
between sense and non-sense, the rational and the non-rational.453  
Religion provides semantic tools for an orientation in life that enables 
the individual to maintain life’s limited rational basis in the face of the non-
rational and unavailable otherness. Religion provides this in both collective 
and inter-human meanings that are provided by collective religious 
practices. In such practices, transcendence provides the orientation required 
for living a decent life, that is, the orientation that navigates by the 
unavailable otherness of life. Hence, religion is the 
common [gemeinschaftliche] life-orientation by unavailable otherness. It is not only 
private religiosity […] but the common life-praxis in which human beings align 
themselves to an otherness through which they know themselves to be positively 
determined without being able to grasp or control it. In religious life-orientation 
human beings relate to a reality that transcend their life […].454 
                                         
450 Ibid., 92. 
451 “Sie [Religion] ist die kultisch und vorstellungsförmig praktizierte Verknüpfung 
des Nichtrationalen mit dem Rationalen, die Beziehung des Unbestimmbaren auf das 
Bestimmte, in der das Bestimmte gegen den Hintergrund des Unbestimmbaren und das 
Unbestimmbare vom Bestimmten her in den Blick gerückt wird. Gegen 
gesellschaftliche Tendenzen, das Leben ganz auf das Rationale zu beschränken, ist 
Religion so die störende Erinnerung an die Appräsenz des Nichtrationalen im 
Rationalen.” Ibid., 88. 
452 Ibid. 
453 “Im Gottesverständnis spiegelt sich so die fundamentale Spannung zwischen Sinn 
und Sinnlosem, Verfügbarem und Unvefügbarem, die in den Religionen bearbeitet wird.” 
Ibid., 91. 
454 “[G]elebte Religion [ist] gemeinschaftliche Lebensorientierung an unverfugbarer 
Andersheit. Sie ist nicht nur private Religiosität […] sondern gemeinschaftliche 
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Lebenspraxis, in der Menschen sich an einer Andersheit ausrichten, von der sie sich 
positive bestimmt wissen, ohne sie als solche begreifen oder kontrollieren zu können. In 
religiöser Lebensorientierung beziehen Menschen ihr Leben auf eine es überschreitende 
Wirklichkeit […]” Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur 
religiöser Lebensorientierung,” 262. 
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9 World-Inhabitation	  
9.1 Absolute Orientation  
The approaches to religion adopted by Nagel and Dalferth are different, 
and yet they are compatible. For Nagel, the question of the religious temper 
derives from a natural concern with the world. This concern reflects how 
human life seeks to take form through its perception of the world. 
Therefore, subjectivity becomes an issue. Nagel attempts to solve the 
problem of the world-relation with his model of perspectives (internal-
external, subjective and objective) as a matter of understanding. 
Understanding the world-relation, and the possibility of a naturalistic 
understanding of the world, was the primary focus of the discussion in part 
one. Now we have gained other means for understanding and discussing 
the question of how the human being relates to the world and why the 
world is an important question. However, we have also developed a way in 
which to understand in what sense the world is something to us even before 
we ask for it. The world we ask for or seek to understand is posited in our 
very presupposition and will always be. This suggests that the question of 
the world responds to a condition, more than a particular lack of knowledge 
of something particular. The question of the world seeks to give answers to 
our condition as not having a steady world. This condition is our need for 
orientation. 
Dalferth approaches religion as a way for human beings to obtain 
orientation in life. The compatibility between Nagel’s and Dalferth’s 
approaches lies in the way religion is understood as entailing a concern 
with the world as our condition. As opposed to religious naturalism, 
religion is understood in its concern with the condition of the human world-
relation. In Nagel, the cosmic question reflects a world-relation, in the form 
of a need to establish a ground for one’s life in something greater than 
oneself that combines one with the whole. For Dalferth, this is simply what 
constitutes the need for orientation; hence, the world-relation is the 
condition of orientation.  
We approach religion as a human way of orienting one’s living in the 
world such that it becomes formative of this life. It should not be 
overlooked that this is an understanding of religion that can also be 
disputed on the anthropological level (religion as a human disposition). 
While it is through both Nagel and Dalferth that we have established this 
notion of religion, in Dalferth we find a basis for correcting Nagel’s notion 
of subjectivity. 
Understanding religion as a human disposition for orientation places 
religion on an anthropological level insofar as it squares with a non-
religious setting. The focus is not God, but religion; it is only to the extent 
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that God is a concern for religion that God is an object under consideration. 
This means that the concern with the world expressed in religion pertains to 
a human concern. The initital formulation of the human preragotive was the 
idea of first-person cosmology. Dalferth has shown how this pertains to 
orientation as a matter of ordering the world and locating oneself in that 
order. However, the fundamental aspect of the need for orientation, and we 
might have addressed this most directly with Schelling, is that the world is 
something to which the human being relates in a certain way that presents 
it with a condition of contingency. This is the condition that the human 
being can never have the world as its object. It is due to this condition – 
and I have described it as a condition of allocation – that orientation is 
decisive of how the human being lives a human life.  
If we return to the question of embeddedness, Schelling’s thought can 
still be made more explicit. From the very outset, Schelling’s ontology of 
freedom can be understood as a philosophy of embeddedness. This was 
unfolded through the three stages of proposition, position and personhood. 
In this regard, it is crucial to understand that Schelling understands 
subjectivity as a problem (as a ‘fall’ and not as a ‘telos’), and his way of 
formulating subjectivity, as a problem, is with his notion of personhood.455 
As a person, the human being is aware of and self-conscious of its own 
subjectivity as finitude (conscious finitude) and thereby has a sense of its 
condition and of this condition as its relation to the world. This suggests 
that we are aware of these conditions both in terms of the world in which 
we live and in the way of living on these conditions. Schelling and Dalferth 
both articulate the great threats to the meaningful life, in the possibility of 
the incomprehensible that can never be overcome.  
The question of embeddedness is, for Schelling, staged as our 
embeddedness in being. The central component is the facticity of being. 
The facticity of being is determining for the way the human being is 
determined by being. Facticity will always precede us. From the 
perspective of the ontology of predication, this means that that about which 
we judge comes prior to any judgment. Yet our intentional being, and our 
living in logical space, implies that we always find ourselves in, and 
engaged with, determinate being. The facticity of being therefore marks an 
                                         
455 Sturma characterizes Schelling’s notion of personhood as “die Festlegung des 
Orts individueller Existenz in der Welt und die Analyse der sich daraus ergebenden 
Konsequenzen. Der positive Begriff der Freiheit fällt für Schelling dementsprechend in 
die Ontologie vernünftiger endlicher Existenz bzw. in die Ontologie der Person, nicht 
etwa in die Moralphilosophie. […] Subjektivität ist in der ontologischen und 
existentiellen Ausformung der Selbstheit kein Königsweg zu Wahrheit und Moral, 
sondern als Freisetzung von Individualität qua Individualität ein Abfall, ein 
Heraustreten aus dem Allgemeinen und seinen naturbestimmten Ordnungen.” Sturma, 
“Präreflexive Freiheit und menschliche Selbstbestimmung,” 157–158. 
World-Inhabitation 187 
ultimate limit. It reflects human finitude insofar as we are bound to a 
semantic dimension of determinate being through which we can never 
ultimately disclose the presupposition that makes it possible. The point is 
that the world therefore only comes into view through the determinations 
we have and the way we have them. As addressed in the reading of 
Dalferth, this is what the phenomenological tradition calls worldliness.  
The idea of worldliness pertains to the way I have tried to give meaning 
to the notion of world-inhabitation. It is the embeddedness that we can 
never escape, and it is an embeddedness that we seek to come to terms with. 
It precedes us. “Once we find ourselves in the world, the world is always 
already there.”456 We are embedded in being in the sense that we have not 
decided the semantic point of departure of our thinking for ourselves. For 
example, when modern human beings dedicate themselves to an 
ideological standpoint, they have not chosen the world in which this 
standpoint is possible. The possibilities of the world are given in advance 
for us to operate and navigate in. The condition of self-formation is, in the 
form of facticity, a fundmantal otherness by which we are ourselves 
determined. This is the underlying heteronomy of human autonomy.  
In regard to the facticity of being, Gabriel’s interpretation of Schelling’s 
employment of the notion of God is rather helpful. In his notion of God, 
says Gabriel, Schelling reflects the facticity of an intelligible world in the 
sense that being reflects itself in determinate being. As has already been 
discussed, the self-consciousness of being has a history, its coming-to-be 
what it is, which is the central concern of positive philosophy. However, 
Gabriel further shows that in God, the human being expresses its most 
fundamental desires, which is not only ‘the possibility of another being,’ 
but desires to reach beyond being.457 As Schelling puts it: “I want that 
which is above being.”458 This is the positing of God as that which is above 
(contingent) being. In the positing of God, God is as God, that is, a free, 
personal being, the lord of being, as Schelling designates it. The ‘person 
seeking person’ dictum finds its meaning in the positing of God as a 
reaching out above the contingency of being. The otherness of facticity 
expressed in God is both an otherness for the person and a determining of 
the person. In this sense, it is the otherness that evokes personhood.  
Personhood is shaped in the moment of shaping the world. This mutual 
determination is expressed in the understanding of the person as the world-
inhabitor. The order of the world is dictated within this notion of a God-
                                         
456 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 91. 
457 Ibid., 95; Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, 234–367, esp. §15. 
458 “Die positive Philosophie könnte möglicherweise rein für sich anfangen, mit dem 
bloßen Ausspruch: “Ich will das, was über dem Seyn ist”, und wir werden sehen, wie 
der wirkliche Uebergang in sie in der That durch ein solches Wollen geschieht.” SW, XI 
564. 
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human relation that is constitutive for personhood. The God-human relation, 
if we follow this reading of Gabriel, determines a response to facticity in 
the reaching out above the contingent world. Facticity is, for the person, an 
unprethinkable otherness. But in the relation to God as God it is an 
absolute relation in the sense of being an absolute origin of personhood.459 
Turning to Dalferth, we find a similar distinction of absoluteness (not the 
absolute) in the understanding of religious orientation. Dalferth seeks to 
illuminate the absolute aspect of orientation as a fundamental aspect in 
orientation one can comport oneself to. He therefore calls this comportment 
absolute orientation and asserts that such an aspect of orientation offers a 
way in which to understand religious orientation as a response to the very 
conditions of the contingency of the world. It is at this point that I see a 
certain possibility of mutual interpretation between Schelling’s notion of 
personhood and Dalferth’s notion of religious orientation. Let me show 
how. 
For Dalferth, the question ‘Why is there something and not rather 
nothing?’ is a question that expresses the problem of orientation in human 
life. 460  The question gives expression to the scope of what can be 
questioned, that is, to the scope of what is not obvious (necessary) but 
contingent. The possibility of questioning everything (that everything can 
be questioned) reflects an awareness of contingency in two fundamental 
respects: 1) what is, could also not be; and 2) what is, could also be 
different. If everything is contingent (could not be, or could be different), 
then how can one gain a steady hold from which to ‘locate’ oneself and 
shape one’s living? This depicts the situation of orientation in human life as 
it pertains to the sense of contingency that guides the fundamental 
questions of orientation. Dalferth suggests, in the conditions of contingency, 
the possibility of an absolute ‘aspect.’ Absolute orientation is the 
orientation by means of which everyone in every situation of orientation 
stands in the same relation to each other. This is not exclusive orientation, 
but an overlay to the particular orientation that one has (Dalferth 
differentiates between local and absolute orientation). 
As Dalferth depicts this, there is an undeniable necessity (absolute 
reality) in the life of contingency and in how we locate ourselves within a 
                                         
459 I want to add that we find many expressions of this throughout Schelling’s text, 
also in the Freiheitsschrift. Here, we have the expression that God requires an image of 
God self (Ebenbild), which Schelling calls the God generated or posited in God self. 
“[Daß] Gott sich selbst in einem Ebenbilde erblickt. Diese Vorstellung ist das Erste, 
worin Gott, absolut betrachtet, verwirklicht ist, obgleich nur in ihm selbst, sie ist im 
Anfange bei Gott, und der in Gott gezeugte Gott selbst.” Ibid., VII 361. See also the 
passage SW, VII 363. 
460 Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung,” 149. 
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contingent world. As I see it, the absolute aspect pertains to the 
fundamental condition of heteronomy that underlies human life-orientation 
as an allocation. Orientation can be absolute, not because it can identify an 
absolute being, but because it comports its orientation to an absolute aspect 
that lies beyond the contingency of the world. It is that which in every now 
and here (both of one’s life and of everyone’s life) stands in the same 
relation to everyone and everyone’s relation to everyone else. Dalferth says, 
“It is that reality, without which there would be no possibility and 
consequently also no life and no orientation in the world, and for that 
reason it is different in principle from everything real and possible.”461  
That which in Schelling’s formulation is an unprethinkable facticity of 
being and its self-consciousness in the notion of God (God posited as God) 
has, in terms of a situation of orientation, a similar point of absolute 
orientation. Seen in this way, we can reflect this point in the notion of 
personhood: in comporting oneself to this absolute aspect one becomes 
what one equally is with everyone else.462 We should not understand this in 
a spatial way, but in personhood, as a potency. Schelling calls it spirit. 
“[T]hrough its unity with the ideal principle [the self] becomes spirit. 
Selfhood as such is spirit; or man is spirit as a selfish [selbstisch], 
particular being (separated from God) – precisely this connection 
constitutes personality.”463 The relation to God as spirit, reflects a two-fold 
relation to God: in its selfhood the human being is ‘particular being,’ 
separated from God; however, in the unity with God, the connection that 
constitutes personality, the human being becomes spirit. Spirit is the being-
in-God.464 Dalferth’s elaboration of the ethical implications of this is the 
idea of becoming everyone’s neighbour. Dalferth’s intention is to show an 
aspect of religious orientation as a self-formative aspect: the aspect of 
orientation that is able to articulate the self-understanding of the human 
being in the conditions of orientation. Absolute orientation not only 
establishes a basis for understanding oneself, but it also establishes the 
                                         
461 Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 153. 
462 Dalferth has explicated the idea of absolute orientation further in Dalferth, “Leben 
angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser Lebensorientierung,” 262–
266. ”Die Pointe der Orientierung an dieser Wirklichkeit des Möglichen ist, daß man 
sich in Beziehung zu ihr lebensweltlich nicht lokalisieren kann, ohne sich und alles 
andere von ihr zu unterscheiden und zugleich in einer solchen Beziehung zu ihr zu 
lokalisieren, in der auch jeder andere sich und alles andere lokalisieren kann.” Dalferth, 
“Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung,” 265. 
463 Schelling, On Human Freedom, 33. “[Die Selbstheit wird] durch ihre Einheit mit 
dem idealen Princip Geist […]. Die Selbstheit als solche ist Geist, oder der Mensch ist 
Geist als ein selbstisches, besonderes (von Gott geschiedenes) Wesen, welche 
Verbindung eben die Persönlichkeit ausmacht.” SW, VII 364. 
464 “Geist ist in Gott.” SW, VII 364. 
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decisive relation that sets one in equal relation to everyone else in terms of 
the common third. 
Through that, one becomes what one is in relation to God, by comporting oneself to 
the way God relates to oneself in an absolute, that is, not sufficiently grounded 
decision. One only becomes a subject paradoxically, that is, not through self-
determination but only through absolute heteronomy – that is, through someone, who 
is subject, who relates to oneself as subject. In short: one becomes an ‘I’ by being 
addressed and treated as a ‘you’ by an ‘I.’465 
Absolute orientation is comportment to the absolute heteronomy of 
facticity that, in such comportment, determines both oneself and one’s 
relation to everyone else. Self-determination is somehow forfeited insofar 
as the self gives itself over to its heteronomous condition. Seeing oneself in 
this perspective transforms the one seeing from being the one seeing to 
being the one seen. Regarding the person, Schelling’s notion of revelation 
comes to mind and Buchheim’s explication of an empiricism of personhood 
(chapter 7.3): a person can only be a person in the eyes of another person. 
There is a break from a fundamental feature of subjectivity in this idea of 
self-formation through revelation. It is a break from the first-person 
prerogative. The view changes from the view that one is, to the view one is 
in. Furthermore, the conditions for a first-person cosmology must be 
reformulated if we are to incorporate Dalferth’s notion of absolute 
orientation.  
If religious orientation can be said to be transformative of the human 
being in a moment of absolute orientation, then the idea of first-person 
cosmology has the objective of establishing second-person conditions. 
First-person cosmology, in which one applies orders to the world and 
locates oneself within these orders, must, in absolute orientation, be 
understood as ordering according to the conditions of absolute heteronomy. 
It is only on this basis that first-person cosmology can provide second-
person being.  
We find in Dalferth’s notion of absolute orientation a break with 
anthropocentrism, and a way that Dalferth somehow discloses a dimension 
of decentered orientation. Another way in which he does this is in his 
emphasis on the pluralism of religious orientation. Dalferth’s motivation 
for explicating the absolute aspect in the form of an absolute orientation 
                                         
465 “Denn dadurch wird man, was man im GottesVerhältnis ist, indem man sich in 
absoluter, nämlich aus nicht zureichend zu begründender Entscheidung aneignet, wie 
Gott sich zu einem verhält: nämlich als Subjekt zu einem Subjekt. Zum Subjekt wird 
man also nur paradox, nämlich gerade nicht durch eine Selbstbestimmung, sondern nur 
durch absolut Fremdbestimmung – durch nämlich, daß einer, der Subjekt ist, sich zu 
einem als Subjekt verhält. Oder kurz: Man wird zum Ich, indem man von einem 
anderen Ich als Du angesprochen und behandelt wird.” Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des 
Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser Lebensorientierung,” 265. 
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lies in his fundamental ambition to interpret and translate traditional 
problems of metaphysics into the human life-world.466 In fact, Dalferth sees 
any kind of ontology as a potential basis for orientation, or at least 
something that can be reformulated as an order of the world. Ontology can, 
however, never become an exclusive or ultimate basis for orientation. And 
that is the point, “in the horizon of absolute orientation the concrete 
pluralism of religious life-orientation is not overcome but affirmed.”467 
9.2 Living and Moving in Meaning 
Human life takes form in the way that the human being lives in the world, 
in the way that it inhabits the world. This is a basic assertion in Dalferth’s 
philosophy of religious orientation. Dalferth shows the merit of 
approaching religion as it pertains to one’s life-world. This approach is an 
attempt to understand the world as that which forms the human life, and 
hence, as a way of thinking the world from the world-relation. The world-
relation is our world-inhabitation as determined through our semantic 
engagement. We are always moving in domains insofar as we relate to our 
world and the way we employ our as-structured determinations in the 
spatial and social environment that accommodates our continious self-
formation. The problem with a notion of the world as itself a possible 
determination, is that one overlooks in what sense the world is what 
enables determination. In regard to the domain-ontological perspective we 
can say one overlooks the semantic domains in use when constructing a 
theory of the world.  
Nagel, McDowell, and Taylor all carry a Kantian heritage (that is more 
or less nurtured by an analytical tradition). Among many other insights, 
Kantian idealism reveals that when we understand, and when something is 
intelligible and meaningful for us, we think. This means that we think in 
terms of employing semantic structures in our positing of the world. What 
comes into view does so as part of a world, as worldly. As Gabriel says, 
transcendental ontology cannot be content with ‘Having the World in View.’ 
Kant provides a critical investigation of our rational capacities that enables 
us to step back, in order to have our ‘having the world in view’ in view.468 
The world is always only in view to the extent that it is in our view. We can 
                                         
466  “Das ontologische Argument hilft daher, einen Aspekt der Grammatik des 
Gottesgedankens zu verstehen, es vermag aber nicht die Wirklichkeit des Gedankens 
eines absolut Wirklichen zu sichern. Entgegen seiner Bezeichnung ist seine Funktion 
hermeneutisch-erläuternd, nicht ontologisch-begründend.” Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit 
des Möglichen, 148. 
467 Dalferth, “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung,” 266. 
468 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, xxii. 
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explore retrospectively, but only under the circumstance of employing yet 
another presupposition. 
The human world-relation expressed in the question of the world entails 
a metaphysical challenge in which one seeks to think a unity that includes 
itself. In Schelling’s over-all program, he approaches this as a unity of unity 
and difference. The metaphysical challenge lies not in the question itself 
(they never do), but in the way we expect it to be answered. Schelling’s 
Kantian agenda asserts that the world is not something we think but 
something at work when we think. Any theory that seeks to make universal 
claims makes itself blind to the presupposition that is at work in such 
claims. Ultimately, we cannot have the world as an object. We only relate 
to the world in the way we relate to determinate objects, or anything 
determinable as such. 
The question concerning the world and our relation to it is therefore a 
question even before we ask it. The world is at issue in every sense we 
have and in every sense we make. Any attempt to articulate an ultimate 
answer fails because it asks for something it can never have nor be without, 
because it concerns the very condition that places us in an intelligible world. 
In the question of the world we speak out our dependency on meaningful 
structures, on structures of orientation. 
Dalferth helps to make the human encounter with the incomprehensible 
clear. Schelling offers various expressions, most clearly providing an over-
all ontology that explains the reality of the irrational, the indeterminable, 
and the unprethinkable. Dalferth provides an understanding of religion that 
concerns the semantic conditions of human life. In the face of the 
incomprehensible, the uncontrollable, and the indeterminable, we can 
doubt what sense to make of things, and find ourselves disorientated and 
dislocated. However, as Dalferth argues, the basic task is to orientate 
oneself according to the condition that the indeterminable and the 
incomprehensible are inevitable.  
As my last point, I want to show that Schelling, with the domain-
ontology offered by Gabriel, can contribute to a further appropriation of 
Dalferth’s understanding of religious orientation by transcendence. I am 
here thinking particularly of the principle that Gabriel formulates as the 
inherent excess of every domain beyond itself as the need for another 
domain. The inherent excess in every domain is required for the benefit of 
illuminating its own structure. In principle, domains relate through their 
incompatibility and their organization (order) in different arrangements. 
However, domains are always limited and only work as limited. Likewise, 
meaning is never complete. The breakdown, or the limitation of a domain 
always requires the excess that leads to another domain. As there is no way 
of stepping outside of domains, the limits of our domains is an encounter 
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with the meaningless and incomprehensible. Any relation of domains or 
illumination of domain-structures requires another (higher-order) domain.  
This idea of an inherent ‘need for another domain’ in every domain 
pertains to the concept of transcendence that Dalferth suggests regarding 
life-orientation. Luhmannian ‘re-entry,’ which was the background for 
Dalferth’s application of transcendence, prepares Dalferth’s thought for 
making this comparison. In life-orientation, the symbolic systems of a 
religion give expression to transcendence as an articulation of that which 
combines the comprehensible with the incomprehensible. For the 
possibility of maintaining one’s life in semantic and existential coherence 
in the face of the incomprehensible, another domain is always needed. 
Symbolic structures are orders of the world, the cosmos, that one has 
available for orientation. In symbolic structures human beings interpret 
themselves in ‘other domains’. When one’s world breaks down, or is 
threatened by the incomprehensible, one seeks to cope with this from 
another domain for the sake of maintaining meaning.  
The religious articulation of transcendence can be illuminated with the 
idea of a need for another domain as the procedure for providing a 
combination of the comprehensible and the incomprehensible. While we 
can articulate this with regard to an existential matter, as is the focus in 
Dalferth, we can also identify this same movement on every other level of 
meaning. The movement beyond the domain we seek to articulate is the 
movement of transcendence. Transcendence is, in that sense, not static, but 
kinetic, in the form of the meaning-making and meaning-maintaining 
movement.  
The application of the domain-ontology illuminates Dalferth’s approach 
to religious transcendence. The principle of the ‘need for another domain’ 
explicates the kinetics of transcendence present in all meaning, as the way 
we live and move in meaning. It shows in what sense domains are finite, or 
insufficient, when life is confronted with the indeterminable (that for which 
one has no domain). Therefore, this is not absolute transcendence but a 
transcendence that pertains to our finite being and the conditions of human 
finitude: the need for another domain is always present. Religious 
orientation offers a way of dealing with our finitude in articulating and 
giving expression to that which is beyond human understanding and 
control.469 Religion provides coherence beyond the limits of the human 
being. Religion is not itself the meaning of life or the meaning achieved in 
human living. Religion is a method for maintaining meaning. In this aspect 
of religion, every criticism of religion can be said to fall back on the human 
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ed. Arne Grøn, Søren Overgaard, and Iben Damgaard (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 
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being who is religious as a critique of the meaning and self-interpretation 
that the religious human being seeks in religion. Religion, in this sense, 
provides an image of what it means to be a finite human being. Religion, as 
a matter of human conditions, provides a self-consciousness to the human 
being, a way of interpreting oneself as a finite being. 
The world of orientation is therefore a world that can respond to the 
otherness, the indeterminacy, and the uncontrollability that reflects human 
limits, the limits of human life. Religion reveals the fundamental conditions 
of human finitude as it reflects our dependence on semantic stability. In 
religion, we can explore the self-interpretation of human life and the world 
that shapes this life. Religion is self-interpretation insofar as it provides the 
domain of human existence with ‘another domain.’ Religious 
transcendence provides the illumination required for human self-
understanding because no self-transparency is possible.  
Personhood, as formulated by Schelling, designates human life on the 
conditions of the impossibility of self-transparency. We seek it in the 
notion of the world, but find that we are embedded in the world in a way 
that makes the world itself unavailable. In absolute orientation, the person 
comports itself to its condition and to the consciousness of its finitude. This 
is how personhood is a candidate for the philosophical reflection of the 
religious human being as well as the process and components entailed in 
coping with one’s human conditions in the form of religion. 
9.3 Recapitulation 
The question of the world has been the guiding question of the discussions 
of this study. The discussion pertaining to this question has served as a 
method with which to illuminate the implication of a world-relation in the 
form of embeddedness. The embeddedness of the self is at issue in the 
fundamental pursuit of human self-understanding that brings the question 
of the world to the fore.  
The reconstruction of Shelling’s notion of personhood had the specific 
aim of elucidating the possibility of thinking the world from the world-
realtion, the embeddedness, which was initially explored as first-person 
cosmology. Schelling’s ontology of freedom shows why it is that the 
conditions for speaking about the world will always overshadow the 
ambition to grasp all there is. The ambition of approaching the world in the 
form of a cosmological model misses the point of the embeddedness at play 
in the question of the world. The world can therefore always only be the 
world we have, the world as it comes into view, the world we inhabit. 
Schelling’s central point is that we inhabit the world as we are and with 
regard to our concern with, and awareness about, who we are. We are 
heteronomous and finite beings who cannot overcome the conditions of our 
embeddedness in being. For Schelling, this means that we order and 
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organize ourselves in the world according to these conditions, that is, as 
persons.  
The ontology of freedom develops through Schelling’s critique of the 
logical immanence of being that is implied in the logical concept of being. 
Judgment is the turning point and it is in the formulation of a new concept 
of judgment that Schelling develops a historical and contingent concept of 
being. The ontology of predication serves to explain how all being, as 
determinate being, takes form from an indeterminate and unprethinkable 
state of facticity and becomes part of a world in the form of an 
indeterminable presupposition that reason employs in every moment of 
thinking. Thinking is therefore always a step behind in order to illuminate 
its own presupposition. This puts the human being in a situation of 
orientation. 
Embeddeness in being is a position in being, a situatedness with which 
the human being always finds itself bound to concrete situations that 
require orientation. Fundamentally, position, as the condition of our 
predicative activity, makes all determinations – and therefore being itself – 
contingent. The meaningful life that takes form in contingent being is 
unfolded in the course of history as the world of human beings and the 
relation to determinate, contingent being, a relation that is fundamentally 
historical. The world, therefore, rests on the person and the conditions of a 
personal being. Personhood is the ontological situation in which the world 
comes into view.  
Schelling’s emphasis on the heteronomy of human life as the basis for 
the formation of personhood entails a constitutive interpersonal aspect as 
formulated in the ‘person seeking person’ dictum. As I have tried to show 
with Dalferth’s notion of absolute orientation, the self-undertanding of 
oneself as a person ultimately rests on another person in whose eyes one 
becomes a person to oneself. This is not irrelevant to the world. It is part of 
the situation in which the world comes into view. This is what Schelling 
means in writing: “the person of God, is the general law, and everything 
that happens, happens by virtue of the personality of God.”470 
Dalferth’s philosophy of orientation offers a phenomenological 
formulation of the first-person cosmology as the basis of an understanding 
of religion. Orientation is a setting that depicts the human world-relation. 
In Dalferth’s exposition of the world of orientation, the first-person 
cosmology is construed in the features of ordering and locating. However, 
there is also a decisive aspect of Dalferth’s thinking that improves the 
understanding of religion defended by Nagel. The world of orientation 
requires orientation because we experience a semantic deficit regarding 
incomprehensible and indeterminate phenomena. Proper orientation 
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provides the means for dealing with these phenomena, which, in Dalferth’s 
application of Luhmann, means combining and attaching them to the 
meaning we have in order to maintain our life-orientation. 
Dalferth’s phenomenological approach proved helpful with regard to the 
first-person cosmology. Meaningful phenomena are not entities within a 
determinate world; they are worldly. This adjectival aspect corresponds to 
an active aspect, as an active ordering, a cosmologizing. The idea of the 
adjectival understanding of the world therefore corresponds with 
Schelling’s ontology of predication. The links drawn between Schelling 
and Dalferth were further supported by Gabriel’s formalization of 
Schelling in the form of the domain-ontology. In particular, this was 
informative for the interpretation of transcendence as it pertains to religious 
orientation and as it was explicated in the idea of the inherent ‘need for 
another domain.’  
What has been established is therefore an understanding of how religion 
is a concern with the world. It is understood in this way in light of the fact 
that it is a deeply human concern. Taylor’s notion of background 
frameworks is informative for understanding the idea of orientation and for 
understanding in what sense conditions of orientation are human. 
Schelling’s notion of personhood can be seen as a forerunner for Taylor’s 
notion of framework insofar as it shows that the world comes into view on 
human terms only. This is world-inhabitation. 
9.4 Conclusions 
This study has concerned the conditions of the human being for seeking an 
understanding of the world. This has been approached in the form of a 
question of the world. From the outset, the question of the world was 
explored in relation to religion under the assumption that religion gives 
expression to a problem of relating to the world. Nagel’s notion of the 
religious temper as a disposition to ask the cosmic question confirmed this 
aspect. The question, however, further entails the aspect of an initial, 
underlying engagement with the world as the basis for the question and its 
expression as a problem. The discussion of possible answers to the cosmic 
question in the form of a first-person cosmology confirmed that the world-
relation must be understood in terms of embeddedness: the world in 
question is always someone’s world.  
As part of the world, the human being comes to question this 
participation, which is the basis of the question of the world. The question 
that pertains to religion is how religion is concerned with an understanding 
of the world. In this regard, my claim has been that 1) Religion is 
concerned with the world from a state of engagement and embeddedness of 
human life in the world. In Dalferth’s approach to religion, the human 
embeddedness in the world is treated as a phenomenological and existential 
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matter of orientation. The insight into embeddedness as a condition of 
orientation derives from the plurality of orders of orientation. Orientation is 
therefore always an engagement with the question of the world. It seeks to 
provide a proper and meaningful basis for living a human life. In this sense, 
orientation pertains to the scope of human life, which is the condition I 
designate as world-inhabitation. 
In order to address this understanding of religion, we took up the 
discussion concerning the world-relation and how embeddedness can be 
understood. In the question itself (the cosmic question as the question of 
the world), the human being is determined as a questioning, that is, 
engaged being. This was pursued with the claim that 2) The embeddedness 
of human life in the world binds the question of the world to an 
understanding of subjectivity and the human self. Selfhood is what enables 
the human being to see itself as embedded in the world, and, as such, in 
need for orientation. The question of the world reflects that the human 
being seeks determination about its relation to the world. This is already 
implied when we speak of the human being as a self. Consequently, there is 
a double aspect of the world-relation. There is a basis for understanding the 
human being in a split, a detachment of consciousness, in which the self 
determines what is set apart from the world. This split is the fundamental 
possibility of the question of the world. However, the questioning itself 
reflects more than a split of consciousness. It reflects a fundamental 
concern with the world, in which it shows that the relation to the world is 
not indifferent or unimportant. And yet the world remains indeterminable. 
The self is therefore embedded in the world in a certain way, namely, as a 
subject. In this sense, subjectivity means that the world comes into view 
from within the world, from a perspective, and correspondingly only in the 
worldliness of the determinate phenomena.  
Schelling’s notion of personhood added a more radical notion of 
embeddedness, one that takes an anthropological stance beyond a 
theoretical conception of subjectivity. This was futher supported by 
Dalferth’s elaboration on orientation as it pertains to the aspect of a human 
life-world. There is a way in which Schelling’s notion of personhood can 
be read as moving towards the implications of the life-world, but it is 
important to understand that Schelling develops this notion as part of an 
ontological program. This program was explicated through the components 
of proposition, position and personhood. 
I have further claimed that 3) Schelling’s notion of personhood provides 
a theory of the embeddedness of human life in the world that reflects the 
semantic conditions of world-orientation. In the course of the discussion on 
various models of the self-world relation, the central issue was the sense in 
which the world-relation was formative of the world. This introduced the 
question of meaning as a question underlying the world. Meaning is not 
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only the issue in an attempt to understand the world, but also in any attempt 
to understand at all. The world becomes a question of how things make 
sense to us, and of the conditions of possibility for the sense we can 
possibly make.  
In Schelling, the question of sense is incorporated into the human 
experience of finitude. The notion of finite reason marks the conditions of 
subjectivity in Schelling’s later thought. The person is placed in the 
facticity and concreteness of a historical life. The person is an agent. In a 
sense, this proves more radical than practical philosophy. Taylor’s notion 
of moral ontologies reflects similar aspects in which fundamental questions 
of qualitive distinction determines a fundamental orientation and 
inhabitation of one’s world. In Schelling, the assertion is that the person is 
an agent with regard to meaning and to the fundamental endeavor of 
making sense in its way of inhabiting the world and orienting itself in the 
world.  
The basis for a personal self-understanding and further self-formation is 
an orientation in a world that does not provide secure ground. The person is 
engaged in the world as an agent that needs to disclose the world for its 
being as an agent. In this matter, Dalferth’s notion of orientation is central. 
The turn to Dalferth, however, is not only a return to the initial question of 
religion as a concern with the world. Dalferth’s exposition on the world of 
orientation offers a phenomenological appropriation of thoughts that are 
central to Schelling. Orientation provides an understanding of human life 
on the conditions of the contingency of the world. The central distinction of 
order and location describes how the human being orients in the world, its 
world-inhabitation. Religion provides a basis for understanding this human 
world-inhabitation. Furthermore, religious orientation establishes the 
possibility, as a rational human being, of maintaining the meaningful 
structures of one’s living in the face of the meaningless and the 
indeterminable. Both Schelling and Dalferth deal with these limits in terms 
of indeterminacy, as a fundamental condition of a life that depends on 
meaning.  
Orientation, as the way of inhabiting the world, has a fundamental 
collective aspect. There is, in the world-inhabitation itself, an aspect of the 
way we constitute our social being that anchors the question of the world in 
a collective perspective. The plurality of orders provides insight into the 
conditions of our orientation. My claim, in this regard, concerns the way in 
which Schelling’s notion of personhood provides an anthropological 
characterization and structural composition for understanding what in 
religion, in terms of heteronomy, is self-forming. 4) From the perspective 
that religion reflects world-inhabitation as a matter of world-orientation, 
Schelling’s notion of personhood can be understood as absolute 
orientation. 
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I do not claim a theory of religion in Schelling’s notion of personhood. 
However, I do claim to have shown how this notion of personhood can be 
made available for contemporary philosophy of religion. I have shown a 
new direction for possible explications of Schelling’s thought. Schelling’s 
notion of personhood provides a way in which to understand the semantic 
conditions of world-orientation. This reflects how religion and selfhood can 
be understood as being tied together in a human need for transcendence in 
self-understanding. This kinetic transcendence is a procedure of 
understanding for a finite being.  
Finally, a question of broader perspective should be raised, concerning 
whether Dalferth and Schelling can be criticized on the grounds of the way 
in which the world seems to be organized around human aspects of finitude. 
To what extent does human self-understanding come to expression? Can it 
fail? I think this is a question worth discussing in regard to the many 
contemporary agendas of our technological age that have a strong trans-
humanistic belief in the ‘flourishing’ and ‘enhancement’ of human nature 
‘beyond human restraints.’471 If we should radicalize the question then one 
could ask: to what extent can a denial of human finitude be an option for 
orientation? The way many people expect that technology can find ways to 
overcome diseases, pains, physical disabilities and ultimately our age, is 
striking. I think that a denial of finitude is itself a human aspect, in which 
the conditions themselves are to be overcome. To seek to overcome one’s 
human conditions seems rather human. The common tenet of a trans-
humanistic approach to human life, in which one seeks, by means of 
modern technology, to ‘overcome’ the human conditions, seems all too 
natural. Whether it is health issues or career planning, it seems to be far 
more common to strive for a longer, better, and richer life, one beyond 
some fundamental conditions and restraints. The belief in enhancement and 
the possibility that we can one day live without pain, without sickness, and 
maybe even without dying, contributes to a way of dealing with the fact 
that we suffer from a discomfort with the meaningless and 
incomprehensible aspects of human life. I believe our understanding of 
religion can teach us what kind of ambitions we put into our conceptions of 
the world, and how we seek to comport ourselves to them. Religion can 
teach how this is what we seek to achieve in our particular way of dealing 
with our finitude as a way of dealing with it.  
I do not argue against science or scientific understandings of the world. 
That has not been my intention in this study. If anything, I have argued 
against the un-reflected conception that only science can reveal the reality 
to which the human being must comport. I have also argued that we cannot 
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make ultimate claims like the ones (too) often implied in a scientific 
orientation, or the belief that science alone will lead us to a greater or truer 
world than other forms of orientation. I do not think that any particular 
orientation can ever profit from ignorance to the plurality of orders and 
domains and the necessity of these orders. This insight should convince us 
that there is always a presupposition that has led us to where we are. To 
claim that people, e.g. people with a religious orientation (Muslims, Jews, 
Christians, etc.), are biased in their perception of the world (as opposed to 
not biased), which is often a point in public debates, is not a valid criticism 
insofar as every standpoint of criticism is itself a certain perception of the 
world. The important questions concern how we are ‘biased’ and whether 
we can live together despite sush biases. As Slavoj Zizek has argued, this is 
the real danger of atheism: to believe oneself to be unbiased, and to believe 
oneself to see the world from a neutral standpoint.472  
Taylor’s notion of framework is one of the contemporary proposals for a 
way in which to think and to orientate in ethical, religious, and ideological 
matters from an insight into the fundamental condition that presuppositions 
are always in play in our meaningful social interactions in the world. 
Taylor advances this discussion with regard to asking the central question 
of how we can come to articulate our underlying presuppositions in order 
to make them available for consideration and discussion. In this he suggests 
the terms on which our standpoint, our perception of the world, can be 
articulated in a meaningful dialogue. In Sources of the Self, he shows that 
this articulation can be reflected in our historical development, which is 
how he approaches the question of the self and its sources in ancient and 
modern society. Our perception of the world is not something we choose to 
have on an intellectual basis as Nagel has suggested. The discussion of 
subjectivity and selfhood shows our preceding engagement with the world 
in a way that throws us back on the task of understanding the world we 
have, and how we have come to understand it in this way. A central value 
of Schelling is his engagement with the facticity of sense. We may ask 
‘why there is sense and not rather nonsense?’ However, in Schelling’s 
engagement with this question, the central point of the facticity of being is 
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the unprethinkable miracle of the world and the life that we share is: that 
there is sense. 
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Summary 
This study concerns the human conditions for seeking an understanding of 
the world. The overall thesis is that human self-understanding depends on 
an ability to relate to and orient oneself in the world, which is to say that 
the human being conceives itself through the way it inhabits the world. 
This thesis pertains to an understanding of religion as a way of orienting 
oneself in the world. Understood in this way, religion not only reflects the 
human disposition to seek an understanding of the world, but also reflects a 
way of inhabiting the world on human conditions. Thus, religious 
orientation reflects the semantic conditions of human life in the way self-
understanding is mediated by the meaningful structures of the world. 
The thesis emerges within a hermeneutic-existential framework. This 
framework determines the central exposition of the anthropological thought 
of the German philosopher F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) as portrayed in 
his notion of personhood. It is my ambition to show how this notion of 
personhood reflects the embeddedness of human life in the world and to 
make this available for a contemporary philosophical discussion of religion. 
This is done by first clarifying, with contemporary thinking, how religion 
can be understood as a concern with the world and how this concern binds 
religion to the question of human selfhood. The methodological movement 
of this study consists in an examination of Schelling in light of the findings 
of preliminary discussions on contemporary standpoints (Nagel, McDowell 
and Taylor), facilitating a return to a discussion of Schelling’s potential for 
contemporary reflections on religion (Dalferth). 
In Part I, I discuss Thomas Nagel’s formulation of ‘the cosmic question’ 
as an expression of human religiosity. The discussion of possible answers 
to the cosmic question and its implications for the self-world relation 
moves on to an assessment and discussion of John McDowell’s naturalism 
of second nature and Charles Taylor’s notion of background frameworks. I 
argue that the cosmic question cannot be sufficiently answered by 
ontologies such as naturalism because these undermine the status of the 
cosmic question as an existential concern. I further argue that any theory of 
the world that is ignorant of the embeddedness of the self that is revealed in 
the cosmic question falls short of providing a satisfying answer. On the 
basis of human subjectivity, our embeddedness gets in the way of 
determining our world as ‘all there is.’ 
Against this backdrop, I initiate, in Part II, the reading of Schelling’s 
notion of personhood. With this notion Schelling designates the human 
embeddedness in being as an ontological situation that is determining for 
the formation of the world and its semantic conditions. I show in what 
sense the human being, embedded in being, is understood as a finite and 
heteronomous being. The human being is a person, which, in light of its 
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finitude and heteronomy, must form its life on the basis of the contingency 
of the world. The central contribution of this study is the application of 
Schelling’s notion of personhood to the problems characterizing the 
question of the world and its application to the notion of orientation. 
Schelling portrays embeddedness as a radical condition of contingency. 
From the perspective of personhood, a modern setting can be seen, one that 
makes clear what it means that no ultimate, objective reference is given for 
an understanding of the world, and that all references lead back to their 
ground in personal being.  
Understood in this way, Schelling’s notion of personhood provides a 
basis for understanding the intersection of religion and selfhood in religious 
orientation. In order to explore this, I consult, in Part III, the notion of 
religion provided by the German philosopher of religion Ingolf Dalferth. In 
religion, orientation is established by interpretations of living in the world 
by means of orders (cosmologizing), which enable a localization of the 
human being. Against the background of Dalferth’s notion of orientation, 
the final discussion seeks to unfold the potentials of Schelling’s notion of 
personhood in the context of Dalferth’s notion of religious orientation. In 
this regard, I seek to demonstrate how religion discloses what it means to 
pursue a meaningful life according to the conditions of human 
embeddedness in a contingent world. In particular, I seek to demonstrate 
that this is the case in Dalferth’s notion of absolute orientation.  
In conclusion I argue that religion is concerned with the world from a state 
of engagement and embeddedness of human life in the world. The 
embeddedness of human life in the world binds the question of the world to 
an understanding of subjectivity and the self. Schelling’s notion of 
personhood provides a theory of the embeddedness of human life in the 
world that reflects the semantic conditions of world-orientation. This is 
what makes Schelling available for Dalferth’s notion of religious 
orientation. From the perspective that religion reflects the human world-
inhabitation as a matter of world-orientation, Schelling’s notion of 
personhood can be understood as absolute orientation. 
  
Resumé 
Denne afhandling handler om de menneskelige betingelser for at forsøge at 
forstå verden. Den overordnede tese er, at den menneskelige selvforståelse 
afhænger af muligheden for at relatere og orientere sig i verden, hvilket vil 
sige, at mennesket begriber sig selv gennem den måde, hvorpå det er i 
verden. Denne tese svarer til en forståelse af religion som en måde, hvorpå 
mennesket orienterer sig i verden. Forstået på denne måde, afspejler 
religion ikke bare den menneskelige trang til at forstå verden, men 
yderligere menneskets væren i verden på menneskelige betingelser. Den 
religiøse orientering afspejler de semantiske betingelser for menneskets liv 
i det at selvforståelse er medieret af de verdens meningsfulde strukturer. 
Afhandlingen udfolder sig på et hermeneutisk-eksistentielt grundlag. 
Dette grundlag er afgørende for den centrale fremstilling af den tyske 
tænker F.W.J. Schellings (1775-1854) antropologiske tænkning, som det er 
kommet til udtryk gennem hans person-begreb. Det er min ambition at vise, 
hvordan dette person-begreb afspejler indlejringen af det menneskelige liv i 
verden, og at gøre dette tilgængeligt for en nutidig religionsfilosofi. Jeg gør 
dette ved først at klargøre, på et nutidigt filosofisk grundlag, hvordan 
religion kan forstås at handle om verden, og hvordan dette binder religion 
til spørgsmålet om selvet. Den metodiske bevægelse i afhandlingen består i 
en behandling af Schelling i lyset af en forudgående diskussion af nutidige 
positioner (Nagel, McDowell and Taylor), som forbereder diskussionen af 
Schellings potentiale for nutidig religionsfilosofi (Dalferth). 
I Del 1 diskuterer jeg Thomas Nagels formulering af ‘det kosmiske 
spørgsmål’ som et udtryk for menneskelig religiøsitet. Diskussionen af 
mulige besvarelser af det kosmiske spørgsmål og dets implikationer for 
forholdet mellem selvet og verden, går videre til en vurdering og 
diskussion af John McDowells liberale naturalisme og Charles Taylors 
begreb om baggrund. Jeg hævder, at det kosmiske spørgsmål ikke kan 
besvares adækvat af naturalistiske ontologier, fordi disse underminerer 
betydningen af det kosmiske spørgsmål som et eksistentielt anliggende. Jeg 
hævder ydermere, at enhver teori om verden som ikke forholder sig til 
selvets indlejring i verden – som viser sig i det kosmiske spørgsmål – 
kommer til kort i sin besvarelse. På baggrund af den menneskelige 
subjektivitet stiller vores indlejring i verden sig i vejen for en bestemmelse 
af ‘alt hvad der er.’ 
På baggrund af dette indleder jeg i Del II læsningen af Schellings 
person-begreb. Schelling betegner med dette begreb menneskets indlejring 
i væren som en ontologisk situation, som er bestemmende for 
udformningen af verden og dens semantiske betingelser. Jeg viser, i 
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hvilken betydning mennesket, som indlejret i væren, forstås som et endeligt 
og heteronomt væsen. Mennesket er en person, som i lyset af sin egen 
endelighed og heteronomi, former sit liv på basis af verdens kontingens. 
Afhandlingens centrale bidrag er en applicering af Schellings person-
begreb på de forhold, der karakteriserer spørgsmålet om verden og dets 
applicering på orienterings-begrebet. Schelling fremstiller indlejring som 
en radikal kontingens-betingelse. Set ud fra person-begrebet, viser der sig 
et moderne forhold, som gør klart, hvad det betyder, at der ikke er noget 
ultimativt, objektivt holdepunkt i forståelsen af verden og at alle 
henvisninger viser tilbage til deres grund i personlig væren. 
Forstået på denne måde, skaber Schellings person-begreb et grundlag for 
at forstå sammenstillingen af religion og selvet i religiøs orientering. For at 
undersøge dette, konsulterer jeg i Del III den tyske religionsfilosof Ingolf 
Dalferths religionsbegreb. I religion etableres orientering gennem 
fortolkninger af livet i verden ved hjælp af ordninger (kosmologiseringer), 
som for mennesket muliggør en lokalisering. På baggrund af Dalferths 
orienteringsbegreb, søger den sidste drøftelse at udfolde potentialerne i 
Schellings forestilling om individualitet i forbindelse med Dalferths begreb 
om religiøs orientering. I den forbindelse forsøger jeg at vise, hvordan 
religion beskriver, hvad det vil sige at føre et meningsfuldt liv i henhold til 
betingelserne for den menneskelige indlejring i en kontingent verden. Især 
forsøger jeg at vise, at dette er tilfældet i Dalferths forestilling om absolut 
orientering. 
Afslutningsvis hævder jeg, at religion handler om verden på baggrund af 
menneskelivets deltagelse og indlejring i verden. Denne indlejring af 
menneskets liv i verden binder spørgsmålet om verden til en forståelse af 
subjektivitet og selvet. Schellings person-begreb tilbyder en teori om 
menneskets indlejring i verden, der afspejler de semantiske betingelser for 
verdens-orientering. Det er det, der gør Schelling tilgængelig for Dalferths 
forestilling om religiøs orientering. Fra det perspektiv, at religion afspejler 
den menneskelige væren i verden som et spørgsmål om verdens-orientering, 
kan Schellings person-begreb forstås som absolut orientering. 
 
  
Bibliography 
Barbour, Ian. When Science Meets Religion. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2000. 
Barth, Ulrich. “Annäherungen an das Böse. Naturphilosophische Aspekte von 
Schellings Freiheitsschrift.” In Gott, Natur, Kunst und Geschichte. Schelling 
zwischen Identitätsphilosophie und Freiheitsschrift. Vienna: Vienna University 
Press, 2010. 
Beach, Edward. The Potencies of God(s): Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
Beiser, Frederick. German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801. 
Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Bowie, Andrew. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction. 
London; New York: Routledge, 1993. 
Buchheim, Thomas. Eins von Allem: die Selbstbescheidung des Idealismus in Schellings 
Spätphilosophie. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1992. 
———. “Grundlinien von Schellings Personbegriff.” In “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf 
einem dunklen Grunde”  : Schellings Philosophie der Personalität, p. 11-34. 
Akademie-Verlag, 2004. 
Buchheim, Thomas, and Friedrich Hermanni, eds. “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem 
dunklen Grunde”: Schellings Philosophie der Personalität. Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 2004. 
 
Cantor, Georg. Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers. 
New York: Dover Publications, 1952. 
De Caro, Mario, and David MacArthur. “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism.” In 
Naturalism in Question, edited by Mario De Caro and David MacArthur, 1-17. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
De Caro, Mario, and David MacArthur, eds. Naturalism and Normativity. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010. 
———. Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
De Caro, Mario, and Alberto Voltolini. “Is Liberal Naturalism Possible?” In Naturalism 
and Normativity, 69-86. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. 
Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1979. 
Churchland, Paul. “Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior.” 
Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 225. 
Cohen, Morris R. “Naturalism.” Edited by Robert Audi. The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Cole-Turner, Ronald, ed. Transhumanism and Transcendence. Georgetown University 
Press, 2011. 
 
Dalferth, Ingolf. “Beyond Understanding?” In Subjectivity and Transcendence, edited 
by Arne Grøn, Søren Overgaard, and Iben Damgaard. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007. 
———. Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen: hermeneutische Religionsphilosophie. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003. 
———. “Leben angesichts des Unverfügbaren. Die duale Struktur religiöser 
Lebensorientierung.” In Orientierung: philosophische Perspektiven, edited by 
Werner Stegmaier. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005. 
Bibliography 208 
Danz, Christian. “Der Gedanke der Persönlichkeit Gottes.” In “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht 
auf einem dunklen Grunde”  : Schellings Philosophie der Personalität, edited 
by Thomas Buchheim, p. 179-195. Akademie-Verlag, 2004. 
———. Die philosophische Christologie F.W.J. Schellings. Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt: 
Frommann-Holzboog, 1996. 
Davidson, Donald. “Reply to John McDowell.” In The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, 
edited by Lewis E. Hahn, 105-108. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 1999. 
Denker, Alfred. “Schelling und Aristoteles.” In Das antike Denken in der Philosophie 
Schellings, edited by Rainer Adolphi and Jörg Jantzen, 305-320. Frommann 
Holzboog, 2004. 
Denker, Alfred, and Holger Zaborowski, eds. Philosophie und Religion. Freiburg; 
München: Alber, 2008. 
Dorrien, Gary. The Making of American Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, and 
Postmodernity 1950-2005. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006. 
Drees, Willem. Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates. New York: 
Routledge, 2010. 
———. Religion, Science, and Naturalism. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
 
Fink, Hans. “Three Sorts of Naturalism.” European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 2 
(August 1, 2006): 202-221. 
Flanagan, Owen. “Varieties of Naturalism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and 
Science, edited by Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, 430-452. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Florig, Oliver. “Die ideelle Reihe der Philosophie - Philosophie und Religion als 
Versuch, menschliche Freiheit im Identitätssystem zu denken.” In Philosophie 
und Religion, edited by Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski. Freiburg; 
München: Alber, 2008. 
———. Schellings Theorie menschlicher Selbstformierung  : personale Entwicklung in 
Schellings mittlerer Philosophie. Freiburg; München: Alber, 2010. 
Frank, Manfred. Eine Einführung in Schellings Philosophie. 2. ed. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1995. 
Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of 
Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20. 
Freydberg, Bernard. Schelling’s Dialogical Freedom Essay: Provocative Philosophy 
Then and Now. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008. 
Fuhrmans, Horst. “Der Ausgangspunkt der Schellingschen Spätphilosophie.” Kant-
Studien 48, no. 1‚Äì4 (57 1956): 302-323. 
———. Schellings letzte philosophie. Die negative und positive philosophie im einsatz 
des spätidealismus. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940. 
 
Gabriel, Markus. Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift. Bonn: Univ. 
Press, 2006. 
———. Der Mensch im Mythos: Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie 
und Selbstbewusstseinsgeschichte in Schellings “Philosophie der Mythologie”. 
De Gruyter, 2006. 
———. Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism. London; 
New York: Continuum, 2009. 
———. Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism. New York: Continuum, 
2011. 
Bibliography 209 
———. “Unvordenkliches Sein und Ereignis: Der Seinsbegriff beim späten Schelling 
und beim späten Heidegger.” In Heideggers Schelling-Seminar (1927-28): die 
Protokolle von Martin Heideggers Seminar zu Schellings “Freiheitsschrift” 
(1927-28), edited by Lore Hühn, 81-112. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-
Holzboog, 2010. 
———. “Zum philosophischen Ansatz Wolfram Hogrebes.” In Die Wirklichkeit des 
Denkens, edited by Jens Halfwassen and Markus Gabriel, 79-100. Heidelberg: 
Winter, 2007. 
Gardner, Sebastian. “The Limits of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German 
Idealism.” In German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Espen 
Hammer, 19-49. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Gawlick, Günter. “Naturalismus.” Edited by Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and 
Gottfried Gabriel. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Basel: Schwabe, 
2007 1976. 
Goetz, Stewart, and Charles Taliaferro. Naturalism. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William 
B. Eerdmans Pub., 2008. 
Guyer, Paul. Kant. London: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Hardwick, Charley D. Events of Grace: Naturalism, Existentialism, and Theology. 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Wissenschaft der Logik I. Erster Teil. Die objektive 
Logik. Bd. 5. 8th ed. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986. 
Heidegger, Martin. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 79: Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge. 2nd ed. 
Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 2005. 
Hennigfeld, Jochem. “Der Mensch im absoluten System: Anthropologische Ansätze in 
der Philosophie Schellings.” In Schellings philosophische Anthropologie, 
edited by Jörg Jantzen and Peter L. Oesterreich, 1-22. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: 
Frommann-Holzboog, 2002. 
———. “Die Menschlichkeit des Absoluten.” In Philosophische Anthropologie im 19. 
Jahrhundert, edited by Friedhelm Decher and Jochem Hennigfeld, 37-50. 
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991. 
Henrich, Dieter. Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
———. “Dimensionen und Defizite einer Theorie der Subjectivität”, no. 36. 
Philosophische Rundschau (1989): 1-24. 
Hogrebe, Wolfram. Ahnung und Erkenntnis. Franfkurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996. 
———. Das Absolute. Bonn: Bouvier, 1998. 
———. Echo des Nichtwissens. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006. 
———. Mantik. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005. 
———. Prädikation und Genesis: Metaphysik als Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang 
von Schellings “Die Weltalter”. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989. 
Hutter, Axel. Geschichtliche Vernunft: die Weiterführung der Kantischen Vernunftkritik 
in der Spätphilosophie Schellings. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996. 
Hühn, Lore, and Jörg Jantzen, eds. Heideggers Schelling-Seminar (1927 28): die 
Protokolle von Martin Heideggers Seminar zu Schellings “Freiheitsschrift” 
(1927-28). Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2010. 
Höffe, Otfried, and Annemarie Pieper. Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. 
Akademie-Verlag, 1995. 
 
Janke, Wolfgang. Kritik der präzisierten Welt. Freiburg: Verlag K. Alber, 1999. 
Bibliography 210 
———. Plato: antike Theologien des Staunens. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2007. 
———. “Praecisio Mundi: Über die Abschnitte der mythisch-numinosen Welt im 
Schatten der Götzendämmerung.” In Mythos und Religion: interdisziplinäre 
Aspekte, edited by Oswald Bayer, 31-57. Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1990. 
Jantzen, Jörg, and Peter L. Oesterreich. Schellings philosophische Anthropologie. 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W 
Wood. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
———. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998. 
Kim, J. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical 
Research APA Centennial (January 1, 2003). 
Kosch, Michelle. Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. Oxford; 
New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Krell, David. The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing of God. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. 
 
Luhmann, Niklas. Die Religion der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000. 
 
Matthews, Bruce. Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of 
Freedom. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011. 
McDowell, John. Mind and World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. 
———. “Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.” In Naturalism in Question, edited by 
Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, 91-105. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2004. 
———. “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” In Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral 
Theory: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot, edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, 
Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Qiunn, 149-179. Oxford; New York: Clarendon 
Press; Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard, 1945. 
 
Nagel, Thomas. “Nietzsche’s Self-creation.” In Secular Philosophy and the Religious 
Temperament  : Essays 2002-2008, 33-40. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
———. “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.” In Secular Philosophy 
and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008, 3-18. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
———. “Subjective and Objective.” In Mortal Questions, 196-213. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
———. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
———. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” In Mortal Questions, 165-180. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
 
Papineau, David. “Naturalism”, n.d. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/. 
———. The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and 
Probability. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
Pippin, Robert. “Natural and Normative.” Daedalus (January 1, 2009). 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/daed.2009.138.3.35. 
Bibliography 211 
Plato. Plato: Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1997. 
Price, Huw, ed. “Naturalism Without Representationalism.” In Naturalism in Question, 
71-88. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
 
Randall, Jr., John Herman. “Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism.” In Naturalism and 
the Human Spirit, edited by Yervant Krikorian, 355-382. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1944. 
Ratschow, Carl H. “Religion II. Antike Und Alte Kirche.” Edited by Joachim Ritter, 
Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel. Historisches Wörterbuch Der 
Philosophie. Basel: Schwabe, 2007 1976. 
 
Sandkühler, Hans-Jörg, ed. F.W.J. Schelling. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1998. 
Schelling, F.W.J. Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie. Münchner Vorlesung WS 
1832/33 und SS 1833. Edited by Horst Fuhrmans. Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 
1972. 
———. Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated 
by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2006. 
———. System der Weltalter: Münchener Vorlesung 1827-28 in einer Nachschrift von 
Ernst von Lasaulx. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1990. 
———. Sämmtliche Werke. Edited by K.F.A. Schelling. I. Abteilung Vols. 1-10, II. 
Abteilung Vols. 1-4. Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1856. 
———. The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2007. 
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. Historical-Critical Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Mythology. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. 
Schulz, Walter. Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie 
Schellings. 2nd ed. Pfullingen: Neske, 1975. 
Scruton, Roger. Kant: A Very Short Introduction. Rev. ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
Sellars, Wilfred. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” 253-329. Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. 1. University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis, 1956. 
Sellars, Wilfrid. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In In the Space of 
Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars, 369-408. Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2007. 
Shibuya, Rie. Individualität und Selbstheit: Schellings Weg zur Selbstbildung der 
Persönlichkeit (1801-1810). Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005. 
Snow, Dale. Schelling and the End of Idealism. Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1996. 
Stegmaier, Werner. “Einleitung.” In Orientierung: philosophische Perspektiven, edited 
by Werner Stegmaier. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005. 
———. Philosophie der Orientierung. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2008. 
———. “Weltorientierung.” Edited by Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried 
Gabriel. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Basel: Schwabe, 2007 1976. 
Stone, Jerome. Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008. 
———. The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence: A Naturalist Philosophy of Religion. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. 
Bibliography 212 
———. “Varieties of Religious Naturalism.” Zygon 38, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 89-93. 
Stroud, Barry. “The Charm of Naturalism.” In Naturalism in Question, edited by Mario 
De Caro and David Macarthur, 21-35. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2004. 
Sturma, Dieter. “Person sucht Person: Schellings personalitätstheoretischer Sonderweg.” 
In “Alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem dunklen Grunde”  : Schellings 
Philosophie der Personalität, p. 55-72. Akademie-Verlag, 2004. 
———. Philosophie der Person: die Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektivität und Moralität. 
Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1997. 
———. “Präreflexive Freiheit und menschliche Selbstbestimmung.” In Über das 
Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, edited by Otfried Höffe and Annemarie 
Pieper, 149-172. 1st ed. Akademie-Verlag, 1995. 
 
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007. 
———. “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Heidegger, edited by Charles Guignon. Cambridge [England]; 
New York USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
———. “Introduction.” In Human Agency and Language, 1-12. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
———. “Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels Between Heidegger and Wittgenstein.” In 
Philosophical Arguments, 61-78. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1995. 
———. “Overcoming Epistemology.” In Philosophical Arguments, 1-19. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
———. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1989. 
———. “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments.” In Philosophical Arguments, 20-
33. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
———. “What Is Human Agency?” In Human Agency and Language, 15-44. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Theunissen, Michael. “Die Aufhebung des Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie 
Schellings.” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, no. 83 (1976): 1-29. 
———. “Schellings anthropologischer ansatz.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 
47, no. 1‚Äì3 (1965): 174-189. 
 
Welchman, Alistair, and Judith Norman, eds. The New Schelling. New York; London: 
Continuum, 2004. 
Wenz, Günther. “Das Böse und sein Grund. Zur Rezeptionsgeschichte von Schellings 
Freiheitsschrift 1809.” Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Abhandlungen., no. 
NF 137. Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften (2010). 
White, Stephen L. “Subjectivity and the Agential Perspective.” In Naturalism in 
Question, edited by Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, 201-227. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
Wieland, Wolfgang. “Die Anfänge der Philosophie Schellings und die Frage nach der 
Natur.” In Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfängen, edited by 
Manfred Frank and Kurz Gerhard, p. 406-440. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1975. 
Wieman, Henry. Man’s Ultimate Commitment. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1958. 
Bibliography 213 
———. Religious Experience and Scientific Method. New York: Macmillan, 1926. 
———. The Source of Human Good. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1946. 
Wirth, Jason. Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005. 
———. The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2003. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Logisch-philosophische 
Abhandlung. Franfkurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003. 
 
Zantwijk, Temilo van. Pan-Personalismus: Schellings transzendentale Hermeneutik der 
menschlichen Freiheit. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000. 
Zizek, Slavoj. The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters. 
London; New York: Verso, 1996. 
———. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso, 2008. 
 
